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Reconstruction of contemporary war-torn societies can lead to further dispossession 
and social exclusion, particularly through neoliberal development policies and financialized 
indebtedness. This dissertation analyses post-war reconstruction of the Jaffna District in the 
Northern Province of Sri Lanka after the end of a brutal three decade long civil war in May 
2009, through a survey and ethnographic study of one village, Pathemany and its oppressed 
caste quarter, Bharathy Veethy. Drawing on a study of Pathemany village on agrarian change 
before the war, this study addresses contemporary questions about land, rural incomes, rural 
debt and caste structure. The study evaluates reconstruction policies through analysis of 
national and regional data and reports, and scrutinizes indebtedness and new forms of 
dispossession. It situates the failure of reconstruction in Jaffna within a broader frame of 
historical changes starting in the late colonial period and the current influences of global 
economic forces including the impact of the Great Recession of 2008. 
 This work argues that reconstruction policies were an extension of a second wave of 
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka soon after the war in 2009, which accelerated the liberalization 
trajectory set by the open economy reforms starting in 1977. An extensive process of 
financialization with integration of Sri Lanka’s state and private finance with the global 
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capital markets, expansion of credit by national banks and new financial products at the rural 
level have led to predatory lending and tremendous indebtedness in the countryside. Social 
institutions and the rural economy in agriculture and fisheries are undermined as development 
emphasizes infrastructure build-out, credit expansion and self-employment schemes. 
Reconstruction-led dispossession is leading to outmigration for remittances and contributing 
to further social exclusion. Caste structure weakened by war-time displacement is 
strengthening by stealth as public silence on caste relations prevails. The vibrant history of 
producer co-operatives, including of caste-based occupations in Jaffna, is explored to provide 
an alternative vision for reconstruction. A critique of the post-conflict discourse of transition 
reframes reconstruction as a political question, with the war-torn society likely to be shaped 







 On what intellectual ground does one stand to ask questions about a war-torn society 
such as in the North and East of Sri Lanka? How do disciplinary and other frames shift the 
questions we ask about societies? And what does it mean to write about a war-torn society 
and for whom? Critical social research and the process of writing should begin with such 
questions of self-reflection. A war-torn society in particular cannot be studied through its 
current empirical reality alone, rather a longer historical perspective of the continuities and 
shifts from the pre-war, war-time and post-war periods is necessary. Furthermore, the 
questions about such a society and the character of those changes are shaped by powerful 
local and international discourses. 
My own intellectual engagement with Jaffna, the North and Sri Lanka more broadly 
started with activism and an effort to address the condition of exile. My activist interests and 
my research finally brought me back to live and write in Jaffna, and to engage in research on 
the social and economic lives of rural people. For almost ten years prior to departing on field 
research I had been writing extensively on the political issues in the public domain, 
influenced by frequent visits to the country and engagement with various actors. While my 
dissertation research and related engagement was qualitatively different, my scholarly 
concerns were shaped by my activism during the previous decade and linked to my own 
personal and familial history. 
 
From Activism to Research 
I left Jaffna in July 1983, soon after completing my primary schooling as I was about 
to turn twelve. My father’s political involvement and human rights work in Jaffna, and our 
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fortuitous travel to Japan for my father’s sabbatical from Jaffna University, changed my life 
permanently. Within days after we left the island, Colombo was burning with the pogrom of 
July 1983 and the civil war had started. My father was in self-imposed exile and many of his 
colleagues were fleeing the country as a crackdown by the state ensued. Leaving Sri Lanka at 
that tragic moment and hearing stories of the war, of deaths, of displacement and of 
assassinations, my family’s story was like many others in the Tamil community. Those 
fortunate enough to leave the country, nevertheless, struggled to find employment and 
meaningful social life in distant lands, and were haunted by the news of a place which day by 
day became distant even as it descended into the anarchy of war.  
My father’s political involvement, my two years of boarding school in India and 
travels to India during my formative years kept me engaged on developments in Sri Lanka. 
The assassination in 1985 of C. E. Anandarajan, my uncle and principal of St. Johns College 
where I had studied, then the assassination of Rajani Thiranagama in 1989, my cousin and 
neighbor, and Marxist feminist activist and co-founder of University Teachers for Human 
Rights (Jaffna) (UTHR(J)), shook our family and made me question the politics of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In subsequent years, during my late teens, I read 
two books, the Broken Palmyrah by UTHR(J) and Pudhiyathor Ulagam by Kovinthan which 
provided me a critique of Tamil nationalism and a more systematic understanding of the 
dreadful political turn taken by the armed struggle. Both works were written hurriedly amidst 
the heat of brutal conflict to alert Tamil society of the disastrous direction of Tamil 
nationalism and the armed struggle.  
I visited Colombo after a span of ten years in 1993; and I was a twenty-one-year-old 
who found it hard to connect to a city I did not know much about. However, it was during 
that visit that thanks to Ben Bavinck, a retired Dutch missionary and former teacher at the 
Jaffna College involved in humanitarian work during the war, that I was introduced to 
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UTHR(J), particularly Rajan Hoole and K. Sritharan. I travelled with all three of them to war 
devastated Trincomalee. That three-day trip and the discussions with them on their critique of 
Tamil politics initiated a collaboration that became crucial for my future activism on Sri 
Lanka.  
From 1993 to 2000, I made yearly visits to Colombo and struggled with ways of 
connecting politically with developments in Sri Lanka from the distance of Tokyo and then 
New York. My parents had moved back to Colombo in 2000, and the familial connection to 
Sri Lanka became stronger. Finally, in August 2002, during the internationalised ceasefire, I 
visited Jaffna with my mother, followed by another visit with my brother in August 2004. By 
the early 2000s, I became more and more engaged with activism from New York, through the 
co-editing of lines magazine, a quarterly social justice magazine that lasted five years and 
then co-founding the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, an international network of voluntary 
activists involved in solidarity work for eight years 
These years of activism from 2002 to the end of the war in May 2009 were intense 
and shaped me profoundly. I was essentially involved in full-time activism, even as I 
managed to maintain my engineering job in New York. In January 2006, I had to leave my 
job, and until I started my PhD in 2008, I travelled continuously to various capitals of the 
world for advocacy. That intense period of voluntary international advocacy on behalf of the 
Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, gave me an understanding of the international actors and the 
international media and how they shape the discourse on conflict, human rights, security and 
reconstruction. After the war came to an end in 2009, I began visiting Jaffna regularly during 
most summer and winter breaks, writing on emerging political and economic developments. 
My dissertation research and writing were linked to my return to Jaffna, living in the very 




Place and Time of Research 
The location of research, Jaffna, was important for me, as it was inaccessible for 
decades for many intellectuals and activists who cared deeply about the social life of the 
people in the war-torn districts. Furthermore, research also took an important place in my life, 
as I attempted to become more reflective about my own political engagement. My interest in 
political economy was two-fold. First, I wanted to understand historical changes with the war 
in relation to labor, land and capital. Second, I wanted to engage people in the countryside on 
their continuing day-to-day social and economic challenges in the post-war context. Such 
engagement was not possible in the past due to the security situation. Furthermore, the 
community of activists I belonged to were preoccupied with the war; including addressing the 
humanitarian crisis, mass human rights abuses, a constitutional political settlement, shrinking 
democratic space and the attacks on dissent. 
I fully realize that the ability to choose to return after the war and to live and work in 
the war-torn place of my childhood is a privilege. The situation of the people who had 
endured the war, particularly the subaltern classes, is of another order. The trauma of the war 
and the hardship is etched on their faces. I have all my life lived in cities, whether it is 
Colombo, Tokyo, Bangalore, Atlanta or New York. My childhood in Jaffna, in proximity to 
the town, was the closest I would come to understanding the problems of rural people. But 
my social and class origins, and my parents’ liberal views, remained distant from the 
oppressive social structures of rural Jaffna. Thus when I returned to Jaffna for my visits and 
eventually to live amidst field research and writing, I had to learn much by way of 
communicating with rural people.  
I was fortunate that I had retained my Tamil, having studied in the Tamil medium for 
my primary education. The two years in boarding school in India between the age of fourteen 
and sixteen allowed me to study Tamil and ensured my Tamil reading and writing skills were 
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intact. But it was activism during my thirties that advanced my Tamil, as I gained a mature 
political vocabulary engaging working-class diaspora forums and others in Sri Lanka. But I 
also realised and continue to realise every day that speaking the language and engaging a 
people, who inhabit rural and socially different worlds, are of a very different order. The 
world that has opened to me of engaging farmers, fisher-folk and rural workers through my 
research has been greatly rewarding.  
I continue to learn bit by bit about the challenges of dealing with the trauma of war 
and how the everyday struggles of the war affected people who inhabit rural Jaffna. I sense a 
huge gulf between the middle-class Tamils residing in Jaffna town and the neighboring 
towns, and those whose lives are shaped by village life with rural provisioning and 
production. I will not pretend to understand the wounds of those condemned to multiple bouts 
of displacement and their horrific losses of loved ones over three decades of war. I realize 
that I am barely beginning to scratch the surface of their social predicament and I am only 
attempting to understand the character of productive relations that lie underneath the changes 
that have swept through this population over the last many decades.  
This is where I am also wary of those who rush to record the trauma of the war-torn 
population. There has been a rush of writings, as if worried that the crisis in the North and 
East of Sri Lanka will flee elsewhere. But these writings come with lens imported again of 
global discourses, including of conflict, reconciliation and transitional justice. As I read about 
Biafra, and the tragedy there, written close to four decades later by writers like Chimamanda 
Adichie and Chinua Achebe, I wonder how we would look at our own Biafra three or four 
decades later. Nationalist thinking and the related social imagination lingers on, and the 
memories of war and suffering trouble people for decades. There is a need for the space of 
time to understand such suffering. The people who went through it also need time to reflect 
on what it means to them, before we rush in and try to excavate. 
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When the issue of war-time abuses are raised with ordinary people, the discourse in 
the media is initially regurgitated as that is what they assume they are expected to say. The 
people have yet to find their own vocabulary and their own terms to speak about their 
suffering. There is a significant difference, when one talks to them about their economic 
problems. Perhaps my interest in political economy, including the social and economic life of 
the survivors of the war, falls short of understanding their suffering. However, I also sense, 
how their day to day economic struggles are an entry point of engagement about their past. 
The attempts to understand their daily challenges and uncertain future are connected to how 
they see the past. 
 
Political Engagement and Research 
 In a place such as in Jaffna, particularly in the militarized post-war context, with 
tremendous surveillance on one side and polarization by nationalist local discourse on the 
other side, it is difficult for research to remain neutral. Soon after I started living in Jaffna, I 
was often invited to give talks on a range of issues from analysing the national budgets to 
critiquing economic policies in various forums. I was also invited to write in the national 
English and Tamil newspapers and magazines. This was in part due to the dearth of writings 
on political economy in Sri Lanka in recent years. While such engagement inevitably took on 
a political character, it also opened many doors to dialogue and debate with local 
intellectuals, greatly expanding my understanding of local developments and thus informing 
my research. Given that the culture of academic and public writing had deteriorated with the 
war, the opportunity to participate in discussions with intellectuals hosted by local forums 
provided many insights. 
 In this context, my two research assistants, first a young journalist, Nirosh 
Thiagarajah and then a graduate of Jaffna University, Akalya Francis-Glaim proved 
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extremely valuable. Akalya in particular, in coming from Pathemany where I had initiated my 
research was insightful about local developments and we became collaborators; writing 
articles in the Tamil press, leading reading groups for university students and graduates and 
co-teaching a course on contemporary social issues to recent graduates of St. Johns College. 
Akalya’s own political development by participating in my research project, including her 
eagerness for field research, was admirable. 
 The question that has troubled me over the last few years is the broader silence in the 
media on post-war economic issues. The overwhelming nationalist discourse, which silenced 
or twisted a number of economic and social concerns, became a challenge to begin 
conversations much less discussions about the post-war rural economy, particularly in Jaffna 
town. Political issues and the role of the military of course remained a taboo topic given the 
climate of fear until regime change in January 2015 after my field research was completed.  
On the other hand, I found a warm reception in rural Jaffna to discuss the range of social and 
economic issues, particularly among the oppressed caste communities. And I also found some 
local bureaucrats, once they had asked a number of questions about my motivation and 
background, to speak candidly about the local social and economic situation, even critiquing 
state policy, however, they all wanted to speak off the record and were reluctant to provide 
documents. I understood their careful avoidance of any attribution due to the restrictions on 
the bureaucracy from Colombo, and the strict regime under a Governor, who until January 
2015 was a military General.  
In this context, I was particularly encouraged by the genuine engagement of local 
community leaders whether they were from co-operatives, farmers’ organizations or 
community centres. Many of them had lost much during the war and wanted to see their 
communities rebuilt in some way. This dissertation owes much to the resilience and vision of 





Perhaps no person has influenced me politically and intellectually more than my 
father Santasilan Kadirgamar, who passed away while I was writing up my dissertation. The 
support that my father, my mother Sakuntala and my brother Ajayan, gave me as I turned 
increasingly towards activism and sometimes the risks it entailed, for that I am fortunate and 
grateful. It is their support and their interest in my work, whether it be activist or scholarly, 
through the decades that gave me the stability and confidence to pursue my interests without 
looking back. My partner Ramya has continuously encouraged me to stay the course and 
complete my PhD. My cousin and fellow activist Niyanthini supported my move back to Sri 
Lanka and has also helped me with the tasks of analysing data. 
Ten years ago on 12th August 2006, one of my mentors and comrades, Kethesh 
Loganathan, was assassinated. When someone is targeted and killed, and their life shortened 
for the power of their intellect, it leaves behind an irresolvable void. When confronted by 
many political questions I continue to think how Kethesh would have thought through them.  
There are so many friends and fellow activists who have influenced me over the years 
that the list is too long for me to mention here. I will only mention the various activist forums 
and intellectual circles that have sustained me and shaped me over the last two decades. 
University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), lines magazine, Sri Lanka Democracy 
Forum, South Asians Against Police Brutality, Himal Southasian magazine, Kafila, South 
Asia Solidarity Initiative, Marxist Reading Group (CUNY), Humanities Seminar on Third 
World Sovereignty and International Law, Democratising State and Society Discussion 
Group, dissenting dialogues, Collective for Economic Democratisation, REINCORP Fish 
Research Project and the Jaffna Research Group. Most of the individuals connected to such 
xiv 
 
forums in the hours, days, months and years of working, talking and debating with them have 
had a tremendous influence in the formation of my ideas. 
My education at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, has been greatly 
rewarding. It gave me the time and space to read widely and engage the world of ideas, which 
was my motivation for starting a PhD. The extensive course work with Prof. Talal Asad, 
Prof. Michael Blim, Prof. David Harvey and Prof. Gary Wilder as well as the intense 
discussions with my comrades in the Marxist Reading Group in the environment of a public 
university provided me with a strong intellectual foundation and an experience I will always 
cherish. However, completing my dissertation became more difficult as I wrote from Jaffna 
while supporting my ageing parents and amidst political developments that required my time 
and energy. I am grateful for the support of my advisor Prof. Michael Blim for reading many 
versions of my draft dissertation and encouraging me to complete my dissertation. Prof. R. S. 
Perinbanayagam, Prof. Marc Edelman, Prof. Gary Wilder and Prof. Maarten Bavinck have 
also encouraged me and readily agreed to support my dissertation. Ms. Ellen DeRiso of the 
Anthropology Department has patiently answered all my logistical queries towards 
completing my dissertation. 
Funding for dissertation fieldwork was provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for 
Anthropological Research, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant and the Social Science Research 
Council, International Dissertation Research Fellowship. My education at the Graduate 












Table of Contents 
 
Introduction              1 
Chapter 1: Post-colonial State, Capital and the Civil War       27 
Chapter 2: The Second Wave of Neoliberalism and Post-war Reconstruction   77 
Chapter 3: Financialization and Rural Debt in Pathemany     129 
Chapter 4: The Silence on Persistent Caste Relations in Jaffna    178 
Chapter 5: Cooperatives and Alternative Visions of Reconstruction    243 
Conclusion           285 






List of Figures, Tables and Maps 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1 Comparison of Sri Lanka, Emerging Markets, World Stock Market Indices    85 
Figure 2.2 EPF and Market Capitalisation of CSE        86 
Figure 2.3 Departures for Foreign Employment from Jaffna District    120 
Figure 3.1 Average Producer Prices and Retail Prices for Red Onions    140 
Figure 3.2 Monthly Incomes from Agriculture       141 
Figure 3.3 Agriculture Land Area        141 
Figure 3.4 Cultivating Share Cropping and Rental Land      142 
Figure 3.5 Expenditure – Education Costs       147 
Figure 3.6 Expenditure on Fuel and Firewood       148 
Figure 3.7 Agriculture Loans        150 
Figure 3.8 Self-employment Loans        151 
Figure 3.9 Housing Costs above Grant for House      153 
Figure 3.10 Value of Pawned Jewellery       154 
Figure 3.11 Informal Loans and Money Lenders and Relatives     155 
Figure 3.12 Comparison of Agricultural and Self-Employment Loans    157 
Figure 3.13 Types of Employment        158 
Figure 3.14 Monthly Incomes of Wage Laborers      159 
Figure 3.15 Monthly Remittances from Western Countries     160 
Figure 3.16 Monthly Remittances from Migrant Labor to Middle-East    160 




Table 1.1 IBRD Report Priorities (1951)         46 
Table 2.1 Soverign Bonds           89 
Table 2.2 Pawning Data from 2007 to 2011         91 
Table 2.3 Resources Used in Northern Province Development (2009 - 2013)     100 
Table 2.4 Jaffna District Census of Population (1871 - 2012)     102 
Table 2.5 Occupations in Jaffna District       102 
Table 2.6 Mean and Median Incomes in Select Provinces and Districts    111 
Table 2.7 Percentage Increase of Expenditure over Incomes     112 
Table 3.1 Red Onion Cultivation in Jaffna District      139 
Table 3.2 Monthly Food and Non-Food Household Expenditure Decile Group   146 
Table 3.3 Types of Loans Taken        156 
Table 4.1 Population Growth in Pathemany       193 
Table 4.2 Pathemany Distribution of Cultivated Land by Castes in 1981    195 
Table 4.3 Pathemany Dominant/Middle vs Oppressed Castes Land Ownership in 1981  196 
 
Maps 
Map 3.1  Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni       129 
Map 3.2  Atchuvely Town         130 
Map 3.3  Bharathy Veethy         135  







How does one explain a society devastated by war for three decades that continues to 
suffer seven years after the war? Was it the decisions of the victorious regime in control of 
state power, or was it the conjuncture of national and global developments that led to post-
war deterioration, or is it the inevitable predicament of survivors of protracted civil wars to 
suffer for years after the war? While increasing evidence of the failure of post-war 
reconstruction emerges in Sri Lanka, the question arises about the relationship of 
reconstruction to dispossession, including the extraction of assets and the deprival of 
livelihoods and entitlements. Is reconstruction a period of transition including with economic 
difficulties for the war-torn people as claimed by policymakers, or is transition itself a 
legitimizing and prescriptive discourse for new forms of dispossession and social exclusion?  
Dispossession, social exclusion and violence characterize Sri Lanka’s postcolonial 
history with the disenfranchisement of the Up-Country Tamils, the tea estate workers brought 
over as indentured labor from India, soon after Independence in 1949, and the periodic riots 
starting in 1956,1 particularly in Colombo and the southern districts, looting Tamil homes and 
displacing Tamils (Vittachi 1958). The early signs of the state’s brutality were evident from 
the manner in which it crushed the insurrection by rural Sinhala youth in 1971. With 
escalating ethnic repression, the pogrom of July 1983 when Colombo burned and over 2,000 
Tamils were murdered initiated a protracted civil war (Tambiah 1986). A second insurrection 
in the south between 1988 and 1990 with more brutal practices by the Sinhala youth 
attempting to grind the state to a halt, brought out the most ruthless counter-insurgency 
                                                          
1 These riots in 1956, 1958 and 1977 by Sinhala mobs, where loss of property and the displacement of thousands 
of Tamils – some of them permanently others temporarily – from their homes were early signs of the violent and 
tumultuous future of the country.     
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measures by the state, with widespread torture, abductions and disappearances by death 
squads, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of mainly Sinhala people (Hoole 2001).  
The armed struggle in the North was initiated by a number of armed groups with 
various Tamil nationalist positions, particularly after the Federal Party, the largest 
parliamentary Tamil party, took on a separatist project in 1976. The escalation of the conflict 
became a full blown civil war with Tamil armed movements gaining considerable support 
from India after the pogrom of July 1983. By 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), the most militarist of the Tamil armed movements, had wiped out all the other 
movements, assassinated the leadership of the Federal Party and carried out a purge of left 
activists, to ensure its total control over the Tamil community (Thiranagama et al. 1990). The 
LTTE’s extreme Tamil nationalist project and its fascist political culture2 of unconditional 
allegiance to its leader, V. Prabhakaran, claims that the movement was the sole representative 
of the Tamil community and its suicidal commitment towards a separate Tamil state, called 
Tamil Eelam, led to the silencing of dissent through assassinations and had a tremendous 
impact on the political possibilities for the Tamil community during the war years and 
subsequently on post-war politics and  reconstruction (Hoole 2001).  
Tamil intellectuals who could have contributed to political and economic 
revitalization after the war were either killed or forced into exile, removing them from any 
role even after the demise of the LTTE in 2009. Furthermore, many other intellectuals who 
survived the war living in Sri Lanka were willingly or unwillingly made complicit in the 
LTTE’s project, and short of public repudiation of their past positions, they are unable to 
chart a different path for political work and scholarship. The predicament of the Tamil 
                                                          
2 Tamil dissent critical of Tamil nationalism, such as the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum of which I was a member 
and the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) have characterized the LTTE as a movement with a 
fascist political culture. In other words, that its practices of naming those who do not agree with it as traitors, 
and attacking if not assassinating them, as well as its attacks on other minorities including the ethnic cleansing 
of the Northern Muslim population are reflective of a political project, the culmination of which would have 
ended in a fascist state.  
3 
 
community, including the lack of engagement by its political leadership and intelligentsia 
with respect to issues such as post-war reconstruction, is constrained by the legacy of the 
LTTE and requires a public debate within the Tamil community on the LTTE’s politics and 
separatist project.3 
The protracted civil war in the North and East led to longer and multiple bouts of 
displacement sometimes spanning decades, periodic and unpredictable bombings, mass 
disappearances, massacres and counter-massacres of civilians by the state and the armed 
Tamil formations was a time of tremendous misery for the civilian population. The 
cataclysmic end to the war in May 2009, on a small strip of land on the eastern coast of the 
Vanni, the districts in the mainland south of the Jaffna peninsula consisting of forest and 
agricultural lands, with the Tamil civilians held hostage by the LTTE and mercilessly 
bombed by the Sri Lanka military had put a few hundred thousand people through the worst 
experiences of war in any part of the world.4  
The communities that survived this devastating long war, mustering all their courage 
and strength, are now giving up. If during the war their survival instincts and hope that the 
guns will become silent kept some social cohesion, in the post-war years only a directionless 
dark future stares at them.  
                                                          
3 It is not that there was no forewarning of the LTTE’s politics and its disastrous course and the need for a 
different politics after the LTTE’s demise. The authors of Broken Palmyrah belonging to the University 
Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), were prophetic two decades earlier in 1989, and it is for the publication of 
this book and the analysis below that Marxist Feminist Dr. Rajani Thiranagama was assassinated by the LTTE 
in 1989: 
“It was now the end of an era. A struggle that had, in its dawn, been fired by several noble ideals, and called 
forth courage and much sacrifice from young persons irrespective of group, had now reached a point where the 
community was powerless and voiceless. How long could a military force that claimed to represent them retain 
any degree of real autonomy with such a weak base?” (Thiranagama et al. 1990, 184) 
 “The Tigers’ history, their theoretical vacuum, lack of political creativity, intolerance and fanatical dedication 
will be the ultimate cause of their own break up. The legendary Tigers will go to their demise with their legends 
smeared with the blood and tears of victims of their own misdoings. A new Tiger will not emerge from their 
ashes. Only by breaking with this whole history and its dominant ideology, can a new liberating outlook be 
born.” (Thiranagama et al. 1990, 367)  
4 Estimates vary on the number of civilians killed during the various insurrections and phases of the war. UN 
Sources estimated forty thousand people dead during the final phase of the war, others put it much higher, while 
the Government claimed much lower figures. I avoid citing numbers of those killed for the most part, as 
research on it is a project in itself. 
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The backdrop to this social crisis is also the state’s repressive militarization and 
dispossessing development policies as well as the bankruptcy of the Tamil political 
leadership in the post-war years. Political leadership and engagement with the war-torn 
people to provide them a vision for post-war restoration is lacking. The reconstruction of the 
war devastated economy is mired in problems. Rural livelihoods remain precarious, incomes 
fall far below expenditure and employment opportunities are minimal. Social institutions 
such as co-operatives, farmers organizations and co-operatives have not been rejuvenated, 
communities lack cohesion and individuals are left to suffer on their own. 
Within a few years after the end of the war, household assets were further depleted. 
Families are torn apart as there are no assets to hold them together and there is no way out of 
the widespread indebtedness. Women have to increasingly take up the economic burden. The 
vulnerability of girls and women is related to their economic marginalization. The youth 
don’t have the routine of work. Day wage work is irregular. These developments reflect 
social and economic disorder. 
Caste structures disrupted by displacement for years are strengthening. The 
demographic changes with the war and migration have led to an increase in the relative 
population of the oppressed castes, but socially and economically they are powerless with 
landlessness and lack of social mobility, including access to decent work. The mobilizations 
against caste exclusion were silenced during the war in the name of the Tamil nationalist 
struggle. The silencing of public discussions on caste oppression continues. 
In the north new forms of social exclusion and oppression of minorities continue. The 
Muslim community ethnically cleansed from the North in 1990 by the LTTE finds it hard to 
resettle and receives little support from the Tamil bureaucracy in Jaffna. A significant section 
of the population in the Vanni districts consists of Up-Country Tamils from the tea 
plantations displaced by riots from the 1950s into the 1980s. They form a large section of the 
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oppressed caste landless labor exploited in the Vanni, even as their belonging in the region 
and even their citizenship in the country had remained uncertain for decades.5 
In this context, what is the role of the state and the donor agencies in reconstruction? 
Is it a return to prewar social relations or construction of a new and in fact a troubling social 
order that is the consequence of post-war development policies? For those troubled by the 
recent economic changes these are questions about the agency of powerful actors and the 
paths not taken. These developments also raise questions about internal differentiation of the 
war-torn population and its institutions, particularly of caste exclusion and the post-war 
character of temples, schools, community centers and co-operatives. The social and economic 
life of these long suffering people provide important lessons for Sri Lankan society to 
consider and for other regions devastated by protracted war. 
My central argument is that reconstruction in Jaffna and the north more broadly has 
led to further dispossession and social exclusion. There are three causes that set the path of 
reconstruction and the misery readily apparent in the war-torn regions: first, the historical 
trajectory of post-colonial state formation and capital in Sri Lanka; second, the contingent 
factors of an authoritarian regime at the helm of a militarized state at the end of the war; and 
third, global forces characterized by market-oriented donor regimes and the increasing flows 
of global finance capital following the Great Recession of 2008. These factors initiated a 
second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka characterized by an extensive process of 
financialization, where integration with the global capital markets and transformation of 
credit at the rural level are creating new mechanisms of financial accumulation and a state 
focused on urbanization and infrastructure development that increasingly places the 
                                                          
5 The predicament of the returning Northern Muslims is central to my activist work in Jaffna. I have written 
about them in media; see for example, ‘The Other Oppressed Minority’ (Kadirgamar 2014). Similarly, the Up-
Country Tamils in the Vanni are another minority that I am hoping to work with in the near future. The social 
standing of both these communities, long excluded by the Tamil middle classes, will determine the plural and 
democratic future of society in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 
6 
 
responsibilities and risks of economic activities on individuals. The reconstruction policies to 
address the war-devastated regions are embedded in this second wave of neoliberalism with 
tremendous expansion of credit, infrastructure for market connectivity and efforts to revive 
incomes and livelihoods through individualized self-employment schemes. The effects of 
reconstruction policies have been tremendous indebtedness that creates a new circuit of 
accumulation with financialization linked to global finance capital siphoning rural assets and 
even the remittances of migrant labor in the Middle East. Reconstruction-led dispossession 
puts new pressures on rural provisioning and livelihoods, and changes the workings of social 
institutions and caste relations. Furthermore, caste relations weakened by war-time 
displacement is strengthening with the return to caste wards in villages, and this process of 
caste exclusion is reinforced by the dispossessing dynamics of reconstruction policies. A 
critique of reconstruction can draw from the legacy and potential of co-operatives in Jaffna. 
And in the face of silence on the crisis of this war-torn society, avenues of reviving the 
politics of struggle and resistance become the urgent task.   
Through such an analysis, I address the problematic path of reconstruction 
characterized by dispossession and social exclusion. The silence on the widely felt 
indebtedness in the war-torn countryside reflects the hegemonic power of international and 
national discourses of post-conflict development. Furthermore, the silence on caste exclusion 
reinforced by Tamil nationalist opinion makers contributes to the persistence and 
strengthening of caste oppression through stealth under the rebuilding of social institutions. 
The dearth of critical perspectives on development and a progressive vision for reconstruction 
have also undermined the search for alternatives. The vibrancy of co-operatives in Jaffna 
before the war provides some possibilities for reconstructing the war-torn society in an 
equitable direction. Finally, I address the importance of resistance including against caste 




Global Frames of Research 
Beneath the seeming isolation of three decades of civil war, flows of people, arms, 
finances and political discourses connected through the humanitarian circuit and the diaspora, 
internationalized the devastated region of the north and east of Sri Lanka. And before the 
war, centuries of colonial domination successively by the Portuguese, Dutch and British had 
transformed the landscape. This transformation brought about by colonial rule including 
modern state institutions and a modern economy linked through the market and forms of 
capital accumulation had determined the social relations of this post-colonial society.  
Global forces are significant in determining developments in Sri Lanka. However, the 
global discourses of development, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, rule of law 
and constitutional reform downplay how global forces shape the problems of this island. 
Research and scholarship have also been shaped by such biases that attempt to look at 
problems within the nation-state framework. In other words, it is assumed that international 
engagement and frameworks only contribute to alleviating national problems and that they 
will not aggravate or create new problems. In reality, such global discourses often seek to 
integrate Sri Lanka into an unequal international order, whether it be a liberalized economy 
for the accumulation of global capital or the repressive stability and legal regimes promoted 
by imperial geopolitical interests, for example the “war on terror.” 
This was not always the case. Earlier generations of intellectuals in Sri Lanka 
influenced by leftist movements had an internationalist perspective of both anti-imperialism 
and anti-colonialism. Similarly, researchers influenced by Marxist political economy and 
historiography contextualized problems in relation to global developments. Their analysis 
was shaped by grounded and committed engagement towards social change, which in the 
process recognized the constraints by global forces. In other words, critical social research of 
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that era did not merely import global frames of analysis including the Marxist variety and 
impose it on Sri Lanka, but evolved their analyses to understand global forces through 
engagement with the concrete situation in Sri Lanka. 
Postcolonial state formation involved debating and negotiating the different strands of 
nationalist forces that were consolidating after Independence. In Sri Lanka, state formation 
and its relationship to its various minorities became central to what is popularly known as the 
national question. The decade following Independence, beginning with the 
disenfranchisement of the Up-country Tamils and culminating in the Sinhala Only Act of 
1956, led to the framing of the national question around concrete issues of language, land, 
devolution of administrative powers and citizenship of Up-country Tamils (Hewage and 
Kadirgamar 2008). While Sri Lankan scholarship addressed the national question in historical 
and concrete terms culminating in the devolution debate of the 1990s (Siriwardena1996), 
international engagement and donor-funded research eventually limited the debate to 
concerns of contemporary liberal constitution making with an emphasis on comparative 
work. 
In Sri Lanka, where caste agitations had begun during the period of decolonization it 
is only during the brief period of the 1960s to the 1970s in Jaffna that major anti-caste 
struggles took place (Senthivel 2009). While caste has been an important determinant of 
social structure both within the Sinhala and Tamil communities, its workings have been 
different from that in India. Unlike in India, there are no caste censuses and for that matter 
any form of affirmative action. In recent decades, caste identities are not even spoken of 
publicly in Jaffna and caste exclusion continues by stealth, particularly with landlessness and 
inequitable land ownership, subtle segregation in education and discrimination in 
employment. While in India, major anti-caste struggles and the construction of a “Dalit” 
identity to unite the untouchable castes has been central to resistance, in places like Jaffna 
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such a political identity has not been consolidated. Therefore, some of the activists in Jaffna 
draw on the concept of “oppressed castes” constructed during the anti-caste struggles in the 
late 1960s (Senthivel 2009). The “oppressed castes” in Jaffna consist of the untouchable 
castes, and the political relevance of this term, is the emphasis on their caste position as a 
consequence of oppression that requires resistance. While there is much that research on caste 
in Jaffna can draw from the scholarship on caste in India and more recently the Western 
academy, there is need for extensive research on caste in Sri Lanka that can in turn inform 
international scholarship and debates on caste. The silence on caste oppression and subtleness 
of its workings in Jaffna, reflect new mechanisms of caste oppression. Furthermore, new 
methodologies for studying caste oppression can also be developed contributing to social 
science research on contemporary forms of social exclusion. 
By the mid-1970s, despite Sri Lanka’s low per capita income, it was internationally 
considered a model for its high human development indicators and relatively equitable 
distribution of wealth. Sri Lanka was the first country in Asia to implement universal adult 
franchise in the early 1930s and this contributed to policies of free education and health 
starting in the 1940s, and eventually a social welfare state and progressive social 
development. However, the legacy of this social welfare state strengthened by an import 
substitution regime for close to two decades and the challenges posed to it by the global 
economic downturn in the 1970s are rarely discussed in contemporary analysis of the war and 
its aftermath in Sri Lanka. 
Ironically, it is with liberalization in the late 1970s commonly known as the “open 
economy” reforms in Sri Lanka, that research was narrowed and the boundaries of analyzing 
the economic problems were circumscribed by framing questions within the nation-state. 
Undoubtedly, neoliberalism, both as an ideology and through its processes including the 
shaping of discourses, has had its impact in narrowing the questions of research. One aspect 
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of this reduction is the lack of attention to global developments and a focus on prescriptive 
solutions within the terms set by a liberalized economy. The problems with the contemporary 
economy in Sri Lanka are not analyzed by critically scrutinizing the turn towards 
liberalization, rather, it is claimed to be one of the war having contributed to a major lost 
opportunity towards high growth and development (Kelegama 2006). Thus the war cast a 
form of amnesia over social research and strengthened the deployment of neoliberal solutions 
at the cost of grounded specific analysis. 
Following the “open economy” reforms of 1977, there were a number of Marxist and 
other scholars who analyzed it as emblematic of a structural adjustment program as it came to 
be known later. The brazen attitude of the regime that brought about liberalization, where 
President J. R. Jayawardena famously stated, “Let the robber barons come!”—necessarily led 
to critical analyses (Kelegama 2006, 52). However, few analysts have used neoliberalism as 
the frame of analysis of economic reforms in Sri Lanka. The lack of scholarship on 
neoliberalism including both Sri Lanka’s relationship to neoliberal globalization and the 
dearth of comparative analysis of the workings of neoliberal capitalism in similar contexts 
have muted scholarly critiques of the problematic economic development trajectory in Sri 
Lanka. 
I draw on the works of David Harvey, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Loïc 
Wacquant, Jayati Ghosh, and C. P. Chandrasekar6 among  others to frame the economic 
trajectory in Sri Lanka as one shaped by neoliberal globalization (Harvey 2003, Harvey 2005, 
Duménil and Lévy 2011, Wacquant 2012). In particular, I claim that finance capital and 
financialization are central to this economic transformation from a country with a strong 
social welfare state and equitable distribution of wealth to one with dispossession of 
                                                          
6 See regular interventions by Jayati Ghosh and C.P. Chandrasekhar on financialization in India through a series 
of articles: http://www.macroscan.org/   
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entitlements and livelihoods and increasing inequalities. Furthermore, this process has 
featured authoritarian regimes that often crush labor and peoples movements resisting these 
economic developments. 
Critical scholarship on the political economy of Sri Lanka was diverted by the mid-
nineteen eighties, as intellectuals shifted their attention to the civil war. When the concept of 
ethnicity was introduced in the late 1970s and into early 1980s, by the Social Scientists 
Association to complicate the political economic narratives that could not provide a fuller 
analysis of the social and political changes, it was a productive turn (Social Scientists 
Association 1984). There was also extensive historical and anthropological work on Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism, including the nationalist ideologies and institutions that shaped modern 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988, Seneviratne 1999). However, the 
concern for ethnicity soon replaced all others, as it became linked to donor funded research 
and internationalized discourses of conflict and peace, and drastically altered the 
development of scholarship on Sri Lanka.  
The internationalized Norwegian Peace Process of 2002 – 2005, and the funds that 
came in with it, led to research and programs on conflict resolution and peace building 
supported by international NGOs and Western academies. Similarly, models of federalism 
and state reform from the West, alien to the long-standing debate on the national question in 
Sri Lanka, were imported and proliferated through workshops in Colombo. By the early 
2000s, for some youth, a job in a NGO and diplomas in human rights, peace and conflict 
studies, became tied to depoliticized job aspirations. In the meantime, the problems of state, 
society and war were reduced to questions of ethnicity and the once strong tradition in 
political economic analysis became non-existent in Sri Lanka. This predicament of research 
and scholarship has continued in the post-war era. The horrific end to the war froze the 
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debates on Sri Lanka as a place of unresolved ethnic conflict within a militarized Sinhala 
Buddhist regime.  
The Rajapaksa regime attempted to shift the domestic discourse to one about 
economic transformation and prosperity through development. This development push 
worked well with militarization, as development and security were merged, with the military 
as the so-called “war heroes” given some supervision over development. And Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalist mobilizations, including repression of minorities and xenophobic 
rhetoric and campaigns, became the cover and diversion when development related 
dispossession led to social protests. In this political landscape, challenging militarization as 
well as Sinhala Buddhist nationalist and majoritarian politics has been important. 
Furthermore, the less engaged topics of self-criticism and a critique of Tamil nationalism has 
been a central challenge within the Tamil community. However, contemporary research and 
scholarship has remained silent on issues of class and a much needed political economic 
critique of neoliberal development. Moreover, an assessment and serious critique of 
problematic reconstruction policies in the war-torn North and East has been lacking.  
The global frame of understanding civil wars and post-war Third World societies, is 
also dominant in the scholarship on Sri Lanka, with an emphasis on transitional justice, 
constitution-making and the rule of law (Arthur 2009). This legal frame of understanding 
state, society and post-war developments displaces questions about class, caste, gender and 
labor. It is assumed that building a strong legal foundation, including a new constitution and 
an impartial criminal justice system, will address the grievances that have torn apart Sri 
Lanka (Arulingam and Kadirgamar 2016). This legal frame is extended and is complicit in 
the building of a market-oriented property regime, restructuring the once strong labor laws 




Research on Reconstruction 
I step outside the received frame of the war in Sri Lanka, which substitutes the 
political economy of the North and East before, during and after the war, and employs instead 
a narrative of ethnic conflict. Questions about how communities and certain institutions 
survived the war relate in part to the social and economic ground before the war. Therefore, I 
want to distinguish between the continuities in the war-torn regions despite the war-time 
destruction and the political economic shifts with the war. 
In this context, what is the economic future of the war-torn population in the North? 
Where does their incomes come from? To what degree are their fates tied to agriculture, the 
state sector, and foreign remittances? And how important is land as an asset? However, such 
research proved to be a challenge, as research on land and agriculture in Sri Lanka, which 
was vibrant in the 1970s and into the 1980s, had come to a standstill with the war. 
My research on rural incomes and debt draws on field research in Pathemany, a 
village near the small town of Atchuvely in Jaffna. I decided to study this village, because it 
was the only case study in Northern Sri Lanka in one of the most extensive research projects 
on agrarian change conducted from 1980 to 1982 by the Social Scientists Association. The 
principal researcher of the project, Newton Gunasinghe,7 claimed the many village studies in 
Sri Lanka, “do not make a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the socio-
economic processes at work in our countryside” (Gunasinghe 1985, vii). They showed that 
anthropological thinking and research on rural communities and village studies require 
analysis of broader national and international political economic processes. My field study of 
Pathemany after the war, is an attempt to ground my own research in relation to a research 
effort at a crucial historical moment before the war.  
                                                          
7 He was one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent Marxist social scientists and introduced many of the Marxist 
debates in the 1970s as well as the works of Gramsci and Althusser into the Sri Lankan scholarship. I have been 
greatly influenced by his work and theoretical orientation. 
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I began my field research, even as most households had returned to their livelihood 
activities, which they had been practicing before the war, and where possible during the war. 
In Jaffna, that meant mainly cash crop cultivation particularly in what is referred to as the red 
soil belt in the fertile northern area of the peninsula and to a lesser extent paddy cultivation 
on the periphery of the peninsula. Small holder agriculture for the landed castes and fishing 
for the coastal communities consisting of the fisher castes are the main forms of rural 
livelihoods. There is also the large population of landless labor, mainly from the oppressed 
castes dependent on wage labor when it is available. Others are involved in cottage industries, 
work relating to palm trees, masons in construction, transporting produce and government 
jobs including in administration, education and healthcare.  
The significant challenge to my research was that the post-war economy was in flux 
and I was always behind fast changing developments. When I conceived my research project 
in 2010 and 2011, I was interested in the revival of agriculture and rural incomes as they 
emerged with reconstruction. Six months into field research and by early 2013, I found that 
post-war indebtedness had become the crucial issue. I learned that the other side to household 
assets was household debt, and that payments on loans were a drain on household incomes, 
and when such debt deepened, it depleted household assets. Dispossession through policies of 
financialization became my preoccupation as the problems of reconstruction became more 
and more apparent. 
While most people in Jaffna were conscious of this crisis of indebtedness, few spoke 
about it in public. And even when some opinion makers in Jaffna began articulating worries 
about rising indebtedness, the policymakers and other actors in Colombo did not 
acknowledge the problem. There are difficulties of recognizing debt and even more analyzing 
its dynamics. First, debt is not limited to the flows of incomes, but relates to the stock of 
assets and is accumulated over time. Second, debt has cascading effects, where debt can be 
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leveraged to get more debt, and additionally, more debt can hide previous debt. Like the 
leveraged derivatives in financial markets, rural debt is also hidden during a period of easy 
credit until a crisis hits.   
Even as the local economy is in crisis in recent years, class, gender and caste relations 
are changing in the post-war years with migration and ties to the now strong Tamil diaspora. 
The middle and lower-middle classes particularly in the towns in Jaffna peninsula see the 
future of their next generation to be linked to the Tamil diaspora in the West. Households 
prefer that young women marry men in the West. While migration to the West has become 
difficult with tightening immigration policies, increasing numbers of youth from all sectors of 
society go for temporary work in the Middle East bringing in regular remittances to sustain 
their families. 
There are a large number of households led by women with dependents – including 
children, the elderly or the disabled – placing a heavy social burden on women. Their 
predicament often depends on wage labor and NGO livelihood initiatives, both of which are 
inadequate. Though their plight is acknowledged by all quarters, the causes are not 
sufficiently addressed by mainstream analysis. Women’s work in cottage industries prior to 
the war has not resumed as the local markets for their goods are flooded with cheap imports. 
Furthermore, new microfinance schemes targeting women have proliferated in the post-war 
years leading to further indebtedness. 
Caste oppression is taking on new dynamics extending beyond the relationship to 
land. There is increasing caste exclusion and discrimination in education and job 
opportunities in the post-war years, which in part due to their subtle character are continuing 
without contestation. Oppressed caste children are segregated into schools falling apart and 
the economic possibilities for those households diminish as they are thrown further into 
downward cycles of poverty. There are changes to the workings and make-up of social 
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institutions such as temples, schools and community centers that further reinforces forms of 
caste exclusion. The temples were the sites of major anti-caste struggles in the 1960s, but 
such conflicts over temples seem to have receded into the background with each caste 
investing more and more into its own temples.  
These changes to class, gender and caste, reflect the broader reconfiguration of social 
relations in the post-war era, and are tied to both the consequences of the war and the path of 
reconstruction in recent years. These changes are also linked to changes in the global 
economy and the policies proposed by international agencies and donors. Dispossession and 




 I employ a variety of methods for my inquiry with historical, qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. My research was grounded in a field study of one village, 
Pathemany, and its oppressed caste ward, Bharathy Veethy, in Jaffna. I also interviewed 
many officials in the Jaffna District. Furthermore, I examined many reports by the 
government and international agencies on reconstruction in Jaffna that were not in public 
circulation. Finally, I also analyzed published government data including the census and 
surveys carried out in Jaffna and the North after many decades.  
My field study in Pathemany village and Bharathy Veethy ward draw on an earlier 
research project between 1980 and 1982. Pathemany has its own unique history. Its proximity 
to Atchuvely town and one of the main bus routes in Jaffna peninsula make it less isolated 
than other villages. Educational, health and state institutions and services are easily 
accessible. Its caste demographics are different from the average village, with a relatively 
large oppressed caste population. Pathemany, like many other villages in Jaffna, went 
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through considerable change with the cash crop boom and the anti-caste struggles in the 
1960s and 1970s. It has also gone through drastic changes with war, displacement and 
migration. My field research analyzes the rural economic life and the social institutions in 
Bharathy Veethy and to an extent Pathemany with close to its seven hundred households.  
 My field research consisted of a quantitative survey, interviews linked to a 
questionnaire and ethnographic research. The questionnaires and surveys were carried out 
through snowball and convenience methods relying on the contacts that my research assistant 
and I had in the village, and therefore they cannot be considered a complete representation of 
the village. The questionnaire was carried out on 10% of the households in Pathemany village 
and the survey was carried out on 25% of the households in Bharathy Veethy oppressed caste 
ward. The purpose of the quantitative aspects of my field research were to generate questions 
and trends that could be explored along-side government data. The data from my survey is 
corroborated with data from the Census and Statistics Department, the Central Bank, the 
Finance Ministry and the District Secretariats. It should be noted, that historical data from the 
government and other sources for Jaffna District and Northern Province were limited by the 
difficulties of access during the war.  
Next, the decades of displacement, return and migration have also made the task of 
collecting accurate data difficult, particularly given that I undertook field research just three 
years after the war and when the process of resettlement was ongoing. Furthermore, the 
continuing militarization and surveillance during the period of my field research deterred 
many villagers and officials from participating in my research or speaking candidly on a 
number of issues. Indeed, a similar research conducted in the same place, five or ten years 
later may provide more accurate findings and evidence of the state of rural economy and 
social relations, both due to the stabilization of rural social and productive relations after the 
18 
 
war and the openness that is emerging with democratization after regime change, including 
the confidence people are gaining year by year after the war to express their concerns.  
There were some issues that were either taboo or self-censored by most people in 
post-war Jaffna for various reasons. War-time mortality, abuses and the role of the military 
were subjects people avoided discussing due to the climate of fear. Historically articulated 
caste identities have derogatory connotations and are rarely mentioned in Jaffna in recent 
times. Furthermore, there is widespread reluctance to discuss caste relations in public. 
Therefore, I had to analyze caste, without explicitly referring to it many interviews, and 
particularly my questionnaire and survey.   
 Unless otherwise specified, the Sri Lanka Rupee to US Dollar exchange rate 
conversion used in the dissertation is Rs. 130 = US$ 1. That is a good estimate of the 
exchange rate during the years of my field research between 2012 and 2014.  
 
Theorization and Implications of Research 
My theoretical orientation comes from Marxist political economy, both from the 
works of Marx and subsequent debates among Marxists. These debates on the state, 
imperialism, the peasantry and in recent decades about neoliberalism are central to my 
scholarly interests (Arrighi 1994, Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2012, Harvey 2005). I also draw 
from a historical perspective in understanding the various global conjunctures, such as the 
end of the Second World War, decolonization, the economic downturn in the 1970s and the 
Great Recession of 2008, including how they have shaped the political economy of Sri 
Lanka. 
I draw on the distinction Marx makes between regime and state in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx 2004). While the conceptual distinction between 
government and state is more apparent, in countries like Sri Lanka where there are large 
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coalition governments of a wide spectrum of political parties, state power is concentrated in a 
ruling group.8 In Sri Lanka, such regimes were able to consolidate even more power with the 
initiation of the executive presidency in 1978, where one individual was elected with 
considerable power. I argue that regimes with their particular characteristics and social bases 
have considerable influence on the manner in which state power gets deployed and the 
consolidation of the political and economic trajectory of the country. Therefore, issues 
ranging from economic development policies to support for nationalist majoritarian 
mobilizations are determined by the politics of such regimes. 
I argue, post-war reconstruction in war-torn Sri Lanka, despite its many apparent 
problems, is legitimized through the discourse of transition. The discourse of transition makes 
unwarranted parallels with other situations, for example that Sri Lanka can transition onto a 
Malaysian model of development (Biller and Nabi, 2013), and justifies economic harm as 
part of the cost of advancing the path of capitalist development (Sanyal 2007). While there 
has been considerable scholarly scrutiny of the concept of transition as it is deployed in 
transitional justice mechanisms relating to accountability and constitutional issues, critiques 
of economic transitions, particularly as they are articulated for post-conflict reconstruction 
are wanting (Paige 2009, Guilhot 2002). I critique the legitimizing and prescriptive character 
of the discourse of transition in order to address the silence on the failure of post-war 
reconstruction. 
                                                          
8 Michal Kalecki put forward a theory on the consequences of the weakness of the bourgeoisie in the Third 
World by analysing the relationship of different classes which seem to come together to control state power 
(Kalecki 1972). This theory of Kalecki on intermediate regimes stimulated a vibrant debate in Sri Lanka, by 
scholars such as Amita Shastri, Newton Gunasinghe, Sunil Bastian and Jayadeva Uyangoda (Shastri 1983a). 
This debate also sought to explain the prominence given to the rural economy by successive regimes, the 
emergence of robust welfare policies and the implementation of import substitution policies in Sri Lanka 
between 1956 and 1977. However, it is my view, that this debate did not place adequate importance on the role 
of external forces, particularly, global political economy including global capital and market forces that affected 
the sustainability of the economic policies during the import substitution decades. My discussions with 
Thushara Hewage have shaped my ideas on this important debate in Sri Lanka (Hewage and Kadirgamar 2008). 
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I draw on David Harvey’s broader definition of dispossession to include both the 
extraction of assets including land and the deprival of livelihoods and entitlements (Harvey 
2005). Other scholars have argued for a more restrictive understanding of dispossession, 
particularly the importance of coercion and the appropriation of land (Levien 2013). 
However, I find a broader definition of dispossession to be relevant for analysis of neoliberal 
development and reconstruction. For example, dispossession in post-war Jaffna is systemic 
including through financialized indebtedness, neglect of the rural economy and diminishing 
entitlements. While there are instances of targeted take-over of land for example by the 
military, however, the broader economic harm on rural people in Jaffna comes from multiple 
dynamics and processes. Next, dispossession is not limited to the take-over of land. 
Contemporary forms of dispossession in Jaffna include pawning that has led to extraction of 
rural people’s liquid assets in the form of gold jewelry and the failure of reconstruction has 
led fisher folk and farmers to abandon their way of life. 
The consequences of dispossession I argue are often social exclusion, both through 
targeted measures such as the denial of infrastructure and entitlements and systemic processes 
of exclusion from participation in social and economic life. I find the Amartya Sen’s 
articulation of social exclusion as active and passive forms to be helpful for my research (Sen 
2000). In post-war Jaffna, caste exclusion is aggravated by both rural economic dynamics and 
oppressive caste relations: the rural economic crisis including widespread indebtedness has a 
disproportionate impact on marginalized oppressed caste communities and reinforces their 
social exclusion; and the discriminatory actions of officials towards oppressed caste wards 
and refusal of upper caste people to sell land to the oppressed caste people, leads to the 





Neoliberalism and Periodization 
 Neoliberal policies have been in place in Sri Lanka and many other countries for close 
to four decades, and they take on different characteristics at different points in time and in 
different places. Therefore, I articulate a new periodization of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. In 
1977, Sri Lanka became the first country in South Asia to go through liberalization, and 
preceded the election of Reagan and Thatcher as well as the Washington Consensus in the 
1980s. Therefore, the history and periodization of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka has important 
implications for understanding the emergence of neoliberalism in South Asia and other parts 
of the world. While the influence of the United States during the conjuncture of the 1970s 
cannot be discounted in terms of its impact on Sri Lankan politics, the resurgence of the 
United National Party (UNP), the leadership of J. R. Jayawardena and the push for 
liberalization were also historically constitutive of a Sri Lankan elite vision. In fact, there was 
an earlier historical moment of Sri Lankan opening its economy during the conjuncture 
between 1948-1953, which was foreboding of the later neoliberal turn, and what I 
characterize as the first of wave of neoliberalism starting in 1977. I further claim, it is the 
global conjuncture with the Great Recession of 2008 leading to global financial flows to the 
emerging markets, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka with militarized stability and the 
consolidation of an authoritarian regime that led to a second wave of neoliberalism in 2010. 
 This periodization of the major historical shifts in the political economy of Sri Lanka 
is paralleled by the World Bank’s changing policies over the course of Sri Lanka’s 
postcolonial history. The first World Bank mission to Sri Lanka in 1951 emphasized the 
development of agriculture and discouraged industrialization as its central recommendation. 
With liberalization in the late 1970s, the World Bank’s emphasis had shifted to the massive 
Mahaweli irrigation scheme and promotion of the garment sector in the free trade zones. 
More recently, after the end of the war in May 2009, the World Bank in addition to 
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emphasizing urban and infrastructure buildout, is calling for further cuts in state support for 
agriculture. These shifting priorities of the World Bank have greatly influenced economic 
policies in Sri Lanka, and I would argue contributed to successive economic crises and 
political conflicts. The major general strike of 1953 in response to the cuts to rice subsidies 
recommended by the World Bank, the political grievances of the Tamil parties about 
colonization schemes in the Tamil regions linked to the World Bank funded Mahaweli 
project and more recently the struggles around slum demolitions linked to the World Bank 
funded urban development projects, are a few instances of how the World Bank’s economic 
projects have serious political consequences.  
Next, authoritarianism, an active security apparatus and a strong role for the state in 
development are linked to models from South East Asia – particularly, Singapore and 
Malaysia – to influence the vision of national and international actors during both waves of 
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. Authoritarian use of state power has been crucial to quell any 
resistance, including from organized labor and social movements, to neoliberal policies 
leading to tremendous social and economic changes including urbanization, infrastructure 
build-out and cuts to social services. Furthermore, during each wave of neoliberalism, there 
are different economic policy packages depending on the character of the authoritarian 
regime and its social base. Therefore, each neoliberal wave sets different priorities on 
urbanization and infrastructure build-out, on privatization, on trade and on cuts to subsidies 
and state services. 
A significant shift during the second wave of neoliberalism is the structure and depth 
of financialization, which reaches deeper into the rural economy and results in the creation of 
tremendous rural debt. Financialization linked to global finance capital through the floating 
of sovereign bonds and corporate bonds of banks in the global capital markets have led to a 
tremendous expansion of credit with a variety of financial products from pawning, lease-hire 
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purchasing, self-employment loans, microfinance schemes to name a few, which have in turn 
greatly increased the levels of indebtedness of the rural population.  
I place importance on the critique of the global order from the periphery. For instance, 
while the Great Recession of 2008 led to an increase in global gold prices, it is from studies 
in the periphery that its consequences such as increases in pawning and the transfer of rural 
household assets in the form of gold jewelry to the financial system can be analyzed. More 
generally, global flows of capital, national processes of financialization and financialized 
indebtedness are leading to processes of social-differentiation at the rural level as evident 
from my village study. The changing character of rural debt has been characterized by a shift 
from public and subsidized loans to increasingly private and high interest loans. The 
increasing forms of predatory loans with high interest rates target the vulnerable, including 
women and the oppressed caste people who lack other means of credit for example from the 
co-operatives. In this way, economic anthropological inquiry can elucidate changes at the 
rural level and its relationship to global processes through such micro-level analysis of 
economic processes and social differentiation.   
I hypothesize a new circuit of accumulation by global capital. Increased rural 
indebtedness from the formal financial sector – connected to the global capital markets 
through the national banks and finance companies that reach down to the rural households – 
is leading to out-migration of labor to the Middle-East. The remittances of migrant workers 
are necessary for sustaining rural life, but part of the remittances are siphoned off for the 
accumulation of global finance in the form of debt payments. In this new circuit of 
accumulation by global capital, there are multiples points of dispossession and exploitation, 
workers are first dispossessed of their livelihoods even as they are mired in indebtedness, 
they incur debts to migrate for work, they are exploited in their new work settings in the 




Caste Exclusion and the Co-operative Vision 
These economic dynamics in the countryside are linked to the aggravation of caste 
exclusion. The failure of reconstruction has caste implications in that it is the oppressed caste 
people consisting of the landless wage laborers that are more susceptible to the monetization 
of the rural economy increasing pressures on rural provisioning, the reducing levels of wage 
work with the falling agricultural incomes and in turn increasing levels of indebtedness due to 
fall in household incomes relatives to expenditure. Next, new forms of the social exclusion 
with increasing educational costs have a bearing on caste exclusion particularly in the rural 
make-up of segregated schools. Furthermore, the discriminatory practices of upper caste 
Tamil bureaucrats and officials deny access to state services and infrastructure for oppressed 
caste households and wards.  
In this context, I address the long history of producer co-operatives, including of 
caste-based occupations, to argue an alternative vision of reconstruction. Indeed, cooperatives 
were some of the most vibrant social institutions engendered by Jaffna society, and have 
become casualties of both the war and now reconstruction. Their difficulties and in many 
cases their disappearances have created deep tears in Jaffna’s social fabric. Their history and 
their workings provide a different vision for the relationship of post-war economic life to 
finance and market. Their revival, I argue, can greatly contribute toward economic and social 
recovery in Jaffna. Furthermore, if the macro-conditions including a reversal of 
financialization and the attendant indebtedness is possible, co-operatives could also lead the 
revival of rural production. Finally, I argue, that a change in the continuing trajectory of the 
neoliberal reconstruction, dispossession and social exclusion will depend to a large extent on 




Paths Not Taken 
 My research engages the question of how the survivors of the war in northern Sri 
Lanka continue to suffer in the post-war era. Breaking the silence is the first step in 
reconsidering the failed path of reconstruction. This silence has a caste and class character. 
The refusal to recognize caste relations and the subtle but significant discriminatory actions 
of the Tamil elite perpetuates caste oppression. Furthermore, it is the class character of the 
Tamil political elite, who are not affected by the rural economic crisis, which allows them to 
neglect the failure of reconstruction and continue with a singular focus on the Tamil 
nationalist political goals. These silences are also related to the legacy of the LTTE and the 
conditioning of Tamil political discourse, where it is only through a self-critical evaluation of 
the LTTE’s politics that a progressive Tamil politics can emerge. 
The Rajapaksa regime saw through the end of the war and shaped the post-war 
trajectory of further militarization, undermined the political process to address minorities’ 
political grievances and implemented problematic reconstruction policies. However, the 
regime was in control of a state that had strong colonial lineages and had undergone 
significant development in the post-colonial era. The Sri Lankan state was also greatly 
debilitated by the war, resulting in the deterioration of state institutions, particularly the 
criminal justice system. The Rajapaksa regime fell in January 2015, but the state apparatus 
shaped by colonialism, civil war, and a new relationship with finance capital continues. The 
state-finance nexus has become central to the workings of the state and the economy, where 
state expenditure requires sovereign debt in the global financial markets and the inflow of 
global capital is necessary to avoid a balance of payment crisis. Therefore, the reversal of 
both financialization and dependence on global finance capital is central to changing the 
relationship between state and society 
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 The inability to consider alternatives to the current trajectory of reconstruction, 
whether it be through co-operative production and distribution or a revitalization of the rural 
economy enhancing rural provisioning and social rejuvenation, are related to the dearth of 
critical social research. The implementation of neoliberal blue prints of economic 
reconstruction by powerful donors has pushed the war-torn regions again towards the brink of 
economic abyss, where people are left without even ideas of alternative approaches to 
rebuilding society. Therefore, charting progressive research agendas and more importantly 
intellectual engagement in the countryside on questions about alternatives are urgently 
needed.  
The subaltern sectors of the war-torn society facing dispossession and social 
exclusion are indeed likely to engender resistance in the future. The crucial question is the 
politics of their resistance. Would oppressed caste politics join forces with and even provide 
leadership to progressive forces towards challenging Tamil nationalism? Would a new 
progressive and democratic Tamil politics join forces with other minorities such as the 
Muslims and the Up-Country Tamils as well as progressive actors in the Sinhala community, 
towards both resolving the national question and addressing the mounting inequalities and 
uneven development in Sri Lanka? What are the prospects of class politics gaining center 
stage after decades of neoliberal attack and displacement by the civil war? These questions 







Post-colonial State, Capital and the Civil War 
 
The problems facing Sri Lanka today, including its institutions relating to its state, 
society and economy, were shaped by over four centuries of colonial rule. Indeed, Sri Lanka 
is certainly not an island when it comes to its political economy, but an appendage 
historically of the Portuguese, Dutch and British empires, and finally decades of United 
States’ over-lordship in the post-colonial era. Sri Lanka was also transformed by its proximity 
to India with migration and conquests during the precolonial era, economic flows including 
of indentured plantation labor during colonial times and then eventually constrained by its 
regional hegemony in the post-colonial era. The political economic transformation 
accelerated during late colonialism and decolonization created modern social, economic and 
political institutions that instituted welfare measures in health and education as well as 
supportive schemes for the small holding peasantry. And it is with this period of 
decolonization that I begin my political economic analysis of the recent war, its consequences 
and the troubling efforts at reconstruction in Sri Lanka.9  
                                                          
9 These political and economic changes also led to extensive research and scholarship. In the 1970s, extensive 
work by liberal and Marxist scholars addressed the legacy of colonialism and the process of decolonization in 
Sri Lanka. Here, my own scholarly interests have gained from a return to and engagement with the research and 
works of scholars such as Kumari Jayawardena, Newton Gunasinghe, S.B.D. de Silva, Vijaya Samarweera and 
Michael Roberts (Jayawardena 2002, Jayawardena 1972, Gunasinghe 1985, De Silva 1982, Samaraweera 1981, 
Roberts 1982). Much of that perceptive scholarship, grounded in a political economy approach is fast receding 
from intellectual memory. While there have been some critical works over the last two decades by scholars such 
as Nira Wickramasinghe, Sunil Bastian, Qadri Ismail, Pradeep Jeganathan and Jayadeva Uyangoda, this recent 
scholarship has been preoccupied with the questions of the recent past; including those of war, conflict, 
ethnicity, nationalism and peace (Wickramasinghe 2015, Bastian 2007, Ismail 2005, Jeganathan 1998, 
Uyangoda 2001). My engagement with the political economy scholarship in the 1970s is not to directly address 
the questions posed by those earlier generation of scholars. Rather, I believe there is much to be gained in 
returning to that scholarship on political economy with new questions that have emerged in contemporary Sri 
Lanka.    
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The colonial transformation led to far reaching changes in society. The administrative 
structures and economic institutions including the forts, the ports and the estates are visible 
remnants of such colonial transformation and extraction. However, changes also occurred in 
educational opportunities, religious practices and caste relations that are less visible but no 
less important effects of colonial rule. Communal representation during the first century of 
British rule and eventually universal adult franchise after 1931, shaped the politics of both the 
Sinhala and Tamil elites. The cultural and religious movements led by these elites starting in 
the late nineteenth century had, by the late colonial period increasingly taken on the narrow 
characteristics of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalisms, as opposed to a broader anti-
colonial nationalism. These social developments had a direct bearing on caste relations within 
the Tamil community in particular, raising the possibilities of an anti-caste movement.  
The great challenge during the decades of decolonization starting in the 1930s was to 
find land for a peasantry that had grown substantially in population in the South Western Sri 
Lanka region called the Wet Zone. In the agriculturally rich Wet Zone there were both 
plantations for the production of tea and rubber but also extensive cultivation of paddy and 
cash crops. Colonization schemes along with irrigation projects in the Dry Zone to mainly 
cultivate paddy, particularly after the eradication of malaria in the 1930s, became the 
dominant policy idea to address demands of the peasantry during late colonialism, and 
became central to postcolonial state policies during the three decades after independence. The 
exports particularly tea came mainly from the labor of plantation workers imported from 
southern India. These Tamil workers of Indian origin were restricted geographically and 
ethnically isolated to the plantations in the hill country of central Sri Lanka. Sadly, one of the 
first major acts of discrimination by the post-colonial state in 1949 was to disenfranchise 
these plantation workers to undermine the left base that was emerging in the plantations. 
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There was a small base of urban working class in Colombo, which was increasingly 
vocal as it was mobilized by newly formed trade unions and left parties. This working class 
in industrial belt around Colombo, the ports and state infrastructure was multi-ethnic in its 
emergence from the late 19th century into the mid-20th century, but Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism and anti-minoritarian tendencies began to emerge within the trade union 
movement as early at the 1920s (Jayawardena 1972). While a thin stratum of the Sri Lankan 
elite had been privileged by colonial policies, for the mass of the population educational and 
social mobility remained distant and the standard of living was low. Nationalist struggles and 
campaigns, more reformist in character than the militant anti-colonial struggles in the rest of 
South Asia, mobilized society around economic and social concerns. Greater representation 
in State Councils with universal suffrage in 1931 set the direction of policies for the emergent 
postcolonial state. 
Sri Lanka went through tremendous changes in tandem with the transformation in the 
global order during the decolonization decades between the 1930s and 1970s. Its economy, 
largely dependent upon tea and rubber, shifted with the ups and downs of global demand 
brought on by depression, war and world economic recovery. Global powers through trade 
and aid policies tried to steer its economy. The creation after independence in 1948 of state 
educational and health institutions, a modern banking system, powerful trade unions and a 
widespread co-operative movement have left an indelible mark on contemporary Sri Lanka. 
The emergence of left-leaning coalition governments a decade after independence led 
to import substitution policies along with efforts at land reform and an emphasis on rural 
development. The state with its social welfare bent had a significantly different role in society 
and economy, both in terms of promoting agricultural production and state-owned enterprises 
and industries. However, the governments in power during import substitution used this 
active and expanding presence of the state to build a Sinhala rural base and alienated the 
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Tamil population through discriminatory policies with the respect to language, education and 
employment.  
In 1977, under the influence of the United States, Sri Lanka undertook so-called 
“open economy” reforms, a package of measures later known as the Washington Consensus, 
which dictated the elimination of tariffs, capital controls, and social subsidies in exchange for 
development assistance. The Sri Lankan economy was in a deep crisis in the mid-1970s, with 
a balance of payments problems curtailing even essential goods, leading it to seek the 
assistance of the IMF. Regardless, the new government led by J. R. Jayawardena was 
committed to liberalization and its alleigence to the United States. Liberalization of the 
economy was paralleled by the centralization of the state under a newly formed executive 
presidency. State repression was not only unleashed on organized labor but also attempted to 
crush Tamil mobilizations and resistance, resulting in a civil war with Tamil movements 
supported by Soviet-leaning India.  
This chapter explores the political economy of Sri Lanka, by outlining the legacy of 
British colonialism, the decades of decolonization and the formation of the postcolonial state, 
in order to analyze the emergence of a liberalized economy and the civil war in Sri Lanka. 
This analysis of the long historical arch of twentieth-century Sri Lanka seeks to contextualize 
the challenges in post-war Sri Lanka.  
 
Commission of Capitalist Transformation 
Successive colonial powers starting in the 16th century, first the Portuguese and then 
the Dutch, weakened existing social structures resulting in the slow but significant historical 
changes to create modern Sri Lanka. Local rulers were defeated or co-opted by the colonial 
powers and the economic and social power of the local clergy were also reduced. New forms 
of trade, taxation and compulsory labor for colonial extraction were enforced with 
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administrative institutions developed to facilitate colonial rule. The political economic 
transformation by colonial power led to coastal development around the island with fortified 
centers of trade and administration. Uneven development characterized by agricultural 
extraction from the inlands and investment along the coast for the colonial economy shaped 
caste relations, religious practices and conversion, and the emergence of an indigenous elite 
whose fortunes were linked to the colonial administration. The predicament of the peasantry 
and the castes oppressed by the peasantry, exploited for colonial extraction, became in time 
the central political and economic problem in modern Sri Lanka (Arasaratnam 1982, de Silva 
1981, Ludowyck 1962).  
While such colonial processes were steadily transforming Sri Lankan society, it is 
with the consolidation of British colonial power in the early 19th century that Sri Lanka is 
subject to a significant capitalist transformation. British colonial rule expanded on the earlier 
coastal economy and introduced the estates with the necessary infrastructure. The plantations 
in time transformed the Sri Lankan economy into one dependent on exports of commodities 
produced in estates, bringing a new dimension to the uneven development of Sri Lanka.  
Sri Lanka became a crown colony under direct rule of the British in 1802, resulting in 
a different political economic trajectory from the rest of South Asia, which until the Mutiny 
of 1857 was controlled by the East India Company (De Silva 1981). Far reaching reforms put 
forward by three significant commissions between the early 1830s to Independence in 1948 
constituted a British colonial experiment in Sri Lanka. These commissions sent from London 
were meant to transform governance in the island going far beyond the regular workings of 
the Governors.   
The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission arrived in 1829, close to three decades after 
the capture of the island from the Dutch, and Ceylon gaining the status as a Crown Colony, 
and just over a decade after the entire island came under the control of British after it 
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defeated the Kandyan Kingdom in 1818.10 While the later Donoughmore Commission of 
1927 and Soulbury Commission of 1945 were to primarily address constitutional changes, the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission was mandated to address three issues; administration, 
revenues and judicial establishment and procedures. The political changes that came with 
Commission set the climate for unified rule of the colony; balanced by the powers of the 
executive, judiciary and a nascent legislature. The economic changes proposed by the 
Commission were deeper in character with major reforms in relation to labor, land and 
property.   
The radical character of the economic reforms was influenced by the convictions of 
the commissioners who were influenced by the liberal thought and economic philosophies of 
Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith. They wanted to see much greater proliferation of private 
enterprises and wanted the state to limit its economic activities inside the country, with 
revenues being collected as taxes or customs as opposed to being an exploitative agent in 
production.  
William Colebrooke, the chair of the Commission, recommended that the colonial 
government should relieve its role in the trade of cinnamon and that: “the growers of 
cinnamon may be allowed the option either of selling to the government, or of freely 
disposing of the cinnamon for consumption in the island, or for exportation from the ports of 
Colombo and Galle, and that export duty be levied on its equivalent to the net profit of the 
government on its sales” (Colebrooke-Cameron Report 1832, 41). Thus cinnamon – the main 
export commodity from Ceylon prior to the emergence of coffee and then later tea plantations 
– exploited by the Colonial officials was to be encouraged as a tradeable commodity 
promoting private enterprise.  
                                                          
10 The last stronghold of Sri Lankan kings in the central highlands. 
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Colebrooke also specified the kind of government intervention that is desirable, 
particularly with respect to distillation of alcohol: 
While the object of raising a revenue on the consumption of spirits is generally to be 
approved, it is desirable to remove any restrictions which unduly affect the value of 
property and check the industry of the inhabitants. With this view, I would 
recommend that the license to distil, under certain regulations, either from toddy or 
rice, should be granted in all the districts, and that distillers should be licensed to sell 
their spirits to persons engaged in the retail trade at Colombo (Colebrooke-Cameron 
Report 1832, 47). 
In this way, the expansion and workings of the market was considered to be important even 
with the lucrative industry of alcohol which brought high revenues for the state. These 
policies expanding and regulating the arrack industry contributed to the emergence of the Sri 
Lankan bourgeoisie, who first accumulated wealth through the arrack industry.11  
The Colebrooke-Cameron Report also made extensive recommendations towards the 
transformation of a labor market and the peasantry. The custom of compulsory local labor 
practiced until then in colonial public works was also opposed by the Commission. They 
recommended such labor should be hired voluntarily and where necessary “advertisements 
should be published throughout the country, and even on the neighboring coasts of India, 
announcing the nature, the terms, and the duration of the employment.” (Colebrooke-
Cameron Report 1832, 22) Furthermore, in addition to calling for changes in land tenure, 
they also made recommendation that: “The application of capital to agriculture will gradually 
remove the inconvenience arising from the poverty of the cultivators, and the subdivision of 
lands.” (Colebrooke-Cameron Report 1832, 27)   
                                                          
11 Kumari Jayawardena traces the emergence of the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie through the sale of arrack, the local 




The implementation of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms coincided with the 
emergence of coffee plantations and the rapid advance of a plantation economy. The colonial 
government addressed the labor shortages and the unwillingness of the local peasantry to 
work in the plantations by importing indentured labor from poverty stricken villages in South 
India. Despite the harrowing conditions in the plantations, these captive workers for the most 
part remained in Ceylon. A European planter community managed these lucrative plantations 
and trading houses in Colombo. With the rapid increase in exports in coffee and then tea, first 
road connectivity and then railroads were built connecting the estates to the growing port in 
Colombo during the second half of the 19th century. Thus the plantation economy contributed 
to an increase in production, trade and infrastructure. 
 The capitalist development of Sri Lanka in the 19th century created an indigenous 
wealthy class involved in the distillation and sale of arrack for local consumption, particularly 
in the highlands where the estates were situated. The capital thus accumulated by the local 
elite was invested in lower cost coconut plantations. This emergent Sri Lankan bourgeoisie 
was represented in the Legislative Council and began agitating for greater powers of 
representation. The advances in education along with religious and cultural revival among the 
Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus created constituencies that by the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century slowly began to question the Anglicized and Christian make up of a 
section of the Sri Lankan elite and their colonial allegiance (Wickremesinghe 2015). Trade 
unions emerged in the late nineteenth century and began agitating for workers’ rights and 
higher wages for the working class in urbanized Colombo (Jaywardena 1972). Therefore, the 
capitalist transformation over the century after the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms slowly 





Commission of Suffrage 
The Donoughmore Commission arrived in 1927 to address the decades of agitations 
by the local elite, whose demands centered on the reform of the Legislative Council and 
greater Sri Lankan representation in colonial governance. The Donoughmore Commission 
was influenced by the Labor Government in power in London, and its far reaching reforms in 
Sri Lanka were an exception in the British Empire, as it sought to carry out a major 
experiment in colonial governance transforming representative politics in Sri Lanka. 
The mandate of the Donoughmore Commission was to examine the problems between 
the Legislative Council with communal representation and the Executive Council which was 
for the most part the arm of the Governor, and to come up with constitutional reforms that 
could result in the efficient administration of the colony. The Donoughmore Commission 
considered the major political and economic changes since the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms. 
Indeed the Donoughmore Commission saw its work as one relating to a more general 
problem: “that the history of modern constitutional development is one continuous record of 
attempts to adjust accepted parliamentary practice to the realistic requirements of social and 
economic progress.” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 19)  One of the chief obstacles they felt 
was the lack of well-formed political parties to promote the “good government” of the 
country. 
The challenge they saw in light of economic changes was the need to create the kind 
of parliamentary practice where political power would come with responsibility, where the 
existing scheme had troubled both the local elite and the colonial officials with “divided 
responsibility”. The Donoughmore Commission did recognize the risks to the Empire in 
addressing the issue of divided responsibility, and they balanced it by actively listening to the 
concerns of minorities and women’s groups in Ceylon. They believed increasing the power of 
the Ceylonese would also put the onus of responsibility on the Ceylonese, subject to some 
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safeguards: “The management of their affairs must therefore be handed over to them, subject 
only to certain safeguards, which should be designed to protect the minorities in their midst 
and the interests of the Empire of which Ceylon forms an important part.” (Donoughmore 
Report 1928, 35) The Donoughmore Commission had a clear argument, it was going to 
“protect the minorities” and guard the “interests of the Empire,” the former out of 
benevolence and the latter out of necessity.   
With such confidence and clarity, the Donoughmore Report recommended 
“administrative devolution” to the Ceylonese with “constitutional reform.” However, this 
understanding of devolution reducing colonial power was coupled with the idea of devolution 
of power to the provinces to reduce the centralized power of the local elite in Colombo.  
The primitive character of the provincial government, as against the comparatively 
advanced system of central government, is very noteworthy. Any further grant of 
central government will emphasize and increase this contrast; and such opportunity, 
as may be afforded, must be given under the new constitution to redress the balance 
by the encouragement of local self-government as a first step in the elaboration of 
measures to diminish the poverty and ill-health which in some provinces is the lot of 
many villagers.  It is essential to emphasize, at the risk of reiteration, the importance 
of keeping in sight the lot of the rural worker. The great gulf fixed between him and 
the educated and westernized classes of Colombo forms a dramatic contrast 
(Donoughmore Report 1928, 44). 
Thus the Donoughmore Commission related provincial devolution12 to poverty reduction and 
the amelioration of economic inequalities between city and countryside. 
                                                          
12 This discussion of provincial devolution in the Donoughmore Report is fascinating as it later becomes central 
to the constitutional debates on the “national question” in the postcolonial era and to this day. The 
Commission’s use of this concept of devolution in Sri Lanka under direct rule of the British, was a step towards 
engaging federal forms of government with decolonization. The devolution debate in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 




 The solution to these social and economic problems was their recommendation for the 
extension of the franchise. They state: “We have already indicated our belief that a wider 
franchise would expedite the passing of such social and industrial legislation as is now in 
force in every progressive country.” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 83) The Donoughmore 
Commissions placed overwhelming emphasis of solving various social, economic and 
political problems through the greater extension of the franchise. Thus with a new 
constitution in 1931, Sri Lanka became the first country in Asia to gain universal adult 
franchise, and only two years after universal suffrage in Britain. This change in franchise 
came despite the opposition of both the Sinhalese and Tamil elites. The genius of the 
Donoughmore Commission was its willingness to take on the argument against franchise 
head on. They turned the argument that only those men who are educated and own property 
can vote responsibly to say only those who gain the vote will be able to resist various forms 
of oppression such as gender and caste discrimination.    
 Here the Donoughmore Commission’s argument for women’s franchise related it to 
the health and social conditions in the country. It claimed, in addition to the “general 
principle of sex equality, we have been impressed by the high infantile mortality in the 
Island, the need for better housing, and for the development of child welfare, midwifery and 
ante-natal services”, and that women’s franchise could address some of those problems 
(Donoughmore Report 1928, 88).  
The Commission similarly addressed the benefits of the extension of franchise to the 
“70,000 or 80,000 of low caste or of depressed classes among the Tamil community”. It 
claimed the low caste people, “by receiving the vote, will not only be placed in a better 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about the minorities’ stake in state power. The shift with this debate was from district level decentralization 
versus provincial level devolution (Siriwardena 1996). Interestingly, the Donoughmore Commission, in order to 
strengthen its argument of devolution as a check on the Ceylonese elite’s power, in addition to articulating the 
concerns of minorities, also relates it to issues of class and poverty. However, in contemporary Sri Lanka, liberal 
and legal discourse has increasingly reduced devolution to an issue of powers for regional ethnic minorities, 
with little engagement on class issues.  
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position to obtain redress for their grievances but will gain a new status and self-respect as 
possessing one of the highest privileges of citizenship” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 86).  
This emphasis on those oppressed by caste among the Tamil community, their franchise and 
self-respect is significant for subsequent developments in northern Sri Lanka. The 
representations made by the oppressed caste communities to the Commission itself were an 
important step towards building an anti-caste movement (Senthivel 2009). In this way, the 
Donoughmore reforms linked the questions of social and economic progress to the idea of 
citizenship and the extension of franchise. This was the context for the emergence of free 
health and education as well as food subsidies in Sri Lanka, which were promoted by the 
newly elected representatives with universal suffrage during the late colonial period.  
 
Soulbury Commission and Independence 
The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission and the Donoughmore Commission were 
perhaps the two most significant commissions in Sri Lanka as they encouraged capitalist 
development and inaugurated liberal democratic state structures. However, the Soulbury 
Commission of 1945 set in motion the process of decolonization and handover of power to 
the local elite. Thus, the Soulbury Commission stands as an important milestone in 
postcolonial capitalist development and the formation of the postcolonial state.  
The Donoughmore reforms in 1931 led to the tremendous colonial experiment of 
implementing universal adult franchise in Ceylon. However, a few years after the 
implementation of the Donoughmore Constitution, the local elite in the Legislative Council 
began agitating for more powers. Delayed by the priorities of the Second World War, by the 
time the Soulbury Commission was appointed in 1944, the war was almost over and Britain 
was set to decolonize India and Burma. For Sri Lanka, the Soulbury Commission sought to 
ensure that state power was handed over to a loyal local elite to continue British hegemony in 
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the neocolonial era. Indeed, the tone and substance of the Soulbury Report are focused on 
safeguarding the British interests of control over defense and external relations of Ceylon 
after decolonization.  
 After reflecting that “the economic development of the Island under British initiative 
added further elements to the complex of communities … (and) indentured labor was 
imported from India to build roads and clear land for the establishment of plantations, where 
first coffee, and later and more extensively tea, was grown,” the Commission elaborated a 
vision of decolonized Ceylon as a developmental state (Soulbury 1945, 6). The Report 
suggests the implementation of state policies such as “budgeting for development” and “tax 
system into one which produces some means for development” (Soulbury 1945, 33). The 
Commission emphasized agricultural policy and development and was concerned that the 
government may not incur the expenditure necessary to develop uncultivated lands. It 
recommended “long range policy in the matter of land development and in the extension of 
irrigation and agriculture” and “schemes of colonization and land development” and 
“agricultural development of the Island” (Soulbury 1945, 46). 
 The exposition of development in the Soulbury Report was both a review of the 
economic changes brought about by the British colonial experiment in Sri Lanka as well as 
setting the stage for the economic development policies that should be pursued after 
independence. The Soulbury Report addresses three key themes of development: (1) the 
continuing importance of the plantation economy; (2) the need to build modern state 
institutions of budgeting and taxation: and (3) the need for extensive land development 
policies including the introduction of irrigation agriculture in the less populated dry zone.  
 The Soulbury Report was clearly constrained by the Second World War and the 
decline of the British Empire. In two exhaustive volumes, K. M. de Silva has edited many of 
the communications (telegrams) between the Colonial Office in London and the Governor in 
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Colombo between 1939 and 1948. In de Silva’s long introduction and in the telegrams, 
imperial priorities of war dominate Britain’s engagement with the colony. Furthermore, with 
the banning early in the war of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)13, the British enjoyed 
full support for the war from the nationalist elite. The timing of the Soulbury Commission at 
the end of the war and eventually its recommendations were meant to bolster loyal support 
from the Sri Lankan elite both during the latter part of the war and then with the handover of 
power to an independent Ceylon.  
 Labor Party Under-Secretary of State Gordon Walker represented the UK government 
at the Independence celebration in Sri Lanka on 4th February 1948. He circulated a report 
about the celebrations and political situation to members of the British Cabinet on 17th March 
1948: 
Ceylon is settling down as a genuine Dominion. Present Ministers are extremely 
friendly and want to maintain and deepen the British connexion. They want, for 
instance, to preserve English as the official language in Parliament and courts. … It is 
hardly too much to say that if we treat them strictly as a Dominion, they will behave 
very like a loyal colony: whereas if we treat them as a colony we may end in driving 
them out of the Commonwealth. … Socially, Ceylon is a mixture of feudalism and 
Eighteenth Century landed aristocracy.  There is relatively little caste and practically 
no communal tension. … A great need in Ceylon is a genuine radical Labor 
Movement based on proper Trade Unions. … If no serious land reforms are 
undertaken the Left Parties will remain of some importance, though I doubt whether 
they will make electoral headway.  The United National Party is beginning for the 
first time to take local organization seriously. Buddhism and Catholicism will become 
                                                          
13 A Trotskyite party formed in the mid-1930s, which was the first Marxist party in Sri Lanka. The Moscow 
leaning Communist Party split from the LSSP in the early 1940s. The LSSP was far more militant with an anti-
colonial and anti-imperalist orientation than the natioanalist elite. The British banned the LSSP during the war to 
squash agitations that could undermine the war effort. 
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increasingly stubborn obstacles to Marxism. If reforms were undertaken, the Marxist 
opposition would cease to be serious: but this would be a slow process (De Silva 
1997b, 365). 
Under-Secretary of State Walker’s communication is a reflection of British interests, albeit 
from a Labor Party point of view, and also of the British consensus on the formation of the 
postcolonial regime in Sri Lanka. The dominion status of independent Sri Lanka discussed by 
Walker relates to the former colony as part of the Commonwealth remaining under British 
influence with the Queen as head of state, and more importantly control over defense, foreign 
affairs, the currency and even law through appeals to the Privy Council in London.14 The 
Marxist left was perceived as the greatest threat to the legacy of the colonial order. The 
possibility of mobilization along language and religious lines was disregarded; the 
tremendous ethno-nationalist mobilizations that would shake Sri Lankan society did not 
figure. The caste structure and its continuing impact on social inequalities were ignored. 
 
Emergence of the Postcolonial State 
The postcolonial state and its modern institutions embodied the politics of the 
nationalist elite during the late colonial period, including the policies that emerged with 
universal adult franchise and the powers devolved to the State Council in the 1930s. 
Therefore, progressive state policies of food subsidies, free education and health, and 
agricultural policies favoring the peasantry were in effect before Independence. The 
nationalist elite at the helm of state power took forward progressive welfare policies. They 
                                                          
14 While the British lost control over many aspects in subsequent years, Sri Lanka became formally a republic 
under the left government in 1972. 
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also began attacking those they claimed to be outsiders such as the Indian origin Tamils in the 
plantations and eventually the English speaking elite.15 
The peasantry was put at the center of the nationalist elite’s campaign for 
Independence during decolonization; an anti-colonial campaign that was relatively weak 
compared to the rest of South and South East Asia.16 The nationalists claimed to be the 
trustees of the Sinhalese small holder peasant even as they attacked the plantation laborer as 
an outsider. Samaraweera, one of the perceptive scholars of colonial Sri Lanka, emphasizes 
the importance of the peasantry and land policy for nationalists, including their most 
prominent leader D. S. Senanayake in the late colonial period:   
Senanayake was not alone in this orientation towards the rural society at the expense 
of the urban; this facet of nationalist perspective was to be a significant feature in 
politics, then as later, for the nationalists were largely committed to drawing their 
political support from the rural masses. The land policy was but one plank of a broad 
program which the nationalists evolved for the benefit of the peasantry. The wider 
measures of welfarism adopted during the State Council era could be subsumed under 
a term which came into vogue then, 'rural reconstruction' (Samaraweera 1982, 151). 
Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake’s first move soon after Independence was the 
disenfranchisement of the Up-Country Tamils, thereby revoking the citizenship of the most 
exploited estate workers, despite their significant contribution to the national economy and 
                                                          
15 The nationalist elite themselves were part of this Anglicized English speaking elite, including many who were 
educated in England, but they changed their attire, religion and switched to using Sinhala to engage the Sinhala 
Buddhist and rural constituencies (Manor 1989).  
16 Moore claims the Sri Lankan elite took up the concerns of the peasantry not due to the pressure from the 
peasantry but for the elite’s own ideological positioning: “The alienation of state land to villagers has been 
conducted on a very large scale since the Sri Lankan elite became and an effective challenger for state power in 
the 1920s. The program has been conducted in the name the peasantry, but owes little in origin or in detail to 
political pressure from the villages. Instead, the elite seized upon and articulated what appeared to be a potential 
or actual grievance in such a way as to give moral and ideological support to its own claims to rule. The issue of 
Crown lands was placed within an interpretation of Sri Lankan history and society which served both to boost 
the elite’s claim to leadership and obfuscate its own responsibility, via plantation enterprise, for some of the 
alleged ills of that society. The notion of a homogeneous peasantry played, and continues to play, an important 
part in this interpretation” (Moore 2008, 48). 
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foreign earnings. This severe move was also meant to break the political base of the left in the 
plantations. Furthermore, it was a deeply worrying development also for the future of 
minorities in Sri Lanka.  
 The relationship between the postcolonial state and national capital, or the national 
bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka at Independence was shaped by two factors. First, the postcolonial 
state in Sri Lanka was a product of the state structures imposed by colonialism, particularly 
policies of the British Empire including the outcome of the three Commissions discussed 
above. Second, Sri Lanka had a weak bourgeoisie due to the prominence of English planters 
and British companies in the plantation sector.17 Therefore, the post-colonial state’s policies 
were to a large measure influenced first by British capital controlling the plantations and 
eventually donor agencies such as the World Bank and IMF under US hegemony (Lakshman 
1985). In this context, with a politically weak Sri Lankan bourgeoisie and extensive state 
structures, there were tremendous swings in the politics of the governments that came to 
power in subsequent decades.  
 
Post-colonial Capitalist Development and Global Integration 
 The West-leaning United National Party (UNP) government prioritized the formation 
of institutions relating to finance and development, as part of a broader process of 
postcolonial state building. While Sri Lanka had the support of the British, the Finance 
Minister J. R. Jayawardena in creating the Central Bank did not seek the help of the Bank of 
England. Rather, he requested support from the Federal Reserve in Washington. Perhaps the 
                                                          
17Class formation in Sri Lanka is charactersised by a weak bourgeoisie, which is the reason why I refer to the 
nationalist elite, which consists of both upper class professionals as well as an emerging bourgeoisie. According 
to Ponnnambalam: “The three-fold class system – bourgeoisie, middle class, and proletariat – of Western 
industrial societies does not fit the Sri Lankan case directly, for whereas a middle class and a working class (not 
an industrial proletariat) were present, there was practically no national (i.e. independent) bourgeoisie with the 
means to defend its interests internationally. The Sri Lankan middle class sharply bifurcated into an upper 
middle class, which was an embryonic bourgeoisie, and a lower middle class, the bulk of it only marginally 
better off than the working class.” (Ponnambalam 1981, 15)  
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shrewd politician that he was, Jayawardena, who would in the late 1970s liberalize and 
transform the economy, already saw the importance of aligning with the United States.  
The Federal Reserve sent John Exter, who wrote the ‘Report on the Establishment of 
a Central Bank for Ceylon’ in November 1949. Exter, the first Governor of the Central Bank 
in Sri Lanka, said in his Report that “in taking steps to establish an independent monetary 
system to be administered by a central bank the Government has demonstrated unmistakably 
its intention to achieve genuine economic freedom as a corollary of the political freedom 
achieved a year and a half ago” (Exter 1994, 1). Thus independent monetary and economic 
policies were linked to state formation. Furthermore, Exter ideologically maneuvered the 
fashioning of Sri Lanka’s monetary authority and control of banking away from stronger 
links to both India and Britain: “In fact, whenever a country voluntarily links its currency to 
another, it establishes a satellite-planet relationship which in effect proclaims that the satellite 
will always move with the planet. This is tantamount to a renunciation of a basic element of 
monetary sovereignty” (Exter 1994, 4). Thus the concept of sovereignty is now evoked in 
relation to even banking. Exter nevertheless makes a distinction between different countries 
and their economies, including the notions of underdevelopment and development: 
“Experience of central banks in underdeveloped economies reveals that such banks need 
different and wider powers than those in developed economies” (Exter 1994, 9). 
 Exter articulated his arguments not only in terms of domestic needs but of global 
changes, including the global capital and goods markets, and emphasized Sri Lanka’s 
economic dependence on the prices of a few primary commodities in foreign markets. He 
went onto say that Sri Lanka is “dependent upon economic conditions abroad, and is 
especially sensitive to the world business cycle” (Exter 1994, 9-10). This reference to 
dependence on foreign markets and the business cycles as the rationale for monetary and 
economic policies is important. Exter went onto discuss the short-term and long-term 
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implications, justifying the role of the Central Bank as one relating to the long run through 
directing savings and foreign capital towards agricultural development and new industries to 
diversify the economy.  
In addition to the Central Bank created with US support, various other international 
initiatives shaped postcolonial developments in the early 1950s. In January 1950 the Foreign 
Ministers of the UK and of many other commonwealth countries arrived in Colombo to 
initiate the Colombo Plan resulting in a report later in the year titled ‘Colombo Plan for 
Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia’. A year later, in the 
context of the Korean War, the United States decided to participate in the Colombo Plan, 
merging support for international development with geopolitical security concerns (Blackton 
1951). The Colombo Plan drew up extensive six-year plans for development first in 1950 (Rs. 
1,400 million, US$ 294 million) and then revised in 1952 (Rs. 3,200 million, US$ 672 
million).18 The priorities were very much agriculture, transport, communications and power 
(IBRD 1953, 107). However, the funds for such development were not assured, and these 
were merely blue prints to develop the South and South East Asian regions in the context of 
the Cold War. 
Next, in late 1951, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
commonly known as the World Bank, sent a large mission to Sri Lanka. The mission, 
consisting of fourteen officials and staff, was headed by Sir Sydney Caine, who was Financial 
Secretary of Hong Kong in the late 1930s and an economist who was a World Bank 
consultant before he became the Director of the London School of Economics between 1957 
and 1967. The extensive report running close to 800 pages titled “The Economic 
Development of Ceylon,” made a number of recommendations focusing on agricultural 
                                                          
18 The Rupee to US$ conversion for the 1950s used here is 1 Rupee = 0.21 US Dollars from the World Bank 
report (IBRD 1953). 
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development, particularly development of the uncultivated regions of the dry zone. The 
Report promoted the colonization of landless peasantry in the dry zone and recognized the 
importance of institutions such as co-operatives and Rural Development Societies. The 
Report also addressed the need for infrastructure including transport and communications as 
well as power generation and transmission.  
The Report’s recommendations for investment in economic development from 1953 
to 1959, in the various sectors totaling Rs. 1,600 million (US$ 336 million) were more 
conservative than the Colombo Plan, but were considered more realistic given the funds 
available (IBRD 112-113). Significantly, the Report emphasized investment in agriculture 
and neglected industries in their vision of development as evident from the priorities 
summarized in Table 1.1.19 
 
Table 1.1 IBRD Report Priorities (1951) 
Recommendations Rs. (Mn) US$ (Mn) 
Agriculture including Colonisation and Irrigation  460 97 
Transport and Communications 430 90 
Power including Plants and Distribution 209 44 
Health 195 41 
Education 145 30 
Industry 75 16 
Rural Development 60 13 
Source : IBRD, (1951), The Economic Development of Ceylon  
 
                                                          
19 W.D. Lakshman summarizes the recommendations of the World Bank mission as follows: “The 
recommendations of the WB Mission of 1951, taken as a whole, were intended to promote private capitalism in 
the country within the broad economic and social structure which then existed. It was the same type of 
dependent capitalism cultivated by British colonialism in Sri Lanka that received the support of the WB 
Mission. No change in the structural significance of plantation agriculture which depended on external markets 
was envisaged. The largely peasant character of non-export agriculture was to continue. No measures were 
recommended to spread the capitalist mode of production into this sector, so that forces of production in it 
would develop rapidly. Introduction of industrial capitalism on a wide front was discouraged so that the country 
would continue to be dependent on foreign sources for technology and a wide variety of industrial goods. 
Foreign capital dominance of the economy would have continued unabated under these recommendations or 
would have even become greater. The significance of the building up of a national bourgeoisie for self-reliant 
capitalist development was not recognized by the Mission and within the policy framework proposed, the 
merchant character of the existing domestic capitalist class would have continued, thereby strengthening the 
existing dependent relationships” (Lakshman 1985, 7). 
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Among other recommendations including those of fiscal consolidation, the issue of 
food subsidies was prominent and would have serious consequences on political 
developments in Sri Lanka: 
Ceylon’s problem of food subsidies is of greatest importance not only because of its 
adverse effect on the budget, but also from the general economic point of view.  In its 
annual report for the year 1950, the Central Bank commented on the problem at 
length, concluding that ‘… a widespread system of subsidies has a tendency to hide 
real costs, to distort the country’s economy, and sometimes to act as a serious barrier 
to efficiency. … Food subsidies are no more than a palliative, concealing the 
necessity of adjustment by keeping food prices at an artificially low level.’ … 
Therefore the Mission concurs in the view of the Central Bank, that food subsidies 
should now be reduced (IBRD 1953, 184 -185). 
The World Bank Report legitimized the Central Bank created with the support of 
Washington, and had considerable influence with the ruling UNP. Such engagement by 
international actors was a significant factor in the formation of the postcolonial state 
institutions in Sri Lanka.  
 
‘Hartal of 1953’, ‘Sinhala Only’ and Postcolonial Politics 
 The economic trajectory and institutions built with the support of powerful Western 
actors met with a serious challenge due to global market changes. From 1952 into 1953 with 
a fall in exports especially of rubber, Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves were depleted. The 
government under considerable financial pressure decided to cut subsidies as recommended 
by the World Bank to address the balance of payments crisis.20 The price of rice was raised 
                                                          
20 Lakshman traces the World Bank recommendations in this context as two fold; the gradual closure of a 
number of public sector industries initiated during the Second World War and the elimination of the food 




from 25 cents to 70 cents a measure.21 Furthermore, even the school children’s mid-day meal 
was withdrawn (Amarasinghe 1998). This resulted in the largest general strike, ‘Hartal’22 of 
August 1953, in Sri Lanka’s history. Militant protests shutdown Colombo and swept the 
coastal areas. The Cabinet of Ministers concerned about their security had to meet on a 
British warship and the Prime Minister eventually resigned. 
The Hartal of 1953 was a landmark event reflecting the emerging contradictions in 
postcolonial Sri Lanka. It was an early sign of the deep disenchantment within society. The 
national elite’s promise of postcolonial development was failing. The left parties, both the 
Trotskyite LSSP and the Soviet-leaning Communist Party, were able to build trade unions in 
urban areas and particularly along the Western coastal belt around Colombo. Trade unions 
were initially formed among printers, then tram cars and railways, then port worker and 
private firms (Jaywardena 1972). However, neither the Sinhala peasantry in the southern 
Sinhala hinterland, nor the peasantry in the North and East, populated by Tamils, nor the Up-
Country Tamils, the plantation labor bolstered the Hartal. There was already a major gulf 
between the politics of the urban left base and the interests of peasantry and the estate 
workers who formed the larger part of the population. 
The Hartal provided the political impetus for S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP), a party formed after splitting from the UNP and with strong links to 
the petty bourgeoisie in the rural South, which saw an opening to mobilize on the Sinhala 
population’s disenchantment with the anglicized elite in Colombo. While Bandaranaike was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
While the latter proposed a ‘gradual’ withdrawal of consumer subsidies, the government tried to eliminate them 
totally in 1953. Since the expenditure on account of these subsidies was a large element in government current 
expenditure, their withdrawal resulted in a large increase in government savings, from an average of 13.2 per 
cent of government revenue in 1951/2 - 1952/3 to 34.5 per cent in 1953/4 - 1955/6. The grave social hardships 
caused by the withdrawal of food subsidies naturally produced a violent social reaction in 1953, later on in 1956 
becoming one of the main factors which brought down the existing regime.” (Lakshman 1985, 9) 
21 One measure of rice equals 2 pounds or 0.9 kilograms, and 100 cents equal one rupee. In 1950s dollars, where 
1 Rupee = US$ 0.21, the price of approximately 0.9 kilograms of rice was raised from US$ 0.05 to US$ 0.15. 
22 The hartal is a form of protest, where in addition to strikes by trade unions, all institutions including shops and 
transport are shutdown bringing economic activity to a halt. The Sri Lankan left leadership exiled in India after 
the British banned them during the Second World War borrowed this concept from the protest culture in India.    
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half hearted in his support of the Hartal, he and his SLFP were able to take the wind away 
from the left in the ensuing years (Manor 1989). 
The Hartal of 1953 was a turning point, which Bandaranaike and his SLFP were able 
to capitalize, leading to the eventual defeat of the UNP in 1956. Bandaranaike came to power 
with a major Sinhala nationalist campaign for “Sinahala Only” language policies, which 
made Sinhala the sole official language, as opposed to the anti-colonial demand of making 
both Sinhala and Tamil official languages. Bandaranaike mobilized the Sinhala masses 
including the peasantry, first against the English speaking anglicized elite, and eventually 
against the Tamil speaking minority communities. Furthermore, Bandaranaike went into a 
coalition with small sections of the left. The broader left parties took a principled stand at that 
time calling for parity of status for both Tamil and Sinhala and opposed the move towards 
“Sinhala Only” (Muthiah and Wanasinghe 2005). Nevertheless, Bandaranaike had initiated a 
tradition of coalitions in the parliamentary realm, between the SLFP which had a Sinhala 
rural base and the left parties that had an urban working-class base.23  
This maneuver by Bandaranaike was significant both politically and economically.24 
The politics of majoritarianism with respect to language policy undermined possibilities of a 
plural polity resulting in the Tamil population being alienated from the state. Next, the 
economic policies were redirected towards land reform and rural development, with the 
                                                          
23 The coalition politics of left parties joining with the SLFP would eventually lead to fall of the left parties, as 
they even had to compromise on their principled stand on the “national question” in order to accomdate the 
Sinhala majority towards progressive economic policies (Philips 2001). 
24 Newton Gunasinghe claims Bandaranaike’s manoeuvre and the important political shift in 1956, set the tragic 
path of Sri Lanka’s postcolonial history: “In a social structure which generates an ideology that religion does not 
relate to one’s personal beliefs but to one’s family antecedents, S.W.R.D.’s move to become a Buddhist and 
what is more, his vocal advocacy of Sinhala-Buddhist interests, testifies to his ability of political maneuver.  
S.W.R.D., through these able political tactics, was able to establish his personal hegemony, distancing himself 
away from his extended family group, while going against the old-established bourgeois strata, simultaneously 
cultivating solid political relations with newly emergent bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata emanating from 
diverse social backgrounds. But his ideology of populist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, while creating the social 
base for his assumption of power, also alienated the Tamils in the northern, eastern and central provinces.  …  
[T]his laid the political foundations for the terrible ethnic conflict, destabilization and violence which we are 
obliged to undergo today.” (Perera 1996) 
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initiation of import substitution policies. The shift in 1956, which empowered the Sinhala 
rural masses including through access to higher education and jobs in the state sector, also 
paved the way for the radicalization of Sinhala youth as the “children of 1956” took forward 
the first major youth insurrection fifteen years later; the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP)25 
insurrection of 1971 was in many ways a backlash from rural Sinhala youth to the failed 
promise of 1956. 
The Tamil community in turn increasingly felt marginalised, as the Sinhala language 
policy reduced the chances for state employment starting in the 1960s. Next, attempts to 
curtail the entry of Tamil students into the universities first on an ethnic basis and then on a 
district basis, was a form of reverse discrimination that heightened Tamil nationalist feelings 
among the lower middle class Tamil youth in Jaffna in particular. There were periodic 
pogroms, in 1956 and 1958, as Sinhala mobs felt emboldened to attack Tamils following the 
victory of the government promoting “Sinhala Only” policies. There were also physical 
attacks against non-violent protests organised by Tamil parliamentarians from the Federal 
Party demanding automy in response to the language policy. Such violence greatly increased 
the insecurity of the Tamil community. 
 By the late 1950s, there were four major political actors in the realm of party politics. 
The UNP, which was the party of the emergent bourgeoisie controlled by the Colombo elite 
                                                          
25 The JVP was a party of Sinhala youth led by its charismatic leader Rohana Wijeveera, who had broken away 
from the Communist Party – Peking Wing. The JVP’s ideology combined Sinhala Buddhist nationalism with a 
home grown version of Marxism and had as its goal the capture of state power to serve the interests of rural 
youth. Its nationalism was consolidated in its idea of opposing Indian expansionism in the region, where it saw 
the Up-Country Tamils working in the plantations as the fifth column of such Indian expansionism. The JVP 
insurrection was brutally crushed in 1971 with massacre of as many as 10,000 youth. It regrouped in the early 
1980s as a political party following the release of its leaders, but attempted a more brutal insurrection in 
opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987. It assumed that it could count on the support of the Sinhala 
population rising up against the Indian military presence in the country in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping 
Forces implementing the terms of the Accord. However, the JVP was again brutally crushed in the course of two 
years when the country saw some of its most brutal massacres and as many as 50,000 people were killed. These 
insurrections by rural Sinhala youth crushed by a military mainly coming from the Sinhala community, is often 
neglected in the rather ethicized writing on Sri Lanka. The JVP today continues as a small parliamentary party 
with a mobilizable social base and has been vocal on issues of democracy and opposition to neoliberal policies.  
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and with a base among Sinhala landed classes. The SLFP, which had split from the UNP, 
with the same class character but with a stronger base among the petty bourgeoisie 
particularly in the non-English speaking Sinhala rural regions. The Left parties, which were 
increasingly fragmented, but centered around the Trotskyite LSSP and the Communist Party, 
which was first aligned with Moscow and then split with a Peking wing. Finally, the Tamil 
parties, which by the late 1950s was dominated by the Federal Party26, whose main demands 
were on language policy and autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Ceylon 
Workers Congress formed in 1950 after changing its name from the Ceylon Indian Congress, 
was both a trade union of the estate workers and a political party representing the Up-Country 
Tamils (Woodward 1969).   
The Left parties gained electoral strength when they went into a coalition with the 
SLFP forming the United Front government in 1970. The state socialist experiment in the 
1970s characterized by nationalization and land reform failed with external pressures and 
balance of payments problems. The Left never recovered after its stint in sharing power with 
a coalition government, and has been in steady decline since 1977. Politics in Sri Lanka to 
this day continues to be dominated by the UNP and SLFP, the Old Left has been replaced by 
the JVP after it entered and gained some presence in parliamentary politics in the 2000s. The 
JVP with Sinhala nationalist undertones has emerged as the voice on class issues. Ethnic 
minority politics are characterized by the Tamil coalition, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
centered on the Federal Party base; various Up-Country Tamil parties after the Ceylon 
Workers Congress gained strength in the 1960s has fragmented over the last two decades; and 
various Muslim parties including the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, which gained ascendancy 
as a powerful party in the 1990s, but fragmented in the following decade.   
                                                          
26 The Muslim community which was mainly Tamil speaking, voted for Muslim leaders who were in the Federal 
Party or one of the major national parties. It is in the late 1980s in the context of the ethnic conflict that Muslims 




Import Substitution and the State’s Role in the Economy 
While the UNP regime soon after Independence focused on support from the West 
and took forward the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie and the large landowners, there 
was a significant shift in the governments that emerged after 1956 and continued until 1977.27 
The regimes that led these governments depended on expanding the role of the state for their 
politics and their consolidation. One characteristic of these regimes was the instrumental use 
of state institutions and state power to build a social base and electoral support among various 
classes, rather than use of state power to carry forward the sole class interests of the 
bourgeoisie. The politics of these regimes were characterized by class compromises as 
opposed to outright attacks when it came to the demands and struggles of the lower classes. 
In the realm of economic policies, these regimes promoted social welfare policies, 
nationalization of some industries and services, and import substitution policies, as opposed 
to greater integration with the global market in capital and goods. 
  The changing relationship between regimes and the state after 1956 had two 
characteristics. First, the expanding social base of the state was characterized by further 
social services including support and subsidies provided by the state. Second, the state took a 
greater role in the economy through initiation of state corporations and greater public sector 
employment (Uyangoda 1993). These changes to the state’s role were taken forward with 
import substitution policies including the nationalization of a number of industries, services 
and the estates.  
                                                          
27 From 1956 to 1959 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in coalition with a small section of the Left, particularly, the MEP 
led by Philip Gunawardena, was in power. Following Bandaranaike’s assassination, his wife became the Prime 
Minister from 1960 to 1965 and again under the United Front coalition with most of the mainstream Left 
political parties between 1970 and 1977. Except for the period between 1965 and 1970 when the UNP was in 
power, the SLFP regimes in alliance with Left leaned more towards the Soviet Blok as they became active in the 
Non-Aligned Movement. With this shift towards the East, aid from the West was reduced to Sri Lanka, and 
import substitutions policies came to the fore. 
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There were a number of efforts at land reform between the mid-1950s and the mid-
1970s. The Paddy Lands Act of 1953 claimed to grant security of tenure, however, it was 
only initiated in the two districts of Hambantota and Batticaloa with little enforcement, and 
was for the most part only a recognition of the problems with land tenure and did not lead to 
any substantive changes (Sanderatne 1972, Sanderatne 2004). The Paddy Lands Act of 1958, 
on the other hand, was brought about with the keen interest in land reform of leftist leader 
Philip Gunawardena, who had joined the SLFP coalition as a Minister of Agriculture. Its 
provisions, however, were focused on addressing sharecroppers through regulations to ensure 
their security of land tenure and reduce their exploitation. Such security for sharecroppers 
were particularly important in the South where absentee landlords living in the towns and in 
Colombo exploited the rural population.   
In reality, the landowners were able to undermine its workings through evictions, 
particularly when tenants attempted to find relief through the Act. Indeed, there was a large 
scale attack on the landless peasantry28 by the landed classes after land reform was initiated, 
and that between 1958 and 1968 some 35,500 evictions were reported to the government 
(Sandaratne 1972, 125).  
There was slightly better success by state policies with respect to indebtedness. A 
related and important factor was the indebtedness of the tenants who relied among others on 
the landlord for credit. In 1957, 54 percent of the rural families were in debt with only 7.8 
percent of debt involving institutional sources. However, by 1961/1962 rural debt was 
characterized by 34.2 percent to institutional sources, showing a marked reduction of 
predatory forms debt as a result of government support including for credit co-operatives 
(Sandaratne 1972, 125 - 132).  
                                                          
28According to Herring, “empirically the tenure reform model has in the South Asian context proved unable to 
accomplish even its limited goals and has indeed often harmed rather than helped the tenants it is meant to 
protect.” (Herring 1981, 134) 
54 
 
It was in the 1970s under the United Front government that a more extensive land 
reform policy was implemented. The Land Reform Law of 1972 and the Land Reform 
(Amendment) Law of 1975 provided for ceilings on agricultural land, alienation of state lands 
with a land to the landless approach as opposed to the earlier approach of merely securing the 
land tenure of share croppers. Furthermore, there was extensive nationalization of land held 
by private corporations including estates (Abeysinghe 1979). The 1972 reforms avoided lands 
held by the rural middle classes and temples in Districts such as Kandy, which would have 
been welcomed by the Kandyan poor, but were considered politically risky by the Left-
leaning government (Moore 2008).  Furthermore, the estate lands after nationalization did not 
reach the landless in any significant levels.29 However, these reforms along with some major 
irrigation projects with colonization of landless peasantry as well as a significant state 
supported infrastructure for rural development were major efforts towards reshaping the 
political economy of Sri Lanka. Rural development was emphasized with greater support for 
co-operatives and agricultural committees as well as state services such as agricultural 
extension. The landed classes resisted such land reforms, even as the government struggled 
with fiscal pressures, until the coalition government unraveled in 1976.  
The economic policies of the import substitution era led to mixed results with some 
gains to the rural classes and decreasing inequalities in the country. State promoted industries 
included steel, chemicals, cerarmics and eventually the nationalization of tea estates. 
Furthermore, agricultural production increased during this period, particularly with much 
higher production of rice which was the staple food for Sri Lankan society. Between 1950 
and 1982, the level of self-sufficiency in rice went from 25% to 90%, with rice production 
growing annually at 4.3% while population grew at 2.2% (Gunatilleke 1993, 8). Such 
                                                          
29 Moore is critical in evaluating the nationalization of estates: “The estate land reform was conducted in the 
name of the peasantry, yet the actual benefits, mainly short-term, took the form of estate jobs for those with the 
appropriate political connections. The total amount alienated to villagers was small, and that mainly low-value, 
uncultivated land.” (Moore 2008, 81) 
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agricultural production was increased through the fertilizer subsidy as well as irrigation 
support. However, producer prices were kept low and the surplus was transferred to the rest 
of the population, particularly in the urban areas.30 Nevertheless, the economic trajectory set 
by the United Front Government could not be sustained and was soon reversed by the UNP 
government of 1977 that was committed to liberalization of the economy.   
The trajectory of economic development had remained more or less consistent 
between 1956 and 1977. Politically, the recognition of the importance of rural constituencies 
became clear to all parties, and the left parties joined the SLFP at the center, changing the 
character of electoral politics which until then was more securely controlled by the elite 
mainly in Colombo (Shastri 1983). In the context of import substitution economic policies, 
welfare policies were protected and even expanded. However, price fluctuations in the world 
market for exports from Sri Lanka and imports into Sri Lanka took their toll on the efforts at 
land reforms. The global economic downturn and the oil crisis of the 1970s crippled the state-
led economic experiment in the 1970s and ended the import substitution policies31 lasting 
close to two decades in Sri Lanka.  
 
                                                          
30 Moore’s conclusions are significant: “The net subsidy from the state to paddy producers is: (a) lower than is 
widely believed; (b) highly concentrated on a relatively small number of recipients; (c) partly outweighed by the 
transfer of income from rice producers to consumers through government policies which depress rice producer 
prices: and (d) massively outweighed by a large transfer of resources out of the smallholder sector as a whole, 
achieved by the direct and indirect taxation of smallholder producers of export crops, especially coconut  
producers. The appropriation of a large surplus from the export crop sector has generally permitted the state to 
subsidise both domestic rice producers and food consumers. However, when the interests of local food 
producers and consumers have come into direct conflict, the latter have generally prevailed.” (Moore 2008, 86) 
31 Godfrey Gunatilleke’s contextualization of import substitution policies particularly with respect to rice and 
eventually self sufficienty in rice are important for understanding the policies form the late 1950s into the 1970s. 
He claims that “any critique of import substitution policies of the post-independence period would need to take 
into account the full complexity of the problems faced by the policymakers… At the time of independence, 
import substitution in rice appeared to be an obvious option. The World Bank mission which surveyed the Sri 
Lankan economy at the beginning of the 1950s endorsed this. Sri Lanka was importing 75% of its requirement 
of rice - the country’s main staple food. There had been a well-developed irrigation infrastructure in the Dry 
Zone which could be speedily restored and rehabilitated. New land was available for agricultural settlements. 
There was a large landless rural population in the densely populated, land-scarce, Wet Zone available for 
transfer to the land-surplus Dry Zone. … Sri Lanka’s performance in the rice sector has been acclaimed as one 
of the best in Asia. … The rice program also increased productivity and incomes in the backward peasant sector 
and by so doing ensured that Sri Lanka followed a development strategy which was equity-oriented” 
(Gunatilleke 1993, 8). 
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Jayawardena Regime and Liberalization 
Following the collapose of Bretton Woods Agreement (Helleiner 1994), the world 
economic downturn in the 1970s (Brenner 2006) and the related Sri Lankan economic crisis 
of falling terms of trade and a balance of payment crisis led to the Jayawardena regime 
coming to power with a landslide victory in the parliamentary election of 1977. Jayawardena 
using his five-sixths majority in parliament further consolidated power by bringing in the 
executive presidential system, which entrenched power in one individual. Centralized power 
was crucial for the economic transformation that he brought about with his open economy 
policies to both direct large development projects as well as to crush resistance including 
from trade unions. Indeed, both on the political and economic front, the Jayawardena regime 
probably brought about the most significant and lasting changes in Sri Lanka’s post-colonial 
history.  
Jayawardena moved Sri Lanka toward the US policy initiatives and away from non-
alignment and pro-Soviet-leaning policies of the previous Government. This shift towards the 
US and a major structural adjustment program ensured much larger flows of aid from 
Western governments and donors (Bastian 2007). The structural reforms included reducing 
exchange rate and price controls, trade liberalization particularly reduction of import tariffs, 
facilitating foreign investments and financial deregulation (Weerakoon 2004, 61). To 
strengthen its financial position, the Government went into a standby arrangement with the 
IMF.  
Political scientist Ronald Herring, who worked on the land question in Sri Lanka in 
the 1970s and 1980s, provides a perceptive evaluation of the IMF agreement: 
International factors in the new strategy thus become critical; external support in 
material terms has arguably been a necessary condition for the liberalization 
initiatives. The international development community has provided resources to tide 
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the regime over the potentially rocky re-adjustment period. The dynamics are 
familiar. Following a sharp devaluation of the rupee in November of 1977, the IMF 
announced support for ‘the comprehensive program of economic reform ... in support 
of which the present stand-by arrangement (of SDR 93 million) has been approved’. 
IMF approval is an important signal in international financial and development 
communities, and the regime quickly took advantage of its new status (Herring 1987, 
328). 
With the IMF agreement32 in place, Sri Lanka mobilized considerable donor funds from the 
World Bank in particular, and a number of bilateral donors as well. It moved on banking 
reform by inviting many foreign banks to open operations in Sri Lanka. It also targeted 
investors to expand the tourist sector and the newly formed garment sector.  
The Structural Adjustment Program was a mixed bag.  The policy package known 
locally as the open economic policies included: exchange rate and trade liberalization; a shift 
from administered prices to market prices with public corporations33 pushed to become 
commercially viable; cuts to budgetary expenditure in food subisidies in place for close to 
three decades; and promotion of private enterprises including foreign direct investment 
(Lakshman 1985).  There was considerable promotion of foreign investment through 
incentives; the foreign investment from 1970 to 1977 was a mere Rs. 17 million (US$ 2.6 
million)34 but from 1977 to 1984 it was Rs. 5,448 million (US$ 340 million) (Gunatilleke 
1993, 34-35).35 However, the Structural Adjustment Program in Sri Lanka was also selective 
in the choice and implementation of reforms given the political concerns; therefore 
privatization of public sector commercial and industrial undertakings was avoided. 
                                                          
32 The role of IMF approval has proven important to mobilize the flow of global capital in the future as well. 
33 Accorinding to Ronal Herring as late as 1982, public sector industrial corporations included steel, petroleum 
products, textiles, fertilisers, tyres, salt, dairy products, distilleries, oils and fats, timber and plywood, paper, 
cement and ceramics. They accounted for more than 60% of industrial production (Herring 1987, 330) 
34 In June 1974, US$ 1 = Rs. 6.5 
35 In June 1980, US$ 1 = Rs. 16 
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Furthermore, there was a sharp increases in government capital expenditure, particularly on 
infrastructural and housing projects, resulting in high budget deficits (Lakshman 1985). In 
fact, much of the inflow of foreign capital was absorbed in construction and infrastructure 
build out. 
International influences and developments led by the United States shaped the open 
economy reforms in Sri Lanka. The World Bank supported the Mahaweli Development 
project, a massive irrigation and colonisation scheme redirecting the Mahaweli River is the 
largest national development project to date. Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were created to 
facilitate East Asian capital investment in garment production and were supported with 
considerable tax incentives and trade liberalization.  
In the context of labor agitations culminating in the general strike of July 1980, 
Jayawardena responded by crushing labor through the dismissal of tens of thousands of 
workers both in the state and private sectors. While the Government maintained that forty 
thousand workers were on strike, trade union estimates vary but claim as many as one 
hundred thousand workers were on strike, the majority of them state sector, but also a section 
of the private sector unions (Fernando 1983). The Government seemed much better prepared 
for the strike, dividing the trade unions on their economic demands, and politically prepared 
and decisive in the attack, including through a state of emergency. This concerted attack 
significantly weakened the trade union movement into the foreseeable future.  
The high economic growth in the first few years after liberalization was mainly due to 
the increasing flows of capital from multilateral donors and a massive construction boom in 
infrastructure and housing.36 By 1979, with the accelerated construction projects37, 
                                                          
36 According to Ganesan, the construction sector clearly became the lead sector in development during this 
period. The accelerated Mahaweli development project and the housing and urban development were both 
construction heavy. The third was the Investment Promotion Zone under the Greater Colombo Economic 
Commission, which led to the emergence of the garment sector (Ganesan 1982, 2). 
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construction grew by 21 percent, while domestic industrial output grew only by 4 percent 
(Ganesan, 1982, 6).  
One of the most acute analyses of the early years of liberalization came from within 
the US Government. A US Foreign Service officer and USAID official based in Sri Lanka at 
that time, John Stuart Blackton, analysed the economic process from 1977 to 1983, as one of 
initial boom with euphoria followed by worries and reversal, which he claimed is the 
conventional path of liberalization.38 While describing the boom and the then slowdown in 
the process of liberalization, Blackton nevertheless prescribed further financialisation 
including expansion of the banking sector and promotion of the capital markets. In any event, 
in his assessment as early as 1983, Blackton was correct about liberalization trajectory: 
 The consensus of moderate and conservative opinion seems to be that another six 
years of liberal economic policies will be sufficient to move the center-point of 
Ceylon's politics significantly to the right, and that no future non-Marxist government 
would be prepared to abandon a basic commitment to the free market (Blackton, 
1983, 750). 
Indeed, over three decades later none of the governments were able to shift significantly from 
the free market policies.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37 The accelerated Mahaweli development project was to be completed in 6 years from the originally planned 30 
years. And the state led 100,000 housing scheme was also to be completed in 6 years (Ganesan 1982, 3). 
38  Blakton’s analysis and sequence of steps with liberalisation are fascinating: “(1) Imported goods flood the 
markets and the consumers are euphoric while traders grow rich overnight; (2) The new money from trade goes 
into real estate and land prices and rents rise dramatically-squeezing some while enriching others; (3) The 
banking system expands dramatically, attracting new deposits (usually in foreign exchange at near-Euro market 
rates). Depositors are initially euphoric because of the high nominal interest rates; (4) The Consumer Price 
Index rises at historically unprecedented rates and euphoria begins to wither among the less favored groups; (5) 
Trade and commerce continue to predominate in the private sector and the government begins to worry about 
the problems of directing resources to productive investments rather than trade; (6) The banking and trading 
constituencies (who are making a killing in commercial transactions) resist pressures to diversify their 
investment portfolios towards production, and public criticism of financial intermediaries mounts; and (7) 
Government begins to re-examine the social and political cost of liberalization and to consider alterations in 
policy to respond to the new distortions.” (Blackton, 1983, 742) 
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Blackton also analyzed the implications of the Jayawardena regime’s embrace of the 
Singapore model and more generally of the East Asian high growth models. He claimed Sri 
Lanka could become a model of high growth, equity and a democratic political system, 
refuting criticism that high growth was only possible under authoritarian governments as with 
East Asia. This narrative of Blackton’s is prescriptive reflecting US geopolitical interests. By 
1983, the Jayawardena regime was anything but liberal. While Jayawardena won his second 
term as president, he had manipulated the legislature to maintain his large majority in 
legislature thorugh a problematic extension of the term of parliament through a referendum. 
Jayawardena was in fact emulating the authoritarian East Asian states. In any event, after the 
initial boom with structural adjustment from 1977 to 1983, the Sri Lankan economy began to 
stagnate even as political developments destabilized the country. 
The other legacy of Jayawardena was the escalation of the armed conflict and the 
emergence of a civil war. Soon after Jayawardena’s electoral victory, the riots that occurred 
with the complicity of the new government in 1977 were foreboding of what was to come.39 
By the late 1970s, Jayawardena was aggressively attempting to crush Tamil militancy. 
Jayawardena declared a State of Emergency and brought about the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act in 1979. Repression was the response to both Tamil youth unrest and the labor agitations. 
Even as the initial spurt of growth propelled by the inflow of capital began to taper, the 
largely state-orchestrated pogrom of July 1983 led to the emergence of the civil war.40 The 
regional power and pro-Soviet leaning India, frustrated with the shift by Jayawardena 
towards the US, began to arm Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan state, thus, hadbecome 
embroiled in a protracted armed conflict.  
                                                          
39 The 1977 riots were worst thus far and it was unleashed by mobs close to the new Government.  
40 Over 2,000 people were massacred in the pogrom of July 1983. The Government watched as Colombo burned 
for three days and much of the Tamil population in the Southern districts were displaced to the North. Soon after 
the pogrom thousands of Tamil youth joined Tamil armed movements with bases in Tamil Nadu in India, and 
that in effect started the civil war. 
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Successive governments during the war continued on the path of economic 
liberalization. Premadasa, who succeeded Jayawardena as the UNP president, had to deal 
with both the war in the North and the second JVP insurrection by rural Sinhala youth in the 
South between 1988 and 1990. The insurgency and a brutal counter insurgency killed tens of 
thousands, crippled the economy and weakened the state. 
On the economic front the Premadasa regime continued on the liberalization 
trajectory. Many scholars on the Sri Lankan economy have argued that the period from 1989 
to 1993 under the Premadasa regime represented the second wave of liberalization, which 
was characterised by financial, trade, tax and exchange rate liberalization (Dunham and 
Kelegama 1995). Next, Chandrika Kumaratunga – the daughter of the founder of SLFP, 
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and later his wife, Srimavo Bandaranaike who had 
led the United Front coalition government in the 1970 – was elected president in 1994 on a 
peace platform with the support of social movements calling for both an end to the war and a 
reversal of liberalization policies that had devastated rural communities since 1977. While 
she had ousted the UNP after seventeen years, she was unable to reverse the liberalization 
trajectory despite election promises to the contrary.  However, she did attempt negotiations 
with the LTTE to arrive at a political solution, but the LTTE broke those talks and restarted 
the war. 
The election of a right wing UNP government in late 2001 led by Ranil 
Wickremesinghe, the nephew of J. R. Jayawardena, with the support of the business 
community in Colombo did create possibilities of a major for liberalization. The 
Wickremesinghe Government attempted to couple the donor-backed internationalised peace 
process with ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’, a market-oriented development and reconstruction 
program. The economic policy package sought major labor reforms, trade and financial 
liberalization, creation of a market in land and privatisation, which if sustained would have 
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drastically reshaped the political economy of Sri Lanka. However, the market-oriented UNP 
Government was defeated after a short tenure in 2004, in part due to the Southern 
constituencies worrying about further cuts to social welfare and in part because of the 
perception that the Government was giving into the demands of the LTTE in the 
internationalized peace process. Wickremesinghe’s defeat in the parliamentary elections of 
2004 to the SLFP coalition led by President Kumaratunga and then the Presidential election 
of 2005 to Rajapaksa, and the subsequent return and escalation of war, again decelerated 
liberalization of the economy. Therefore, I argue that the first wave of liberalization initiated 
in 1977 continued into the following decades, as it did not lead to any significant 
transformation of the economy nor change the economic policy trajectory. 
 
The North before the War 
An analysis of economic developments during and after the war requires a long durée 
perspective. The Jaffna District, while relatively small with just 1,012 km2 continues to house 
a majority of the population of the Northern Province. Much like the other coastal towns in 
Sri Lanka, Jaffna was transformed by centuries of colonial rule first by the Portuguese, then 
the Dutch and finally the British. During the Dutch period in particular, Jaffna became central 
to the colonial economy as the place of greatest revenues accruing to the Dutch in Sri Lanka. 
Furthermore, Dutch policies in Jaffna monetised the local economy through the export of 
cash crops particularly tobacco.  
With the shift to British colonial rule in the early 19th century, the Jaffna economy 
continued to be commercialised by the tobacco trade, but very differently from the plantation 
economy including coffee plantations carried forward by the British in the Central Province 
(Arasaratnam 1982). The estates were run by companies with a captive indentured labor, 
however, the cash crop economy in Jaffna was led by the small-holdinng peasantry. In 
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addition to tobacco, the Jaffna Peninsula was also the centre of agricultural production 
particularly in grains and vegetables. Such agricultural production in Jaffna also led to heavy 
taxation by the British in Jaffna shaping the small holding land tenure system in Jaffna in the 
19th Century (Bastiampillai 2006). 
Jaffna also gained from advances in education with schools built during the British 
colonial period, particularly starting in the mid-19th century. These schools providing English 
education helped produce a small professional middle-class stratum that worked in the 
colonial clerical service and as educators in the rest of the country and even in places like 
Malaysia during the early twentieth century. Thus a small remittance economy was also 
historically true for Jaffna during late colonialism (Paramothayan 1990).  
The Tamil elite demanded constitutional power sharing, as their minority status 
became increasingly evident in the context of universal suffrage and territorial representation 
in the State Councils with the Donoughmore reforms in the early 1930s. This was not the 
case under communal representation where the Tamil elite wielded equal power with their 
Sinhala counterparts. The Up-Country Tamils were disenfranchised in 1949 with the 
complicity of the Tamil political leadership in parliament, particularly G. G. Ponnambalam of 
the Tamil Congress. This was one of the precipitating factors in the emergence of the Federal 
Party on a Tamil nationalist platform. The Tamil public also began to rally behind the Tamil 
nationalist cause with the discriminatory “Sinhala Only” policies in 1956 that affected job 
opportunities and access of state services. Anti-Tamil riots in 1956 and 1958 made the Tamil 
community insecure. The continuing fear within the Tamil community of violence and 
repression of non-violent Tamil political protests led to the further strengthening of Tamil 
nationalist politics.  
It is the economic policies of these Sinahala nationalist regimes between 1956 and 
1977 that also provided state lands for Jaffna Tamils willing to cultivate in the Vanni (the 
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region in the mainland south of the Jaffna District with a large land area but low in 
population). Economically, the import substitution policies beginning in the late 1950s, and 
particularly from 1970 to 1977, supported the cash crop boom in onions, chillies, and 
tobacco, which fetched higher prices in the rest of the country (Gunasinghe 1985). There was 
also a fisheries boom as seafood was exported with the introduction of trawling and fish 
processing facilities in Jaffna (Scholtens 2012). These economic changes benefitted sections 
of the Jaffna Tamils, particularly the lower middle classes, with considerable accumulation in 
the agriculture and fisheries sectors during this period. Such accumulation was best reflected 
by local investment and increased construction, including cement housing and other buildings 
for example of co-operatives.  
It is this sector of the lower middle-class youth, the children of landed small farmers – 
who were increasingly educated but lacked job opportunities despite aspirations towards 
clerical and professional jobs – that increasingly came under the influence of Tamil 
nationalism (Ragavan 2009, Thiranagama et al. 1990). In the early 1970s, controversial 
policies for university admission reducing the high intake of Tamil students from Jaffna were 
implemented by the left-leaning government beholden to the rural Sinhala masses. These so-
called policies of “standardization” eventually led to district quotas, increasing the university 
admissions of educationally backward districts, but were perceived by these lower middle-
class Jaffna youth as discriminatory policies against the Tamils. Historically, relative to other 
districts university admissions from the Colombo and Jaffna Districts were much higher due 
to better facilities in schools in both districts. Therefore, these new university admission 
policies had both a rural and ethnic bias. However, while only a very small section of Jaffna 
youth entered the universities, the professional or white collar jobs that came with university 
admission were central to lower middle class youth aspiration. It is mainly these Tamil youth 
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of lower middle-class background who were also the early cadres of Tamil militancy and 
built the armed movements leading to the armed conflict (De Silva 1978).  
The prosperity from import substitution and cash crop agriculture in Jaffna had a caste 
character. The unique characteristic of caste in Jaffna is that the dominant Vellala caste also 
forms numerical majority of the population of Jaffna. Furthermore, relatively small land area 
resulting in land scarcity in Jaffna coupled with a large population of the dominant land 
owning Vellala caste shaped the small holding character of land ownership. Such landed 
relations have resulted in labor intensive cultivation of cash crops characterising productive 
relations in Jaffna. A large section of the oppressed castes consisted of landless laborers. 
Others were involved in services including as barbers, dhobis, manual scavenging and 
cleaning and tree climbing.  
Here, a broad section of this small-holding Vellala population used both their own 
labor and the labor of oppressed castes whom they hired. Indeed, the wealth and 
accumulation accruing from cash crop cultivation mainly benefitted the Vellala caste (Lebbe 
1979). In this way, the Vellala caste which had been involved in tobacco cultivation for 
export to the rest of the country and even South India as early as the late 19th century, made 
major gains from the cash crop boom in the 1960s and 1970s (Gunasinghe 1985).  
Sections of the fishing community, belonging to the Karaiyar caste also gained from 
the fisheries boom that coincided with the cash crop boom in agriculture. Caste relations in 
Jaffna, where a Brahmin caste is for the most part non-existent, is characterised by the upper 
sections of the Karaiyar fishing caste claiming a position almost equal in status to the 
landowning Vellala caste. The Karaiyar caste have some independence from the Vellala caste 
as they are restricted to the coastal region and control production in fisheries. This is unlike 




The other unique characteristic of Jaffna is the long and vibrant history of co-
operatives beginning in the early twentieth century. Colonial policies of promoting co-
operatives combined with an educated lower middle class and returning Malayan pensioners 
with wealth and time contributed to the growth of co-operatives. By 1970, Jaffna and the 
Northern Province also had an extensive co-operative structure. The Northern Division Co-
operative Federation had 1259 co-operative societies consisting of Credit and Thrift 
Societies, Stores Societies, Hospital Societies, Industrial Societies, Labor Societies, Fishing 
Societies, Credit Unions, School Coop Societies etc. The co-operative societies with 
hundreds of thousands of members were organised into 42 Secondary Unions (Paramothayan 
1990). However, such co-operatives were very much under the control of the dominant 
Vellala caste community.  
While caste oppression had been severe for centuries, including under colonial rule, 
where until the early 19th century oppressed castes were legally categorized as slaves, the 
introduction of representative democracy, the social and economic changes in the late 
colonial period and the cash crop boom triggered anti-caste agitations. The oppressed castes 
consisting of the landless labor and those involved in palmyrah (a palm that grows widely 
and naturally in northern Sri Lanka) and coconut work had gained from the educational 
advances with an emerging leadership from within the community. The toddy tappers, the 
artisans who climb the palm trees to tap the shoots to make a local alcohol, were in the fore 
front of the anti-caste struggles along with others in their caste communities who worked as 
agricultural labor.  
The Communist Party began making inroads into rural Tamil society in the decades 
after Independence. While it was initially involved in parliamentary politics contesting also in 
from Jaffna, following the Peking wing split in the mid-1960s it became militantly involved 
in anti-caste politics. (Senthivel 2009) The Party organised community centres in many 
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oppressed caste villages and started agitating for state services for the oppressed castes. 
While the strength of the oppressed caste communities varied from village to village, the 
leadership provided by the Party was critical to forging an anti-caste movement in Jaffna. The 
caste struggles emboldened the oppressed castes with respect to agricultural relations and 
gave them confidence to demand access to schools dominated by the Vellala caste. It also 
gave them dignity in terms of access to temples and equal seating at tea shops.  
The organisation of oppressed castes in community organisations including the 
community centres, the work of the left particularly the Communist Party in Jaffna and the 
formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives eradicated untouchability and was steadily 
weakening caste structure in Jaffna by the 1970s (Lebbe 1979). However, state discrimination 
and repression and the riots against the Tamil community mobilized large sections of the 
Tamil community under the Tamil nationalist banner. The armed movements led by Tamil 
youth began recruiting youth in the villages and took over the community organisations and 
redirected them away from their focus on caste politics towards their nationalist project. The 
Communist Party lost its social base to these newly emerged armed groups, who through 
intimidation and violence ensured the dominance of Tamil nationalist politics to the detriment 
of anti-caste politics.  
 
War Economy in the North 
During the last two decades of the war, Jaffna was cut off from the national and 
interanational market, and the Vanni was pummelled by bombing and displacement. 
Economic survival during the war depended on three factors: the accumulation during the 
boom in the rural economy prior to the war that the better off spent down; the tremendous 
efforts towards subsistence and make-shift economic possibilities; and humanitarian 
livelihood support from a range of actors including international donors and the state.  
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Accumulation in the rural economy in the two decades prior to the war supported 
some measure of resilience in the Tamil community during the war, particularly in the form 
of assets including savings in banks and gold jewellery. Many families had gained the 
economic means and social connections to send their youth abroad. The mass migration of 
youth as refugees to Western countries provided support in the form of remittances. Social 
institutions such as co-operatives were able to survive and keep their constituencies mobilised 
during the war thanks to their growth and accumulation of resources prior to the war. For 
example, the co-operatives had a range of assets from savings in banks to vehicles and 
buildings, which were all used to sustain the co-operatives during the war.  
State institutions including banks, pension departments and state employee salaries 
continued through the war, including in the territory under the control of the rebels, as the 
state wanted these institutions to continue even if they were subject to manipulation by the 
armed groups. State employees faced the challenge of maintaining the state institutions, 
balancing the demands of the Central Government and the increasingly ruthless armed 
groups, which led to the intimidation, abduction and murder of a number of prominent 
bureaucrats who courageously kept state institutions functioning to serve the local 
communities. 
Agricultural production continued at a minimal level and was mainly for subsistence 
and the local market. The state maintained an economic embargo on fuel and other inputs that 
it claimed could be used for the war efforts by the rebels. Therefore, local communities had to 
mobilise innovative ways of sustaining day to day economic life. Shortages in food items 
were addressed through food substitutes which would not have been possible if not for the 
survival mind-set amidst war-time conditions. Substitutes for food during the war drew on 
traditional foods that had been replaced by wheat and sugar. For example, yams, kurarrakan 
(a local grain) and jaggery (a palm-based sugar) substituted for wheat bread and sugar.  
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A range of actors provided support to the war affected population. The state kept the 
educational institutions and hospitals functioning. Schools became centres for housing the 
displaced during heightened bouts of war and the hospitals were crucial for the increasing 
casualties from the war. The donors and the state provided humanitarian support including 
food subsidies to the war affected population. NGOs provided a range of support working 
with local communities to ensure at least minimal livelihood activities were possible. 
Remittances were also important for the war affected population, but limited to the section of 
the population that had relatives in the Tamil diaspora. By the end of the war, the Tamil 
Diaspora was considered to be almost a million strong, whereas the Tamil population within 
the country amounted to about 2.5 million. That is excluding the Muslim and Up-Country 
Tamil population, who have their own exclusive ethnic and identarian politics. The Vellala 
caste had a much higher proportion of relatives in the diaspora than those of the rural 
oppressed castes.  
The economically marginal sections sought or gained patronage from the LTTE, 
where their youth were recruited, including the forced recruitment of children. The families 
whose youth were in the LTTE or whose children died fighting for the LTTE were given 
privileges and some support from the LTTE. However, this was limited to the territory 
directly under the LTTE, which meant the Vanni from mid-1990 to the end of the war in 
2009 with a population of around half a million. 
Dependency on state institutions, the donors including NGOs, the Tamil Diaspora and 
the LTTE was a defining feature of the Northern war-time economy. The coping mechanisms 
during the war were merely efforts towards survival under harsh conditions. The fisher 
communities were for the most part barred from going to the sea for fishing, except for small 
windows of time and in limited coastal areas. Agricultural communities despite displacement 
sought wage work where possible and support of NGOs for survival, but production was 
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greatly reduced. In other words, households largely became dependent on external actors that 
provided them relief and this dependency undermined and debilitated local social institutions 
capable of mobilising communities (JICA 2011, UN 2011). 
Some of the social institutions such as trade unions more or less became defunct. 
While the North, unlike the commercial and industrial belt around Colombo, never had a 
strong tradition of trade unions, it nevertheless had a small trade union presence with the state 
owned industries built during the import substitution decades. However, with the war and 
displacement, factory production came to a halt disrupting these trade unions. Teachers 
unions had a very strong presence in the North, with the Northern Province Teachers 
Association formed in 1914. These northern teachers unions were weakened with 
displacement and migration of its leadership abroad, and they lost their vibrancy as 
independent organising was curtailed during the war. In the post-war years the teachers 
unions, bank employees unions and some of the state employee unions have continued as 
mere appendages of the stronger federations based in Colombo.  
The historically powerful co-operatives survived the war. The consumer co-operatives 
were utilised by the state to distribute humanitarian supplies and that ensured their survival. 
The producer co-operatives linked to caste-based occupations and as central institutions at the 
village level survived the war with considerable strength. This is evident from their continued 
mobilisations including the ability to negotiate with the state. I discuss both the history and 
the present potential of co-operatives in Chapter 5. The other social institutions such as 
schools, temples and community centres were weakened, as in many places they could not 
function for years due to displacement. However, given their centrality to village life 
including processes of resettlement they are developing in new directions. The relationship of 
schools, temples and community centres to caste and the new dynamics of caste relations in 
the post-war years are discussed in Chapter 4.  
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The war-torn people of the North suffered considerable loss of life and high 
casualties, their homes and livelihoods have been devastated and they were subject to 
tremendous displacement and migration. After the war, many of the war-torn districts in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces have the highest incidence of poverty, the highest drop out 
rates of teenagers from schools, the lowest literacy rates and the highest levels of infant and 
maternal mortality rates (UN 2015). Their deprivation during the war is also a story about the 
crippling of their social institutions built and nurtured over a hundred years if not longer.  
 
End of the War and Regime Consolidation 
In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president with a broad coalition 
consisting of the Sinhala Buddhist right and the left parties.41 However, he had scraped 
through to victory only because the LTTE had forced a boycott of the elections in the North 
ensuring the defeat of the UNP candidate Ranil Wicramasinghe. This move by the LTTE, 
which on a war footing wanted a hard line president to escalate the war, proved to be suicidal. 
The blame for the collapse of the peace process fell on the LTTE, as the European Union and 
Canada banned the LTTE claiming it was a “terrorist organization” in 2006, which restricted 
the financial and political support from the Tamil diaspora to the LTTE. The Rajapaksa 
regime with the support of a whole range of international actors, capitalized on the global 
“war on terror” push and was ruthless in what proved to be the last phase of the civil war.  
The Rajapaksa regime mobilised the South for the war through an extensive process 
of militarization. It gave prominence to the military with the President’s brother appointed as 
Defence Secretary and greatly increased the defence budget and expanded the size of the 
military through recrutment. Large swathes of land in the North and East and areas 
                                                          
41 The left parties never recovered after their coalition government experiment in the 1970s and major defeat by 
the UNP. They slipped further into patronage politics in coaltion governments, particularly with return of the 
SLFP in the 1994. The rise and decline of the left from the mid-1930s to this day parallels the tragic history of 
Sri Lanka from a multi-ethnic and egalitarian society to a polarized country. 
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surrounding important facilities were designated as High Security Zones denying access to 
civilians. Militarization characterized by the public glorification of the military as war heroes, 
greater powers for the military to control civilian institutions and censorship of any criticism 
of the military in the press became the norm during the last years of the war. Militarization 
included extensive surveillance by the intelligence agencies including by military 
intelligence. Such surveillance was even more insidious in character when it targeted the 
Tamil community, where former members of Tamil armed groups including the LTTE were 
used to surveil and eliminate those believed to be linked to the LTTE, both in the Tamil 
regions as well as in Colombo and the South. The press and dissent were disciplined both 
through legal sanction as well as extrajudicial physical attacks, abductions and killings of 
journalists and Tamil parliamentarians.  
Sinhala Buddhist nationalist rhetoric in the press and prominence given to chauvinist 
ideologues further mobilized Sinhala society. Sinhala Buddhist nationalist interests were 
pacified as President Rajapaksa intervened in proposals towards a constitutional solution by 
restricting devolution of power and insisting that the constitution will ensure a unitary 
structure of the state as opposed to one with federal features. In effect, the decades of 
progress towards a constitutional political solution as government policy were reversed as a 
military solution to the ethnic conflict was promoted. On the economic front, the Rajapaksa 
regime adopted populist policies to ensure support from the rural South, including investment 
in rural roads and electrification, and expansion of public sector employment. 
Both the military and the LTTE committed grave human rights abuses against the 
citizenry. In the dirty war, the state used torture and disappearances to dismantle the LTTE’s 
intelligence and terror networks responsible for assassinations and bombings in Colombo. 
The LTTE forcefully recruited thousands of youth and children in preparation for the final 
war. The state used massive firepower, bombing and shelling the Vanni region, even as the 
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LTTE retreated into a small strip of land on the Mullaitivu coast holding the civilian 
population as human shields. The LTTE even fired on fleeing Tamil civilians to hold them 
hostage (Hoole 2015). Tens of thousands of civilians died in those cruel final months of the 
war. In May 2009, the LTTE was militarilly defeated without the possibility of even a low 
intensity insurgency. The LTTE had created a single pyramidal and centralised structure 
around its leader Prabhakaran and transformed itself into a conventional army. Thus with the 
decimation of the LTTE leadership its revival was not possible (Hoole 2015).  
The Rajapaksa regime, euphoric in victory, did not feel compelled to address the 
grievances of the minorities. Instead they focussed on the consolidation of their political 
power. The Rajapaksa regime, in the process of mobilising Sinhala society for the war had 
given centre stage to Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The military had been given prominence 
and carte blanche to carry out the war effort. After the war, strengthening the Sinahala 
Buddhist nationalist base and reliance on the military became central to the stability of the 
Rajapaksa regime.  
The Rajapaksa regime alienated the minorities and caused further suffering for the 
Tamil survivors of the war as they were interned in camps for many months and were only 
allowed to resettle slowly. While the Tamil survivors of the war were resentful of the LTTE, 
particularly the manner in which the LTTE suppressed them during the last phase of the war, 
they felt humiliated by the state after the war. They continued to live under a climate of fear 
as the military was given full control over their future after the war. 
The Rajapaksa regime seemed invincible in national politics. However, Sarath 
Fonseka the ambitious former Army Commander, disappointed with the regime that he was 
not given more powers, decided to contest the early presidential elections in January 2010. 
Rajapaksa’s calculation to callfor presidential elections one and half years early worked in his 
favour as he swept the elections. Fonseka was arrested soon after the elections as Rajapaksa 
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further consolidated his hold over the military. Next, the coaltion led by Rajapaksa gained a 
two thirds majority in the parliament elections of April 2010. The electoral strategy after the 
war had worked and the regime carried forward constitutional reforms to consolidate 
tremendous powers under the executive presidency. The 18th Amendment to the Constitution 
in September 2010, provided greater powers to the president to make appointments for the 
judiciary, police and other independent commissions and repealed the two term limit of the 
presidency. 
There were a number continuities from the last phase of the war to the post-war years. 
First, there was the expanding militarization in the country, particularly the North and East. 
The civil administration in the war-torn regions including the Governors of the Provinces and 
a number of Government Agents – the chief administrator of a District – were led by military 
personnel. The Urban Development Authority and the NGO Secretariat responsible for 
regulating NGOs in the country were brought under the Defence Ministry to accelerate urban 
development and control the activities of the NGOs. Second, Sinhala Buddhist 
majoritarianism was given a prime place nationalist politics with the Rajapaksa regime 
instigating and supporting political forces such as Jathika Hela Urumaya and the Bodu Bala 
Sena, the former a political party and the latter a right wing social movement, led by virulent 
Buddhist clergy and chauvinists. Annual victory parades and war memorials added to such a 
militarised Sinhala Buddhist ideological thrust. Third, in the post-war period the Rajapaksa 
regime became more and more authoritarian drawing on its new constitutional powers, 
militarization and Sinhala Buddhist nationalist mobilizations.  
The national question was debated in Sri Lanka during the decades after 
Independence and into the war years as a constitutional political solution to the grievances of 
minorities. However, Rajapaksa rejected any engagement with this long held consensus in Sri 
Lanka by mobilising and championing the majoritarian agenda of the Sinhala Buddhist forces 
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that consolidated with the war victory. Instead, Rajapaksa put forward development as the 
solution to address the concerns of the minorities as well as the country as a whole.42 
 
Conclusion 
Centuries of colonial rule and integration with the global economy continued with 
new forms of global political and economic forces into the mid-twentieth century and the 
postcolonial era. Global capital flows, international trade for the export oriented economy and 
the infrastructure built over the previous centuries were expanded and rebuilt over the last 
century. The estates and the urban centres in the country created a contrast to the largely 
underdeveloped regions where the small-holding peasantry struggled. The advances and 
proliferation of educational institutions, the anti-colonial disourses which took on Sinhala 
Buddhist and Tamil nationalist forms, the emergence of trade unions and co-operatives in the 
country set Sri Lanka’s politics firmly on a modern path with new challenges for state and 
society. 
Sri Lanka during the eight decades from the late colonial period into contemporary 
times has been transformed by postcolonial capitalist development and modern institutions of 
the postcolonial state. The active role of the state led by left-leaning governments with their 
import substitution policies and emphasis on rural development and land reform along with 
                                                          
42 Such thinking about solving the economic and political problems in Sri Lanka through economic growth had 
existed for sometime. Harvard scholar D. R. Snodgrass, a decade before the end of the war claimed Sri Lanka’s 
economic development was held back by lack of ideological coherence and the ethnic conflict. He further 
claimed that the change of government in 1994 with the continuation of liberalization policies by the new SLFP-
led government had addressed the first issue, but that the ethnic conflict and the youth insurrections had to be 
addressed. He wrote in 1998: “The second major impediment, however – ethnic conflict – has not yet been 
overcome. Economic growth is taking place, but the costly war drags on and much more could clearly be done 
to accelerate economic progress if the long-sought political solution could finally be found. By the same token, 
economic development could help to ameliorate ethnic conflict, as it has in Malaysia. Youth unemployment was 
a factor in the emergence of the LTTE, as it was of the JVP. Creation of a million new jobs through outward-
looking economic expansion would go far toward solving Sri Lanka’s political problems as well as its economic 
problems.” (Snodgrass 1998, P. 30) Interestingly, the right wing US-leaning UNP Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe during his short stint in power between 2002 and 2004 as well as after regime change in 2015 
claimed he was going to create a million jobs through an export-led economy. 
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the free education and universal healthcare policies transformed Sri Lanka into a model 
developing country with high human development indicatotrs. However, during the last four 
decades, economically and politically, the country deteriorated, with the open economy 
reforms leading to increasing inequality and the ethnic conflict crippling sections of society. 
The three decades of war were particularly devastating for the mostly rural people in the 
north and east, who not only faced the violence of the state but also were mobilised by a 
militarised Tamil nationalist movement. In the process, the people caught in the war saw their 
social institutions deteriorate and even disintegrate.  
Economic realities diverged. Accelerating economic development centred on the 
capital Colombo on the one hand and a diabled economy in the war-torn regions on the other 
hand, characterized the new Sri Lanka. The process of reconstruction in Jaffna after the war, 
including reintegration with the national economy and the social and economic development 






CHAPTER 2  
The Second Wave of Neoliberalism and Post-War Reconstruction 
 
As with any other society devastated by war, decades of disruption of cycles of 
investment and production in the North and East of Sri Lanka curtailed capital accumulation. 
Though the state has poured billions of rupees in investment on infrastructure and facilitated 
the flow of considerable private finance, these flows have neither stimulated local production 
nor mobilised local labor. Indeed, development and the reconstruction of a war-devastated 
society raise not only the need for capital but also the particular form of capital in relation to 
labor, resources and institutions. Therefore, it is not just the amount of money that has been 
put into circulation after the war in the North and East. Rather, it is about how the money has 
been used, and how it affects relations between people and their institutions.  
 I argue in this chapter that the post-war years starting in 2010 have been characterized 
by a second wave of of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. I categorize the period between 1977 and 
1983 with the launch of the “open economy” reforms and structural adjustment as the first 
wave of neoliberalism. While the civil war between 1983 and 2009 did not disrupt the 
neoliberal trajectory of Sri Lanka, it nevertheless curtailed efforts to drastically transform the 
economy through accelerated liberalization. This periodization is central to my analysis. I 
argue that national authoritarian stability, global conditions conducive for the inflow of 
finance capital and accelerated liberalization processes constitute waves of neoliberalism that 
set national economies on a transformative path. Furthermore, each neoliberal wave has 
particular characteristics including distinct policies; on banking and finance; on urbanization 
and infrastructure build-out; privatization and restructuring of state enterprises; trade, exports 
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and foreign direct investment; changes to the rural economy; and entitlments and services of 
communities and individuals.  
In this context, post-war reconstruction starting in 2010 – focused on the rebuilding 
large infrastructure, expansion of credit and the promotion of self employment to the 
detriment of rebuilding social institutions – are embedded within the national development 
trajectory in Sri Lanka. Therefore, I begin this chapter with an analysis of the post-war 
economic development in Sri Lanka as a whole followed by a discussion of reconstruction in 
Jaffna.  
 
Second Wave of Neoliberalism 
At the end of the war, the Sri Lankan economy was facing a balance of payments 
crisis with the depletion of foreign reserves and high levels of inflation. In the final months of 
the war in 2009, Sri Lanka began negotiating a Standby Arrangement with the IMF. The 
Western powers concerned about Sri Lanka’s strong relations with China, Iran and Libya, 
and increasingly critical about the humanitarian conduct of the war during the last phase, put 
some pressure on the IMF to reconsider if not delay the IMF agreement. However, the IMF 
agreement finally went through in July 2009 providing US$ 2.6 billion in loans with 
conditions on the Sri Lankan state’s economic policies including reducing the fiscal deficit,43 
expanding the tax base, addressing the losses of state enterprises, a flexible exchange rate and 
strengthening the banking sector (Skanthakumar, 2009; IMF, 2009).  
The IMF agreement was much more than the financial support of US$ 2.6 billion. It 
was the first move in a major shift in the political economy of post-war Sri Lanka. The IMF 
agreement marked a turning point of support and approval for the Rajapaksa regime’s 
                                                          
43 The IMF called for a reduction of the budget deficit to 5 percent of GDP by 2011, from a target of 7 percent in 
2009, but it did not prescribe how that reduction was to be achieved. 
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economic policies by global finance capital. Despite the antagonistic moves by Western 
states in forums such as the UN, the economic rationale prevailed when it came to the flow of 
global finance capital into Sri Lanka, particularly with the guarantee of the IMF agreement.  
Next, the economic crisis of 2008 resulted in the flow of capital to the “emerging 
markets.” The Rajapaska regime seized this moment, characterising Sri Lanka as a stable, 
post-conflict, emerging market on the path to becoming the “Miracle of Asia” (Rajapaksa, 
2010). Large flows of global finance capital were facilitated through greater integration with 
the global capital markets, both by the state in the form of sovereign bonds as well as banks 
that floated corporate bonds. Such global capital was absorbed in various infrastructure and 
urban development projects, including in real estate ventures in Colombo, with centralized 
and militarized development policies made possible by the new constitutional powers 
usurbed by the President after the war.  
The end of the war, the emergence of stability characterised by militarised security in 
the entire country, a strong authoritarian regime at the helm of state power and global 
conditions following the global economic crisis in the West leading to the flow of capital to 
emerging markets, created the conditions for a second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. 
This latest phase of global integration and transformation of the political economy of Sri 
Lanka is on the order of the changes that came soon after Independence from 1948 to 1953 
and then again with the first wave of neoliberalism from 1977 to 1983.  
The dominant discourse about the post-war economic transformation of Sri Lanka 
disregarded both the history of similar waves of opening of the the Sri Lankan economy 
including liberalization as well as the impact of global economic forces. Instead, the post-war 
transformation of the economy is articulated as a “transition” from war time stagnation to 
high growth with economic development by actors such as the World Bank (Biller & Nabi, 
2013). The World Bank claims: “seen through the lens of Malaysia’s successful economic 
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transition, Sri Lanka has the basis to reap a peace dividend and move into a higher growth 
path that would help it achieve high-middle income status in 15 years” (Biller & Nabi 2013, 
102). However, the selective discussion of the Malaysian model does not address the 
problems that Malaysia encountered with the East Asian economic crisis and its policies of 
control on capital movement. For the World Bank, Sri Lanka emulating the Malaysia model 
meant building an export-led economy, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in building 
infrastructure and creating business friendly conditions. Furthermore, for some actors close to 
the Rajapaksa regime the Malaysian model also meant focusing on economic development as 





                                                          
44 The following report by the Institute of Policy Studies, the foremost state sponsored economic think tank in 
Sri Lanka, reflected the thinking that a change of mindset was possible with the end of the war including the 
possibility of pursuing the Malaysian model: “The conflicts in Malaysia were mostly in two periods – 1948 and 
1969 – while in Sri Lanka, the conflict lasted from 1983-2009 – nearly three decades. … It is true that the 
conflict is sometimes used as a ‘scapegoat’ by those who lament Sri Lanka’s economic ills. Yet, the impact of a 
30 year war and the impact of its conclusion on the prospects of the economy cannot be overlooked. … While 
East Asian countries were able to use external threats to build the public impetus needed for growth, Sri Lanka 
struggled with complex internal divisions caused by the conflict that made it increasingly difficult to get the 
public to rally around bold economic reforms.” (Attygalle 2012) 
Scholarship on Sri Lanka also tends to compare Sri Lanka’s failures with Malaysia’s success. But in the process 
reduced the political resolution in Malaysia into a success, disregarding Malaysia’s legacy of authoritarian and 
majoritarian politics. Harvard scholar Donald R. Snodgrass claims: “It is not evident that the ethnic situation in 
Sri Lanka should inherently have been more of a threat to economic growth in, say, 1960 than that in Malaysia. 
The ethnic Chinese minority in Malaysia was more than twice as large as the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, while 
the numerical position of the ethnic majority was far more secure in Sri Lanka, where Sinhalese were seventy-
four percent of the population in 1981, than in Malaysia, where the Malays were just over half the population. 
Moreover, religious, cultural and linguistic differences between the two largest communities were all sharper in 
Malaysia. Yet Malaysia got off with brief episodes of conflict, notably in 1969, adopted a comprehensive 
affirmative action policy (the ‘New Economic Policy’ of 1971), and managed to record one of the world’s 
highest rates of economic growth in 1970-95, while Sri Lanka was only able to attain modest economic growth 
as the political situation deteriorated into civil war.” (Snodgrass 1998, 29) 
Malaysian scholar Jomo K. Sundaram has a more sober assessment of Malaysia’s resolution of ethnic tensions. 
He claims much of the growth with the New Economic Policy was characterized by the rich getting richer, while 
migrant workers were severely exploited. Furthermore, the ethnic issue was only managed through deals to 




Facets of Neoliberalism in Contemporary Sri Lanka 
I have identified three aspects of neoliberalism45 that are important for analyzing the 
political economy of post-war Sri Lanka. First, finance capital and financialisation have 
become the engines of economic transformation, where without the continuing inflow of 
finance capital and its circulation the economy will be crippled by crisis (Dumenil and Levy 
2011, Fine 2013). Large flows of global finance capital as well as integration with the global 
capital markets have immensely transformed Sri Lanka’s national finances and its banking 
sector. Second, the role of the state has changed to one that reshapes the economy and creates 
the conditions, including through its repressive apparatuses, for the accumulation of finance 
capital (Harvey 2005). In post-war Sri Lanka, an authoritarian regime controlling a national 
security state shapes mega urban and infrastructure development to absorb investments by 
finance capital. Third, individuals are atomised and called upon to take economic 
responsibility for themselves as entrepreneurs and through self-employment, even as social 
institutions are marginalised, where individuals are eventually blamed for the devastation 
they face with economic processes and crises. The neoliberal policies targeting individuals 
changes the relationship between state and citizen, where the state is less and less responsible 
to the citizen (Wacquant 2012).  
These three facets of neoliberalism do not exhaust theorisation on neoliberalism. For 
example, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation and funded-NGO schemes are also 
                                                          
45 While there is extensive theorization of neoliberalism in South Asia, the conceptualization and analysis of 
neoliberalism here is limited in Sri Lanka. This gap in the use of neoliberalism as an analytical concept is 
intriguing. It could be in part related to the displacement of class analysis with the emergence of the ethnic 
conflict and the deployment of ethnicity as the central concept in scholarship on Sri Lanka. While political 
economic analysis flourished in the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the descent into civil war in the mid-1980s 
saw the energies of most scholars turn to analysis of ethnicity. The emphasis of anthropological scholarship as 
opposed to political economy in the 1980s to address the emergent problems in the country was a turn away 
from class analysis to the analysis of culture (Jeganathan 1998). Over the last few decades, there has been some 
analysis of the different phases of liberalisation under successive regimes in Sri Lanka. Such analysis attempted 
to understand the impact of policies on specific sectors including agriculture, irrigation, privatisation and trade. 
However, there is a dirth of systemic analysis of the social, economic and political changes that came with 
liberalisation and the civil war. My own intellectual engagement in Sri Lanka was linked to the displacement of 
these forms of analysis in recent decades, particularly political economy and a critique of neoliberalism. 
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important facets of neoliberalism. Indeed, after regime change in Sri Lanka in 2015, there is a 
much greater emphasis on trade liberalization and restructuring of state enterprises. 
Therefore, neoliberal policies in different contexts and at different points in time take 
different paths.  
The reconstruction of the war-torn regions starting in 2010 were an extension of the 
second wave of neoliberalism transforming the country, and were constituted by the 
interaction of financialization, the neoliberal state and processes atomizing individuals by 
seeking them out as consumers and clients. The interaction at these three realms were shaped 
by global forces and national changes, with global financial flows circulating through 
national financial institutions were seeking new places for absorbtion of such finance. In this 
context, the war-torn regions that were isolated during the war from financial flows and the 
market became an open field for a range of new entrants including institutions of finance and 
retail trade. Financial instituitons hungry for an untapped population, and euphoric about 
Jaffna society as historically a saving population and now with flows of remittances, 
aggressively moved to capture the region. However, this financial and market integration was 
also a political project, encouraged by the Rajapaksa regime and the international donors and 
agencies, who claimed that finance and the market leads to development of the war-torn 
regions. 46 
In the next two sections, I will discuss financialization followed by the neoliberal 
state. I will then discuss reconstruction in Jaffna focused on infrastructure development and 
expansion of credit leading to falling incomes and rising indebtedness. I will conclude with a 
                                                          
46 Wacquant describes the dynamic working of neoliberalism at three levels: “This core consists of an 
articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the 
third. So all three of these institutions must be brought into our analytic ambit. I diverge from market-centred 
conceptions of neoliberalism in that I prioritise (political) means over (economic) ends; but I part with the 
governmentality framework in that I prioritise state crafting over technologies and non-state logics, and I focus 
on how the state effectively redraws the boundaries and tenor of citizenship through its market-conforming 
policies.” (Wacquant 2012, 71) 
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discussion of the failure of reconstruction, increasing out migration and the policies seeking 
to atomize individuals.  
 
Financialization and Global Capital 
In analysing the history of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka, there has been some discussion 
of trade liberalization, foreign aid, cuts to social welfare, fiscal austerity, the attack on 
organised labor and large development projects (Law and Society Trust 2010; Skanthakumar 
2013; Bastian 2007). However, there is little analysis of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka focused 
on the process of financialization and banking. Neoliberalism at the outset in the 1970s was 
centred on the processes of financialization (Dumenil and Levy 2011) and could be 
characterized as a class project of finance capital (Harvey 2005). I draw on the broader 
concept of financialization47 from the work of Dumenil and Levy, who consider it to be the 
expansion of financial institutions and mechanisms and the corresponding increase in assets 
and debt. Financialization in contemporary times leads to accumulation with profit-making 
through financial mechanisms as opposed to actual production. Furthermore, such 
financialization reduces the wealth and incomes of workers, though both processes that 
indebt workers and reduce their real wages in order to increase profits.48  
                                                          
47 Dumenil and Levy analyze financialization as follows: “on the one hand, the expansion of financial 
institutions and mechanisms (and the corresponding masses of assets and debt), taking account of innovative 
procedures and, on the other hand, the imposition of managerial criteria such as the creation of value for the 
shareholder. The comparative size and profit rate of the financial sector is involved. The same is true of the 
expansion of the financial component of management within financial institutions and within nonfinancial 
corporations, as well as the spectacular rise of the income paid to financial managers. Given the role conferred 
on financial interests in contemporary capitalism, the term ‘financialization’ is also used in a broader sense in 
the literature, encompassing most of the features of neoliberalism. There is a lot of meaning in the assertion that 
neoliberalism is a ‘financialized capitalism,’ sometimes denoted on such grounds as ‘financial or finance 
capital(ism).’ But this feature is not really new. The phrase ‘Finance capital’ was coined by Hilferding at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. ‘Finance-led capitalism’ would be closer to the perspective here, provided 
that a proper definition of ‘Finance’ is given.” (Dumenil and Levy 2011, 35-36) 
48 According to Stockhammer, financialization include, “rising indebtedness of households, more volatile 
exchange rates and asset prices, short-termism of financial institutions, and shareholder value orientation of non-
financial businesses.” Furthermore, his discussion of the falling labour share of national income through a 
discussion of financialization and its imparct on labour including its bargaining power is important: “First, firms 




The first wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka restructured the banking and financial 
sector. According to Karunatilake: “The banking and the financial system between 1979 and 
1982, expanded by leaps and bounds and more than 14 leading international banks opened 
branches in Sri Lanka. Thus, by 1988, there were 26 commercial banks operating in the 
island and the majority were branches of foreign banks.” (Karunatilake 2004) There were 
also powerful investment incentives for foreign and domestic capital (Herring 1987). Thus 
the post-war process of financialization was built on an earlier period of new financial 
structures with banking reform in Sri Lanka. 
What is different with the second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka is the role 
played by global finance capital and integration with global capital markets. Influenced by 
such global finance, the process of financialization was far more extensive transforming Sri 
Lanka’s national finances and financial sector as a whole with financial institutions and 
products reaching down to the rural economy. In otherwords, there is a structural shift in the 
workings of financialization, where global circuits of financial accumulation were able to 
reach the rural households through the formal channels of banks and finance companies and 
range of new financial mechanisms.  
I first discuss changes to financialization at the national level. Then I discuss the 
changes to banking, including by comparing the national flow of finances through the 
markets compared to the historically high donor assistance in countries like Sri Lanka. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
invest at home as well as abroad. They have gained mobility in terms of the geographical location as well as in 
terms of the content of investment. Second, it has empowered shareholders relative to workers by putting 
additional constraints on firms and the development of a market for corporate control has aligned management’s 
interest to that of shareholders.” (Stockhammer 2013, 7)  
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Financialisation at the National Level   
Fnancialization in Sri Lanka at the national level is acceding to global trends in 
financial architectures. The current structure of Sri Lanka’s national finances are 
characterized by the increase in shorter term and high interest commercial loans  and the 
relative decline of longer-term and concessionary loans from multilateral and bilateral 
donors. For example, in 2000 almost 100 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was 
concessional loans, but by 2013 that figure had dropped to below 50 percent (Finanance 
Ministry Annual Report 2013, 178). 
Financialization is also propelled by the increasing market capitalization of the 
Colombo Stock Exchange. Furthermore, high levels of euro and dollar bonds are floated by 
commercial banks and other companies controlled by the Government. The early evidence of 
the dynamics of this process of financialization was the quadrupling of the stock market in 
the eighteen months after the war ended in May 2009. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, there is a 
tremendous rise in the Colombo Stock Exchange in the two years after the war, but it tapers 
off after the initial boom. Furthermore, between 2009 and 2010, Sri Lanka far out performed 




Figure 2.1 Comparison of Sri Lanka, Emerging Markets, World Stock Market Indices 
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Financiers close to the regime benefited from state finances and other funds 
channelled into the stock market to make speculative returns. 49 The Employees’ Provident 
Fund (EPF) controlled by the Central Bank, is the largest retirement fund in Sri Lanka with 
the net value at the end of the 2013 worth Rs. 1.3 trillion (US$ 10 billion) or close to 14% of 
GDP and half the market capitalisation of the Colombo Stock Exchange at that time. See 
Figure 2.2 for market capitalization of the stock market as a percentage of GDP. While 
historically, the EPF was invested only in government bonds, in recent years as much as 7.5% 
(EPF 2013) of this fund is being diverted into the stock market. There have been attempts to 
divert much larger percentage of this workers retirement fund even as trade unions accuse the 
government of propping up the stock market through risky investments. In the post-war 
years, the successive regimes are attempting to create larger private retirement funds as part 
of the project to create a large financial market, and investing the existings retirements funds 
in the stock market is part of that project.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 EPF and Market Capitalisation of CSE (% of GDP) 
Source: EPF, Central Bank, Securities Exchange Commission 
 
                                                          
49 As the post-war euphoria and capital flows into Sri Lanka tapered the Government tried to prop up the stock 
market resulting considerable manipulation. In 2011 and 2012, two Securities and Exchange Commission 
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Between 2009 and 2012, most of the major banks in Sri Lanka doubled or tripled 
assets by expanding retail business dominated by loans to households.50 Such expansion of 
bank assets have been possible through borrowings in the global financial markets. For 
example the Bank of Ceylon has floated a total of US$ 1 billion in euro and dollar bonds in 
the international capital markets in 201251 and 2013. The National Savings Bank floated a 
similar bond of US$ 750 million at an extremely high interest of 8.9% in 2013.52  
The National Development Bank (NDB) and Development Finance Corporation of 
Ceylon (DFCC), the two development banks in Sri Lanka, were given tax incentives to float 
similar bonds worth US$ 250 million each in the Budget for 2013. Their failure to float the 
bonds led the Central Bank to call for the merger of the two development banks. While the 
Central Bank has not forced the merger of the development banks, since 2014 there is a major 
push for financial consolidation with the merger of banks and finance companies. Such 
mergers are expected to facilitate greater financialization through increased floating of 
international bonds and the inflow of global finance capital to invest in the financial sector in 
Sri Lanka.  
The floating of dollar-denominated bonds are encouraged by policy makers to bring 
foreign exchange necessary for the burgeoning import bill.53 Such a strategy – with high 
interest rate loans that could prove costly to the banks – was possible because most of these 
                                                          
50 For example, the largest commercial bank, the Bank of Ceylon, increased loans and advances from Rs. 275 
billion to Rs. 715 billion, while deposits only increased from Rs. 408 billion to Rs. 694 billion, between the 
years 2009 and 2012 (BOC 2013, 63). Of these loans, 45% to retail customers, 17% to the corporate sector and 
38% to state owned enterprises (BOC 2013, 70).    
51 Reflecting this strategy of market borrowing by state-owned commercial banks, the BOC’s foreign currency 
loans increased by 165% from Rs. 65 billion in 2011 to Rs. 171 billion in 2012 (BOC 2013, 71).    
52 The lead managers, Barclays, Citigroup and HSBC and the investors in the bonds were Geographically US 
contributed 39%, Europe with 38% and Asia with the remaining 23%. The bond carried an international rating 
of BB- (Daily Financial Times, 7 January 2015). 
53 The high import bill in Sri Lanka is influenced by global oil prices with Sri Lanka dependendant on its 
electricity production through oil. In other years, the import bill has been due to high levels of vehicle imports.  
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banks are still majority owned by the state.54 Furthermore, borrowings through such state 
controlled commercial banks do not go on the books as state borrowings, in other words, it is 
borrowings that do not add to the budget deficit.  
In this way, there was a clear strategy of financialization with the flow of foreign 
funds. A prominent business news agency reported the following approach of the Central 
Bank back in late 2011:  
Sri Lanka's non-bank finance companies should borrow abroad to increase resources 
they have to lend to the domestic economy, Central Bank Governor Nivard Cabraal 
said. ‘We need new money coming into the country if we are going to achieve this 
growth that we are targeting,’ Cabraal told a forum of non-bank lenders in Colombo. 
‘We cannot do it with only the savings that we have in our own country.’ Cabraal said 
the state has borrowed abroad and set a benchmark for private borrowers to go to 
international markets (LBO 2011). 
Thus global financial flows were encouraged through inter-connected interventions of foreign 
borrowing by the state, banks and non-bank financial companies.55 
Next, comparing the flow of finances through such financial transactions in the capital 
markets to foreign aid points to an increasingly dominant role for the financial sector. The 
total disbursement of aid from the multilateral and bilateral donors in 2013, including the 
World Bank, ADB, Japan, China and India was Rs. 180 billion (US$ 1.4 billion) with net 
flows after repayments amounting to Rs. 68 billion (US$ 520 million).56 Next, Foreign Direct 
                                                          
54 These high interest rates and tremendous accumulation which the Sri Lankan public has to burden is related to 
the point above that while the West was against Sri Lanka in Geneva at the UN Human Rights Council, it did 
not deter Western financiers from pouring in capital to accumulate high financial profits.  
55 National Savings in Sri Lanka have been on the order of 23% to 33% of GDP between 2009 and 2015, so it is 
not the lack of savings, but rather the kind of investments in infrastructure and the increasing import bill that led 
to calls for increased global financial flows. National investment has ranged between 24% and 39% of GDP, 
which in turn increased GDP growth (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 3). 
56 According the Finance Ministry: “On a gross basis, total foreign loan proceeds in 2013 amounted to Rs. 179.3 




Investment continues to be marginal and much of it is channelled into real estate 
development, rather than productive investments.57 For example FDI in 2013 was only US$ 
1.4 billion compared to bonds worth US$ 1 billion floated by the Bank of Ceylon alone 
(Finance Ministry Annual Report 2014, 8). 
 Given that exports are almost half the imports, Sri Lanka would have serious balance 
of payment problems if not for the worker remittances. Indeed, it is migrant workers 
remittances from the Middle East that have kept the Sri Lanka economy afloat; worker 
remittances have steadily increased from less than US$ 2 billion in 2005 to US$ 6.4 billion in 
2013 (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 157). 
 
Table 2.1 Soverign Bonds 
Date Amount (US$ Mn) Interest Rate (%) Tenure (Years) Maturity Date 
17/10/2007 500 8.250 5 Matured in 2012 
22/01/2009 500 7.400 6 Matured in 2015 
30/10/2010 1,000 6.250 10 30/10/2020 
27/07/2011 1,000 6.250 10 27/07/2021 
25/07/2012 1,000 5.875 10 25/07/2022 
06/01/2014 1,000 6.000 5 06/01/2019 
07/04/2014 500 5.125 5 07/04/2019 
03/06/2015 650 6.125 10 03/06/2025 
02/11/2015 1,500 6.850 10 03/11/2025 
11/07/2016 500 5.750 5.5 11/01/2022 
11/07/2016 1,000 6.825 10 11/07/2026 
Source: Central Bank 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
repayments of foreign loans were Rs. 111.4 billion, total foreign financing on a net basis amounted to Rs. 67.9 
billion.” (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 178) 
57 According to a recent World Bank Report: “FDI remains below 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
five years after the end of armed conflict, relative to much higher levels of FDI in other MICs such as Vietnam 
or Cambodia. While FDI can enhance access of producers to global production networks and facilitate the 
development of new activities within existing value chains, FDI inflows to Sri Lanka have been largely focused 
on infrastructure (inclusive of real estate development), with a relatively small proportion reaching sectors of the 
economy that are associated with global networks of production” (World Bank 2015, 4). However, the World 
Bank itself had been promoting such infrastructure development and continues with such projects. The World 
Bank’s analysis here is premised on the questionable claims that further liberalization will increase FDI flows 
that will in turn lead to production of exports. The reality may be that even if such increased FDI flows are 
mobilized they may only lead to greater speculative investment in real estate and other assets.  
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Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt accumulated over the decades is also changing 
drastically. The total foreign debt of the government at the end of 2013 was Rs. 2,960 billion 
(US$ 22.8 billion); of which multilateral and bilateral concessional loans were Rs. 1,492 
billion (US$ 11.5 billion) and non-concessional loans were Rs. 459 billion (US$ 3.5 billion); 
and market borrowing have increased considerably to Rs. 1,007 billion (US$ 7.7 billion) 
(Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 206). The latter increased by the issuing of sovereign 
bonds is now a third of foreign government financing. As evident form Table 2.1, Sri Lanka 
has issued US$ 8.05 billion in sovereign bonds after the war and incurs quite high interest 
costs of foreign capital. Furthermore, foreign debt was also accrued through state-held 
commercial banks and other state-owned enterprises.  
 
Financialisation at the Rural and Household Level 
Financial integration with the global financial markets and changes to national 
finances have also extended down to the level of the households including in the villages with 
increasing financial products such as pawning, micro credit and lease hire purchasing. In Sri 
Lanka, leasing refers to purchase of vehicles as well as household consumer goods, where 
following an initial payment of up to 20% of the value of the item, the rest is paid in 
instalments. However, if three successive installments are not paid, the leasing company 
seizes the item forcefully resulting often in the loss of both the item, the initial down payment 
and monthly installments that were already paid, resulting in a massive loss to the 
consumer.58  
Next, evident from Table 2.2 pawning increased by 53% in 2010 and 60% in 2011 
with the increase in the value of global gold prices after the Western economic crisis of 2008. 
                                                          
58 There has been a tremendous increase in leasing business in recent years. For example, the Bank of Ceylon 
increased its leasing business by 53% in 2012 from the previous years (BOC 2013, 68). Furthermore, when it 
comes to the Non-Bank Financial Institutions as many as much as 50% of their business is in leasing and hire 
purchae amounting to Rs. 492 billion in 2015 (Central Bank Annual Report 2015, Table 132). 
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Furthermore, in 2011, pawning was 26% of the total loan portfolio of banks. Pawning was 
historically provided by informal networks and this level of pawning by banks was 
unprecedented. The Bank of Ceylon, which is the largest commercial bank in the country, 
had between 2009 and 2011 tripled its pawning loan portfolio (Finance Ministry Annual 
Report 2011, 464-465). 
 
Table 2.2 Pawning Data from 2007 to 2011 
Name of the Bank Amount  of Loans (Rs. Bn) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Commercial Bank - 0.01 1 4 24 
DFCC Vardhana 0.03 0.21 0.34 1 4 
Lankaputra Bank - - - - 5 
HNB 17 21 22 28 36 
Peoples  Bank 76 96 125 190 291 
Sampath Bank 12 16 25 43 64 
RDB 47 54 58 66 76 
BOC 25 38 55 94 188 
NSB 11 15 25 36 58 
Seylan Bank 2 5 7 18 31 
Total 189 245 318 480 777 
No. of loans provided 5,095,518 5,900,434 6,673,524 7,608,067 9,027,369 
Interest  rate 19-24% 18-24% 14-23% 10-14% 10-14% 
Average loan size (Rs.) 37,730 42,302 47,682 63,899 86,186 
Growth  rate - 30% 30% 53% 60% 
Source: Finance Ministry Annual Report 2011, 464-465 
   
The Bank of Ceylon Annual Report for 2012 states the following about the extensive 
expansion of credit through pawning:  
The Bank provides a variety of other loan schemes, such as short term “pawning” 
loans on personal property, loans for travel expenses, and loans for self-employed 
individuals and government workers. As of 31st December 2012, pawning loans & 
other loan schemes accounted for 44% of the retail banking loan portfolio of Bank 
amounting to LKR 136,962 million [ US$ 1.1 billion]. Pawning loans are short-term 
loans that are fully secured by pledged gold coins and jewellery. Pawning loans are 




The fall in global gold prices and its impact on the banking sector with increasing non-
performing loans, particularly with increased defaults on pawning loans and the depreciation 
of gold collateral, shook the banks. 59 However, they seem to have avoided a serious crisis by 
2016 due to the diverse character of their assets and continuing expansion of their business 
with other services. 
In recent years, microfinance loans have also been on the rise. Historically, co-
opearatives and state insitutions provided such micro loans. However, in recent years there 
have been a whole range of actors from NGOs, non-bank financial institutions to subsidiaries 
of banks that have got into the microfinance business. Data on the total loan portfolio of 
microfinance are not available. However, a survey done by the Central Bank in 2015 claims 
50% of those who have taken micro-finance loans pay over 25% interest. Furthemore, close 
to 10% of the microfinance loans charge extremely high interest rates on the order over 45% 
(Central Bank Annual Report 2015, 250). The government continues to promote 
microfinance in its annual budgets and in a move to regulate microfinance institutions has put 
forward a new microfinance bill in 2016. However, the microfinance industry and prominent 
think tanks oppose powers given to the Central Bank to put a ceiling on interest rates for 
microfinance loans.60 
In this way, financialisation and greater integration with the global capital markets 
have led to higher levels of capital flows. The investment of such capital directed by the state 
is transforming the economic landscape through urban and infrastructure development. In the 
                                                          
59 The following year, the Central Bank Annual Report 2013 had the following to say about pawning: “The 
quality of assets in the banking sector deteriorated as indicated by the increase in the NPL ratio from 3.7 per 
cent as at end 2012 to 5.6 per cent by end 2013. This was largely the result of weaker loan quality in the 
pawning portfolio, and slower loan growth. NPLs increased by Rs. 74 billion [US$ 570 million] during 2013, of 
which Rs. 56 billion [US$ 430 million] relates to pawning advances. In comparison, the increase in NPLs 
amounted to Rs. 17 billion [US$ 130 million] in 2012.” 
60 See, ‘Regulating Financial Services for the Poor in Sri Lanka: A Closer Look at the Long-Awaited 





countryside, credit has expanded through banks and financial businesses charging high 
interest rates on pawning, leasing and microfinance loans. 
 
Urbanization, Infrastructure and the Neoliberal State  
Over the last few decades, there has been some analysis of the neoliberal state in Sri 
Lanka, including in relation to the global flows of trade and capital. (Dunham & Jayasuriya, 
2001; Herring, 1987; Lakshman, 1985). The massive accelerated Mahaweli Development 
Scheme, which came with the open economy policies in 1977 discussed in the previous 
chapter, at the outset brought attention to the large role of the state in development. 
Therefore, unlike the issue of financialisation, the role of the state was critically discussed by 
political economists as well as mainstream economists when considering the various phases 
of liberalization.  
While I claim a second wave of neoliberalism was initiated by the Rajapaksa regime 
at the end of of the war, there was a debate in the early post-war years about whether the 
Rajapaksa regime can be characterised as neoliberal.61 President Rajapaksa had roped 
together a coalition consisting of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists and the left parties and 
made statements that could appeal to and disarm any critique from both ends of the spectrum. 
Months before the end of the war, Rajapaksa had the following to say in his Budget Speech: 
Neo-liberal globalization process that was followed by our country for over 30 years, 
paid economic dividend only to a very small segment of our society. … The need to 
develop irrigation, highways, electricity, water supplies and rural development was 
also forgotten. In short, rural villages were so neglected and were made distant from 
Colombo as though they were no longer a part of Sri Lanka. … we rejected 
                                                          
61 The three Left Ministers in the Rajapaksa Government have also made this claim in the years after the war. 
Rajapaksa had also maintained that he would not be an agent of the Western agenda, but that is more to do with 
the call for investigation of war crimes taken forward by the US and the UK in the UN Human Rights Council. 
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‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ [the economic policy package of the Ranil Wickremesinghe 
government of 2002 – 2204] which underestimated local entrepreneurship and viewed 
any problem with a blind eye in the guise of globalization and neo-liberalism 
(Rajapaksa 2008). 
Such populist rhetoric continued as the regime felt compelled to distinguish itself from the far 
right and pro-West UNP government that preceded it. However, the regime with support of 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF, took forward many aspects of 
‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ policy package of the earlier Wickremesinghe government, 
particularly financialization, urbanization and infrastructure development. 
 The financial support from the World Bank and other donors for the neoliberal state 
was premised on particular forms of investment: 
The two principal drivers of investment for sustained high economic growth and 
productive employment are (a) international competitiveness for export-led growth 
and (b) urbanization, which facilitates productive economic activity. These two 
drivers of investment and economic growth, in turn, depend crucially on efficient 
infrastructure that shortens the international supply chain on the one hand and brings 
about agglomeration dividends on the other (Biller and Nabi, 2013, 2). 
The building of such large infrastructure and urbanization required global finance capital 
channelled through the state. Indeed, close to US$ 10 billion was raised as sovereign bonds 
and bonds floated by the state controlled commercial banks between 2009 and 2016, and 
much of those finances were used towards such large development projects. That is over and 
beyond the capital that came in for infrastructure development from the multilateral donors 
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors such as China, 
Japan and India. 
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 In addition to such large levels of finances the state required vast powers for large 
development projects. In 2010, the Rajapaksa regime merged the Defence Ministry with the 
Urban Development Authority to use the military in accelerated urbanization. The military 
became involved in construction, city beautification and slum demolitions. The emphasis on 
urbanization was further accentuated by the regime unsuccessfully fielding Milinda 
Moragoda62 as the candidate for Mayor in the 2011 Colombo Municipal Council elections. 
While the regime could not succeed in capturing the Mayorship in UNP-centered Colombo, 
the powers of the Central Government and the military were used to push urbanization of 
Colombo at a tremendous pace.    
The budgetary capital expenditure is consistenly highest for the Ports and Highways 
Ministry in recent years. And road and highway construction came to signify the visible 
priorities of the Rajapaksa regime and the role of the state in the economy both in resource 
terms and in popular discourse. In the Budget Speech for 2015, President Rajapaksa boasted 
that construction was now 10 percent of the GDP and that the sector had a high growth of 17 
percent. A major component of construction growth is the building of roads and highways. 
 While the international and national media focus on Chinese infrastructure investment 
in Sri Lanka through their geopolitical lens, the question remains as to why so many of the 
other donors including multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank fund such infrastructure projects, particularly when they are unlikely to provide the 
necessary returns. The World Bank in a recent report concurs that the highest contributor to 
                                                          
62 Moragoda was a highly influential neoliberal politician, known to be close to Washington including the 
Heritage Foundation. Between 2002 and 2004, he held the very high post of Economic Development Minister 
under the UNP government, when it attempted accelerated neoliberal policies during its short stint in power 
between 2002 and 2004. Moragoda’s cross over to join Rajapaksa and contest the municipal elections was a 
clear sign of the emphasis placed on urban development. However, despite the massive neoliberal campaign 




GDP growth in Sri Lanka was public investment in infrastructure.63 Indeed, while 
acknowledging the nature of such growth,64 it is now calling for a shift in the very policies 
that it was promoting not long ago (World Bank 2015, 28-30).  
 Despite the Rajapaksa regime’s populist rhetoric, its priorities were reflected by the 
secular decline in agriculture and fisheries expenditures. As a percentage of government 
expenditure, transport and communications, increased from 11.2 to 14.6 percent, while 
agriculture65 and fisheries decreased from 2.3 to 1.5 percent between 2008 and 2013 (Finance 
Ministery Annual Report 2014). In other words, as a share of government expenditure over 
the five-year period, transport and communications increase by 30 percent, while agriculture 
and fisheries declined by 35 percent, reflecting the government’s priorities. The two major 
toll expressways built during this period are reflective of the social inequalities linked to such 
infrastructure, because it is only the middle and upper classes that can afford private vehicles 
and moreover travel on such toll expressways. These figures also reflect donor priorities, with 
agriculture and fisheries amounting to 0.1 percent and transport and communications 
amounting to 44 percent of total donor disbursements in 2015 (Finance Ministry Annual 
Report 2015). The World Bank not only rejects investment in agriculture, its analysis is in 
favor of trade liberalization in agriculture, claiming that 30% of the labor force only produces 
                                                          
63 “Private consumption accounted for 67 percent of GDP in 2013, having expanded by 6 percent a year on 
average between 2002 and 2013. Private investment, on the other hand, accounted for 23 percent of GDP in 
2013, after an average growth of 9 percent a year during the same time period. In addition, public infrastructure 
spending grew at an average rate of 18 percent a year between 2002 and 2013, and made up 6 percent of GDP 
by 2013. The impulse coming from exports, on the other hand, was very small, with an average growth rate of 4 
percent a year, so that the contribution of exports to aggregate demand declined from 35 to 26 percent of GDP 
between 2002 and 2013.” (World Bank 2015, 26) 
64 “Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 43 percent from 2009 to 2014. The top four sectors contributing to 50 percent 
of the total growth during the period were all non-tradable sectors: construction, transport, domestic trade and 
banking, and insurance and real estate. Reflecting the intensity of a needed post-conflict infrastructure 
development thrust, the construction sector alone contributed to 16.8 percent of the total growth while growing 
by 109 percent in real terms. The transport sector contributed to 14 percent of the total growth, reflecting 
improved transportation infrastructure and increased vehicle registrations. Domestic trade (11.1 percent), import 
trade (7.8 percent) and financial services (8.2 percent) were the other main contributors to growth.” (World 
Bank 2015, 28) 
65 I do not include the fertilizer subisidy, which is a cash transfer to appease the peasantry whose vote is 
significant in elections. 
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10% of GDP (World Bank 2013). However, due to the political sensitivity of agricultural 
trade liberalization, the World Bank has not been vocal and there was little pressure on the 
government.  
I would argue, the World Bank during the tenure of the Rajapaksa regime limited its 
policy reform push to financialization with urban and infrastructure development. The World 
Bank diagnostic report published in late 2015, came well after regime change in January 
2015, and there its message had shifted. With the new Government, the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank66 and the IMF are continuing the agenda of financialization, but 
also promoting trade liberalization67 and privatization where possible.  
In June 2016, amidst balance of payments problems, the new Government signed an 
Extended Fund Facility for US$ 1.5 billion dollar with the IMF68 and augmented by an 
addition of US$ 500 million from other donors. That agreement is ambitious calling for 
structural reforms that go much further than their advocacy with the Rajapaksa Government. 
The second wave of neoliberalism was initiated by the Rajapaksa regime, but that 
development trajectory is deepening with the new Government willing to openly take forward 
neoliberal reforms. 
 
Reconstruction as Infrastructure Development 
It is in the context of such a second wave of neoliberal policies transforming the 
political economy of Sri Lanka that reconstruction policies were launched in the war-torn 
regions of the North and East. During the final years of the war, the government was of the 
view that donor aid for reconstruction may even boost the national economy. However, by 
                                                          
66 The Asian Development Bank has initiated a massive US$ 250 million project to expand the capital markets 
in Sri Lanka.  
67 The donors are fully behind the the Wickremesinghe government’s push for new free trade and investment 
agreements with India, China, Singapore and the US. 




end of the war, the government’s relationship with Western countries had soured. Therefore, 
with only moderate pledges of donor assistance for reconstruction, the Government’s 
approach for reconstruction was similar to what it was doing with national development; to 
build infrastructure and expand credit.   
The Budget Speech given by the Deputy Finance Minister Sarath Amunugama in June 
201069, had the following to say about reconstruction of the North and East: 
A comprehensive medium- to long‐term reconstruction strategy has been planned to 
transform conflict affected areas in order to create decent living conditions. The 
construction arrangement of railway lines in the northern sector connecting 
Thalaimannar to Medawachchiya and Omanthai to Kankasanthurai and such 
arrangement for the construction of national highways such as the A‐9 and the A‐32 
have been finalized. Funding arrangements have been secured to implement water 
supply, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, court houses, administrative facilities, 
police posts, drinking water, irrigation and livelihood programmes. … The early 
completion of these development initiatives will change the landscape providing north 
south connectivity and build a strong economic base to exploit agriculture, livestock, 
fisheries and tourism based investment opportunities in the north and east 
(Amunugama 2010, 71). 
Therefore, from the outset, reconstruction was about building infrastructure. Such 
infrastructure-centred development was initiated with the re-building of the A-9 Highway 
connecting the North to the rest of the country. The A-9, which was repeatedly closed and re-
                                                          
69 It is normally the President who holds the Finance Minister portfolio that gives the Budget Speech. 
Furthermore, in late 2009, the Budget for 2010 was not announced as the Government wanted to hold elections 
in January and May 2010 to consolidate its power on the heels of the war victory. 
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opened as a humanitarian corridor during the war, became important for connectivity to 
markets after the war.70 
Reconstruction of infrastructure in the North moved swiftly after the war as by 2012, 
the signs of war, the ruins and the warnings of land mines were fading. Electricity was 
reaching many villages and by the end of 2012, 72% of houses in the Northern Province had 
access to electricity (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 63). According to a Government 
official by early 2014, electrification of 85% of the houses in Jaffna was complete.71 Such 
electrification also facilitated a market for consumer appliances from refrigerators to 
television sets.  
The northern railroad, first built over a century ago by the British, was rebuilt by 
India. As the train service first reached Killinochi, and months later Pallai and then eventually 
Jaffna Town in October 2014, it created much excitement among the local people. A 
generation born during the war had not seen trains, and many lined up to watch the arrival of 
the trains. Therefore, reconstruction with respect to infrastructure related to transport and 
communication could not be faulted. 
The many housing schemes, including the fifty thousand Indian housing grant to the 
war affected was a massive boost to the war-torn population. However, the faltering incomes 
and rising indebtedness, has led to these housing schemes adding to increasing indebtedness, 
as owner driven housing costs have been greater than the housing grant.72 When early signs 
of such housing grant related debt became evident, the donors and their implementation 
agencies the ICRC and UN Habitat claimed it was merely a few bad cases. 73 The officials, 
                                                          
70 The 2010 Budget Speech emphasized the “opening of the A-9 road, removal of fishing restrictions, opening of 
bank branches and unrestricted transportation have expedited business development in the north” (Amunugama 
2010). 
71 Interview with Government Planning Official, 30 April 2014. 
72 ‘Web of debt looms for Indian housing scheme beneficiaries’, The Hindu, 18 September 2013 
73 The Indian Government had claimed the housing grant was a major effort on their part to address the 




donors and even think tanks were cautious about finding fault with the housing grant 
schemes.74 Nevertheless, the debate around housing debt became one of the few extensive 
debates on post-war indebtedness in the war torn regions.75 
 
Table 2.3 Resources Used in Northern Province Development (2009 - 2013) 
Item  
Total Amount 
 (Rs. Mn) 
Total Amount 
 (US$ Mn) 
Welfare of IDPs  23,933                      184  
Demining of 1,982 Sq. km. Area 12,174                        94  
Resettlement of 295,136 Persons  6,096                        47  
Infrastructure Development  221,444                  1,703  
Roads  68,000                      523  
Transport  30,701                      236  
Electricity  14,762                      114  
Water Supply & Irrigation  14,103                      108  
Health  20,410                      157  
Education  19,561                      150  
Housing  11,716                        90  
Court Houses  1,110                          9  
Agriculture and Fisheries  17,878                      138  
Livelihood Development & Other  23,203                      178  
Total  263,647                  2,028  
  Source: Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
issue. Eventually, a major conference was organised by the UN Habitat on donor-led housing schemes, but it did 
not address the issue. The UN Habitat organised conference sponsored by the European Union, Australian Aid 
and the Swiss Development Cooperation titled, ‘Restoring Communities through 'Home-Owner-Driven' 
Reconstruction: from post-Emergency to Development’, was held at one of the Five Star hotels in Colombo and 
had no panellists from the North even though it was a conference about housing in the North and East. I 
attended the conference and when challenged the panellists about the issue of debt, they had no answers. The 
conference did not address the crucial question of indebtedness.  
74 A Centre for Poverty Analysis Study though weak in its recommendations including calling for greater 
financial literacy, nevertheless surveyed the extensive nature of such debt: “A survey of 347 households in 
Jaffna, Mullaitivu and Killinochchi, (with 2/3 of households participating in a housing programme) indicated 
that average debt among housing beneficiaries were higher than those that have been approved to participate, 
but have not begun construction of houses. Half of the sample reported inability to pay back debt; and increased 
debt leads households to coping strategies such as reducing food consumption that negatively affects the quality 
of life. Findings of this study indicate that participation in an owner-driven housing programme is not the cause 
of indebtedness, but is a catalyst that leads to higher levels of borrowing. The lack of sustainable livelihoods 
appears to be a strong factor leading households to borrow. Other factors such as the lack of financial literacy 
and the increased supply of debt also appear to be linked with indebtedness” (Romeshun et al 2014). 
75 The Swiss Development Cooperation following the UN Habitat conference commissioned another study to 
address the increasing housing-related debt and the uncompleted houses, but the study was misplaced in its 
focus on financial counselling. In response to a follow up study by the Centre for Poverty Analysis on Financial 
Counselling sponsored by the Swiss Development Cooperation (Gunaskera et al 2015), I wrote a critical review 
in the press on the assumptions and the outcomes of that study (Kadirgamar 2015). 
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As evident from Table 2.3, total expenditure on reconstruction of the Northern 
Province by the government during the 2009-2013 period amounts to Rs. 264 billion (US$ 2 
billion). Furthermore, reflecting the broader neglect of the rural economy in national policy, 
expenditure in agriculture and fisheries amounted to just Rs. 18 billion or 6.8% compared to 
infrastructure expenditure of Rs. 221 billion or 84% for the reconstruction of the North from 
2009 to 2013. Arguably, after a war such infrastructure growth is necessary, but the relative 
lack of investment towards the creation of livelihoods and jobs, has led to infrastructure led 
jobless growth in the post-war period.  
 
Demographic Changes and Occupations in Jaffna 
 Table 2.4 illustrates the considerable fall in population in Jaffna from 1981 to 2012 
and a significant shift in the gender balance.  According to Census and Statistics, between 
1981 and 2012, Sri Lanka’s population grew from 14,846,274 to 20,277,597. However, the 
population of Jaffna District fell from 734,474 to 583,071. 76 That is an average annual 
population decline of 0.74 percent Jaffna District in contrast to 1% growth for SL as a whole. 
This drop in population is linked to the mass migration of the Tamil community from Sri 
Lanka to form the Tamil diaspora in the West estimated to be 800,000 people and an addition 
200,000 people living as refugees in India (ICG 2010). There is also a gendered character to 





                                                          
76 The discrepancy in data for 1981 between Table 2.4 and the data from Census and Statistics relates to the re-
demarcation of Jaffna District. 
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Table 2.4 Jaffna District Census of Population (1871 - 2012) 
Year Male Female Total 
1871          122,500           123,600           246,100  
1881          131,500           134,100           265,600  
1891          137,600           141,700           279,300  
1901          149,200           151,700           300,900  
1911          159,700           167,500           327,200  
1921          161,600           169,000           330,600  
1946          212,200           212,600           424,800  
1953          246,400           245,500           491,900  
1963          307,900           304,700           612,600  
1971          349,900           351,700           701,600  
1981          412,700           417,900           830,600  
2012          275,500           307,800           583,400  
Source: Statistical Hand Book 2013 Jaffna District, Page 58  
 
The occupational pattern of Jaffna District77 at the end of 2014 is given in Table 2.5. 
In Jaffna, 51% are in agriculture and fisheries, 11% in construction related fields and 17% are 
employed by the state including as bureaucrats, teachers and healthcare workers. The low 
level of occupied women, is probably related to the fact that women’s informal labor 
including as domestic workers is not accounted for in the data. In many farming and fishing 
households, women provide assistance in farming and fishing.  
 
Table 2.5 Occupations in Jaffna District 
Occupation Male Female Total Total (%) 
Farmers 31,651 3,378 35,029 23 
Farm Labor 18,291 6,680 24,971 16 
Fishers 17,198 959 18,157 12 
Construction (Masons Carpenters) 16,967 23 16,990 11 
State Employess (officials, teachers) 15,007 11,467 26,474 17 
Others (Private Sector and NGOs) 22,154 10,787 32,941 21 
Total Occupied 121,268 33,294 154,562 100 




                                                          
77 The Jaffna District population is 583,882 out of the Northern Province 1,061,315 constituting 55% of the 
population. Therefore, Jaffna District is the largest of the five districts in the Northern Province. Source: Census 
and Statistics, Housing Census of 2012. 
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Recent data from the Jaffna District Secretariat reflects an unemployment crisis. By 
the end of 2014, there were 154,562 persons occupied with an additional 32,682 people 
looking for work. Of those looking for work, 28,752 or 88% are youth between the age of 16 
and 36, and 84% of those youth do not have vocational training or higher education such as in 
universities.78 Thus youth unemployment in Jaffna is severe. 
 
Growth Claims and Expansion of Credit 
With respect to criticism about the the economic crisis in the North, the Central Bank 
Regional Development Department made the following defensive comments about their 
efforts in the North: “The Province’s GDP growth rate has also showed a steady acceleration, 
starting from 12% in 2009, to 22% in 2010, and to over 25% per annum in 2011 and 2012.”79 
This high level of growth is due to the economy grinding to a halt during the war and the 
initial boost due to economic activity after the war; the high level of economic growth does 
not mean much as the level of Provincial GDP in the North at the end of the war was quite 
low.  
Next, the Regional Development Department claimed it had disbursed Rs. 13.3 billion 
(US$ 100 million) over 11 cultivation seasons to 116,337 farmers in the Northern Province. 
This amounts to loans averaging Rs. 114,000 (US$ 880) per farmer. Expansion of credit was 
initiated by the state and was a major component of the reconstruction policies.80  
 
Reconstruction Approach of the New Government 
The Rajapaksa regime was defeated with the support of the Tamil minority in January 
2015 and there was some hope that the new government would be able to address the 
                                                          
78 Data I directly obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016. 
79 ‘Post-war realities in the Northern Province: CB replies Friday Forum’, Daily Financial Times, 12 June 2014. 
80 Furthermore, the Central Bank claimed 37 new bank branches and 22 extension offices were established after 
the war in the Northern Province from May 2009 to May 2011. See: Central Bank Press Release 26 May 2011. 
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challenges of reconstruction. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe announced in his economic 
policy statement in November 2015 that he planned to have a major donor conference in 
Tokyo to find commitments for the reconstruction of the North and East in June 2016. 
Regardless of his ambitions to organize adonor conference like the one at the height of the 
peace process with the LTTE in 2003, the donor conference did not materialize. The various 
powerful actors including the donors no longer saw Sri Lanka as a crisis prone country. In the 
Budgets of 2016 and 2017, there was little allocated for the reconstruction of the North and 
East.  
Wickremesinghe was not defensive like Rajapaksa: tactically he blamed Rajapaksa 
for the post-war woes. In any event, he concedes the economic crisis in the North. In an 
interview in December 2016 with The Hindu, Wickremesinghe stated:  
The North is going to take a longer time. The war has destroyed the economy. So it 
will be a longer period but we have given special concessions for investment in the 
North —double the normal concessions we have given the rest of the country, 
incentives.81 
The vision for reconstruction of the war-torn regions by the Wickremesinghe government is 
to promote businesses through tax concessions for investors. While Wickremesinghe awaits 
the private sector, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) led Northern Provincial Council awaits 
the Tamil diaspora to reconstruct the North. Over seven years after the end of the war, there 
is little change in the neoliberal trajectory of reconstruction. 
 
Key Reports on Jaffna and the North 
 There are a few important reports by the Government, the UN and donors assessing 
the post-war challenges in Jaffna and the Northern Province. These documents which came 
                                                          
81 ‘We’re all patriots, we’re all nationalists’, The Hindu, 15 December 2016. 
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out in 2011 and 2012 were not all accessible to me immediately and I was only able to access 
some of them after my field research. The unavailability of these reports in the public domain 
have also contributed to the muted response to the problems with reconstruction. 
 The Government’s reconstruction policies were put forward through its Northern 
Spring Development Plan. This development plan unveiled in 2009 had two components a 
180 day programme and a five year investment programme (2009-2013). The 180 day 
programme emphasised de-mining, resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction of damaged 
economic and social infrastructure and livelihood recovery. The five year investment 
programme emphasised solutions to displacement, restoring livelihoods, reactivating services 
and facilities, rehabilitating infrastructure facilities, developing human capacities, targeting 
vulnerable groups and establishing good governance. Some of the key features in the plan 
were addressing property rights and generation of livelihoods and employment. Next, it 
sought to connect the north and south through mega development projects with special focus 
on road development, power and irrigation sectors. Furthermore, the Central Bank launched a 
special loan scheme called ‘Awakening North’, with a maximum loan of Rs. 200,000 to be 
borrowed at an annual rate of 12% for those households seeking to resume their livelihoods 
(JICA 2011).  
 With increasing concerns about the post-war humanitarian situation and development 
needs, the UN, the Government and various international NGOs put forward ‘Joint Plan for 
Assistance Northern Province’ in 2011 and 2012. These reports written jointly with the 
government were cautious in their tone not to contradict the Government’s optimistic 
statements, but nevertheless highlighted some serious concerns. The 2011 Report highlighted 
the donor commitments of US$ 2 billion and reconstruction of infrastructure including water, 
housing, irrigation, supply of electricity, rehabilitation of roads and railway, health and 
education (Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2011, 4). However, the 2012 Report 
106 
 
was concerned that donors were not allocating funds for continuing needs and had the 
following to say about the economic situation referring to a World Food Programme Survey: 
While much progress has been made in addressing the immediate resettlement needs 
of the returnee and other conflict-affected populations over the last year, critical gaps 
still exist and must be addressed simultaneously with efforts in medium- and long-
term development. Over 60% of households in the NP [Northern Province] lack any 
capacity for securing their agricultural, fisheries and livestock livelihoods, food 
security and other basic needs. As a result, many communities remain in a fragile and 
precarious socio-economic situation with a growing burden on host communities due 
to resource limitations and delaying a return to normality and sustainable 
development (Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2012, 23). 
The failure of reconstruction affecting an estimated 60% of the population was significant. 
However, both these reports as well as the Government’s Northern Spring development 
programme were in many ways only needs assessments and lacked deeper analysis and vision 
for post-war reconstruction. 
 In this context, an extensive report was published in November 2011 by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) titled, ‘The Project for Development Planning for 
the Rapid Promotion of Reconstruction and Development in Jaffna District’. This extensive 
report drafted with research from March 2010 to November 2011, was led by Mr. Yonesaka 
Hiroaki, and involved seventeen other Japanese academics and experts. It only addresses the 
Jaffna District, and not the entire Northern Province. The report states in its Preface: 
The project formulated the road maps in order to envisage the reconstruction and 
development in Jaffna district toward 2020 after the end of the war in 2009. The road 
maps consist three sectors of agriculture, fisheries and community development which 
are assumed as the main pillars for recovering Jaffna economy.   
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The JICA Report argues for an extensive rural development programme and in its discussion 
of community development places emphasis on co-operatives. 82 However, as discussed 
above, the Government’s economic policies over the last few decades continued to reduce 
investment in the rural economy and that economic vision has undermined reconstruction of 
the North. To sum up, these key reports suggest that the crisis facing the war-torn North and 
the problems with the path of reconstruction were apparent to many of the international actors 
working in Sri Lanka. However, neither the government nor the major international actors 
and donors seemed to have the political will to address the crisis. 
 
Local Officials on Reconstruction 
Within the state structure, there are clear differences between the centralised market-
oriented policies advocated by high level officials in Colombo and the views of local state 
officials in the North. A number of interviews with local officials reflected the conundrum 
they are caught in. On the one hand, they are conscious of the economic crisis in the North, 
particularly the falling incomes, lack of job opportunities and the rising indebtedness. On the 
other hand, they continue to think within the framework of existing policies of further 
expansion of credit and the greater integration with the market.  
In 2012, just three years after the end of the war, they were still involved in a process 
of ensuring fallow lands were cultivated and they expressed some hope of recovery in the 
rural economy.83 One of the most contested political issues in the North relates to land, 
                                                          
82 While I only gained access to this report towards the latter stages of writing my dissertation, my own research 
for my dissertation and participation in another fisheries research project, have led me to as similar conclusion 
that the three sectors that require focus for sustainable reconstruction are agriculture, fisheries and co-operatives.  
My knowledge of fisheries come from a five year long University of Amsterdam led research project on 
fisheries conflicts titled REINCORPFISH (Re-Incorporating the Excluded: Providing Space for Small Scale 
Fishers for Sustainable Development of Fisheries of South Africa and South Asia). This project opened not just 
engagement on the Palk Bay fisheries conflict but larger issues of fisheries development in Sri Lanka and I 
found it a greatly rewarding experience. It also complemented my understanding of the rural economy in 
northern Sri Lanka where close to 20% of the population depend on fisheries.  
83 Interview with Agriculture official on 2 October 2012.  
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particularly with military grabs of private lands and the problematic use of state lands. The 
processes of ensuring fallow paddy lands – particularly, those left behind by migrants – are 
cultivated and land registration more broadly were also central issues in 2012.84 Thus there 
was some initial sensitivity about my research given the politicisation of the land issue. 
By 2014, the crisis of the local economy had become very clear to local officials and 
they were despondent. While Tamil politicians continued to focus only on the land issues 
relating to military occupation, the local bureaucrats were conscious of the widespread 
economic crisis affecting the rural population.  
Official reports claim agricultural production in the Northern Province has increased 
considerably in the post-war years.85 Similarly, a local agriculture official claimed most of 
Jaffna peninsula’s paddy lands are under production. However, he said that in the islands off 
the Jaffna peninsula that were subject to extensive displacement during the war, the lands 
remain fallow due to lack of labor.86  
The same official also noted how farmers in the North and Sri Lanka generally cannot 
compete with agricultural produce from India, where the scale of production is much larger 
and labor is much cheaper. He said that “one of the problems, is the lack of coordination 
between the Ministry of Trade determining imports and the Ministry of Agriculture 
[monitoring production]. Imports at the wrong time disrupt farmers harvest prices.”87 Like 
this Agriculture official, many of the local officials I interviewed are from Jaffna and have 
been working in Jaffna for many years and are frustrated by the crisis in the Jaffna economy. 
Their responses to the current predicament in the Jaffna District and the Northern Province 
                                                          
84 Interview with Land official on 8 October 2012 
85 “The new and abandoned lands are being increasingly cultivated in the conflict affected districts and about 
120,921 ha [hectacres] of land have been brought under cultivation of paddy and other highlands crops during 
last three years.” (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 62) 
86 Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014. 
87 Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014. In 2015, I myself heard from a parliamentarian 
that the Finance Minister wanted to unload two containers of agricultural produce despite a government decision 
to the contrary due to the harvest. The traders are a strong lobby and this comment by the official may also have 
to do not just with lack of coordination but also corruption relating to the profits of traders. 
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are shaped by their inability to challenge the state’s policy direction as they assume the 
market oriented policies are a given and thus incapable of offering alternatives.  
The falling agricultural incomes were argued by another official in the Provincial 
Agriculture Ministry to be a consequence of the lack of proper marketing arrangements and 
the need for diversification of crops.88 She argued that the Jaffna farmers should consider 
moving to the Vanni where land is available; she also believed that the younger generation 
“are lazy and unwilling to work.” She further claimed that the large and expensive harvest 
machines used for paddy harvesting in the Vanni were necessary given the unreliability of 
labor.  
Other officials also discussed the consequences of addressing labor problems with 
capital inputs, including through the major increase in the purchase of tractors and harvest 
machines. One official explained these phenomena as a result of everyone in Jaffna wanting 
to become a “mudalali” (a capitalist or manager) by owning a tractor, one can become a 
“tractor mudalali” even though there was no room for profits.89 However, government 
officials are not disinterested observers given that families of such officials in Jaffna are 
involved in cash crop cultivation employing wage labor.90  
In the context of falling agricultural and fisheries-related incomes, there has been 
some discussion in Jaffna on the need for industries providing regular monthly incomes. 
Interviews with District level planning officials91 and officials responsible for industries 
agreed on the need for small industries.92 They were, however, frustrated by the lack of 
private investments flowing into the North. Their assessment is that investments from the 
                                                          
88 Interview with Provincial Agriculture official 13 May 2014. 
89 Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014 
There was a tinge of contempt in the tone of the official for the rural folk who want to own a tractors.  
90 Such comments about the laziness of rural youth and day wage labour is common among middle class people 
in Jaffna. They often say there is plenty of work available but youth are unwilling to work. The workers in my 
view are more strategic in what work they accept knowing that day wage labour is irregular. This kind of 
rhetoric and resistance is not unique to Jaffna, see (Scott 2008) and (Guha 1987). 
91 Interview with Planning official 30 April 2014 
92 Interview with Industries official 12 May 2014 and Board of Investments official on 2 May 2014. 
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Tamil diaspora will not be forthcoming.93 The planning official explained her Department’s 
skills training program, and then went on to say, these were just “time pass” for the youth.94 
The frustration expressed by these officials with the lack of effective local entrepreneurs and 
private investment to stimulate local employment and growth, and their condemnation of the 
youth as lazy, may in part be linked to the difficulties of addressing and conceptualising the 
failure of reconstruction policies.95  It may also reflect the officials’ class position 
condemning rural folk.  
 
Unfolding Crisis: Falling Incomes and Rising Debt 
 While the economic crisis in the war-torn region of falling incomes and increasing 
debt is clear from interviews with officials in Jaffna and reports on resettlement, 
macroeconomic data does not fully capture the economic crisis in the north. Data on the north 
and east have been wanting for decades and the census carried out every decade in Sri Lanka, 
was carried only out in the entire Northern Province in 2012 after a lapse of three decades. 
The Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Census and 
Statistics Department is a 12 month long survey done every three years and is an important 
survey to analyse the economic inequalities and uneven development. While this survey was 
initiated in 1990/1991 taking place every five years and following 2005/2006 every three 
years, it was only carried out in the entire Northern Province96 in 2012-2013 and was 
                                                          
93 Other than two tourist hotels in Jaffna there had been no significant investment by the diaspora in Jaffna as of 
May 2014. Interview with Board of Investments official on 2 May 2014. 
94 Interview with Planning official 30 April 2014 
95 It is difficult for me to pin down the reason. The absence of ideas for alternative policies at the district and 
provincial level, including broader reflection about the local predicament, could reflect the hegemony of the 
centralised state. Discussions with an older generation of government officials showed this was not always the 
case, as they had advocated for various economic initiatives during their time in office. The current impasse 
with little local initiative by the local bureaucracy could be both a consequence of the war-time impact on the 
bureaucracy which focused on humanitarian and logistical concerns of survival of the community and the 
centralised and authoritarian dominance of neoliberal state. 
96 Data for 2009/2010 is only available for some districts of the North, and that too is unreliable due to the mass 
displacements from those districts. 
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published in March 2015. As Table 2.6 illustrates, the Northern and Eastern Provinces have 
the lowest levels of median incomes in the country. I focus on the median income rather than 
mean income, as it is more reflective of the state of incomes of the bottom 50% of the 
population. The only district where the median income is close to and below some of the war-
torn northern and eastern Districts is in southern district of Moneragala.97 
 
Table 2.6 Mean and Median Incomes in Select Provinces and Districts 
Sector/ Province/ District 
Mean (Rs.) Median (Rs.) 
2012/13 2009/10* 2012/13 2009/10* 
Sri Lanka 45,878 36,451 30,814 23,746 
Urban 69,880 47,783 42,267 31,000 
Rural 41,478 35,228 29,376 23,126 
Estate 30,220 24,162 24,087 17,366 
Northern Province 34,286 23,712 23,571 16,710 
Jaffna 34,788 18,917 23,446 14,815 
Mannar 28,535 - 24,200 - 
Vavuniya 43,965 39,640 30,967 29,370 
Mullaitivu 23,687 - 17,714 - 
Kilinochchi 30,643 - 20,614 - 
Eastern Province 30,676 23,922 22,710 18,030 
Batticaloa 25,483 22,844 20,359 16,129 
Ampara 32,537 24,721 23,429 19,082 
Trincomalee 34,577 24,291 24,436 19,154 
Western Province 64,152 47,118 42,100 30,600 
Colombo 77,723 51,070 50,071 34,186 
Uva Province 35,638 28,717 24,228 19,761 
Moneragala 34,804 22,161 20,686 17,226 
*Data for not all districts are available 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey – 2012/2013 Final Results August 2014 
 
While incomes are low in the North, due to the slow recovery of the economy, a more 
worrying development is the gap between income and expenditure in the North, which is one 
symptom of rising indebtedness. The only provinces other than the north and the east where 
median expenditure exceeds median income are the Western and Central Provinces. This is 
                                                          
97 Moneragala is a mainly agricultural district in the South, which is commonly known in Sri Lanka to have a 
high incidence of poverty. 
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also the case with the urban and estate sectors. See Table 2.7 for comparison of selective 
districts and sectors on the levels of median expenditure exceeding median income.  
 





Median Income  
(Rs.) 
Expenditure over Income 
(%) 
2012/13 2009/10* 2012/13 2009/10* 2012/13 2009/10* 
Sri Lanka 30,701 24,509 30,814 23,746 0% 3% 
Urban 43,825 34,039 42,267 31,000 4% 10% 
Rural 29,010 23,600 29,376 23,126 -1% 2% 
Estate 25,580 20,490 24,087 17,366 6% 18% 
Western 44,318 32,500 42,100 30,600 5% 6% 
Colombo 49,229 36,597 50,071 34,186 -2% 7% 
Gampaha 43,057 31,825 38,807 29,821 11% 7% 
Kalutara 39,036 28,361 36,512 27,511 7% 3% 
Central 29,513 22,741 28,900 21,410 2% 6% 
Kandy 31,120 23,770 30,371 22,450 2% 6% 
Matale 27,342 20,400 26,441 18,606 3% 10% 
Nuwara Eliya 28,327 22,245 28,152 21,431 1% 4% 
Northern 26,414 22,171 23,571 16,710 12% 33% 
Jaffna 28,209 21,059 23,446 14,815 20% 42% 
Mannar 22,563 - 24,200 - -7% - 
Vavuniya 33,503 28,757 30,967 29,370 8% -2% 
Mullaitivu 17,352 - 17,714 - -2% - 
Kilinochi 24,052 - 20,614 - 17% - 
Eastern 25,936 22,040 22,710 18,030 14% 22% 
Batticaloa 23,959 20,536 20,359 16,129 18% 27% 
Ampara 26,757 22,686 23,429 19,082 14% 19% 
Trincomalee 26,777 23,169 24,436 19,154 10% 21% 
*Data for not all districts are available 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey – 2012/2013 Final Results August 2014 
 
As evident from the HIES survey, there are clear issues for the bottom half of the 
population with respect to the gap between expenditure and income resulting in indebtedness. 
It is in the war-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces that in the 2012/2013 survey we see 
that median expenditure over income is on the order of 12% and 14%. This is only in one 
year, and such debt is accumulated every year compounding the levels of debt. Data is 
available for 2009/2010 for the Jafffna District and the Eastern Province, where the median 
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expenditure exceeds median income in Jaffna District and the war-torn Eastern Province by 
42% and 22% respectively. 98 
The above analysis of debt is limited by the data as the HIES survey on monthly 
income and expenditure flows will not capture household assets and debt as stock. Nor does 
the HIES survey provide data to analyse the dynamics of debt. The dynamics of debts are 
such that interest payments for the larger stock of debt, including for larger purchases and 
investments in vehicles and houses, are covered by new debt thus effectively rolling over 
debt until there is a crisis.  
 The dire economic situation in the North was beginning to unfold close to three years 
after the war, with an emerging crisis in the food security situation and increasing 
indebtedness. A report99 based on a survey on food security provided some insights into rural 
debt: 
The proportion of households with debt is high across all districts and population 
groups. The highest was in Jaffna district, with 75 percent of the households having 
debt. At least on average 70 percent of the households in Northern Province have debt 
compared to 63 percent of households in the Eastern Province. The median debt 
holding per household is estimated at LKR 50,000 or an average of LKR 116,380. Of 
the households with debt, the major source of credit was banks, followed by friends 
and relatives then traditional credit arrangements (WFP 2012, 36). 
By early 2012 the report found that some households particularly in Jaffna and the Vanni 
required ten months of their current income to settle their debts and most others required at 
                                                          
98 Data is not available for some districts in the Northern Province during the survey. However, the data may not 
be accurate due to the war-time conditions. Furthermore, the severe differences in incomes and expenditure 
during the 2009/2010 period may also reflect the disruption of livelihoods due to displacement. 
99 This extensive surevey of 3,800 households was conducted by the Ministry of Economic Development, the 
Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute and the United Nations World Food Programme 
in March-April 2012. Unfortunately, the Report based on that survey titled, ‘Food Security in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka: A Comprehensive Food Security Assessment Report Sri Lanka 2012’ did not 
get the necessary attention. 
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least six months of their current monthly income. Furthermore, the Report went onto state 
that, “high indebtedness and food security are negatively related, with households that are 
highly indebted tending to be food secure.” In other words, the Report through it survey 
showed that people who took loans were able to spend more on food.100 Furthermore, “debt 
was also used for household construction and livelihood inputs” (WFP 2012, 38).  
Thus by early 2012 debt had become widespread for food consumption to home 
construction. What this report does not capture is the large section of the population in the 
North indebted through lease hire purchasing, because of the focus of the report on food 
security. Therefore, this report does not capture all the dynamics of rural debt including the 
full impact of the expansion of credit. Nevertheless, its focus on food security does provide 
some insights about the state of livelihoods in the rural sectors: 
Across livelihood groups, the most food insecure households were those relying on 
gifts and donations, but are only about two percent of the households. This is followed 
by unskilled laborers depending on both agriculture and non-agriculture wage that are 
the majority at least 28 percent of the households. The third most food insecure 
livelihood groups are farmers and fishermen. Those dependent on casual labor 
become vulnerable as casual labor tend to be seasonal and with households reporting 
that labor was not available during the main rainy season – November to January. 
Furthermore, reports from the field indicated that women are usually paid half the 
men’s wage rate of Rs 600 to 1000 per labor day as in April 2012 (Food Security in 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, 41).  
A follow up limited survey in parts of Mullaitivu and Vavuniya South in the Northern 
Province by the World Food Programme in August 2013, not made public, but the results 
                                                          
100 This point is counter intuitive, that is at least during the short-term it is only those who took loans could 
spend on food. 
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which I am in possession of paint an even bleaker picture.101 This survey shows that jewellery 
assets had depleted by 50% between the previous survey in March 2012 to the later survey in 
August 2013.102 For rural households in Sri Lanka, jewellery is the main form of liquid asset 
passed over generations and are used to tide over household emergencies and seasonal 
agricultural failures. In some of the war-torn northern districts, jewellery assets which had 
even survived the war were wiped out in the post-war years. While historically, jewellery was 
pawned during the emergencies, the jewellery is recovered within a few years if not months 
and are maintained as insurance against future emergencies. The severity of the post-war 
crisis of indebtedness is reflected in such wealth being consumed or leveraged to augment 
further debts.  
The situation had deteriorated much further by early 2014 in the context of a drought. 
Another food security assessment claimed: “A series of consecutive natural disasters is 
undermining household resilience especially in the rural areas of North Sri Lanka.”103 Indeed, 
natural disasters mount on the failure of reconstruction, resulting in the downward spiral of a 
post-war economic crisis.  
 
Failure of Reconstruction and the Production of Neoliberal Individuals 
There have been a few initiatives towards regular employment through investment in 
industries with the support of international donors. There is the MAS Holdings garment 
factory in Killinochi opened in 2013 that employs close to two thousand young women. 
There is also a Hydramani garment factory in Mullaitivu opened in 2015 employing a few 
                                                          
101 I was able to access this data through a donor agency official who interviewed me on reconstruction. I had 
heard about this survey and I wanted to see it published, however, the WFP was reluctant to publish the data.  
102 The survey through stratified random sampling interviewed 300 households in 4 Divisional Secretary areas. 
The government did not give permission to conduct the survey in all 12 districts due to the Provincial elections 
the following month. While the WFP informally stated they did not wish to release the data due to the survey 
being incomplete, I believe they did not want any negative publicity around the serious economic crisis in the 
war-torn regions. Documented in World Food Programme, ‘Food Security, Nutrition Situation’, August 2013. 
103 Drought Sri Lanka April 2014, Report by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of 
Disaster Management of the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Food Programme. 
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hundred women. In Killinochi, the military initiated farms employ over a thousand 
individuals and pay them regular monthly salaries. While there was criticism of such military 
enterprises by Tamil politicians, the people desperate for jobs continue to work in those 
farms. The Atchuvely Industrial Zone in Jaffna was re-opened in September 2014, however, 
despite considerable efforts by officials, only six businesses have agreed to put small plants 
thus far.104 Indeed, in the context of failing livelihoods in the rural economy, there is great 
demand for such jobs in industries that provide regular monthly incomes.  
Many of these private sector initiatives are by firms from outside the North and 
capital subsidised by donors, particularly USAID.105 The garment companies in particular are 
owned by Sri Lankan multinational comapanies based out of Colombo, and one concern is 
that the capital accumulated by such external actors may not be reinvested in the North and 
are likely to repatriate elsewhere. Furthermore, for those companies that were initiated with a 
major subsidy from USAID, they may pull out after a few years. In any event, such ad hoc 
donor led initiatives for job creation hardly address the large demand for employment with 
regular incomes. 
The bulk of the capital flowing into the North for reconstruction has been absorbed in 
infrastructure which does not seem to engage local resources nor labor. Many road and 
construction contractors from Colombo who successfully bidded for reconstruction projects 
                                                          
104 The Atchuvely Industrial Zone before the war in the 1970s had employed some 3000 people in small 
industries. The 65 acre zone has now been developed in a limited way with 25 acres divided into a number of 
plots. However, by May 2014 there were commitments for only 7 projects in the Zone. These projects include 
Fiber Glass, Light Engineering, Hose Pipes, Nylon Twine, Food Processing and Waste Paper Recycling. Each 
investment is on the scale of Rs. 15 million. Couple of them have an additional investment of Rs. 15 million 
from USAID; particularly the Light Engineering and Waste Paper Recycling Plant. Land is given on a 30 year 
lease, with infrastructure such as water, power, land development and roads provided. Interview with Industries 
Development Board official 12 May 2014. 




brought labor from the South. The Indian construction of the railroad to North after the war 
mostly did not provide much demand for local labor.106 
 
Donor and Government Housing Grants and Local Incomes 
The donor and government housing schemes as well as housing construction in 
general after the war creates considerable demand for labor. For each house that is built about 
25% of the cost is direct labor of masons and masonary assistants. With close to 100,000 
houses built in the North through donor and government grants after the war from 2009 to 
2016, it translates into considerable wages. Furthemore, construction of private houses often 
with remittances and other construction initiatives from government facilities to temples after 
the war greatly increased the demand for local masons and construction related labor.  
Each house can contribute the equivalent of one household’s income for one year, 
with 25% of the cost of the house being paid as direct wages. So for example, the largest 
housing project initiated after the war, the Indian housing scheme, provided a grant of Rs. 
550,000 (US$ 4,200), but in reality many estimates point to owners spending a total of about 
Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200). Therefore, Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) in direct wages almost 
equivalent to the median household income per year in Jaffna as per the HIES data above 
results from each house. Therefore, 100,000 houses just from the various donor and 
government housing grants built over a period of 8 years from 2009 to 2016 translates to 
incomes for 12,500 households per year.   
                                                          
106 I was unable to find independent data on the total number of those employed in this massive project to 
rebuild the railroad, amounting to US$ 800 million. The Indian High Commission claims 500,000 man days of 
labour will be provided in the region. That amounts to approximately 500 jobs for the four years that it took to 
build the railway. However, during my field research and conversations with local officials, I did not hear of any 
local person employed in the project. So the question remains as to whether even those few jobs were 
subcontracted to southern contractors. 
See: Northern Railway Project: Scope of Project. 




In January 2016, the Resettlement Minister decided to award the building of 65,000 
houses in the war-torn districts to Arcelor Mittal, a multinational company that builds 
prefabricated steel houses, for a total cost of US$ 1 billion over a period of five years. This 
massive award to a multinational for steel houses that many in Sri Lanka considered to be 
unsuitable for local conditions and relatively very expensive, led to a major debate. I was also 
part of this debate in the media and eventually some of us formed an adhoc committee to 
draft an alternative proposal to build owner and community driven cement houses with 
architects from Moratuwa University, those with experience in donor-led housing schemes 
and activists.  
The extensive proposal had many sections, but I was interested in the financing of the 
project and the livelihoods linked to the project. The Arcelor Mittal houses cost Rs. 2,200,000 
(US$ 16,900) each, where as even the government was supporting an owner driven cement 
housing scheme for 10,000 houses in 2016 at Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200) each. The government 
would have incurred a major foreign loan of US$ 1 billion to be paid over ten years with an 
HSBC financing option that came with the Arcelor Mittal project, where as the adhoc 
committee drafting the alternative proposal was able to get a commitment from the local 
National Development Bank, to float a rupee bond to finance houses at almost half the cost. 
The proposal illustrated that the government need not incur a foreign loan, the cause of 
periodic balance of payment problems in Sri Lanka, and 102,000 cement houses can be built 
for same cost of the 65,000 prefabricated houses. Finally, and most importantly, prefabricated 
houses do not contribute to local incomes, cement houses as per government housing grant of 
Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200) would have contributed Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) in direct wages, 
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which amounts to approximately the income of one person per year. There are additional 
economic benefits of stimulating local industries in roofing and other house fittings.107  
These efforts to grant the largest post-war development project for the North and East 
to a multi-national corporation and the foreign financing loan through HSBC reflects another 
level of global financial maneuvering to the detriment of labor and production in the war-torn 
North and East. The provision of post-war housing itself is only seen as a consumer good 
granted to a household. The steel prefabricated house is unsuitable for the recipient, the 
participation of the home owner in the building process is denied and the larger contribution 
to the community in the form of employment is not considered. This is another scale of 
producing neoliberal individuals who are only expected to consume and the project if it goes 
ahead will be another major mark in the continuing failure of reconstruction.  
 
Out Migration for Foreign Employment 
In this context, one of the main avenues for regular incomes now is foreign 
employment through migration, which allows for monthly remittances. There is a steady 
increase in the out flow of migrant labor to the Middle East from Jaffna in recent years. The 
data for Jaffna District in Figure 2.3 reflects the departures for foreign employment only and 
is not the total number of those employed overseas. The data may not be accurate as some 
individuals leave without informing officials and there is no tracking of those who return 
from employment overseas.  
                                                          
107 At the time of revising my dissertation, in December 2016, almost a year since the government decided to 
finance 65,000 houses, the debate is continuing in parliament and in the media, even as the Resettlment Minister 
with the backing of the Prime Minister insists on the Arcelor Mittal project. There are allegations of corruption 
with a notorious local agent for Arcelor Mittal, who had been arrested for previous frauds and known to be a 
contributor to the ruling political party. The debate on this project including aspects of the alternative proposal 




Figure 2.3 Departures for Foreign Employment from Jaffna District 
Source: Economic and Social Statistics 2015, Central Bank 
 
The data for Jaffna is revealing of the economic pressures, where between 2012 when 
the crisis in the rural economy became apparent as per many of the reports mentioned above 
and 2014 there is a major increase. In terms of male migrant workers in 2012 and 2014, there 
were 3,621 and 7,817 departures respectively, amounting to a 115% increase. The data for 
2015 is provisional and the drop could also be related to the general fall in demand for 
migrant workers in the Middle East. The total number of those employed overseas108 is likely 
to be much higher as many of them work for two to three years before returning for a break. 
Some of them, then choose to again migrate abroad for employment depending on their 
household’s financial situation. Unlike in other districts, where Sinhala and Muslim women 
do migrate on a large scale abroad, women from Jaffna do not migrate abroad for 
employment in large numbers. Finally, in the districts devastated by the last phase of the war, 
Killinochi and Mullaitivu, which are also the poorest districts as evident from the HIES data 
                                                          
108 The data on total estimated number of those employed from Sri Lanka is only available for 2010, amounting 
to 1,932,245. In that year, it is estimated that 23.8% of the labour force is employed overseas. The total 
departures from Sri Lanka in 2014 was 300,703.  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Male 855 956 1,08 899 1,20 1,40 1,99 2,26 2,21 3,39 3,61 2,62 3,64 3,55 3,62 5,61 7,81 5,63














above, only a few hundred men manage to go abroad for employment.109 Thus there is also a 
class character to those who can access means and ways of going abroad for employment. 
The departure of male migrant workers from Jaffna as a percentage of population 
compared to the rest of the country is not significantly different, with 1.25% and 0.9% for 
Jaffna and the national average respectively.110 Therefore, one conclusion could be that such 
out migration from Jaffna is becoming similar to the situation in the rest of the country and 
could taper off in a few years. However, the dynamics of the increasing out migration 
discussed above and the jump from 2012 to 2014, could point to structural shift in the 
economy with dependence on migrant remittances. 
Employment in the Middle East has few protections in the form of labor rights and 
workers are subject to harsh working conditions. In addition, such out migration creates 
problems within households due to the long absence of spouses adding to the debilitated 
famlial ties after the war. The large number of youth willing to work under such conditions is 
also a strong refutation of the rhetoric of “lazy youth” deployed by middle class Jaffna 
society including officials mentioned above. 
 
Return to Rural Livelihoods and Self Employment 
 Reconstruction was initiated with the idea of returning the war-torn rural population 
to their original livelihoods consisting mainly of cash crop agriculture and fisheries in the 
Jaffna District. Those livelihoods it was assumed could be resumed with loans from banks, 
including subsidized loans backed by the Central Bank. Those who could not get involved in 
agriculture and fisheries were given self employment loans by the banks at market rates. Such 
                                                          
109 Only 458 men sought foreign employment from these two districts in 2014.  
110 According to the ILO in 2013, some of the highest levels of out-migration of male and female workers from 
South and South East Asia in the Middle East comes from Sri Lanka (247,356), Nepal (284,392) and Philippines 
(791,765). These statistics of the departure of workers as a percentage of population is Sri Lanka (1.2%), Nepal 
(1.02%) and Philippines (0.8%). Thus regionally Sri Lanka has the highest levels of out-migration of workers to 
the Middle East (ILO 2015, 7). 
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self employment for men might involve putting up a shop, driving a three wheeler for a fare, 
or owning a small truck to transport goods. For women, such self employment meant raising 
livestock, taking sewing orders after purchasing a sewing machine or some other cottage 
production such as weaving baskets. 
 The state’s reconstruction vision then only considered the individual and their 
capacity to make living with initial capital. The question did not arise that a people devastated 
by war, production that had ground to a halt, and a market for local services that was 
marginal could be an impediment to the return and revival of the local economy. There were 
the added pressures of mass produced goods suddenly flooding the war-torn regions after a 
lapse of few decades. The result was that many of these self employment loans failed. Either 
investments in shops, vehicles and livestock failed or people used those loans for day to day 
consumption including food. 
   When such self-employment and loans failed, the people were blamed instead of the 
market and the reconstruction vision. Dr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan one of the few 
economists working in Jaffna had the following to say about debt and the market:  
‘I’m not surprised about this because for a long time they lived in a closed economy,’ 
said Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, economist and founder of the Point Pedro Institute 
of Development. ‘They had nothing to borrow and did basic, subsistence farming. So 
there was pent up demand. All of a sudden, everything opened up and the North 
became, more or less, like any other part of the country. People are tempted for 
things.’…Dr. Sarvananthan believes that that the market will correct itself after a 
period of pain that might involve some suicides and even institutional collapses. 
‘People will realise that they cannot go on like this,’ he said. (Wijedasa 2014) 
Sarvananthan at the time of the interview in 2014 at least realized the severity of the debt 
problem due to his strong connection to Jaffna, whereas, many of the economists and policy 
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makers in Colombo did not even recognize the problem. However, Sarvananthan like most 
neoclassical economists blamed the situation on the people and the legacy of the import 
substitution era and the war. 
 Reconstruction and the sustainable livelihoods of the war-torn people are in this way 
reduced to individual responsibility. In other words, people should become thrifty, hard 
working and entrepreunerial. If they have access to capital, and they are unable to make a 
linving it is their fault.  
Reconstruction policies of this neoliberal vision then are about individuals finding the 
capital through the financial system or helping them activate the use of their own assets such 
as the pawning and sale of gold jewellery as well as mortgaging and sale of land.111 Indeed, 
there are now moves to create a market in land as per the economic policy statement of Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe in November 2015 and the Budgets for 2016 and 2017. They want 
to convert permit land given to people on government lease for a few decades into free 
holding land that can be mortgaged or sold. The World Bank112 for close to two decades has 
been calling for such market-led reforms113 in Sri Lanka, which is tied to its vision of 
urbanization with small holding farmers selling their plots and moving to the cities, where by 
small-holding agricultural land is consolidated under larger agribusinesses.114 
                                                          
111The neoliberal ideologue Hernando de Soto calls land that can not be sold dead capital (de Soto 2001). 
112 The World Bank argues such permit land “restrictions on mortgaging preclude its use as collateral to access 
the credit households could use to finance both income-enhancing farm and non-farm investments. For those 
wanting to remain in agriculture, the small landholdings, the lack of secure tenure rights, and the legal 
restrictions on acquiring or leasing in land reduce incentives for productivity-enhancing investments. Those 
interested in shifting out of agriculture into non-farm activities, or merely moving to another location would 
have to leave without compensation for their land. In addition to fostering a large cadre of part-time farmers, 
these legislative provisions limit the ability of the land market to allocate land to its best use.” (World Bank 
2003, 38) 
113 See discussion of market led agricultural reform. (Lahiff  et al 2007) 
114 Ha-joon Chang has the following to say about agencies such as the World Bank and their policies that it 
“believes that land markets should be deregulated so that entry into and exit from agriculture becomes easier. 
However, deregulated land markets almost always lead to re-concentration of land ownership, nullifying the 
result of the land reform. Sooner or later, such holdings will be hit by a shock and the owners will have to sell 
out to survive. Large farmers (be they commercial farms or traditional landlords) who can more easily survive 




In this way, the second wave of neoliberalism increasingly focuses on the individual 
making him or her responsible for their economic lives. The production of such neoliberal 
individuals is linked to financialization, as it is only those who are claimed to possess access 
to finance that can also be asked to take responsibility. Finally, the role of the neoliberal state 
is facilitation of access to the market and finance for the individual, as it increasingly 
withdraws from the social welfare services it provided during an earlier era. The state, 
however, is very much active in disciplining those “irresponsible” individuals and 
suppressing any collective protests (Wacquant 2012).  
 
Conclusion 
The relative surplus population exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it 
during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed. Leaving 
aside the large-scale and periodically recurring forms that the changing phases of the 
industrial cycle impresses on it, so that it sometimes appears acute, in times of crisis, 
and sometimes chronic, in times when business is slack, we can identify three forms 
which it always possesses: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant (Marx 1992, 794). 
 
The war-torn people for two and a half decades were caught in the war, displaced 
multiple times, and were forced to wait for the war to end in order to resume production. In 
the post-war years, this long suffering population has been further ravaged by a second wave 
of neoliberalism, characterised by financialised indebtedness and condemned to become 
neoliberal individuals attempting to find self-employment in a war devastated wasteland. The 
situation of this population, draws parallels with Marx’s description of a relative surplus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
percent of the beneficiaries of the pre-Pinochet land reform had sold out by the mid-1980s, especially in the face 
of diminishing state support in credit, extension, and other inputs.” (Chang 2009, 487) 
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population. While global finance capital has indebted and uprooted most of them, only some 
are absorbed by global demand for labor, in this case, migrant labor to the Middle East.  
What will become of the subaltern sections of this population, those who are socially 
excluded, and do not have the wherewithal to find employment in the Middle East? Will the 
demand for labor in the Middle East increase to a point where employment agents will come 
in search for them? Or will a crisis in the Middle East send back those who have recently 
migrated increasing the size of those excluded from capital? Will the process of social 
exclusion with dispossession by the second wave of neoliberalism remain a wasteland for the 
longue durée, as Sanyal has argued about the informal sector in rural India abandoned by the 
state and capital? (Sanyal 2014) In otherwords, would a section of the war-torn population of 
Jaffna become in a stagnant pauperized population?  
The challenges that have emerged with reconstruction in Sri Lanka may in part be a 
result of the particular form of capital mobilised for such reconstruction and the manner in 
which it changed social relations including processes that atomize individuals. However, 
policy makers assumed that integration with the national market and the flow of finances 
through the expansion of credit would lead to a “transition”. While the concept “transition” 
(Sanyal 2014) has a long history both in Marxist and liberal discourse, it gains a particularly 
powerful deployment with respect to war-torn societies. The idea of transition implies a 
definite process of normalisation. Transition demarcates a particular temporal relationship 
between the period of war and post-war and assumes inevitable progressive change. It also 
emphasises an economic break between the time of war and the period after the war and de-
emphasises the continuities. Thus any socio-economic deterioration after the war is 
considered part of the cost and process of normalisation, at the end of which a better future 
awaits the population. My analysis of post-war Jaffna, question the certainty of the discourse 
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of “transition”. Indeed, the politics of “transition” becomes the justification for forms of 
dispossession and social exclusion.  
While these changes have been happening in the rest of the country over a few 
decades, the dynamics are different during a short period, as with the war torn regions during 
the post-war years. Furthermore, arguments about the necessary social costs of “transition” 
are perhaps easier to push against a war-torn population when they are attempting to recover 
from devastation by war under conditions of continuing militarization and widespread 
climate of fear. It may also be a consequence of the time needed for movements of resistance 
to emerge, including new forms of politics by the socially excluded. At the level of analysis, 
the changes to social relations including the production of neoliberal individuals, 
indebtedness by financialization and dispossession by the neoliberal state during the short 
post-war period, may reveal the dynamics of social processes that may be harder to capture 
and analyse over the longue durée.115 
The failure of reconstruction and dispossessed individuals condemned to indebtedness 
in the war-torn regions are shaped by the second wave of neoliberalism transforming Sri 
Lanka. This second wave of neoliberalism is constituted by extensive processes: (1) 
financialization with global capital flows, changes to national finances and the financial 
sector and financial mechanisms reaching down to the rural level in the form of increased 
pawning, leasing, micro credit and bank loans; (2) a neoliberal state promoting private 
business as well as urban and infrastructure development; and (3) attempts to discipline and 
produce neoliberal individuals who have to fend for themselves even as they are immersed in 
debt. In this way, the second wave of neoliberalism was a departure from the earlier period of 
                                                          
115 In a talk I gave to the Social Science Study Circle in Jaffna in July 2014 on the Economic Causes of Social 
Deterioration in Jaffna, I mentioned Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement, “There is no such thing as society.” 
And I was surprised at the way in which it resonated with the local activists. The changes in Jaffna over the last 
few years seem to be racing along towards a neoliberal attack on the very idea of society.  
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liberalization in the levels of financialization and the attendant indebtedness and the social 
inequalities that were reinforced by the new infrastructure. 
While the Rajapaksa regime initiated this second wave of neoliberalism with what 
were opportune conditions with the end of the war coinciding with the flow of global 
finances to the emerging market countries due to the Great Recession of 2008, the new 
government after regime change in January 2015 continues and expands these neoliberal 
policies. While an IMF agreement initiated this wave of neoliberalism in 2009, a new IMF 
agreement in June 2016 under the new Wickremesinghe government is giving fuel to expand 
that wave as neoliberal policies are broadened to include trade liberalization, privatization 
and the creation of a financial center in Colombo. The Rajapaksa regime spoke of a 
repressive Malaysian model, but the Wickremesinghe regime speaks of a Singapore model 
with an even greater emphasis on the market.  
With neoliberal policies and discourse seeming to be ubiquitous, the question arises 
about the particular characteristics of what I have called the second wave of neoliberalism. 
There are a few significant aspects to the working of neoliberalism during the post-war 
moment in Sri Lanka. First, the depth of financialization, where global finance passes through 
formal banking and financial institutions down to the rural level. In other words, it is not just 
the deployment of any one financial instrument at the rural level, such as micro finance 
schemes, but rather a structural change in the financial system where global finance circulates 
through the formal banking system down to the rural level through multiple financial 
products. Second, the emphasis on self-employment, including attempts to create livelihoods, 
through the expansion of credit with a variety of financialized products. The consequence of 
such policies have led to individuals and households having to shoulder greater 
responsibilities and risks, and eventually high levels of indebtedness and inability to sustain 
their way of life. Third, the new circuit of accumulation, where financialized debts lead to 
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rural dispossession resulting in out migration to pay for such debts that in turn provides for 
the accumulation of global finance capital. In the next, chapter I illustrate the workings of the 






Financialisation and Rural Debt in Pathemany 
Map 3.1 
Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
Some of the central challenges of post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka relate to rural 
incomes and rural debt. I examine the state of rural incomes and rural debt in Jaffna through a 
field study in one village, Pathemany, a village near the small town of Atchuvely in Jaffna. I 
chose this village, because it was the only case study in northern Sri Lanka, in an extensive 
research project on agrarian change conducted by the Social Scientist Association. This 
multi-site research project was conducted between 1980 and 1982 just before the war, and 
provides a good baseline of social relations in rural Jaffna (Abeysekera 1985). My field study 
three decades later in the same village, after a long war and bouts of displacement, sought to 
investigate the changes to rural incomes. In the course of the field study, I discovered that 
rural debt had become the major issue in Jaffna. 
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When I began my field research in late 2012, three years after the end of the war, 
many of the roads and highways had been rebuilt. The ruins that had remained during the war 
years that were visible when I had visited Jaffna in 2002 and 2004, and for that matter soon 
after the war in late 2009 and 2010, were increasingly receding from sight as one travelled on 
one of the main roads crossing the Jaffna peninsula, the Pointpedro road. Pathemany village 
begins just a kilometre north of Atchuvely town, which is located mid-way between Jaffna 
town on the South West corner of the Jaffna peninsula and Pointpedro town on the North East 
corner of Jaffna Peninsula. There is regular bus service between Atchuvely and both towns 
on the newly carpeted Pointpedro road connecting a string of villages and small towns. 
Atchuvely town has its own hospital, schools, market, a number of banks and finance 
companies, co-operative societies and tea shops. In this way, Atchuvely town is centrally 









 Field research in the years after the war was constrained by many challenges, 
particularly the continuing militarisation of northern Sri Lanka and widespread climate of 
fear. Most villagers, particularly during the tenure of the Rajapaksa regime, were reluctant to 
be recorded and avoided surveys unless it was by government officials or someone they 
knew. In this context, I found that people in the oppressed caste quarter of Pathemany village, 
called Bharathy Veethy, were more willing to speak about their predicament. The oppressed 
caste in Pathemany mainly belonged to the toddy tapping (tree climbers who tap the sap of 
palm trees) caste, but they mostly work as agricultural wage labor in contemporary times. I 
had established a good relationship with one of the local leaders of this oppressed caste 
community in Bharathy Veethy, Mr. Chandrabose, and coincidentally found a research 
assistant from the same community, both of which facilitated my field study including access 
to oppressed caste households.  
 Pathemany, Grama Niladari (GN) division (the smallest unit with government 
officials at the village level) J281 is one of 31 GN divisions in located in the Kopay 
Divisional Secretariat. The Kopay Divisional Secretariat is part of the red soil agricultural 
belt, and is one of 15 Divisional Secretariats in the Jaffna District. Pathemany, covers a land 
aread of 2.75 square kms and in 2012 had a population of 696 households (2,258 people) with 
an estimated 400 households in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy with the rest 
mainly belonging to the dominant Vellala caste.116 However, among the Vellala caste an 
estimated one hundred households are displaced people renting houses and land from Palaly. 
Some of these Palaly Vellala households have agricultural land elsewhere including in the 
Vanni. 
                                                          





 My research assistant Akalya, the only if not one of the few university graduates from 
Bharathy Veethy, and I attempted to reach as many of the households as possible in 
Pathemany village through convenience and snowball sampling. We began with the contacts 
of Akalya and Mr. Chandrabose and through those contacts, we reached their families and 
friends. We also attempted to reach as many other households as possible by randomly 
knocking on doors in Pathemany. However, it was much harder to find agreeable respondents 
through such random visits.  
We first carried out a questionnaire starting in March 2013 in the various parts of 
Pathemany village, but it was those in Bharathy Veethy that mostly agreed to participate in 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire was also combined with open-ended interviews where 
possible, which helped identify participants for longer detailed interviews for questions 
relating to the history of the village, caste relations and the role of social institutions. These 
short interviews and conversations, gave me a broader understanding of rural life in 
Pathemany, and when agreeable led to longer interviews later.  
 The initial questionnaire was framed in a broad manner with some open ended 
questions consisting of the twelve sections as follows: 
1. Identity including religion, temple and membership in community centres 
2. Educational level of family members 
3. Housing including war-time damage, ownership or rental, housing assistance 
4. Economic status of household including assets and home garden 
5. Livestock reared by the household 
6. Agricultural land, share cropping and wage labor 
7. Agricultural support from government, co-operatives and private business 
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8. Jobs of household members, migration, incomes and remittances 
9. Inter-generational relationship to Pathemany village and migration 
10. Agricultural crops reared and time spent in agriculture 
11. Agricultural equipment and machinery including ownership and rental 
12. Women’s labor in the household and wage labor 
We attempted the questionnaire on 107 households and 68 agreed. Therefore, 9.8% of the 
696 households in Pathemany participated in the questionnaire. The exercise of the 
questionnaire and the related conversations were valuable for me in familiarizing myself with 
not only Pathemany village, but the broader concerns of rural social life in Jaffna. Therefore, 
the questionnaire was mainly of qualitative value. 
The questionnaire and the interviews provided some important insights for the 
construction of the survey to gain quantitative data. Questions emerged about rural 
provisioning, rural debt and migrant remittances from the Middle East as opposed to 
remittances from permanent migrants to the Western countries. Such questions were 
addressed in the survey and data was collected to understand the dynamics of incomes and 
debt in Pathemany village. 
I also realized from the questionnaire that it was going to be difficult for me to gain a 
detailed breakdown of household expenditure in the surevy with the resources available to 
me. Most rural households did not keep such accounts or think in terms of monthly and 
weekly expenditures. Therefore, I decided to focus on their monthly expenditure on firewood 
bought once or twice a month and education expenditure paid once a month. 
The questionnaire and the related interviews also reinforced the point made to me by 
many including the village leader that it would be difficult to ask direct questions about caste 
identity. I continued my research on caste through subtle means, such as detailed interviews 
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relating to social institutions including temples, schools, co-operatives and community 
centres. Analysis of caste relations in Pathemany are addressed in Chapter 4. 
We also organised a focused group discussion at the Bharathy Veethy community 
center.117 The discussion with seven men including the community center leaders was 
insightful on the dynamics of debt. We found that people were more willing to talk about 
debt in a group discussion rather than in individual interviews.  
We carried out a survey starting in November 2013 approaching 136 households and 
102 households agreed to participate. The survey was only carried out in the Bharathy Veethy 
oppressed caste quarter, and the survey recorded 25% of the estimated 400 households in 
Bharathy Veethy. Again it was administered as a convenience and snowball survey. The 
survey consisted of 34 questions under the following categories: 
1. Monthly household expenditure (food, education, firewood) 
2. Monthly household incomes (income from agriculture, income from other jobs) 
3. Loans incurred (agriculture, self-employment, leasing, pawning, social 
institutions, informally from individuals, for housing) 
4. Land ownership (own home, own farm, share cropping) 
5. Remittances (diaspora in the West, migrant workers in the Middle East) 
Therefore, the survey following the questionnaire was geared towards understanding the 
impact of monetization, credit, rural provisioning and remittances.  
My experience with the survey is that there is likely to be considerable error for the 
reason that the villagers make broad approximations of monetary amounts on a monthly 
basis. It was also very difficult to get historical information from them for example of 
incomes and expenditures more than a year ago. Furthermore, they were also guarded in the 
information they provided. Finally, I found that with the survey and the interview, the 
                                                          
117 This discussion was held on an evening after the members returned from work on 16 May 2013. 
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villagers responded to my questions with the most recent developments in mind. Therefore, a 
drought year would mean they are very pessimistic during the interview about the future of 
agriculture, eventhough in reality they will cultivate the next year if they have the 
wherewithal.  
The value of the survey for me was to get an on the ground sense of data to be able to 
compare it with the robust HIES survey carried during the period of my field study and 
identify broader patterns of rural economic life in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy 
Veethy. While my initital questions were about rural incomes, in the course of my field 
research I became more interested in the post-war dynamics of debt linked to new forms of 
financialization at the rural level. Therefore, the construction of the survey and the analysis of 









Rural Incomes, Land and Capital 
The Jaffna economy is characterised by failure of incomes to match the rising cost of 
living as illustrated from data in the previous Chapter. How does one account for the falling 
incomes relative to household expenditure after the war? This problem can be analysed from 
three angles: first, the challenges faced in agricultural production and incomes following 
integration into the national and global market after the war; second, the impact of systemic 
changes to the rural economy after the war in the form of monetisation of the economy, the 
shift in rural provisioning, and changes in consumption; and third, the expansion of credit that 
allowed for much higher expenditure than incomes. 
 
Land and Landlessness in Jaffna 
The size of plots cultivated by farmers, has historically been small in Jaffna. 
According to the Agricultural Census of 2002/2003 in Jaffna there are no plots over 20 acres.  
There are 25,303 plots, between 0.25 and 20 acres cultivating a total extent of 31,895 acres. 
That is an average plot of 1.26 acres lower than the national average of 2 acre plots for those 
holding lands between 0.25 and 20 acres. The farmers with plots between 0.25 and 20 acres 
could be categorized as the small holding peasantry. Therefore, there are no large farmers in 
the Jaffna District and the small holding peasantry also have smaller plots than in the rest of 
the country. Next, there are 66,526 plots that are less than a quarter of an acre cultivating a 
total extent of 9,941 acres in Jaffna. Many of these small plots are possibly home gardens. 
Since this data is from the Agricultural Census of 2002 and the Agricultural Census of 
2013/2014 is yet to be published, it is difficult to analyze the land pressure and the number of 
farm households and farm workers and their acces to land.118 
                                                          
118 According to the Department of Agrarian Development, in 2012 there were 63,280 farm families, 33,888 
farm laborers and 230 registered farmer organizations in Jaffna (Jaffna District Statistical Handbook 2013, 78). 




Pathemany is located in the Kopay Division in the Jaffna District. In this Division, out 
of 22,064 households 2,682 households are absolutely landless, which is about 12percent of 
the population.119 In the Jaffna District as a whole, out of 186,681 households 14,001 
households amounting to 7.5% are absolutely landless.120 Such landlessness means they do 
not even own one-eighth of an acre of rural land or one-twentieth of an acre of urban land 
that would have qualified them for the government and donor housing grants for the war 
affected. It is mainly the oppressed caste community of landless wage labor who also lack 
such housing land. Indeed, many of these landless households are looking to purchase even a 
small plot to qualify for a housing grant.  
In this context, agricultural land is an important asset in the Jaffna District, and 
agricultural plots are very small. However, given that my survey was mainly carried out in 
the oppressed caste quarter, there is only a limited number of agricultural plots and they are 
smaller in size than those owned by the upper caste landowners. Agricultural plots for cash 
crops in Jaffna are referred to in multiples of 1,000 crops by the farmers. The local measure 
of land in Jaffn is called a lacham. 121 The measures of land used by farmers can be 
summarized as follows: 
1,000 crops = 3.5 lachams of land 
1 acre of highland = 16 lachams  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organizations in Jaffna (Jaffna District Statistical Handbook 2015, 72) This decline in two years of 8,863 or 15% 
of farm families and 11,470 or 34% of farm laborers is quite significant if the published data is accurate. 
However, it would be prudent to wait until the Agriculture Census of 2013/2014 is published to verify this data 
as well as analyze the cause for such a major change in agriculture. 
119 Data obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016. 
120 Data obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016. 
121 Different parts of Sri Lanka have historically had different measures for land. Jaffna has both capacity 
(volume of seed) measures and surface measures.  
In terms of capacity measures: the amount seed that can be used to sow and area. 
For paddy land: the land area necessary to sow 12 measures paddy = 1 lacham  
For high land: the land area necessary to sow 12 measures kurrakan grain = 1 lacham 
In terms of surface measures: the smallest measure is a kuli, whichi is the squared area of a side with 12 foot 
pole called a kole.  
For paddy land: 12 kulis = 1 lacham and 24 lacham = 1 acre 
For high land (for non paddy cultivation) 18 kulis = 1 lacham and 16 lacham = 1 acre 
I draw this from the paper by D. B. Ellepola. (Ellepola 1936) 
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Highland refers to land not used for paddy cultivation and is land used for cash crop 
cultivation and home gardens.  
1 acre of paddy land = 24 lachams  
1 hectare = 2.47 acres  
Therefore, in one acre of land and one hectare of land, 4,500 crops and 11,300 crops, 
respectively are cultivated. 
 
Incomes from Agriculture 
 Jaffna is historically known for the cultivation of cash crops and particularly red 
onions. Nesamma, a fifty-two-year-old farmer whom I interviewed, had six lachams of dowry 
land, but the soil in that land was unsuitable for cultivation and therefore she was cultivating 
just 1,000 crops or about quarter of an acre of onions on a relative’s land. 122 She like many 
others had lost their crops the previous year due to floods and did not take an agricultural 
loan for the 2013/2014 Maha season.123 Since she was cultivating her relative’s land, she did 
not have to pay the Rs. 3,000 (US$ 23) per season (for six months) for share cropping.  
She puts in her labor and her family labor into agriculture. She estimates her costs for 
fuel for pumping water, fertilizers, pesticides and some labor costs for harvesting could cost 
her about Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230). Because her crops failed the previous year, she bought seed 
onion at a very high price of Rs. 7,000 (US$ 54) to Rs. 8,000 (US$ 62) per anthar (50 kgs) 
and she bought 4 anthar. So, her seed cost was approximately Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230). 
Therefore, the total input cost for her was Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460) excluding her labor. She 
estimates, depending on the harvest it could yield 15 to 25 anthar. Therefore, depending on 
                                                          
122 Interview with Nesamma (pseudonym) on 4 March 2014. 
123 In Sri Lanka, the Maha season refers to the rainy season from November to March that coincides with the 
north east monsoon, where agricultural production is highest. The Yala season is mainly tank or well irrigated 
season from May to August and not all farmers farm during this season of smaller production with the need for 
much higher levels of irrigation. 
139 
 
the yield and price of onions at harvest, she might sell her harvest for Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460) 
to Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150). Therefore, her take home from the season she said could be at 
the value of cash inputs or a profit of Rs. 90,000 (US$ 690). If she has a good harvest, given 
that she has only sown 1,000 crops, she gets about Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115) in monthly income 
over six months. 
In most cases farmers would cultivate 2,000 or 4,000 crops (half acre or one acre), 
and they would also cultivate multiple seasons. However, most households I interviewed 
were unable to pay back the agricultural loans they had taken the previous year. They claimed 
it was due to the failed crops the previous year. 
 
Table 3.1 Red Onion Cultivation in Jaffna District 




Unit Cost  
(Rs./kg.)* 
Net Return  
(Rs./hectare)* 
Yala 2013               12,874  119 31       1,131,597  
Maha 2012/13               14,532  54 31          333,206  
Maha 2011/12               13,151  51 33          239,431  
*excludes own labour  
Source: Central Bank, Economic and Social Statistics Report 2016, Table 5.8 
 
Central Bank data has only been published thus far for a select few seasons on 
farmgate prices, unit prices and net returns for red onions in the Jaffna District coinciding 
with the time of my field research. Table 3.1 illustrates how farm gate prices vary. The Yala 
season in Jaffna which is irrigated mainly through ground water from wells clearly fetches 
much higher prices. However, the two difficult Maha seasons with crop failures at the end of 
2012 and 2011 the farmers only got a net return of Rs. 333,000 (US$ 2,540) and Rs. 239,000 
(US$ 1,840) per hectare or Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230) and Rs. 22,000 (US$ 160) per 1,000 crops 
respectively. 124 With agricultural incomes in those seasons for 1,000 crops cultivated 
                                                          
124 One hectare is equivalent to approximately 11,000 crops. 
140 
 
approximating to just one month or one and a half months of montly expenditure, the farmers 
were devastated and therefore could not pay back their loans. 
   
 Figure 3.1 Average Producer Prices and Retail Prices for Red Onions (Rs. per kg) 
Source: Central Bank, Economic and Social Statistics Report 2016 
 
 
The fall in in agricultural incomes seen in Table 3.1 was partly due to unfortunate 
weather conditions, and it is reflected in the massive increase in the average producer price of 
onions in Figure 3.1. However, Figure 3.1 also illustrates a structural problem, where 
producer prices with respect to red onions are far below retail prices, on the order of 60% of 
retail prices. Furthermore, retail prices for red onions in the North are 20% lower than the 
national average. In this context, many farmers mentioned that in the past before the war, the 
co-operatives used to ship the onions to the market in Colombo and fetch them a good price. 
Therefore, the falling incomes of agricultural production has many causes from unfortunate 
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Figure 3.2 Monthly Incomes from Agriculture* (Rs.) 
*45 of 102 respondents recorded incomes from agriculture 
 
In this contex, the low levels of agricultural incomes in Bharathy Veethy are evident 
from Figure 3.2 based on data from my survey conducted in late 2013. The cause for such 
low agricultural incomes could be partly influenced by the failed crops discussed above and 
the resulting low incomes. Furthermore, their low level of land ownership leads farmers to 
combine cultivation of their own land with share cropping where possible and wage labor. 
 
Land Ownership and Rent 
Most farmers in Bharathy Veethy cultivate 1,000 to 4,000 crops that is farming only a 
quarter to one acre of land. As evident from Figure 3.3, only a minority of people in 
oppressed caste quarter where the survey was conducted owned land to cultivate agriculture.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Agricultural Land Area* (crops) 
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Of those who don’t own land only a few households manage to participate in sharecropping 
or renting land for agriculture as evident from Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4 Cultivating Share Cropping and Rental Land* (crops) 
*9 of 102 respondents share crop or rent land for cultivation 
 
Rent for land is quite low costing just Rs. 3,000 (US$ 23) for quarter acre of land per 
season. The Vellala landowning caste avoid giving their lands for share cropping by the 
oppressed caste, and prefer to rent it to the Vellala caste.125 Therefore, there is only a small 
number of share cropping or rental plots cultivated by the oppressed caste residents of 
Bharathy Veethy, despite the lack of land owned by the oppressed castes as evident from 
Figure 3.3. 
Land rent which had become monetised with the cash crop boom in the 1970s 
continues in the same form. However, as Gunasinghe describes it, during times of 
accumulation and growth, rent was high: 
On the one hand, the rent of land from the mid-70s to1980 increased 2 to 3 times. On 
the other hand, a new system of rent came into operation which in actual fact 
increased the ground rent still further. The new system of rent known as ‘otti’ requires 
the renter to deposit a substantial amount of money with the land owner; the interest 
emanating from this amount forms the ground rent. When the contract comes to an 
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end the land owner is obliged to return the entire amount to the renter. … The new 
system of renting also drives the cultivators with no savings out of the cultivation 
process (Gunasinghe 1985, 213). 
Both systems of rent, paying just the rent or the deposit accruing interest, exist today in both 
Pathemany and in Jaffna. However, land rent relative to income is quite low after the war. 
The process of driving out cultivators with low savings, described by Gunasinghe a few 
decades back, does not apply now due to the tremendous expansion of credit.  
During the time of my field research, land rent is only a fraction of the total 
production costs of a farmer in Pathemany, where for one thousand crops land rent is Rs. 
3,000 (US$ 23) for a season, where as production costs for onions discussed above can be at 
least Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230) and if seed costs are added to it, production costs could be as 
much as Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460). 
Land rent per acre in Pathemany was Rs. 12,000 (US$ 92) per season in 2013. 
However, the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme initiated before liberalization in the 
1970s, where farmers are eligible for subsidized loans from commercial banks, provides Rs 
95,000 (US$ 730) for the cultivation of an acre of onion for one season. The interest rate 
charged is 8 percent, which is much less than the market rate of 14 percent. Thus rent costs 
are not an impediment for cultivation. Therefore, if land is available for cultivation, such that 
the upper castes are willing to provide their land for cultivation, an oppressed caste farmer 
could readily finance the rent through an agricultural loan. Therefore, in contemporary Jaffna 
caste-based landed relations, credit from banks and profits from production are the 






Labor Costs and Capital Investment 
There is a shortage of labor within the Vellala caste community, as a large sector of 
them had migrated abroad with the war. Therefore, the Vellala landowners can no longer rely 
on exchange of labor through networks involving Vellala youth. Furthermore, oppressed 
caste wage labor can no longer be coerced into working for lower wages, as caste oppression 
no longer works through coercion and overt violence. In this context, farmers including 
bureaucrats who form the dominant sections of society, as discussed in Chapter 2, complain 
of the rise in monetized wage labor after the war and condemn wage labor as lazy.  
Male wage labor per day costs Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) plus lunch and tea. Women’s 
agricultural labor can be between Rs. 600 (US$ 4.62) to Rs. 800 (US$ 6.15) plus lunch and 
tea. However, demand for agricultural wage labor is irregular and average monthly real 
incomes of wage laboring households are low. Furthermore, with the monetisation of the 
rural economy farmers in Pathemany find it more efficient to provide short-term contracts for 
the labor process. Therefore, when it comes to labor relating to cash crop cultivation such as 
seeding, building water channels and harvesting, it is networks of groups of workers from 
neighboring Puttur village that are employed on short-term contracts spanning a day to a few 
days.  
The oppressed castes in Puttur village do not own any agricultural land and due to the 
historical severity of caste oppression in that village do not have the possibility of cash crop 
cultivation. Therefore, the men and women from Puttur are completely dependent on wage 
labor. They are involved in breaking stones and clearing plots or they work on contract in 
farms during the agricultural seasons.126 In this context, it is financially prudent for the 
                                                          
126 I visited Puttur village a few times in preparation for a conference paper on caste in August and September 
2016. Their village set up, very small plots of residential land and village geography of isolation was very 
different from Bharathy Veethy. 
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farmers to employ these teams from Puttur, and the workers from Puttur are also willing to 
work for less.  
Caste relations are not as coercive or obligatory as they were before the war. 
Historically, an oppressed caste person worked on the land of the same upper caste person. 
During the cash crop boom of the 1970s they did demand higher wages, but the oppressive 
caste based productive relations continued. However, with the war, displacement and the 
mass migration of the upper caste landowners, familial ties and productive relations linking 
upper caste landowner to oppressed caste wage laborers were disrupted. Furthermore, wage 
laborers demand higher cash wages with the rising cost of living and the monetization of the 
economy.  
In this context, the landowners now prefer to substitute labor with machinery and 
other contractual agreements to groups of workers. The landowning farmers do not have cash 
flow problems due to the post-war expansion of credit and there is abundant access to capital 
to invest in such labor substituting equipment. In this context, with falling incomes in Jaffna 
as evident from the data discussed in Chapter 2, the accumulation is only for the foreign 
producers of agricultural machinery and the banking and financial sector which has facilitated 
the purchase of such equipment on credit, particularly through lease hire purchasing.  
 
Household Expenditure and Rural Provisioning 
In Bharathy Veethy, in many interviews with rural households, including with 
landless wage laborers, it was claimed that for a household of four to six persons, monthly 
expenditure to sustain the household is Rs. 20,000 (US$ 154). It is women who are mainly 
responsible for provisioning for the home and they claim to spend close to Rs. 1,000 (US$ 
7.70) at the market. Furthermore, they claim they do not go to the market everyday because 
of the costs, and only go every other day. Therefore, they estimate food costs at Rs. 15,000 
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(US$ 115) per month and non-food expenses at Rs. 5,000 (US$ 38) per month. In this 
context, male wage labor of Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) per day is not high, particularly given that 
wage labor is irregular. Furthermore, wages for female day wage labor is only Rs. 600 (US$ 
4.60). While I did not have the capacity to do a detailed survey on household expenditure, I 
can draw the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 2012/2013 carried out at 
the same time. The HIES data on household expenditure is far more rigorous and complete 
and puts my findings in perspective. The median monthly expenditure per household in 
Jaffna District is Rs. 28,209. (HIES 2013, 19) However, Bharathy Veethy falls into the 
bottom 25% of Sri Lanka’s expenditure. As Table 3.2 illustrates, the median household 
expenditure for the third decile group is Rs. 20,454.  
 























All  30,701 41,444 15,651 25,793 45,878 
1 Less than 13,837 10,795 10,238 6,531 3,708 14,111 
2 13,837 - 18,498 16,328 16,254 9,815 6,439 21,322 
3 18,499 - 22,461 20,454 20,474 11,693 8,782 24,819 
4 22,462 - 26,354 24,408 24,397 13,438 10,959 28,965 
5 26,355 - 30,701 28,479 28,514 14,643 13,871 35,274 
6 30,702 - 36,011 33,237 33,259 16,267 16,992 38,473 
7 36,012 - 43,248 39,268 39,412 17,764 21,647 49,070 
8 43,249 - 53,321 47,547 47,816 19,490 28,326 51,365 
9 53,322 - 74,933 61,585 62,654 21,521 41,133 66,186 
10 More than 74,933 100,777 131,471 25,357 106,114 129,239 
Source: Household Incomes and Expenditure Survey 2013, 35 
 
While Sri Lanka has had a history of free education policies since the 1940s, and even 
provides free school uniforms and textbooks along with a mid-day meal, in reality household 
educational expenses have been increasing. These expenses are due to the hidden fees by 
schools and after school tuition programs. Parents believe such after school tuition is 
necessary for their children to get ahead in competitive national exams. As Figure 3.5 shows 
about 66 of the 102 of respondent households in Bharathy Veethy have school going children 
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and they incur education related expenses.127 Furthermore, as Figure 3.5 shows expenditure 
on education for households with school going children are significant, with 60% of them 
spending between Rs 1,000 (US$ 7.70) and Rs 4,000 (US$ 31) per month and 8% spending 
over Rs. 4,000 (US$ 31) per month. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Expenditure – Education Costs* (Rs.) 
*66 of 102 respondants have school going children 
 
The increasing monetisation of rural economic life in Bharathy Veethy is evident 
from my survey findings for the costs of firewood used as fuel for cooking. If the household 
does not have medium sized plots of housing land as is the case in the oppressed caste 
quarters of the village, where most houses are on very small plots on the order of 1.5 lachams 
(close to one-tenth of an acre), almost all firewood128 must be bought. Furthermore, adding to 
the financial burden on such oppressed caste households, without the possibilities of foraging 
for firewood, the cost of firewood for cooking alone can be close to Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) per 
month as evident from Figure 3.6. I chose to look at the cost of firewood to understand the 
changing dynamics of rural provisioning with the monetisation of the rural economy in 
                                                          
127 According to the HIES Survey for 2012/2013 average household expenditure on education is Rs. 1,448 (US$ 
11.10), and since this includes a number of families that do not have children going through education, the 
number is possibly higher. However, since Bharathy Veethy is in the bottom 3 deciles, the average household 
expenditure on education for the third decile is only Rs. 407 (US$ 3.20). These figures reflect a much higher 
monetised cost for education in Bharathy Veethy. 
128 According to the HIES Survey for 2012/2013 79% and 57% of rural households in Sri Lanka and the Jaffna 
District respectively, collect firewood as opposed to purchase firewood. Again the monetised cost of firewood in 
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Jaffna. Indeed, Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) for monthly expenditure in firewood and fuel is a 
significant portion of the non-food expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Expenditure on Fuel and Firewood (Rs.) 
 
From the HIES data, the bottom three deciles monthly expenditure ranges from Rs. 
6,531 (US$ 50) to Rs. 11, 693 (US$ 90) for mean food expenditure and Rs. 3,708 (US$ 29) to 
Rs 8,782 (US$ 68) for mean non-food expenditure. Therefore, the approximate averages of 
Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) for education and for firewood each per month evident from my survey, 
is a significant share of the non-food costs for the Bharathy Veethy population. 
Unlike the Vanni (mainland region south of Jaffna peninsula), where land alienation 
schemes129 have provided most families with half an acre of land in recent years and much 
larger plots in the past that allows for some level of subsistence including the possibility of a 
home garden, in Jaffna small plots and landlessness creates further economic pressures. The 
comparison with the Vanni is relevant because many of the housholds in Pathemany were 
displaced to the Vanni during the war, and managed to survive the years of war through 
subsistence agriculture and rural provisioning from home gardens.  
                                                          
129 The state provides permit lands which are on lease for a few decades but are eventually free holding title is 
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In the post-war context in Jaffna, landlessness and small plots of residential land 
constrain rural peoples’ possibilities for survival through rural provisioning and are trapped in 
a monetized economy. Therefore, land is important for rural provisioning of food from home 
gardens including livestock and for firewood as much as it is for agricultural production, 
particularly for the bottom sections of income earners.  
 
Expansion of Credit and Rural Debt 
 Banks and finance companies have been greatly expanding credit in Pathemany, as is 
the case throughout Jaffna, in the post-war years. Such credit takes the form of various bank 
loans, pawning, leasing and microfinance schemes.  
 
Agricultural Loans 
Pathemany, like many other villages in the country, continues to benefit from the 
agriculture loans with the Central Bank backed New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme 
initiated in the 1970s. The loan amounts are determined by the Central Bank based on the 
crop cultivated per acre of land, for example onion – Rs. 95,000 (US$ 730) and chilli – Rs. 
65,000 (US$ 500), and provided at subisidized interest rates. Figure 3.7 shows the 
agricultural loans taken by those surveyed. Since the survey was conducted in the majority 
landless and wage laboring households in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy, the 
number of agricultural loans taken were 40 of the 102 households surveyed.130  
The Central Bank backed agricultural loans are administered by the commercial 
banks. Therefore, in every town linked to villages, a large number of banks work with village 
farmers’ organisations to determine who should receive such loans, and such loans are to be 
                                                          
130 This approximates well with the fact that 33 households claimed they had agricultural and and 9 households 
claimed they were involved in share cropping. Therefore  
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paid back at harvest. In recent years, farmers have been unfortunate with harvests failing due 
to untimely rains, crop diseases and drought. At the time of my field research in late 2013 to 
early 2014, many of the families had not paid back the loans from the previous year. This is 
also another reason for the lower level of agricultural loans taken in Bharathy Veethy during 
the time of my survey. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Agriculture Loans (Rs.) 
 
Self-Employment Loans  
After the war in May 2009, private commercial banks were tasked with providing 
loans to initiate livelihoods; the loans were used by farmers to begin farming to fisher-folk 
resuming fisheries. These loans were on the order of Rs. 50,000 (US 380) to Rs. 200,000 
(US$ 1,540) at a subsidized interest rate of 8% and part of the ‘Northern Spring’ 
reconstruction programme discussed in Chapter 2. Once the bank branches were established, 
the banks began providing so-called self-employment loans at market rates on their own 
initiative in 2011. As evident from Figure 3.8, close to 60% of the households surveyed had 
taken self-employment loans. If Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.7 are compared, it becomes clear that 
there was far more credit expanded through the self-empolyment loans than through the 






























Figure 3.8 Self-employment Loans (Rs.) 
 
One of the community center leaders in Bharathy Veethy explained the proliferation 
of self employment loans.131 He said the Bank of Ceylon manager came to their community 
center in early 2012 and offered to provide self employment loans to the community. He 
believes a total of Rs. 10 million (US$ 77,000), with each loan to an individual amounting to 
Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and to be repaid through monthly instalment payment in either two or 
three years, were distributed as self employment loans starting in early 2012. The villagers 
only knew and mentioned the monthly installment payments of Rs. 3,600 (US$ 28) a month 
for 3 years and Rs. 5,000 (US$ 38) for two years. I was able to calculate that the interest rate 
in this case is 14%. The loan merely required two guarantors and no collateral. Furthermore, 
in many cases loans were given to each member of a household, and thus in a few cases four 
members of a household incurred a total debt of Rs. 400,000 (US$ 3,100). The loans were 
meant to initiate small businesses such as starting a shop or used to raise cattle, and those 
                                                          
































seeking loans had to state the purpose, but the community center leaders told me the people 
who took the loans had no plans or ideas of how to generate incomes from those loans and 
merely consumed the loans. Some people used it to pay for house building or to pay other 
loans. A year later many people were defaulting on their loans and the bank manager began 
deducting payments from the guarantors’ savings creating a tense situation.  
 
Debt tied to Housing Schemes 
Another major problem tied to the reconstruction efforts is the indebtedness tied to the 
housing schemes.132 During the latter phase of the war and after the war, many donors 
including the World Bank and the Swiss Development Cooperation gave grants to households 
to rebuild houses destroyed by the war. India’s major contribution to post-war reconstruction 
was 50,000 houses to the war affected, each worth a grant of Rs. 550,000 (US$ 4,230). These 
owner-driven housing construction grants were administered in installments after each major 
step of building of the house. By 2013, the cost of building a house with the specifications of 
the donors cost between Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,150) and Rs. 1 million (US$ 7,690). As Figure 
3.9 shows, 26.5% of those surveyed had received housing grants by the end of 2013. As 
discussed above, the absolutely landless, who do not own an eighth of an acre of rural 
residential land, do not qualify for the housing grants. Most of the housing grant recipients 
incurred expenses far in excess of the grant to build their house. The additional expense of 
building the house was met through debt. Such housing debt came from variety of loans from 
self employment loans to pawning.  
 
                                                          
132 I along with a few activists raised the housing debt issue as it became clear to me during my field research. A 
focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center called Ilankathir Sana Samuha Nilayam 
about community issues led to a discussion on housing related debt on 16 May 2013. Meera Srinivasan the 





Figure 3.9 Housing Costs above Grant for House* (Rs.) 
*27 of 102 respondents received housing grants 
 
The implication of post-war housing grants and their related debt for the rural 
economy in Bharathy Veethy and Jaffna more broadly is that while a house in the form of a 
major asset had been added to the household, the household also incurs large debts from the 
financial sector, which have to be paid with interest. The debt and debt related payments in 
time shapes and directs rural economic life, including the level and form of incomes that are 
necessary to sustain household finances. The high level of out migration for work in the 
Middle East discussed above in Chapter 2 is possibly linked to the repayment of such debts, 
including housing construction related debts. 
 
Pawning, Leasing and Informal loans 
With the boom in global gold prices between 2009 and 2012, many banks got into the 
pawning business in a major way and even extended their hours of operation so that wage 
laborers could come to the banks after work. For most rural households in Sri Lanka, gold 
jewellery continues to be their main liquid asset. Rural households in the North had managed 
to preserve some amount of gold jewellery despite the war. Historically, pawning of gold was 
the fall back mechanism for rural household financing and provisioning during familial and 
























Figure 3.10 Value of Pawned Jewellery (Rs.) 
Amount pawned by 102 respondents 
 
In the post-war years, households pawned their gold not only due to crisis caused by 
crop failures but also to pay the installments on other loans. As Figure 3.10 illustrates about 
85% of the surveyed households had pawned their jewellery. The scale of the pawned loans 
for 80% of the population on the range of one month (Rs 20,000 or US$ 154) to more than 
ten months (Rs. 200,000 or US$ 1,540) of average monthly incomes in Bharathy Veethy is 
going to be very difficult for them to recover.  
In Bharathy Veethy, only 12.5% of the respondents in the survey had bought a vehicle 
or consumer item such as a refrigerator on leasing. This might be in part because of the low 
levels of savings and the larger cash flows necessary to purchase a vehicle.133 While both 
banks and leasing companies were involved in such leasing sales, the leasing companies were 
considered to be much more aggressive in seizing products where installements had not been 
                                                          
133 For example, a two wheeler tractor costs Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,700), but to buy it on leasing one has to make a 
down payment of Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770). The rest of the Rs. 250,000 (US$ 1,900) has to be paid in monthly 
installments over three years. The few people who did purchase tractors and three wheelers in Bharathy Veethy, 
would typically get a self employment loan for Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and use it toward the down payment. 
However, they have to pay monthly installment payments on the self employment loan and the leasing contract 
for the total amount in the case of a two-wheel tractor of Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,700) that is a Rs. 12,500 (US$ 96) 

































paid. The leasing companies are ruthless, they forcefully seize the product, where by the 
customer loses his down payment and the value they have paid in installments until the time 
of the company seizing their product. These problems with leasing were explained to me 
during the discussion at the community center.134 At the time of my field research, leasing 
was not prevalent in Bharathy Veethy, where it was widely discussed as a social curse. The 
few cases of default had made it clear that individuals lose much of their assets and end up 
with considerable debt.   
Historically, in Jaffna most people took loans from money lenders and relatives. 
However, as Figure 3.11 illustrates only 21% of households surveyed took informal loans 
from local money lenders and relatives. As the various levels of loans illustrate, much of the 
debt is in the form of loans to banks and financial institutions. However, the fewer informal 
loans from money lenders charged a much higher interest rate.  
 
 
Figure 3.11 Informal Loans from Money Lenders and Relatives (Rs.) 
 
In Bharathy Veethy and in Jaffna more broadly, a new form of debt called “meter 
vatti” (metered interest, colloquically meaning it increases like an electric meter) from money 
lenders are given at 5% interest per day. Such extremely high interest loans are taken by 
individuals when they have serious cash flow problems including when they have to meet 
                                                          




























installment payments to banks and finance companies.135 Some individuals take loans from 
banks to lend to others in the village at higher interest rates.136 Therefore, the tremendous 
expansion of credit has also created worrying and new forms of debt culture.  
 
Table 3.3 Types of Loans Taken 
Types of Loans Percentage 
Agriculture, Self Employment and Pawning 25% 
Agriculture and Self Emploment 26% 
Agriculture and Pawning 34% 
Self Employment and Pawning 55% 
Neither Agriculture nor Self Employment 28% 
Neither Agriculture, Self Empl nor Pawning 10% 
 
 Table 3.3 illustrates how many households in Bharathy Veethy have taken multiple 
loans, particularly a combination of agriculture, self-employment and pawning loans. 
Furthemore, only 10% of the households have not taken any three of these loans. Therefore, 
there is considerable access to credit from the formal financial sector to the households in 
Bharathy Veethy. In figure 3.12, I compare the levels of agricultural and self employment 
loans. Clearly, there is a shift towards the recently launched self employment loans reflecting 
the new expansion of credit by the banks. 
 
                                                          
135 Focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center on 16 May 2013. 




Figure 3.12 Comparison of Agricultural and Self-Employment Loans* 
* Out of 102 respondents 39% took Agricultural loans and 60% took Self-employment Loans 
 
 
Out Migration and Remittances 
 The faltering incomes have led a section of wage labor to seek employment in 
construction. As Figure 3.13 shows 11% of those surveyed are involved in mason and 
carpentry work137, however, a significant section of wage labor shifts to construction when 
work is available. Such pluriactiviy characterized by occupational multiplicity is common.138 
However, employment in construction is linked to the one-time post-war construction boom; 
particularly, the various housing schemes discussed above which were a major stimulus for 
labor in the form of mason work in almost every village. By mid-2014, when my field 
                                                          
137 While carpenters should be classified as middle castes rather than oppressed castes, due to the proximity of 
the carpenter caste ward to the oppressed caste ward, and with some connections in that ward, we were also able 
to interview and also conducted the survey in the carpentry caste ward. 
138 The complexity of such pluriactivity is not captured by the survey as I only became aware of the level of 
switching of labor and the self perception of households and their work in the course of my fieldwork. For 
example, there is greater social standing and pride attached to cultivating their own land as opposed to share 
cropping, and in turn share cropping as opposed to wage labor. Therefore, in the survey and even in interviews, 
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research was coming to an end, there were increasing concerns about the decreasing demand 




Figure 3.13 Types of Employment 
 
 The monthly incomes of those involved in wage labor are given in Figure 3.14. The 
low levels of incomes, where 58% of them earn less than Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115) per month 
and 42% earn less than Rs. 10,000 (US$ 77) per month, allows them to spend what the 
bottom two and bottom one deciles respectively of national expenditures as compared to the 
HIES data in Table 3.2. This is a worrying reflection of the crisis of rural incomes in 
Bharathy Veethy. Such a hopeless condition leads to high levels of indebtedness and where 
possible out migration in search of incomes.  
 
                                                          
139 Nesamma explained she was providing some wage work in her fram to one of the village youth rather than 
wage workers from Puttur. She explained that this youth like many others could not find construction related 























Figure 3.14 Monthly Incomes of Wage Laborers* (Rs.) 
*Monthly wage distribution of 24 respondents involved in wage labor 
  
While there is much discussion in the mainstream media about the considerable 
remittances coming from immigrants to Western countries,140 the flow of such remittances 
from the diaspora to places like Bharathy Veethy is not significant, at least since the end of 
the war. Once permanent migrants marry and have children or after they help their immediate 
family members to migrate, remittances tend to decrease. In fact, such remittances from the 
Tamil diaspora tend to be for major events such as weddings rather than on a regular monthly 
basis. As Figure 3.15 shows only about 12% of the households surveyed get remittances from 
the permanent migrants to the West who form the large Tamil diaspora.  
 
                                                          
140 There is no data breaking down the historical flow of remittances, and it is particularly lacking in the North 
due to the war. Migrant remittances in the South emerged in the 1980s and there again the data is not 


















Figure 3.15 Monthly Remittances from Western Countries (Rs.) 
 
The more significant flow of remittances after the war is migrant labor to the Middle 
East, where regular monthly remittances are possible. As Figure 3.16 illustrates 25% of those 
surveyed have sent youth to work in the Middle East who provide regular remittances. 
Indebted households often depend on such remittances from young men involved in migrant 
work to meet household expenditure and debt payments. 
 
 




























































In Figure 3.17, I provide the distribution of various forms of rural incomes. While 
there is some error in the classification of these incomes as some of those receiving 
agricultural incomes are involved in wage labor and other incomes. Nevertheless, the 
comparison illustrates the continuing importance of agricultural incomes and the generally 
low level of wage labor incomes.  
 
 
Figure 3.17 Distributions of Incomes in Bharathy Veethy* 
*Out of 102 respondents, 45 have agricultural incomes, 24 have wage labor incomes, 31 have other incomes, 25 
receive Middle East Remittances and 12 receive Western Remittances 
 
 
Response to the New Debt Culture 
Rural indebtedness in Pathemany was discussed in a number of interviews. I first 
provide the perspective of the bank manager from a state bank in Atchuvely providing loans 
in Pathemany. Next, I provide the perspective of the village leader for Pathemany on 
indebtedness. I follow that with a discussion of the perspectives that emerged from interviews 
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Loans from a Bank Manager’s Perspective 
 In May 2013, I interviewed a Bank Manager141 in Atchuvely town. He was the 
manager of a Bank responsible for the highest level of loans given in Pathemany village. 
There are a number of banks and finance companies situated in Atchuvely town and serve 
many of the neighboring villages; Pathemany, Valalai, Thambalai, Kathiripai, Iddaikadu, 
Thenmolai, Thopu, Avarangal West and Sirripuddity.  
 The Manager described the agricultural loans as those based on the New 
Comprehensive Rural Credit System (NCRCS) developed in 1974. Agriculture loans used to 
be for a length of 180 days, but he said two years ago it was changed to 274 days (9 months). 
Furthermore, the Central Bank decides on the loan amount per acre depending on the kind of 
crop cultivated. For example, for onions, it used to be Rs. 50,000 [US$ 385] per acre but with 
the 2010/2011 season it was increased to Rs. 95,000 [US$ 730]. If a farmer takes a loan of 
Rs. 190,000 (US$ 1,460) then it is given in two stages first Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and then 
rest of the Rs. 90,000 (US$ 690) after two weeks. Such loans are given for both the Maha, 
monsoon rain-fed seaon and Yala, well irrigated season. At the time of the interview, the 
market rate for loans from the Bank was 14% but the Central Bank gives a guarantee and 
subsidy on agricultural loans of 6%, so the farmers effectively pay an interest rate of 8%. 
 The Manager explained that his Bank began actively giving loans, after the 
interruption of the war, during the later phase of the war starting in 2007. In 2011 and 2012, 
approximately 3,600 agricultural loans were given each year by the Atchuvely bank during 
the two seasons. For example, Maha 2011-2012, a total of 2,325 agricultural loans were given 
and in Yala 2012, a total of 1,817 agricultural loans were given. For Pathemany village, for 
                                                          
141 The Bank Manager and the Bank are not named here. I interviewed the Bank Manager on 23 May 2013, who 
by then was frustrated with the increasing number of non-performing loans, and wanted to vent his frustrations 
though he refused to speak on record.  
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the Maha and Yala seasons about 150 loans were given on the scale of Rs. 100,000 (US$ 
770) to Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150) each. 
The Bank Manager then explained the various other loans provided by his Bank. He 
mentioned how Self-employment loans were initiated in 2011 with interest rates of 11% for a 
maximum amount of Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770). In the Atchuvely bank branch they had given 
out 450 Self-employment loans in 2012. Furthermore, Self-employment Horticulture loans 
were also started in 2011 with interest rate of 14% for a maximum amount of Rs. 500,000 
(US$ 3,850). Again he claimed his bank branch had given about 1,000 Self-employment 
Horticulture loans in 2012.142 
He also mentioned the Northern Spring loans that were granted soon after the war on 
the scaled of Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) to Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) per family at subsidized 
interest rates.143 Then a new Central Bank loan for villagers called the Poverty Alleviation 
and Micro Project loan, with interest rate of 12%, and on the scale of Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) to 
Rs 100,000 (US$ 770); the Bank had given 750 loans in Atchuvely of which 150 loans were 
given in Pathemany village. He also mentioned a new loan that had been initiated in 2012 for 
Rehabilitation with the coordination of the Central Bank and the District Secretariat. 
The Bank Manager, who was increasingly in a confrontational situation with the 
villagers who were defaulting on the loans, claimed the bank had been generous in helping 
the people but the people were ungrateful. Furthermore, he claimed it had been the Bank’s 
policy to expand credit to assist the people after the war. Therefore, in October 2009, the 
                                                          
142 These horticulture loans were not given in Bharathy Veethy as they probably could not show the levels of 
lands and collateral necessary for those loans.   
143 The initial Northern Spring loans were at subsidized rates, but were implemented by commercial banks as 
opposed to the state insitutions. Within a few years the banks used their newly opened branch offices to provide 
a range loans at much higher interest rates. 
164 
 
Chairman of the Bank himself visited the Atchuvely branch, and formally distributed loans 
for villagers purchasing tractors on leasing.144 
 He said one of the reasons for the major increase in indebtedness was that the Credit 
Information Bureau of Sri Lanka (CRIB) system only came into use in Atchuvely in 2012 
and therefore, until that system was in place there were no mechanisms for banks to cross 
check if other banks had given loans to the same clients. Therefore, the banks restricted 
lending after 2012 as they became aware of same people taking multiple loans from different 
banks.  
The Bank Manager mentioned the increasing number of micro-credit schemes that 
were entering his region by micro-finance companies, which were charging 29% annual 
interest rates to be paid in weekly installments. By 2016, that is almost three years after I had 
interviewed the Bank Manager, micro-credit schemes and leasing that had become a serious 
problem of predatory lending, piling further debt on on loans owed to banks. The Jaffna 
District Women’s Federation took a decision in July 2016 to addres both as their main 
concerns. Microfinance and leasing companies lend to anyone without collateral, and then 
use thugs who are abusive to recover loans mainly given to women.  
 The Bank Manager raised fears of a banking crisis in his region unless the villagers 
started paying these loans. He suddenly wanted to conclude the interview as he said he was 
going with the police to a village after a complaint he had made about the threatening 
behaviour of a defaulting client. The interview with the Bank Manager provided a clear 
                                                          
144 The down payment value had decreased down to 5% or even 0% and it can also be manipulated through the 
valuation of the product. With increasing competeting such changes became common in Jaffna in subsequent 
years by other leasing providers particularly leasing companies. The leased products are the property of the bank 
until full payment, and following a down payment of up to 20% of the value of product, a monthly installment 
of the product has to be paid at 12% interest rate and for a period of 2 to 5 years depending on the product. The 
interest rates could vary increasing up to 20% depending on the leasing provider. None of the interviewees in 
Pathemany or those whom I have spoken to in other villages knew the interest rates they were paying on leased 
goods and they only made the decision based on the monthly intallment payment and length of years. 
165 
 
picture of how a proliferation of loan products and expansion of credit was by 2013 proving 
to be a major problem for the banks themselves.  
 The Bank branch had been providing as many as a fifth to a third of some its loans in 
2012 to Pathemany village, the rest going to neighboring villages. Therefore, in 2012, I 
would estimate that this bank branch alone had given 150 each of the following loans 
agricultural loans averaging Rs. 150,000, (US$ 1,150) self employment loans averaging Rs. 
100,000 (US$ 769) and Poverty Alleviation and Microproject loans averaging Rs. 75,000 
(US$ 577). Therefore, the estimated total credit expanded in Pathemany village thorugh one 
bank by these three forms of loans could be Rs. 50 million (US$ 380,000).145  Therefore, for 
the 696 households in Pathemany, this is an average increase in their debts of Rs. 70,000 
(US$ 539) in one year from just one bank, which is 3.5 months of the average income of a 
household in Bharathy Veethy. It is such sudden increase of the expansion of credit in one 
year in post-war rural Jaffna that creates new dynamics of rural indebtedness. 
 
Bharathy Veethy Village Leader on Indebtedness 
 In May 2014, I interviewed Mr. Chandrabose, the oppressed caste leader in Bharathy 
Veethy, who described the naiveté and desperation of his people by narrating the ways in 
which the debt problem proliferated: 
The debt problem was started by the banks. The people were living within their 
means. But then the banks came and gave loans freely and the people took loans. And 
today they are in debt and they don’t have their vehicles. They gave vehicles on 
leasing and people took these leased vehicles, and it was profitable for the leasing 
companies. The people would have paid ten months in instalments and then they 
                                                          
145 Note that this estimate only includes three types of loans from one bank, with the self-employment loans and 
micro project loans being the new kinds of loans. There could have been other loans such as the larger 
horticulture loans given to residents of Pathemany. Also, this expansion of credit is for all of Pathemany not just 
Bharathy Veethy where I conducted my survey. 
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would lose their vehicles. Without the people knowing, the people’s entire wealth has 
been taken. The banks have taken and the leasing companies have taken what little the 
people had. 
What Mr. Chandrabose, himself a farmer with one acre of land, describes is a commonly 
heard explanation of banking and debt in Jaffna. As he was talking, his wife interjected: 
“Leasing and loans have brought our people to this state.” 
 What is significant here is the insidious character of lease hire purchasing of vehicles, 
where a large down payment is made often by taking a bank loan and then monthly 
instalment payments are made from their incomes or by pawning their jewellery. However, in 
many cases payments cannot be sustained and then the vehicle, with value paid up to an 
equivalent of a couple years of income is seized. The owner having lost the vehicle is still 
stuck with the bank loan and may have depleted his assets such as gold jewellery. 
 In mid-2014, Chandrabose described how such indebtedness was also affecting loans 
that farmers were traditionally able to pay back:  
The farmers have taken loans and for two years they have not been able to pay, and 
banks are not able to get it back. It may take 5 or 6 years, and that is if there is an 
agricultural boom like old times [referring to the cash crop boom of the1970s], it is 
then that banks will be able to get their money back. It is starting in 2012 that for the 
first time this kind of debt crisis has come about. 
Thus with increasing indebtedness and the falling incomes from agriculture, even the 
historically feasible agricultural loans are now in trouble. Indeed, debt is contagious, as one 
loan is taken to pay another loan. Furthermore, with higher interest payments on high levels 




 Banks with a view towards expanding their asset base got into new loans particularly 
in the North after the war. These so-called self-employment loans were justified as a form of 
employment creation. 
In the old days, they used to give loans, but they were limited and for a particular 
purpose. And we returned the loans at harvest time. Now they give self-employment 
loans, which can be as much as Rs. 2 lakhs [Rs. 200,000 or US$ 1,540]. You can give 
such loans to a company. But what business do I have taking that kind of money? 
They take the loan and then they buy vehicles. In the Atchuvely banks, many of those 
who took loans used it to buy motorcycles. 
Mr. Chandrabose sees the problem as one resulting from credit expansion providing loans to 
individuals without consideration of how those loans will be used. Indeed, he explains how 
this has led to naïve consumption in the form of villagers purchasing motorcycles.  
 Mr. Chandrabose articulates this problem as one of about insidious accumulation: 
“This is all about exploiting people. Look at the high interest people are paying on debts.” 
For such exploitation by the banks, his solution depends on measures by the state: “Only if 
the government forgives this debt, like small children we can grow again. Otherwise, we will 
remain as infants, and continue to pay the interest on the debts.” This point about debt 
forgiveness is hardly discussed in policy circles, but the incomes of the villagers and their 
level of indebtedness implies the need for such debt forgiveness. The only other avenue of 
addressing such high indebtedness has been out migration and remittances to pay back at 







Peoples’ perception of debt in Bharathy Veethy 
 I interviewed Sakuntala, a 57-year-old farmer146, who said she had taken an 
agricultural loan for Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150) in 2012 that she had not been able to pay back 
due to the crop failures that year. In the meantime, one of her sons has taken a self 
employment loan for Rs. 100,000 (US$ 769) and she had pawned her jewelerry to complete a 
house she had started with the World Bank housing grant of Rs. 325,000 (US$ 2,500). The 
completion of the house had required an additional Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540). Sakuntala, has 
six children with two of them married and the other four living with her and her husband, is 
in a better financial state than most others in Bharathy Veethy. Eventhough her houshold’s 
total debt is Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,690), two of her children living with her have regular 
monthly incomes, one works as a toddy tavern co-operative employee and another works as a 
nurse.  
Income from pluriactivity is necessary for farmers’ survival. In fact, during the war in 
the late 1990s, Sakuntala’s family was able to purchase a total of 7 lachams of land (close to 
half an acre) because her husband who is now retired was a co-operative employee. It is the 
combination of his regular monthly income and the household’s farm incomes that allowed 
them to acquire some land. Sakuntala, because of the regular incomes of her children spoke 
with some confidence and said, she “will never allow her sons to go work in the Middle 
East.” That is not the case with most households in Bharathy Veethy, where falling and 
irregular incomes and high levels of indebtedness provides few choices other than 
remittances through migrant work.  
The discussion at the community centre in Bharathy Veethy, made it clear to me that 
rural people understand the dynamics of bank loans. They believed it was targets given to the 
bank managers that had led them to approach the Community Centre to facilitate the 
                                                          
146 Sakuntala is not her real name, and I interviewed her on 4 March 2014.  
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disbursement of loans. They think that possibly 50% of the households of Bharathy Veethy 
have taken self employment loans by the time of the discussion in May 2013. They were up 
to date with new kinds of loans such as the one introduced by the Hatton National Bank 
(HNB) to complete houses, where the deeds of the houses have to be given as collateral. 
Indeed, as evident from that discussion in Bhararthy Veethy and with most villages I visited, 
village people were mostly aware of the various kinds of loans available, levels of loans and 
the monthly installments.  
What also emerged from the discussion at the community centre was a sense of 
desperation and the inability to emerge out of such a new debt culture. They mentioned how 
the banks were becoming increasingly harsh, not allowing clients to withdraw their pawned 
jewellery until they had paid intallments on other loans. They also mentioned the desperate 
situation of some individuals, who have gone into hiding unable to deal with the harassment 
of the bank managers and police that came looking for them to recover debts.  
 
Conclusion  
My research in Pathemany was an attempt to understand the transformation of the 
rural economy by liberalization policies and civil war that came after the cash crop boom in 
rural Jaffna between the 1960s and 1970s. My field research reveals how post-war 
reconstruction policies and reintegration with the liberalized national economy have resulted 
in falling incomes, rising indebtedness and out migration in Jaffna. While my findings are 
particular to the oppressed caste quarter of one cash crop agricultural village in the Jaffna 
peninsula, I draw conclusions about contemporary characteristics of rural social and 





Rural Provisioning and Pluriactivity 
There is continuing decrease in agricultural land in Jaffna District as such land is 
converted to other purposes including as residential land. There is also a continuing decline in 
the number of farm households and farm laborers. However, conclusive data on the changing 
pattern of land use147 as well as farming households and farm labor in Jaffna will be not clear 
until the extensive Agricultural Census for 2013/2014 is published. Comparing the data from 
this recent Agricultural Census with those from for 2002 and 1981, will allow for analysis of 
the level of decline of agricultural holdings. 
Those involved in small holding cash crop agriculture, whether it be on their own 
land, rented land or working as landless wage labor, are facing falling household incomes 
relative to household expenditure. In this context, the landless who are dependent on wage 
labor are worst affected due to irregular work. Those wage workers who do not have a small 
plot of land with their home cannot provision basic needs through a home garden and 
livestock. Furthermore, the landless households incur significant additional costs, particularly 
firewood for cooking, which households with a quarter acre of land need not incur as 
firewood can be foraged.  
 In my field research an important point that emerged about the viability of rural 
agricultural production and accumulation is the diversification and receipt of multiple forms 
of incomes within households that is characteristic of pluriactivity of rural households in Sri 
Lanka and many other countries.148 During the war, it is those oppressed caste households 
with the steady monthly income of at least one member of the household as a government or 
                                                          
147 According to data obtained from official sources that requested anonymity, following a series of release of 
military held land in the Jaffna District, as of October 2016, military held land is about 5,000 acres. Much of this 
military held land is in the Valikamam North Division, one of the fifteen Divisions of Jaffna District, 
surrounding the Palaly airport along the northern coast of Jaffna peninsula. Therefore, in this Division, where 
40% of the land is held by the military, it could be a cause of land pressure, but in the other Divisions of Jaffna 
and the Jaffna District as a whole that can not be the cause.    
148The Sri Lankan Integrated Survey (SLIS) (1999-2000) had revealed that non-farm activities contributed 56% 
of the total rural household income whereas the contribution of crop cultivation, livestock and casual agriculture 
wage labour was only 23% (De Silva and Kodithuwakku 2010, 86). 
171 
 
co-operative employee that managed to purchase land and increase their agricultural 
production. Such diversification has become even more important for rural survival with the 
monetised economy and declining possibilities of rural provisioning in the post-war context. 
Increasingly, diversification has become a necessary condition of agricultural production; 
agriculture is only viable for those who have an alternate source of income and therefore not 
dependent on agriculture for the day to day expenditure of the household.  
 While such pluriactivity with the new rurality is characterstic of many other 
agricultural societies, there are now few possibilities for such alternative livelihoods and 
incomes in Jaffna. Many oppressed caste residents of Pathemany village, who were 
historically involved in agricultural wage work, are now involved in mason and construction 
work, with reconstruction efforts including state and donor supported housing grants. 
However, such construction efforts are a onetime opportunity with post-war reconstruction. 
Therefore, while there is a demand for sustained incomes from alternative forms of local 
employment including in industries, reconstruction policies have not generated such jobs and 
incomes. 
  
Debt and Dispossession 
 There has been increased levels of indebtedness in the context of falling incomes and 
expansion of credit through new financial products. Such rural debts in Pathemany and Jaffna 
have been mainly through the formal sector including banks, finance companies and 
microfinance institutions. This is different from other countries in South Asia as well as 
historically in Sri Lanka, where rural debts were to the informal money lenders. However, the 
levels of such formal debts are also difficult to identify, as they are cascaded through 
different financial products and mechanisms of various durations from bank loans, pawning, 
leased goods on instalment payments and microfinance loans. 
172 
 
 The inability of farmers during my field research period to pay back the agricultural 
loans was due to crop failures. However, with generally high indebtedness following other 
forms of credit, they may not be able to take the agricultural loans even if conditions for 
agricultural production improve. In other words, the dynamics of debt creation including 
defaulting on agricultural loans, increased debt through self employment loans and the 
depletion of gold assets losing their emergency reserves may determine their future 
possibilities for recovering agricultural incomes. 
Banks expanded into pawning business because of the rise in global gold prices. In 
fact, after the fall in global gold prices, the scale of pawning led to a worrying increase in 
non-performing loans for the banks as discussed in Chapter 2. Subsidiaries of banks and a 
range of finance companies also came into the rural economy providing micro-finance loans 
and lease hire purchasing of a range of items that have dispossessed a war-torn population. 
The significant point here is that indebtedness in the war affected regions would not have 
been possible on this scale, if not for the process of displacement, uprooting from the local 
economy and then integration into the economy under conditions of financialization. In 
Bharathy Veethy, most families including landless laborers are indebted on the order of Rs. 
200,000 (US$ 1,500) to Rs. 400,000 (US$ 3,000) per household by the end of 2013. That was 
the perception of indebtedness in the village during my discussion at the community center 
and in numerous interviews with villagers, and the data from my survey on the various forms 
of debt falls in that range. That is debt on the scale of ten to twenty times their monthly 
expenditure. 
The larger process of indebtedness was fuelled by the expansion of credit in the 
formal banking sector, and any solution requires addressing the loans by this formal sector. 
Such formal sector debt is very different from debt in many parts of rural India. In India, rural 
debt is mainly to local money lenders. The point is that most agencies and analysts tend to 
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ignore increasing levels of indebtedness in the formal sector, as such debt is considered to be 
legitimate. In this context, there is a need to recognize the predatory nature of the financial 
system, including the formal sector of banks and finance companies and their working at the 
rural level. Given the strength of the financial lobby and the refusal of state actors to 
recognize the severity of the rural debt crisis, the situation is unlikely to change without a 
major political mobilization. 
 The high level of indebtedness including the depletion of a major portion of rural 
people’s liquid assets in the form of gold jewellery and their inability to locally provision 
their livelihoods can be characterised as dispossession. Gold accumulated by rural households 
over generations can not be recovered in a few years and perhaps even decades. David 
Harvey claims, the credit system, finance capital and debt are central features of 
dispossession with contemporary capitalism.149 It is such indebtedness that has emerged with 
the tremendous expansion of credit and processes of financialization linked to global systems 
of finance capital including the predatory forms of credit leading to new forms of 
dispossession and accumulation. Such processes are particularly pernicious in places such as 
Jaffna mired in war during the decades of neoliberal globalization, where the population had 
not experienced and was not aware of the workings of such financial processes and the 




                                                          
149  According to Harvey: “The credit system and finance capital have, as Lenin, Hilferding and Luxemburg all 
remarked, been major levers of predation, fraud and thievery. Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset 
destruction through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt 
encumbrancy that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say 
nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock 
and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations – all of these are central features of what 
contemporary capitalism is about. … But above all we have to look at the speculative raiding carried out by 
hedge funds and other major institutions of finance capital as the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession 
in recent times.” (Harvey 2004, 75) 
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Loans Targeting Individuals 
A major shift in recent years is that loans are directly negotiated between the 
individual and the financial institution. This is unlike the agriculture loans involving farmers’ 
organisations. Thus in Bharathy Veethy, many individuals have got self-employment loans 
up to Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) to Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) to start up shops and to buy three 
wheelers. The loans do not require collateral, but only two guarantors, most of whom are 
themselves recipients of loans. These loans from banks are leveraged for leased hire 
purchasing of three wheelers (used as a taxi in South Asia) and tractors either from leasing 
companies or the banks themselves in the form of a credit line.  
There has been no analysis about the demand for so many shops, three-wheelers and 
tractors in the same village. Furthermore, many such loans are used for purposes other than 
self-employment such as for consumption and festivities or to repay other debts. And this 
approach of targeting individuals with predatory loans without engaging village organisations 
makes individuals vulnerable both in the process of taking loans, where the conditions of the 
loans may not be clear to them and then to face the intimidating collectors, when loans cannot 
be repaid. Such targeting of individuals for loans and allowing them to fend for themselves as 
opposed to negotiating defaulters concerns in a collective manner through farmers’ 
organisations and co-operatives is a major shift in the administering of loans in the post-war 
period. The war-torn population not used to such financialization in recent decades found this 
new loan culture to be devastating.  
 
Outmigration 
 While monetisation of labor including in agriculture has a long history, the 
contemporary forms of dispossession and financialized debt have led to a form of out-
migration that is new to Pathemany. The war led to tremendous displacement and 
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considerable permanent migration to the West, however, the recent form of outmigration is of 
a temporary nature to sustain livelihoods and address indebtedness.  
In Pathemany, there is a long history of proletarianised wage labor. In the post-war 
years, such proletarianised labor switches between wage labor in agriculture, to labor in 
construction characteristic of pluriactivity in rural economies. However, the pressures for out 
migration to find work in Middle East are of a different order. I can not conclude from my 
field research about the causal link between indebtedness and out migration. The dynamics of 
out migration have a different temporality, with outmigration increasing after a few years of 
declining rural incomes, and my field research was taking place around the time that 
indebtedness had become a crisis in Bharathy Veethy. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, in 
the two years since my field research, in 2014, there is a tremendous increase in the out 
migration of labor in Jaffna District. Furthermore, what is also clear is that a substantial 
proportion of remittances will end up becoming debt payments. The scale of incomes sought 
reflect the debt dynamics, as alternative local incomes including in construction and even 
other industries in southern Sri Lanka would not suffice to meet the high levels of 
indebtedness.  
An important question is whether there is some difference in the income levels within 
the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy itself in who can migrate and who can not 
migrate due to the lack of social networks and the initial capital often about Rs. 150,000 (US$ 
1,150) needed for migrant labor to the Middle East. With the increasing expansion of credit 
available to all households and increasing networks of migrant labor, the conditions are there 
for almost all sections of the population to migrate.150 Capital in the process of accumulation 
through dispossession does not seem to discriminate on the basis of caste or class. However, 
                                                          
150 During visits on fisheries related research to the oppressed caste village of Maruthapuram in the Karainagar 




the levels of exploitation may have a caste character, with the levels of remittances varying 
depending on skill level, education and social networks. 
 
The New Circuit of Neoliberal Accumulation 
The banks and finance companies are themselves increasingly indebted through the 
sale of euro and dollar bonds in the global capital markets, as discussed in Chapter 2. I argue, 
a new circuit of neoliberal accumulation through dispossession in the countryside is 
emerging. It works through indebtedness in the countryside leading to out migration to the 
Middle East where labor is exploited but provides remittances back to the village, some 
portion of those remittances are in turn sent as debt payments through domestic banks to the 
accumulation of global finance capital. 
 This new circuit of accumulation for global finance capital is not in the realm of 
production but rather through a process of accumulation through dispossession (Harvey 
2005). That circuit involves the double exploitation of workers from the war devastated 
regions. These workers migrate to the Middle East where they are first exploited and then the 
second part of the exploitation involves their remittances being siphoned off thorugh debt 
payments for the accumulation of global finance capital. It should be noted that there are 
contingencies relevant for this circuit of accumulation. First, this circuit is dependent on the 
oil rents and stability in the Middle East. Second, if a barrier to migrant labor to the Middle 
East emerges for any reason, for example a war in the Middle East or sustained collapse of oil 
prices, it can lead to the disruption of this circuit of accumulation.  
The most worrying next stage of dispossession could be if the rural households are 
pushed to meet debts, by selling their small plots of land and even houses, which are their 
most important asset accumulated over generations. Indeed, the new wave of debts seem to 
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be linked to such mortgaging of housing land for loans from banks.151 Thus falling incomes 
and increasing indebtedness are important conditions for post-war dispossession with myriad 
forms of social consequences including forms of social exclusion discussed in the next 
chapter. 
  
                                                          
151 The discussion at the community center brought up such a new loan for completion of houses through 
mortgaging the houses. In May 2016, an official from the local government in Atchuvely mentioned to me the 
increasing number of loans taken by mortgaging houses for various reasons. The local government official 
became aware of this trend as many individuals approached them for documents relating to landownership to be 





The Silence on Persistent Caste Relations in Jaffna  
  
Map 4.1 
Atchuvely, Pathemany and Neighboring Villages 
 
Source: Northern Provincial Council 
 
 At a commemoration at the Jaffna Public Library152 of the launch of the anti-caste 
struggles in October 1966, C. K. Senthivel, described the militant thousands that marched 
from Chunnakam town and ended in a major rally in Jaffna town. Senthivel some five 
decades earlier was the leader of the youth wing of the Communist Party. The struggles that 
were launched during the late 1960s were central to ending “untouchability” in public spaces, 
the practices of forced segregation and exclusion that were humiliating to the oppressed caste 
                                                          
152 The event was organized by the New Democratic Marxist Leninist Party at the Jaffna Public Library on 27th 
October 2015.    
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people. Public spaces such as temples, access to schools for oppressed caste children and 
equal seating in tea shops that had barred oppressed caste communities were opened to them 
through those struggles.  
Almost, fifty years later, as Senthivel remembered the onset of those anti-caste 
struggles and the youth who died fighting caste oppression, the audience at the 
commemoration meeting barely stood at fifty individuals. Caste continues as an oppressive 
social institution in Jaffna, but consciousness and discussions about caste oppression have 
receded. If the library event was an attempt to break out of the silence of discussing caste 
oppression including its history, the inability to mobilise an adequate audience suggests that 
caste oppression continues, if in silence. 
What are the historical dynamics that have shaped caste relations in the post-war 
years? The three decades of war were characterised by massive displacement. Such 
displacement necessarily meant being uprooted from the historically strong landed social 
relations in Jaffna. Indeed, one important consequence of displacement was the weakening of 
caste relations as people were uprooted from their spatial and productive relations tied to 
land. However, it should be noted that caste relations continued in many forms during 
displacement, particularly between the displaced people and the host communities. 
Furthermore, there was a caste and class character to the displaced, where the oppressed 
castes and lower classes were more likely to remain displaced for longer periods of time 
(Thanges 2008). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), neither reinforced nor 
attempted to dissolve caste relations, rather, it contained the overt materialisation of social 
contradictions within the Tamil community with its singular militarised nationalist goal for a 
separate state (IIDS 2008). Therefore, the LTTE suppressed any struggles and even 
discussion of caste, as part of a strategy of silencing dissent and any independent 
mobilisations within Tamil society. 
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In this chapter, after providing the historical context of caste relations in Jaffna, I 
draw on my field research in Pathemany to analyze caste relations through social institutions, 
particularly religious and educational institutions central to rural social life, and the everyday 
struggles people face in the countryside. I then analyze how post-war resettlement and 
reconstruction, after the Tamil nationalist mobilisations, civil war and displacement, are now 
shaping caste structure in Jaffna. Furthermore, I address the silence on caste relations and the 
possibilities of direct violence both of oppression and resistance, particularly after regime 
change in January 2015, democratization and the increasing space for protests and 
mobilisations. 
 
Contextualising Caste in South Asia and Jaffna 
The literature and work on caste in South Asia is extensive constituted by various 
theoretical trajectories. Furthermore, historical developments particularly in the post-colonial 
era have engendered various debates, state policies and new forms of struggles around caste. 
Desai and Dubey have framed the theoretical trajectories on caste relations into four 
categories (Desai and Dubey 2012). First, the work of Max Weber and Louis Dumont, and 
the emphasis on theories of status including a focus on the concepts of purity and pollution. 
Second, theories of social transformation, drawing on the work of Indian anthropologists and 
sociologists, particularly M. A. Srinivas and André Beteille, who analysed the changes to 
caste based occupations and the impact of urbanisation. Third, postcolonial theories of social 
construction including the work of Nicholas Dirks, which emphasizes the importance of 
colonial power and orientalist discourses in solidifying caste orders. Fourth, theories of 
exclusion and exploitation, which is also my orientation, and I draw on the work Gail 
Omvedt and Anand Teltumbde (Omvedt 1991, Teltumde 2010). 
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The vast corpus of work on caste in India, has also been shaped by major historical 
and political developments. The emergence of caste based parties has had a significant impact 
on Indian politics and democracy. The Mandal Commission Report of 1982, calling for 
reservations (affirmative action) along caste lines and its implementation starting in the 1980s 
have shaped debates on caste and placed much importance on state policies in determining 
social mobility and addressing caste discrimination. Over the last few decades, Dalit politics 
has led to tremendous struggles as well as writing on caste in India. Such Dalit politics draws 
on the works of the earlier writers on caste such as Phule and Ambedkar.153 Finally, caste 
atrocities and anti-caste struggles in India have led to extensive debates and research in India. 
The central question then in India as in South Asia is the persistence of caste. How is 
it that despite modern postcolonial states, capitalist economic transformation and vibrant 
debates and struggles against caste oppression, that caste relations persist? I find the research 
in the State of Tamil Nadu in India to be relevant here. A century of successive research 
studies in the village of Iruvelpattu between 1916 and 2008, point to both political economic 
changes due to increasing states services and migrant labor, but also the persistence of landed 
caste relations (Harriss et al 2010). This study is particularly important for my work, as I also 
ground my research on a village trying to understand broader dynamics of the political 
economy of caste in a region. 
Such extensive work on caste and major caste related political upheavals in India have 
hardly influenced analysis and politics of caste in Jaffna. While historically, Jaffna and the 
Tamil community in Sri Lanka were greatly shaped by developments in India, the militarised 
nationalist politics during the civil war and the physical isolation shielded Jaffna society from 
                                                          
153 Gail Omvedt’s work has created considerable interest in the writings of Phule the 19th century anti-caste 
activist in Maharashtra. There is a corpus of literature on Ambedkar, who had many phases from his early 
debates with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, to his role in drafting the Indian Constitution and finally 
calling for mass conversion to Buddhism and coining the term Dalit.  
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the flow and reflection on caste politics in India. Western scholarship on Sri Lanka also 
focused on ethnicity and neglected analysis of caste relations. 
Scholarship on caste in Sri Lanka, examined caste in both the Sinhala and Tamil 
communities, with each region having its own characteristics. There was vibrant work on 
land, kinship and caste in the Sinhala community (Leach 1961, Tambiah 1965). The work on 
caste in the Sinhala community addressed questions such as the rise of Karava (coastal and 
fisheries castes) challenging the dominance of the Goigama (the Kandyan landed castes), 
through an analysis of economic changes and political representation (Roberts 1982). Caste 
in eastern Sri Lanka, a multi-ethnic region of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese has its own 
specific characteristics of land ownership (McGilvray 1982). One of the few recent works 
trying to contextualise caste in Sri Lanka, looks at caste in the Sinhala, Up-Country and 
Tamil communities and claims caste continues to be severe and rigid in the Jaffna Tamil 
community (Silva 2009).  
Historically, before the civil war, the anthropological and sociological scholarship on 
caste in Jaffna focused on the centrality of caste for village structure and religious practices. 
Furthermore, the discussion of caste in a number of works on Jaffna, took off as their starting 
point comparisons of caste structure and village life in South Asia (Banks 1960, Leach 1960). 
Many of these works were also concerned with an analysis of religion and rituals, including 
questions about the individual’s relationship to society as they also related to caste 
(Pfaffenberger 1982, Perinbanayagam 1965, Suseendirarajah 1978). Thus the earlier 
anthropological and sociological work on caste in Jaffna was limited to theories of status 
particularly in village life. I find the historical works (Arasaratnam 1981, Bastiampillai 1988) 
and the more recent political writings on caste in Tamil (Senthivel 2009, Senthivel 2014) to 
be more relevant for a political economy of caste relations in Jaffna. 
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Contemporary analysis of caste structure in post-war Jaffna, has to take as it starting 
point factors outside village life, including the war, the massive displacement and return, the 
integration with the market after the war and the character of reconstruction policies. Have 
such macro changes affected caste structure and caste relations resulting in new forms of 
social exclusion and oppression? Thus my concerns are not so much about village structure, 
but rather with the dynamics of caste in the context of greater movement out of villages and 
migration. However, in Jaffna, unlike in India, there has been no caste census and caste does 
not even exist in any contemporary official records. 
 
Use of Caste Names in Jaffna 
Given the relative silence of discussion on caste in Jaffna in recent decades and the 
related taboo of naming caste identities, which were part of the structure of domination, both 
in my research and my writing I am confronted with ethical, political and pragmatic 
considerations of discussing caste. The caste names themselves in Jaffna are derogatory and 
would rightly lead to a strong reaction from those communities. In India, with the anti-caste 
movement, the so-called untouchable castes took on a “Dalit” identity. In other words, they 
referred to themselves as Dalits, drawing on the identity constructed by Ambedkar. Some 
progressives in Jaffna have considered using the term Dalits, but that has not gained much 
tractionin Jaffna.  
Most progressive activists in Jaffna draw from the struggles in the 1960s and use the 
term “oddukappatta makkal” (“oppressed people”). I borrow that terminology and refer to the 
castes that faced severe oppression of untouchability in the past and continue to face new 
forms oppression, by using the term “oppressed castes”.154 These castes were involved in 
                                                          
154 Some others use the term “depressed caste” instead of oppressed caste, and Kuganathan has traced the use of 
these various terms (Kuganathan 2014). 
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occupations such as field labor, toddy tapping, washing clothes, shaving and cutting hair, and 
scavenging and cleaning waste. Such work was categorised by the upper castes as “impure”, 
and relationship with the oppressed castes was enforced through “untouchability”. However, 
untouchability took a blow with the anti-caste struggles in the 1960s, and is not practiced 
openly in Sri Lanka. I refer to the upper caste, the oppressors, the landed farmers, by their 
caste name “Vellala” and as “Vellalar” when referring to groups of people belonging to the 
Vellala caste.  There are also a number of middle castes, which were service castes to the 
Vellala caste, such as the “Thatcher” (carpenters) and “Koviar” (cooks). The Karaiyar (fisher 
castes), though subordinate to the Vellalar in the local caste hierarchy, have a degree of 
economic independence, as they are not bound to the Vellalar though productive relations 
constituted by land.  
 
History of Caste and Colonialism in Jaffna 
Some of the historical works on the colonial period provides some insights about the 
social and economic workings of caste in Jaffna. Four hundred years of colonial rule 
contributed to the dominance and consolidation of the Vellala caste in the Jaffna. The 
Portuguese, the Dutch and eventually the British in different ways engaged the Vellalar in the 
process of colonial rule (Arasaratnam 1981, Bastiampillai 1988).  
In the 16th century and into Portuguese period of the early 17th century, Jaffna had 
become a commercial hub drawing on trade developed in the previous period of Tamil kings. 
Such commercial activity was characterised by the export of tobacco grown in Jaffna along 
with the export of elephants to the Moghul Empire and other kingdoms in India. By the 
Dutch period starting in the late 17th Century there was an expanding Indian Ocean trade 
which made Jaffna a strategic outpost (Arasaratnam 1981).  
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When the colonial powers arrived, the Vellalar were at the apex of the social 
structure. The colonial powers governed through a fine balance of working with the Vellalar 
while also making sure the Vellalar did not gain too much power. The Portuguese (1619 -
1658) contribution to social change included the introduction of Christianity. They rewarded 
the Karaiyar (fisher) caste as they accepted Christianity. However, they also had to work with 
the Vellalar, who maintained control over the villages and administered the regional offices 
for revenue collection. When the Dutch took over, there was a rebellion by the two coastal 
castes close to the Portuguese, the Karaiyar and the Madapalli, and they were crushed by the 
Dutch. Therefore, the Dutch favoured the Vellalar in administrative positions during their 
century and a half of rule, greatly strengthening the position of the Vellalar (Arasaratnam 
1981, 383).  
The colonial processes of extraction utilised the caste system. For example, there was 
a massive boom in the tobacco exports from Jaffna, as early as the 17th and 18th Centuries 
under Dutch colonialism. The Dutch ensured the forced migration of oppressed caste people 
from India to Jaffna, under the then existing system of slavery, and augmented the labor 
necessary for such tobacco production. The caste system in Jaffna became rigid during this 
period when the Vellalar augmented their power through production for colonial trade 
(Pfaffenberger 1990). 
The Dutch also strengthened the caste system through the codification of 
Thesawalamai, the customary law in Jaffna. In 1707, the Dutch commissioned a group of 
Jaffna Mudaliyars (local administrators who also served as magistrates) to codify these laws 
(Tambiah 1952). The codification came with some transformation of property and laws on 
caste relations. The Dutch through the codification of customary law and the expansion of the 
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export economy clarified caste demarcations, but they also provided oppressed castes the 
possibility of escaping bondage by working for the colonial state.155 
With the shift to British colonial rule in the early 19th century, the Jaffna economy 
continued to be commercialised and depended during the next one and a half century on the 
demand and price for tobacco trade. In 1921, there were 25,000 laborers employed in tobacco 
farms and another 10,000 employed in administration and other white collar jobs such as 
teaching of the total population in Jaffna of close to 300,000 (Arasaratnam 1982, 36-40). 
Under British colonialism as early 1842, the turn to wage labor was noticeable: “forms of 
payments varied from full cash payment to cash plus one meal, cash plus two meals, full 
payment in paddy, paddy plus food.” However, comparing cash wages to food prices in the 
18th century, Arasaratnam argues: “these agricultural laborers lived at or near starvation 
levels, a feature compounded by the seasonal nature of the demand for labor” (Arasaratnam, 
1982, 30-31). Thus, while the increase in the wage form might be construed as an advance 
toward a capitalist economy, the over-riding penury spread misery rather than progress 
throughout Jaffna and the South.  
In the early 19th century, American missionaries negotiated with the British to initiate 
educational institutions. Education in American mission schools became a major asset to 
middle class Jaffna society. Indeed, Jaffna became a centre to recruit clerks for the British 
civil service. By the early twentieth century, Jaffna Tamils had created a strong remittance 
                                                          
155 The caste relations that were consolidated during the Dutch period, particularly the relations between the 
Vellalar and the oppressed castes had a lasting impact. The renowned historian of the Dutch period, 
Arasaratnam has the following to say: “Many of those who are classified as slaves appear to have been in a state 
of bonded serfdom than slavery. Some of these must have been depressed castes that originated from South 
India together with their masters of the higher castes and continued this bond in Jaffna. But over the years a 
number of these appear to have liberated themselves, though they may have continued to live on the land of 
their masters and performed some services. When Thesavalamai was codified, the rights of slaves were carefully 
written in, despite opposition from the Mudaliyars. There were many who were listed as state slaves who were 
obliged to work for the state. After some years, the Dutch gave them a monthly wage, from the savings of which 
they were able to buy their freedom.” (Arasaratnam 1982, 18) 
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economy with migrant clerks to South East Asia under the British Empire. However, neither 
the missions nor the schools challenged the caste system.  
Historian Bertram Bastiampillai describes the challenge to British administrators and 
American missionaries, both with respect to policy on caste and related problems in 
education: 
The Tamil people in the north were so steeped in caste prejudice, the British 
administrators and even missionaries were apprehensive that impetuous or precipitate 
action in regard to caste practices could provoke unrest among the Tamils. … As a 
result, administrators as well as missionaries treated each caste problem specifically 
instead of prescribing general principles of universal action to deal with the social 
scourge of caste. … So strong were caste prejudices among Tamils of the North that 
bringing together children of different castes within a school or persons of diverse 
caste within a church was in itself a social revolution, that could well have triggered 
off deleterious consequences to the progress of education or religion. Even teachers 
had to be selected from those of the higher castes, if children were to be attracted to 
the Christian mission schools (Bastiampillai 1988, 57-58). 
As late as the 1930s in Jaffna, caste oppression in education manifested itself in at least three 
ways. First, some castes were forbidden entry into a number of schools. Second, non-Vellala 
children had to sit on lower chairs or on the ground. Third, the Vellalar did not allow Vellala 
and non-Vellala children to eat together (Russell 1982). When caste exclusion in education 
was challenged it led to the outbreak of caste violence and even strikes.156 In this way, caste 
oppression by the Vellalar continued in the late colonial period, despite counter-policies by 
                                                          
156 The colonial government’s policy of equality of opportunity in education in the 1920s and attempts to 
implement inter-dining in schools in the 1930s, led to the outbreak of caste violence. Furthermore, Vellala 
children boycotted schools in protest. Such conflicts spread to other spheres. The Vellala bus drivers went on 
strike when oppressed castes demanded they be allowed to sit on seats in buses rather than on the floor of the 
bus (Russell 1982, 11-12).   
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the colonial government, mainly through segregation and exclusion of oppressed castes in 
public spaces. 
 
Emergence of Anti-Caste Politics and its Silencing: Crucial Decades of 1960s and 1970s 
 Caste politics in Jaffna was influenced by political and social developments in India. 
Gandhi’s campaign against untouchability during the 1920s deeply affected Jaffna’s 
politicised youth. The Jaffna Youth Congress, one of the first nationalist movements in Sri 
Lanka to call for full independence, facilitated Gandhi’s visit to Sri Lanka in 1927 and took 
up issues such as inter-caste dining and called for an end to untouchability (Kadirgamar 
1980). Influenced by the work of the Jaffna Youth Congress, an organisation by the 
oppressed caste community in Jaffna was formed in 1927 under the name of the Oppressed 
Tamils Workers Union (Oddukkapatta Tamil Ooliyar Sangam) (Senthivel 2009). It demanded 
greater representation and protection of oppressed castes, at a time when the Donoughmore 
Commission came to address constitutional reform considered universal suffrage. However, 
the politically active Tamil Vellalar elite, opposed universal suffrage to safeguard their 
dominance (Russell 1982, 16). The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 transformed electoral 
politics, with Sri Lanka becoming the first country in Asia to gain universal suffrage.  
The Jaffna Youth Congress boycotted the first State Council elections with universal 
suffrage in 1932, as it called for full independence from Britain. In subsequent elections the 
conservative Tamil elite entered electoral politics and gained ascendancy. This move by the 
Jaffna Youth Congress to boycott electoral politics in retrospect was a major blow to 
progressive politics, as Tamil politics came under the hegemony of the conservative Tamil 
elite who supported forms of caste oppression. However, many from the Jaffna Youth 
Congress joined the left political parties in the 1940s and 1950s. The Minority Tamils 
Mahasabha (Forum) an all island forum of oppressed caste activists was formed in 1942 
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(Senthivel 2009). The 1930s and 1940s proved to be a time when the conservative Tamil 
elite, under the leadership of G. G. Ponnambalam, consolidated their position within the state 
structures and electoral politics. The formation of the right wing Tamil Congress in 1944, 
which dominated Tamil politics over the next decade, consolidated the Vellala caste’s 
influence on electoral politics and the postcolonial state.  
By the early 1950s, the Tamil Congress was challenged by Tamil political forces both 
within and outside it, questioning the Tamil Congress’ complicity with the Sinhala elite in the 
disenfranchisement of the estate workers in the central highlands, Tamils of Indian origin 
brought by the British as indentured labor in the 19th Century. The Federal Party which split 
from the Tamil Congress, took up the mantle of Tamil nationalism and called for greater 
autonomy for the Tamil regions. Left politics within the Tamil community, built on the 
legacy of the Jaffna Youth Congress and in alliance with the Minority Tamils Mahasabha, 
challenged Tamil nationalist politics. The left parties with their parties headed in Colombo 
had a national orientation prioritising caste and class issues as opposed to the Jaffna-centred 
parochialism of the Tamil nationalist parties. The Communist Party led anti-caste agitations 
with campaigns for access to public spaces, including temples, tea shops and public wells.  
 There was a historical shift in anti-caste politics in Jaffna, with the Communist Party 
taking the decision to launch struggles against untouchability in October 1966. (Senthivel 
2009) The launch of this major struggle by the Communist Party drew on the previous 
decades of isolated struggles for equal access to public spaces, culminating in a focus on 
temple entry and equal seating in tea shops, which symbolised public spaces that undermined 
the dignity of the oppressed castes. The Communist Party had gained confidence by the 
militant support it gained in the years before it launched the campaign and went along with 
the pulse of the oppressed caste people who were keen on the temple entry movement. While 
there were pitched battles in many villages, the most prominent struggle was for the entry 
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into the Mavattapuram temple (located in the north west of Jaffna peninsula) in 1968 by the 
oppressed caste communities consisting of the toddy tapping and landless wage laboring 
castes (Pfaffenberger 1990). This struggle gained much attention, as several people died in 
the struggle and reflected the ultra-conservatism in Jaffna society with respect to caste 
relations. While the Social Disabilities Act of 1957 had outlawed such segregation by caste, it 
was never implemented by the authorities in Jaffna. In fact, the Vellalar in many Jaffna 
villages attempted to crush anti-caste sentiments with violence. The police force for the most 
part backed the Vellalar (Senthivel 2009). 
 The leading Tamil nationalist party in the 1960s was the Federal Party, with a Vellalar 
base, and it was in a quandary as caste divisions made it difficult to unite the Tamil 
community under its fold. Even as there were major caste struggles in rural Jaffna in the early 
1970s, Tamil nationalism was also on the rise following majoritarian policies of the state. The 
Tamil nationalist call for federal autonomy in the regions where Tamils were a majority, 
particularly the Northern and Eastern Provinces, gained a considerable hearing within the 
Tamil constituencies. The politics in Jaffna continued to shift with escalation of the ethnic 
conflict. While incidents of caste violence continued in the 1980s, the priorities of the leftists 
in Jaffna shifted to addressing state repression. Writings and mobilisation against caste 
oppression receded into the background as mass violence and the ethnic conflict became the 
central contradiction facing Tamil society.  
Eventually, the LTTE consolidated power with the protracted civil war. Tamil armed 
movements, particularly the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, which 
attempted to raise caste issues within its nationalist struggle, was decimated by the LTTE in 
the late 1980s. The LTTE had the support of the Jaffna Vellalar in these attacks on the 
EPRLF, which was labelled “Eelathu Pallar” (Eelam stands for the Tamil nation, but Pallar is 
a derogatory caste name for one of the historically untouchable castes). The LTTE in its quest 
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to become the sole representative of the Tamil community silenced dissent including through 
assassinations of politically independent Tamils; in that process discussions on caste were 
also silenced.157 
 
Previous Research on Caste in Pathemany 
Newton Gunasinghe and his team analysed caste relations in Jaffna, particularly 
Pathemany, through their field research on the potential for accumulation in different agrarian 
systems in Sri Lanka. They describe the caste structure in Pathemany from the early 1960s to 
the time of their field research in the early 1980s. They specified a few economic categories 
relating to the castes in Pathemany village. Those at the bottom of the pyramid were rural 
workers and the landless consisting of oppressed caste people. Then there were the peasants 
who own small plots of land, and were involved as rural workers along with cultivating their 
land, and they belonged to both the oppressed castes and the middle castes. Next, there were 
the middle peasants mainly from the Vellala caste who derived a sufficient income from the 
land and did not have to work as rural workers. Finally, they claim there were also a thin 
stratum of Vellala rich peasants, who used capital and labor intensive methods of cultivation. 
These rich peasants produced mainly for the market to accumulate capital and often had a 
permanent group of rural workers attached to their land. 
Thus in the 1960s and the 1970s caste structure was related to land ownership, not 
only for the oppressed castes and the Vellala upper caste, but also the middle castes, such as 
the Koviar caste who were the service castes of the Vellalar. Levels of landownership also 
related to whether rural wage work was necessary to sustain livelihoods or whether 
cultivation of land owned was sufficient.  
                                                          
157 A full discussion of the political changes that shaped Tamil politics and the fascist political culture of the 
LTTE are outside the purview of this dissertation. The works of the University Teachers for Human Rights 
(Jaffna) remain the important archive for understanding the trajectory of Tamil politics and its disastrous 
trajectory. See Thiranagama 1990, Hoole 2001 and many related reports by UTHR(J). 
192 
 
Thirty years later, when I went to Pathemany, the following changes were observed 
few years after the war compared to the caste structure elaborated in Gunasinghe’s study few 
years before the war. First, the service castes consisting of the Koviar, Madaththavar and 
Thanathar castes had become difficult to identify in the village, as they no longer had 
separate caste quarters. These service castes historically worked inside the Vellalar homes 
and temples, as opposed to the oppressed castes historically considered untouchable and not 
allowed inside upper-caste homes and temples. In the decades before the war, these service 
castes were also primarily involved in agriculture even as they performed some of the social 
practices ascribed to them in the Vellala homes and temples, particularly for marriage, 
funerals and temple festivals. These service castes had either migrated or been assimilated 
into the Vellala caste through marriage.158 Second, The Vellala caste originating from 
Pathemany had greatly diminished due to migration to the Western countries forming the 
large Tamil diaspora. Third, Vellala households displaced from Palali, the region north of 
Pathemany near the airport that had been taken over by the military and designated as a high 
security zone in the 1990s, were now renting houses in Pathemany from Vellalar who had 
migrated to Western countries. These Palali Vellalar, historically a wealthy community, also 
were involved in agriculture both in the paddy lands they owned in the Vanni region south of 
Jaffna peninsula and in lands rented from the Pathemany Vellalar. These changes to the 
origin of the Vellalar households in Pathemany also weakened the caste relations relating to 
agriculture as in addition to the war and displacement, the Palali Vellalar do not have the 
power and authority of caste relations relating to local social institutions such as temples. 
Fourth, the Thatchar, the carpenter caste ward had remained intact: while sections of their 
community had also migrated to Western countries, those who remained continued to work 
                                                          
158 This point was made to me in an interview by a Vellala man in Pathemany on 12 May 2014. I was not able to 
verify what happened to the middle castes, as I did not do extensive research in that part of Pathemany. 
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mainly as carpenters. The oppressed caste community consisting of wage laborers and toddy 
tappers had grown proportionately in the village population as a much smaller ratio of them 
migrated to the West. Some people belonging to the oppressed caste community, described 
by Gunasinghe as landless rural workers above, had managed to purchase small plots of land 
and were involved in farming in addition to working as wage labor. 
I was able to observe changes to the social structure recorded by Gunasinghe, 
including the divisions of castes and their land ownership. However, Gunasinghe’s study 
continues to be important to understand caste structure in Pathemany village for the reason 
that it is difficult to discuss caste identities openly in post-war Jaffna. It is very difficult to ask 
people about their caste identity, including to do a survey on caste in contemporary Jaffna, as 
open discussion of caste is taboo or may result in an aggressive reaction from oppressed caste 
people. Table 4.1 reproduces the population data from Gunasinghe’s work in the early 1980s: 
 
Table 4.1 Population Growth in Pathemany 
Year Population 
1921            1,314  
1931            1,258  
1953            1,935  
1963            2,457  
1971            2,558  
1981            2,647  
2012            2,258  
Source: (Gunasinghe 1985, 208) 
 
What is significant here is the drop in population from 1981 to 2012, from 2,657 people to 
2,258, which is a drop of 15 percent. If Pathemany had grown with the national average it 
would be 55 percent larger than its current population totalling close to 3,500 people. Such a 
drop in population is characteristic of Jaffna with migration159 and the expansion of the Tamil 
                                                          
159 Mortality due to war is not significant. The estimated size of the Diaspora is one million, where as those who 




Diaspora, and a large proportion of that migration was by the Vellalar. Therefore, the ratio of 
oppressed caste people to Vellalar had drastically increased, and this in turn has also changed 
the ratio of rural workers to middle and rich peasants. 
According to the Grama Niladari, the village official, in Pathemany160, there are close 
to one hundred families of displaced Palali Vellalar. Furthermore, the village official claimed 
there has been the out migration of a section of the original population of Pathemany to the 
Vanni after 2010, amounting close to 25 families. These are families that had been displaced 
to the Vanni, went through the ordeal of the last phase of the war, returned to Pathemany 
after the war, and yet again moved to the Vanni due to the difficulties of economic survival 
and finding livelihoods in Jaffna. In any event, the total number of families residing in 
Pathemany in 2012 was 696 families, compared to 478 families in 1981.161 The increase in 
the number of families after the war despite the fall in population is the smaller family sizes 
with demographic changes over those three decades. 
 What is of great value from Gunasinghe’s research in 1981 is the breakdown of castes 
and their land ownership. Given the taboo of asking peoples about caste in contemporary 






                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the war in the Vanni in 2009, and the Jaffna population was not as affected by such deaths, except for those 
who were displaced to the Vanni during the war. While in Districts like Mullaitivu mortalities due to the war 
and tsunami of 2014 are factors influencing population, in Jaffna I believe it is migration that is the main factor. 
One of the reasons it is difficult to account for the war dead and the disappeared is also the large numbers of 
migration which are not documented as people left in various forms including as undocumented boat people.  
160 Interview with Grama Niladhari (Village Official) of Pathemany on 3 December 2012. 
161 Jaffna District Handbook 2013, District Secretariat Jaffna. 
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Vellala (Hindu) 666 69 125 26% 5.3 
Vellala (Christian) 184 16 35 7% 5.3 
Nalavar (Hindu) 120 36 137 29% 0.9 
Nalavar (Christian) 27 3 35 7% 0.8 
Madaththavar 260 35 48 10% 5.4 
Koviar 171 25 42 9% 4.1 
Thanathar 111 17 24 5% 4.6 
Carpenters 3 1 19 4% 0.2 
Others 27 3 13 3% 2.1 
Total 1,569 205 478 100% 3.3 
Source: (Gunasinghe 1985, 209) 
 
The castes documented by Gunasinghe in the table are not openly uttered in Jaffna. 
There were references to “our community” (Samuham) which implies our caste, but few 
people openly spell out the names of theirs and others “community”. It was understood and 
known locally. During my field research, most people would ask me and my research 
assistant, where I was from, to locate our caste. The place and name of the Hindu temple a 
person worships at is another marker of caste. Remarkably, conversion to Christianity does 
not allow one to escape caste. My family is of Protestant Christian origin and my research 
assistant is of Roman Catholic origin, but caste would be subtly identified in that case 
through the location of our house and hence the village quarter. In Pathemany, there have 
been conflicts between the two Roman Catholic parishes of Vellalar and oppressed caste 
communities, with Vellala caste community excluding the oppressed caste people from their 
Church. In other words, while caste may have originated and consolidated with the 
development of religious practices, it is also about social relations including landed 
productive relations. Therefore, a person cannot escape caste relations by religious 
conversion alone, rather, that person would have to leave Tamil society itself. 
For the most part, vocalising caste identities is taboo and could only be understood 
from body language, the tone of the voice when discussing other castes and other hints such 
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as description of their dress and behaviour. The Vellala caste people’s contempt for the 
oppressed caste community, comes out in the manner in which they talk about the low 
intelligence of oppressed caste children and the unacceptability of their dress. In the past, an 
individual’s name itself would have given away their caste, but with recent generations that is 
rarely the case. Furthermore, caste identities are not explicated, in public or to outsiders, 
except when there is a conflict or a confrontation. Otherwise, a Vellala person will just say 
“they” and it would be understood as referring to the oppressed caste community.  
  In the post-war context, caste dynamics have changed from occupations that 
historically characterised caste structure to forms of social exclusion. The main caste 
contradiction is one between the dominant and middle castes versus the oppressed castes. I 
summarize the table above from Gunasinghe into the following comparison of the dominant 
and middle castes with the oppressed castes, particularly in relation to land ownership as it 
existed in 1981. While there has been a major demographic change with the dominant and 
middle castes migrating abroad in much larger numbers, the disparity in land ownership 
remains. 
 




















Dominant and Middle 
Castes 
       1,422           166               306  64% 91% 4.6 
Oppressed Castes 
includes Wage Labour 
           147             39               172  36% 9% 0.9 
Total 1,569 205 478 100% 100% 3.3 
 Source: Analysis of Data (Gunasinghe 1985, 209) 
  
 The significant point from the Table 4.3 is that less than 10% of the agricultural land 
was owned by the oppressed caste community before the war. As discussed in Chapter 3 from 
my own survey, little had changed in the ownership of land by the oppressed caste 
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community three decades later. Ownership of land continues to be an important marker of 
caste identity and shapes caste relations. 
 
Local Leaders Views on Social Structure 
 Mr. K. Chandrabose, was an elected member of the local government, the Pradesha 
Sabha as it is known in Sri Lanka. He belonged to the EPDP (Eelam Peoples Democratic 
Party)162, which was at that time in the government coalition. The EPDP is an offshoot of the 
Tamil militant movement the EPRLF. During the war, the EPDP also functioned as an armed 
group aligned with the military in the war against the LTTE. In the Tamil political spectrum, 
the EPDP is a relatively small political party with an oppressed caste base, whereas the Tamil 
National Alliance, a coalition formed by the Federal Party, is the most popular Tamil political 
party committed to Tamil nationalism.  
Mr. Chandrabose is a member of the Central Committee of the EPDP. He also held 
many positions within the village, including secretary of the Farmers Organisation, leader of 
the Rural Development Organisation, secretary of the Senior Citizens organization, advisor to 
the community centre and leader of the Coconut Development Board. He also used to be a 
secretary of his temple. Given all his official positions, he is perhaps the most influential 
individual in the village, particularly in Bharathy Veethy the oppressed caste ward of 
Pathemany.163 
Mr. Chandrabose’s porch with a small low table where the newspaper was placed 
along with a few chairs, is a place where many would visit to talk to him about a variety of 
issues relating to the local government, the farmers organisation, the community and his 
                                                          
162 The EPDP came out of dissident Tamil militants and joined the Government in the war against the LTTE, it 
gains importance as a political party with an oppressed caste base. 
163 The Grama Niladari (GN), the village official responsible for Government services, while he will not speak 
of caste identities, told me the population of Bharathy Veethy was approximately 400 families. 
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extended family. I also benefited from many conversations on his porch during my two years 
of field research in Pathemany.  
Early on during my field research in October 2012, after I had met Mr. Chandrabose 
on two occasions, he decided to invite Mr. Sivalingam to speak to me about the history of 
Pathemany. Mr. Sivalingam is one of the most senior village residents, and belongs to the 
Vellala caste. The long interview with the two of them eventually turned into a fascinating 
discussion about caste and politics. 
 
On Incomes and Landholdings 
This is how they described the social structure of Pathemany. According to them, out 
of the 600 families now in Pathemany, about 20% of the families have large plots on the scale 
of 50 lachams164 (3 acres). Then 50% of the families have lands on the scale of 3 lachams 
(0.2 acres), 5 lachams (0.3 acres), 10 lachams (0.6 acres), and up to 20 lachams (1.2 acres). 
Thirty percent of the families don’t have any agricultural land. About 300 people have gone 
abroad during the war, but perhaps only 5% of those may have sold their land, including for 
money to go abroad. Land fragmentation due to increasing population has reduced the land 
available for agriculture. In comparison to land tenure half a century earlier, housing land has 
increased and garden land has decreased, even though most people are still dependent on land 
for incomes. About half the population of Pathemany are dependent on kuli (wage labor) 
work, because farmers cannot survive on farm incomes alone. They claim a kuli worker’s life 
is very difficult due to the lack of regular work, due to rain, crop failures and other 
disruptions.  
Mr. Sivalingam, who was displaced for two decades, claims people survived the war 
and continue to sustain themselves with the support of remittances from relatives. In southern 
                                                          
164 16 lachams equals 1 acre of highland. 
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Pathemany, in the upper caste ward, most people have relatives in the diaspora and Mr. 
Sivalingam believed half of their income comes from remittances.165 However, Mr. 
Chandrabose mentioned that only about one in five families of northern Pathemany, which is 
the Bharathy Veethy, the oppressed caste quarter, receive remittances.166 
 
On Displacement 
They narrated the many bouts of war related displacement that affected Pathemany. 
The first bout of major displacement was during the Sri Lankan Army’s major offensive, 
called Operation Liberation, against Tamil militants in early 1987. Most people were 
displaced to villages a few kilometre away. However, this bout of displacement soon ended 
with arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces in late 1987 and they were able resume 
agriculture during the following years. Then again starting in 1991, there were bouts of 
displacement culminating in the entire population being displaced to Thenmaraatchy 
(southern Jaffna) during the forced exodus of 1995. The LTTE enforced this exodus by 
demanding the entire population to leave Jaffna in the face of a military offensive. About 400 
out of the 600 families present in Pathemany were displaced to the Vanni (the region south of 
the Jaffna Peninsula on the mainland) controlled by the LTTE, and continued to live there for 
many years. Those who were displaced became heavily dependent on state and donor 
humanitarian supplies, remittances from relatives abroad, and support and work from 
relatives and friends.  
In 1995, Mr. Sivalingam was also displaced to the Vanni and only returned after the 
end of the war. Mr. Chandrabose, however, returned to Pathemany within a year after the 
                                                          
165 As discussed in Chapter 3, such remittances from the Diaspora have been declining in recent years. Also, 
such remittances are increasingly more for weddings, temple festivals and other such important events and not 
regular monthly remittances for livelihoods.  




1995 mass displacement. Such varying lengths of displacement are characteristic of many 
parts of Jaffna. Those who feared the Sri Lankan military, or those who had stronger 
allegiance to the LTTE, remained longer in the Vanni. Those who did not have relatives in 
the Vanni and lacked access to remittances and savings, returned to their villages and live 
under military occupation. There were a variety of reasons and calculations that went into 
determining if one decided to return quickly to their village or spend years displaced in 
another region.  
After such displacement, a small number of households returned to agriculture in 
1997, but with scant success. There were attempts to revive agriculture during the Norwegian 
sponsored ceasefire period between 2002 and 2004. However, with the resumption of war in 
2006 and the closing of the main A-9 Highway to the South, agricultural produce had to be 
transported by ship out of the Jaffna peninsula. The lack of transport facilities and cost of 
trasportation reduced demand for agricultural production. It was only after the war in 2010 
that the displaced population to the Vanni returned and full-scale agriculture resumed. 
 
On Caste and Politics 
The discussion turned to the history of uneven development in Pathemany. 
Accumulation during British rule enabled the upper caste to build large houses. They also 
mentioned the social differences, including the prevalence of poverty in northern Pathemany 
(the oppressed caste quarter). Mr. Sivalingam claimed the community living in the vicinity of 
the Wairavar Kovil (Temple)167, had developed from being landless to becoming capable of 
buying land and building houses due to the cash crop boom in the 1970s. Mr. Sivalingam’s 
comment here was perhaps meant to placate Mr. Chandrabose, by saying your people have 
also advanced. 
                                                          
167 The reference to the temple, was his way of pointing to the oppressed caste community. 
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Then Mr. Sivalingam acknowledged: “The caste mind-set has not changed”. Mr. 
Chandrabose responded: “but there have been changes, we are able to eat together.” Now, it 
was Mr. Chandrabose who was making a concession saying the oppressive situation had 
changed. Then Mr. Sivalingam said: “The Pillaiyar Kovil (Temple)168 area people have also 
advanced. Anyway, we don’t speak about caste. Yesterday also someone told me not to speak 
about caste. But I can tell you about the areas, which are surrounding each temple.” Mr. 
Sivalingam’s comment that “we don’t speak about caste” and “someone told me not to speak 
about caste” is the clearest articulation of the taboo of talking about caste in Jaffna society. 
Mr. Sivalingam given his age and stature in Pathemany society is able to verbalise how this 
taboo works in practice. 
Mr. Chandrabose was uncomfortable about the direction of the conversation.  While 
he had agreed to discuss the history of Pathemany by inviting Mr. Sivalingam, he was not 
ready to have a deeper discussion about caste. He intervened by belittling the caste problem: 
“Now there are no problems going to temples, any person can go to any temple. Marriage can 
become a problem, but other problems are not there.”169  
 
A Vellala Leader on Caste and Politics 
Then Mr. Chandrabose stepped outside his gate to speak to someone, and Mr. 
Sivalingam went into a fascinating monologue, emboldened by the absence of the oppressed 
caste leader who had invited him. Mr. Sivalingam’s views and comments were a turning 
point in my research on caste.  
In each place there are different communities. I live in the central area of 
Pathemany. I belong to the Vellala community. The people who now live in Wairava 
                                                          
168 The temple in the Vellala caste quarter. 
169 In this early interview, and with Mr. Sivalingam present, whom Mr. Chandrabose had invited, there was 
considerable discomfort in discussing caste. Mr. Chandrabose’s strong views on caste oppression became 
evident in subsequent conversations and the interview recorded below. 
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Kovil (oppressed caste temple) had bought our lands in the 1970s, as our people sold 
their lands and went abroad. In my community also there is poverty, as some of them 
became poor over the generations. About one hundred families have become poor due 
to displacement.  
Before 1960, there were a lot of caste problems. Then the Communists and the 
Federal Party took up activities including by giving jobs to lower caste people, and 
the Federal Party started taking action in 1957 to get rid of caste. I was a member of 
the Village Council in 1963. I am a Vellalan, and there was another Vellanan from 
Valali, and together we brought a resolution that if there is discrimination in tea shops 
and in workshops, we [in the Village Council] would take away their licences. So, in 
tea shops and eating places, people could sit equally, drink equally and eat equally 
without any difference. Before that they were given tea in a Mukkuperni (a special 
cup for oppressed castes) at tea shops. There were communists like him 
(Chandrabose) and they used to do demonstrations against us, the upper castes, with 
slogans questioning the Tamil community and Tamil politics. We were progressives, 
so we supported them, but we were afraid that the other Vellalar would attack us.  
In 1963, the Federal Party did a Pathai Yatharai (a campaigning journey) 
where we went to different houses and ate together. Since, I was in the Federal Party, 
I also followed that. After that some people went back to the old ways, I did not. If 
people are kind, I don’t show any difference. There were early on difficulties in 
entering temples, but in 1957, Nallur Kanthasamy Kovil (the largest temple in 
Northern Province located in Jaffna town) opened up. Kopai Vanniyasingham, a 
leader of the Federal Party was active on caste issues in Jaffna. Kailaspillaiyar Kovil, 
Vannarpillai Sivan Kovil, Sattanar Kovil (there are villages in Jaffna peninsula) and 
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all these temples were opened up170. Also, tea shops including the Malayan tea 
shop171 were opened up. And thus all tea shops all over Jaffna became equal.  
Most temples, except may be a few small temples in villages, became equal. If 
you take our region, Atchuvely people can go to any temple, same in Avarangal, but 
not in Puttur (neighboring villages to Pathemany, Puttur village is known for severe 
caste oppression). In our village also people can go and worship, but in some temples 
when people (oppressed caste people) go in, they will show they are unhappy. There 
is a Kali temple here, and there they will be really worried. You can’t go into temples 
in Idaikkadu (a neighboring village where caste oppression is strong). 
The anti-caste mobilisations in the 1960s focused on equal access to public spaces. The 
Communist Party gave leadership to these struggles mobilising oppressed caste youth to fight 
against discrimination in public spaces. The upper caste controlled Tamil nationalist Federal 
Party, to which Sivalingam belonged, wanted to represent the entire Tamil population, but its 
upper caste character made it difficult to address the caste conflicts that were bursting out 
into the open in many villages like Pathemany.  
Sivalingam said it is mostly the oppressed caste community that does not have land. 
However, there are people in his community who also don’t have land. He believes there 
might be about 200 families from the Vellalar community with the rest having migrated 
abroad. Out of those who are left, he claims about ten families have no land even to build a 
house. They don’t qualify for the Indian housing scheme because they have no land to build 
houses. He said: “they are not my relatives, but they are Vellalar. There are divisions within 
the Vellalar.” 
                                                          
170 Significantly, he did not mention the Mavattapuram Kovil, where the major temple entry struggle took place.  
171 It was owned by Malayali people from the Indian state of Kerala. I learned later that the Malayali owned tea 
shops were the first to open up, also because some of the owners were linked to the Communist Party. 
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Sivalingam’s reference to the few landless families in his Vellala community, was to 
counter the perception that Vellalar are the landed oppressors in the countryside. Then 
Sivalingam gave his analysis of politics, which flowed well after his interjection about caste. 
Indeed, for Tamil nationalists like Sivalingam, caste oppression was not the main issue, rather 
its importance or the need to silence it stemmed from the way in which it complicated party 
politics.  
Mr. Sivalingam narrated how initially it was the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party 
that were present in politics, but then he said the Communists and Minority Tamils 
Mahasabha took up the concerns of oppressed castes. He qualified that statement by talking 
about the oppressed caste persons in the Federal Party including the Deputy Mayor for Jaffna 
Town. He further stated that by the 1960s, there were four political parties in Pathemany. 
Tamil Congress, Federal Party, Communist Party and LSSP (Trotskyite Party).  
   With this broad canvass of party politics in Jaffna, he discussed the history of village 
level politics despite the presence of the two Tamil nationalist and two leftist parties. 
But in the Village Council at that time, people were elected on the basis of caste, and 
how much work they did for the people, not on the basis of political parties. When I 
stood for elections, certain sections of each caste supported me, other sections 
supported the Tamil Congress candidate, who also happened to be my relative. They 
tried to defeat me, but they couldn’t. People liked the House (the symbol on the ballot 
paper and for campaigning) of the Federal Party too much. They were crazy about the 
House. 
The interesting observation here is that both Tamil nationalist parties in the 1960s, the 
Federal Party and the Tamil Congress, were controlled by the Vellala caste. Even at the 
village level, the two opposing candidates were not only from the Vellala community, but as 
Mr. Sivalingam explains were in fact relatives. The Left parties attempted to break the 
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hegemony of Vellala-led Tamil nationalist parties with anti-caste mobilisations. But given 
that the upper caste candidates could gain the allegiance of different sections of the oppressed 
castes, it was very difficult to put forward an oppressed caste candidate–a situation 
compounded by the fact that the Vellalar were the numerical majority before the war. 
Then Mr. Sivalingam went on to discuss current politics, and claimed how the people 
are interested more in rights than development. And what he meant by rights are about Tamil 
nationalists demands of autonomy. He went onto say, they will ask for material assistance 
from the EPDP, Mr. Chandrabose’s party, but they will in the elections vote for the House, 
the Federal Party’s ballot symbol used by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). 
 As evident from the discussion above, even for experienced local leaders with party 
experience, as with Mr. Sivalingam and Mr. Chandrabose, talking openly about caste was 
difficult, and they particularly avoid it in the presence of each other. Perhaps they worry 
about social repercussions. Their conversation of caste was cautious and fractured. Younger 
men and women in Jaffna are even more careful, and avoid talking about caste all together. 
 
Caste and Social Institutions 
The hegemony of the Vellala caste affects the schools, temples, and the Sana Samuha 
Nilayam (Community Centres with Reading Rooms). In the following sections, I address the 
workings of caste structure at present in the village schools and temples. I do not have a 
separate section on the Sana Samuha Nilayam in part because their role is not as prominent in 
the post-war context and in part because I understood their historical significance fairly late 
in my field research. There is very little written about the social history of this important 
social institution, and I hope to work on the Sana Samuha Nilayam in the future. 
The Sana Samuha Nilayam are located in each caste ward and often next to a temple, 
and reproduce the caste dynamic in village social life. Many of these Sana Samuha Nilayam 
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host pre-schools, thus pre-school children end up interacting with only those of their own 
caste. They also organise a host of community activities such as sports events, dramas and 
cultural festivals. On a daily basis, men congregate there to read the newspapers. Some Sana 
Samuha Nilayam organise tailoring centres and other community activities for women.  
In the past, Sana Samuha Nilayam organised anti-caste struggles as explained in some 
of the interviews below. The running of these community centers requires local funds 
collected in the community. In the post-war years, with low levels of contributions in the 
oppressed caste quarter, the community centers are no longer the vibrant institutions they 
were before the war. In affluent parts of Jaffna, and in the upper caste quarters, well off 
individuals including from the Tamil diaspora, support the Sana Samuha Nilayam and make 
contributions, so that newspapers and other reading material are available. In the oppressed 
caste quarters, with increasing emphasis placed on individual responsibility by state policies 
and NGO schemes as opposed to greater involvement of the community in the process of 
resettlement and reconstruction, and without the galvanising power of anti-caste 
mobilisations, the Sana Samuha Nilayam have not recovered after the war. However, the 
institutional memory of the work done by Sana Samuha Nilayam in the past remains, and it 
may be too early to write them off.  
 
Caste, Education and Social Exclusion 
An oppressed caste farmer and toddy tapper cooperative leader in a village adjoining 
Pathemany, insightfully commented on education in a passing conversation.172 He claimed 
the upper castes would not allow the oppressed castes to advance in education, and would 
actively oppose oppressed caste educators gaining positions of power in the school system. 
                                                          




Education, he said, was central to the emancipation of the oppressed castes, and control of 
education was central to upper caste domination. His comments were perhaps prompted by 
the recent news of a number of qualified oppressed caste candidates denied school principal 
appointments in Jaffna. Furthermore, social progress through education is the approach 
advocated by many in the oppressed caste community, including those leaders who were at 
the forefront of the anti-caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Sri Lanka has benefited from free education policies starting in the 1940s. While there 
were many Christian and Catholic private schools into the early postcolonial years, left 
leaning Governments took over most of them in the 1960s. Some of these private Christian 
schools became assisted schools, with the teachers’ salaries being paid by the Government, 
where in turn the schools had to ensure free education. However, in reality many of these 
former private schools continued to charge exorbitant entrance fees. Officially, there are only 
two fully private schools in the Northern Province, Jaffna College and Uduvil Girls’ College, 
which are supported by a trust fund of the American missionaries. While free education 
policies in Sri Lanka have continued for seven decades and contributed to the high literacy 
rates and Human Development Indicators, there continues to be a class and caste character to 
schools. 
Caste exclusion in education in Jaffna begins even prior to school entry, in pre-
schools run by caste-linked community centres discussed above. Such exclusion continues in 
schooling, with the better off upper and middle caste children commuting from the village to 
schools located in towns, with only the oppressed caste children of landless wage labor 
attending the village schools. In Jaffna, due to the proximity of villages to towns, for example 
Pathemany village is only one to four kilometres from Atchuvely town, Vellala children are 
dropped and picked up from the town schools by their fathers and uncles on their 
motorcycles. As the children get older they bicycle the few kilometres to the schools in the 
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town. Even though the town schools are also funded by the government with the system of 
free public education, in reality admission to these schools requires a large entrance fee called 
the “donation”. The low income households that cannot afford the “donation” send their 
children to the village schools.   
Along with this form of exclusion in urban and rural schools, a caste divide exists in 
rural schools with Vellala teachers and oppressed caste students. While the social 
transformation with free education in the past had made some space for teachers from lower 
caste communities, the persistence of caste relations is reflected in a large majority of 
teachers and principals belonging to upper castes. For example, when I visited the Ratneswari 
School, the only school in Pathemany village in 2012, all the teachers except one and the 
principal were upper caste, even though all the children were oppressed castes. Teachers’ 
expectations for students are low, and students themselves rarely finish high school as they 
drop out and go into wage labor in their teens. 
 
Ratneswari School in Pathemany 
The Ratneswari School in Pathemany village was formed in 1932 by a prominent 
individual in the village who wanted to promote Tamil and Hinduism. It was part of a trend 
of schools started by the local movements for the revival of indigenous language and religion 
in the late colonial period in Sri Lanka. It was initially a school that only went up to Grade 5, 
but now it goes up to Grade 9. In 2012, the school had only 72 students, but had eight 
teachers and the principal. School records show that in 1975, there were as many as 340 
students. The school provides a glass of milk at 10am and then lunch as part of the mid-day 
school meal.  
The decrease in the Ratneswari school student population is because most children 
from the village attend schools in Atchuvely town. The boys go to Atchuvely Central and 
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girls go to St. Theresa’s, which are schools initiated by the Catholic Church in the past. While 
these schools are now supported by the government under the free education system, they 
nevertheless charge exorbitant entrance fees that in the process exclude the children of the 
landless laboring classes. 
I first met the principal of Ratneswari School, located at the centre of Pathemany 
village, Mr. Suppiah Mohanarajan soon after I had initiated my field research in late 2012.173 
He had been the principal of the school from 2007. He is from the southern part of Jaffna 
peninsula, and had been posted as a teacher in other districts, but his wife is from Atchuvely 
so he had developed a strong connection to this area. The villagers and community leaders 
spoke quite highly of his commitment to the students and his efforts to develop the school. 
Mr. Mohanarajan himself came from one of the oppressed caste communities, and his ties to 
the community were strong because of his marriage to someone from the region and more 
importantly his caste affiliation. The villagers were unhappy about the principal before him, 
who was a Vellala man, and it was during the tenure of the earlier principal they felt that the 
school had started to deteriorate. With more and more students moving to the urban schools, 
Mr. Mohanarajan was worried that if the student body at the Ratneswari School dropped 
below 50 students, with more of its oppressed caste students moving to urban schools, the 
government might close the school. 
I had visited the school a few times during my field research and towards the end of 
my research, I interviewed the principal, Mr. Mohanarajan.174 He addressed the problems of 
rural education: 
The social inequalities after the war is an important reason [for the low enrolment in 
the school]. In fact, I would say that is the main reason for the low student body. 
                                                          
173 Interview with Suppiah Mohanarajan, 22 November 2012. 
174 Interview on 7 February 2014, with Suppiah Mohanarajan.  
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There are mainly two communities (castes) who are present in this area, one being the 
community on the Atchuvely side (Vellalar) and the other on the Bharathy Veethy 
(oppressed caste ward). In earlier times, it was the Atchuvely side people that were 
active in this school including its administration. Initially, the children from Bharathy 
Veethy side were not accepted into this school. Eventually, with social changes (with 
the caste struggles and greater integration in the 1970s) the children from that 
community were allowed into this school. But even then, there were restrictions like 
not allowing those children to draw water from the well. Those children 
(BharathyVeethy) had to sit on the floor and study [while the Atchuvely side children 
were given desks]. With time the conditions changed. In fact, there used to be a 
school exclusively for them (Bharathy Veethy) called the Sri Vibathy Vithiyalayam. 
But that school was closed with displacement, and after the displacement the 
community (Bharathy Veethy) started sending all their children here [to Ratneswari 
School]. Then these people (Vellalar) said, we can’t send our children to this school. 
They pulled out their (Vellalar) children little by little and now there are no children 
from that community (Vellalar). 
In this way, the Vellala children had moved to the schools in Atchuvely town, leaving only 
the oppressed caste children from Bharathy Veethy quarter of Pathemany to attend the 
Ratneswari School.  
Principal Mohanarajan was surprisingly open in talking to me about the caste 
dynamics in the village. However, even then he did not vocalise caste group names, choosing 
instead to refer to the village quarters as the Bharathy Veethy and Atchuvely sides. 
Nevertheless, he clearly focused on the issue of caste as central to the social make-up of the 
school, and how the caste character of the schools changed with the war. Principal 
Mohanarajan spoke about the high level of school drop outs in his school: 
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The children from this community (oppressed caste) are stuck in poverty. Parents 
have also not studied, and they don’t understand the importance of education. Parents 
don’t send their children to school, and so we have to inform the government officials 
and go with them and try to bring the children to school. And even in that community 
(oppressed caste), when the parents have some interest in education, they take their 
children toward the schools in the town. Those who have advanced a little 
economically send their children to the urban schools. It is those children who are at 
the very bottom that come here. This school is only up to Grade 9, and with that they 
say, that is enough education, and don’t send their children to the next school to 
continue their education. So most children, go for work after Grade 9, either for kuli 
(wage labor) or mason work. 
With war and displacement, education was disrupted for many of the parents and the current 
generation of students. In a research effort on rural education, I visited eleven rural schools 
between 2012 and 2013, and the teachers and principals of those schools confirmed the 
impact of such disruption with the war on schooling.175 The UN’s humanitarian news agency 
reported that school drop outs are highest among the war-affected population in the Northern 
Province and concurred that children in their early teens drop out of school to take up odd 
jobs (IRIN 2014). An education officer also told me that many of the Jaffna schools did not 
have special catch up programs for children who had returned from the Vanni after the last 
pahse of the war.176 
 Mr. Mohanarajan went on to discuss the social problems and the economic situation 
of parents which affects the educational mind-set of the community: 
                                                          
175 The outcome of that research was published in the following book chapter: Kadirgamar, A. (2015). 
Neoliberal state, rural dispossession and struggles for education. pp 135 – 147. In Kumar, R. (Ed.) 
Neoliberalism, Critical Pedagogy and Education. New York: Routledge. 
176 Interview with Zonal Education officer on 5 November 2012. 
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The parents of these children have little education and here they are mainly involved 
in kuli work. And then heavy drinking is a problem, much of their earnings goes into 
drinking. Then fighting. If every night there is a fight at home between the husband 
and wife, how will the children study? The parents are not interested in educating 
their children. They only want them to earn. So now, everyone wants to send their 
children abroad. That is mainly to the Middle East to earn. They don’t consider what 
their children will do after working in the Middle East for a few years, they are only 
interested in earning money now. Now debts are also high, loans to banks are high, so 
they want their children to earn. 
The widespread indebtedness and out migration to the Middle East discussed in Chapter 3, is 
thus affecting the commitment to educational advancement of the oppressed caste 
communities.  
 The Principal then went on to discuss the problematic character of the bureaucracy in 
its engagement with rural schools. Good teachers are rarely sent to such schools with 
transfers of such teachers blocked through political interference. The Principal was also 
troubled by the role of teachers. He mentioned the problems of parent teacher relations in the 
context of caste relations and the caste mind-set of teachers. 
As for teachers, the old teachers are still around and so educational methods are not 
changing. The young teachers coming out of the College of Education are well 
trained. The university graduates who are not trained in education are also poor 
teachers. And Jaffna University graduates are particularly poor teachers. I also 
graduated from Jaffna University, so I know the low level of education there. 
The teachers don’t take interest in the students in rural schools like ours. They don’t 
teach properly. They know the parents can’t challenge them, because they lack 
education. Teachers are caste conscious. I know some teachers did not go to the 
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funeral of their student’s parent because the child was from the oppressed caste. There 
are also caste differences between teachers. 
Parents of two school children my research assistant and I spoke to complained of the low 
quality of teachers at the Ratneswari School. They were particularly critical of one lady 
teacher who was abusive towards the children and felt it was her caste outlook. But the 
parents were not keen to take any action.177 Parents of two girls, of oppressed caste origin, 
who attend the urban school said they don’t send their children to Rarneswari School as the 
teaching is of low quality, though they struggle to pay for the various education related 
expenses in the urban school and after school tuition.178 
Finally, Mr. Mohanarajan discussed significant caste discrimination in the 
administration of schools:  
Caste continues to be major issue. My colleague and I went for an interview for 
principal position at the Senguttuvan School [closer to Jaffna Town and known as an 
upper caste stronghold]. My colleague, who is currently a principal in the school in 
Puttur (village close to Pathemany), which is mainly an oppressed caste school, was 
clearly the most qualified. But there was pressure from the Old Students Association 
not to accept him, because he was from the oppressed caste. Even the Northern 
Provincial Council became involved in this issue, and decided to block his 
appointment. 
The comments of Principal Mohanarajan may not be echoed by other principals in Jaffna, 
because it is his commitment to addressing the caste exclusion that made him so vocal. 
However, during visits to other schools in Jaffna, I was able to observe a similar dynamics of 
rural schools with exclusively oppressed caste children. Furthermore, there has been a series 
                                                          
177 Interview with parents of Ratneswari School parents on 11 June 2013 and 8 July 2013.  
178 Interview with parents of two girls at St. Theresa School on 22 June 2013. 
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of cases, where oppressed caste teachers and village officials are being denied positions as 
heads of schools or as officials of upper caste villages.179 These discriminatory acts by the 
bureaucracy are reflective of the persistence of caste. 
 In an earlier era, oppressed caste children may have been denied entry to a school or if 
admitted, segregated and humiliated by being asked to sit on the floor while upper caste 
children sat on chairs with desks. However, the contemporary form of caste exclusion in 
education is through economic inequalities; the oppressed castes being stuck in the village 
school and the upper castes moving their children to urban schools.  
 
Social Investment in Temples 
 Temples have been absorbing much of the local investment since the end of the war. 
In most towns and villages in Jaffna, the Hindu temple steeples are being rebuilt and in much 
larger sizes. Historically, castes have had their local temples and the massive displacements 
caused by the war weakened the connections between caste communities and their temples. 
After the war, villages have established a subtle segregation of temples. Temples have 
become symbols of caste pride and investment. The oppressed castes that struggled to gain 
entry into the upper caste temples few decades ago are now focused on building their own 
temples, reinforcing the exclusionary character of caste temples. Furthermore, the oppressed 
caste temples have also become sanskritised emulating the rituals and practices of the upper 
castes (Muttulingam 2016). In Pathemany, I interviewed the leaders of both the wealthiest 
temple in the Vellala caste ward and the relatively small temple in the oppressed caste ward. 
 
 
                                                          
179 Many of these cases of discrimination only emerge word of mouth and have not been documented. In most 
cases the Education Ministry mediates and finds a transfer for the principal in question. But such cases were 
discussed in a series of discussions on education in Jaffna from October to December 2015 as part of the 
Anandarajan Memorial Education Seminar Series at St. John’s College, Jaffna.   
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Pillaiyar Kovil in the Upper Caste Ward 
Mr. Karalasingam is 49 years old and has two sons aged 28 years and 23 years of age. 
He and his forbearers have been the presidents of the Pillaiyar Kovil. His son is on the board 
of the Ganesha Sana Samuha Nilayam (community center). He explained his role and history 
of the temple: 
As a president, I am like the head of the family, like in the country there is a 
president. We decide on the temple matters, and there is no such thing as a committee. 
In our ancestry, I am the 7th descendant in charge of this temple. Since 1822 it has 
been under our family. I have been in charge of it since my father died 11 years ago. I 
have one older brother, but he has gone to Canada. … Our ancestral relatives 
converted to Christianity, so when they converted they gave the temple to our family. 
The land was their land, those Christians converts, but now the land is temple owned 
land. My house land is my father’s brother’s land, and I married my father’s sister’s 
daughter’s daughter, and so that is how the housing land continues to be transferred 
among us.  
Mr. Karalsingam described the generational transfer of temples through the eldest son. 
However, such temple ownership is a major source of pride and the rest of the family is also 
active in the management of the temple. The extended family’s wealth is preserved through 
cross cousin marriage as in his case. It is common for a man to marry his father’s sister’s or 
mother’s brother’s daughter. In this way, a strong bond is created with the temple, even as 
houses and agricultural land remain within the extended family, with property passed down 
through the daughters as dowry.  
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Mr. Karalasingam then explained the temple finances including the regular monthly 
expenses of the temple including payment for the temple priest180 called the Aiyar: 
From the donation box we pay the electricity bill, if it is not enough we ourselves pay 
it. … There are ten days in the Thiruvila (yearly temple festival). We do the first day 
of the Thiruvila, the male siblings of our family get to do the first Thiruvula. For the 
Aiyar (Priest), we pay Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115). So, if you multiply that by twelve for 
one year and divide by those who take each Thiruvila, so by ten, then it is Rs. 18,000 
(USD$ 138) from each [family that runs a day of the festival], and I pay the Aiyar 
every month. 
He then gave the detailed accounts of the costs for the ten-day temple festival every year. To 
finance the day of the temple festival organized by his family, he said his brother usually 
sends Rs. 100,000 (US$ 769) to 150,000 (US$ 1,150) and his cousin sends another Rs. 
50,000 (US$ 385). The ten-day temple festival, according to his estimates, cost a total of Rs. 
1.5 million (US$ 11,500) to 2 million (US$ 15,400), a large sum of money as much as the 
annual income of five to ten households in rural Jaffna.  
 Every twelve years, the temples go through a process of rebuilding and cleansing, the 
expenses of which are even larger. The temple was not damaged much by the war and in 
1998, his father did the Kumbavisaham [consecration and refurbishment of the temple done 
every twelve years]. Then again in 2012, he did it with the cleansing ceremony costing a total 
of Rs. 1.5 million (US$ 11,500). The ten members who run the Thiruvila also rebuilt the 
temple with five new structures for a total cost of Rs. 4.5 million (US$ 34,600). In this way, 
he had an intricate knowledge of temple finances. 
                                                          
180 Karalasingam’s contempt for Aiyar (priests) was evident in his tone. He was implying that they are there to 
take money. This is also characteristic of caste relations in Jaffna where the Brahmin castes have little power 
and they are basically the paid employees of the Vellalar. This is very different from many parts of India, where 
power resides with Brahmins, who are responsible for the religious rites and also hegemonic in the social, 
economic and political realms. 
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 Mr. Karalasingam’s own financial situation is quite dire, and after speaking about the 
temple finances he spoke about his own financial situation in the same vein. He farmed when 
he was a student, and then again only during the last four years. He became a shop owner 
when he was 22, but it resulted eventually in major financial losses. Currently he cultivates 
7,000 crops in about 2 acres of land, which is a significant farm size in Pathemany. His sons 
help in the farm, but his older son is continuing his studies, and the younger son wants to go 
to Canada to join Mr. Karalasingam’s brother. He hires kuli labor for certain kinds of work, 
such as cutting the water channels. He also pays for watering, though he said it is expensive. 
Due to previous losses, he wants to now put in as much family labor as possible.  
Mr. Karalasingam was displaced twice in 1987 and then in 1995. And during the 
period of displacement he used to transport firewood on his bicycle for a little money. During 
his business days he had taken loans from a range of people including banks. He claims he 
never took loans for more than 3% per month from the money lenders, which is still 36% per 
year. Debts had accumulated from the failed business and he is now indebted for Rs. 1.5 
million (US$ 11,500). Mr. Karalasingam’s pride, and his family’s position in the community, 
as with the position of the temple including their caste in the village, requires tremendous 
expenditure in temples, even though he is deeply in debt. 
 
Wairava Kovil in the Oppressed Caste Ward 
 I was fortunate to meet the chairman of the Wairava Kovil, Mr. Tharmaratnam, who 
was an acquaintance of my research assistant’s parents. Given the introduction by people 
known to him, I was hoping he would speak more candidly about caste.  
 In the Wairava Kovil, the temple committee consists of ten members. While the Aiyar 
does his services for free, the monthly expenditure for the various pusai (a regular ritual of 
worship at the temple) comes to about Rs. 2,800 (US$ 22). There are about 350 families who 
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worship at this temple, and they are mainly families doing kuli work. Running the temple is 
costly: each year the Thiruvula (annual temple festival) cost is Rs. 70,000 (US$ 538), so a 
group of people, usually about 15 people in the group bear that cost. 
The year I interviewed Mr. Tharmaratnam in 2013, the temple committee and temple 
members had done a Kumbavihasam (refurbishing of the temple), and it cost Rs. 1.2 million 
(US$ 9,230), because it required 15 priests, and the cost of the priests itself cost Rs. 850,000 
(US$ 6,530). Out of that Rs. 1.2 million (US$ 9,230), Mr. Tharmaratnam estimated about 
200,000 (US$ 1,540) came from the diaspora. People may send on the scale of Rs. 10,000 
(US$ 77) to Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) from abroad. 
Mr. Tharmaratnam believes this temple is over a hundred years old. They have a Sana 
Samuha Nilayam (community center) which was rebuilt after the displacement with the 
support of an NGO. When I asked him repeatedly about the caste issues in the village or in 
relation to the temples, he was firm in his reply:  “Until 1965181 there were problems, but 
after that caste problems are not there. With economic progress all those problems are now 
gone.” 
I mentioned to him that I felt Jaffna society has three strong social institutions, 
specifically the temples, the schools and the Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centres), and 
asked him about his impression of these institutions in relation to his community. And that is 
when he made some interesting comments: 
For our growth, the Sana Samuha Nilayam is the most important. Next in importance 
for our growth are the schools. The reason I can talk to you with confidence is 
because of the Sana Samuha Nilayam. The founder of our Sana Samuha Nilayam, 
Ponnuthurai, knew each and every family here. He was a communist. He was the one 
                                                          




who built our Sana Samuha Nilayam to this state [of a strong institution]. He was a 
CTB driver [Ceylon Transport Board bus driver], and he was from another village and 
he married here and came and lived here and developed our village. Then there was 
another man called Kathirkaman. Both of them were communists. They opened their 
houses to everyone, and whether or not they had food to eat, [they sacrificed their 
own well-being and] they cared about the village. They were concerned about the 
interests of the people and what kind of work could be done for the people. They both 
worked hard. Ponnuthurai died about 3 months ago and Kathirkaman died twenty 
years ago.182 
Mr. Tharmaratnam went on to explain the engagement of those communist leaders at the 
village level: 
They would work on all problems. If a road had to be repaired, they would work on it 
[by agitating and placing demands], and then get the authorities to fix it. But most 
importantly, they created awareness. People like me are able to talk like this because 
of them. I did not have the background to study much. It is to the Sana Samuha 
Nilayam that we went often and watched and learned. They would call us to speak in 
public, to read in public and trained us like that. I worship them like gods, because 
they are the ones who have given me the confidence to talk. In those days, 
Ponnuthurai brought all the Ministers here, Peter Kenuemen, N. M. Perera, Colvin R 
de Silva, [national leaders of the Communist and Trotskyite parties, who were 
ministers in the United Front Government in the 1970s]. They all came to our reading 
room (part of the Sana Samuha Nilayam). 
                                                          
182 It is very difficult to get exact dates in interviews, unless one pursued and got death certificates, in rural 
Jaffna when people say twenty years ago, it may be fifteen or twenty five years ago. 
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Mr. Tharmaratnam was visibly emotional as he spoke about his mentors. He was proud that 
the famous leftist leaders from Colombo visited his Sana Samuha Nilayam. However, Mr. 
Tharmaratnam himself did not identify himself as a communist. Furthermore, it is the social 
consciousness they raised rather than the struggles that were important to him. As he talked 
about such public education and awareness, the temple of which he is the chairman, and 
which gains more attention now in the village, receded into the background. What had 
become clear from our conversation was that the Sana Samuha Nilayam was a space that both 
perpetuated caste difference and supported struggles against caste oppression. 
 Towards the end of the interview, my research assistant asked him about an incident 
at a neighboring village, Avarangal, where youth had bashed up a hall few weeks earlier. He 
again became defensive and said it was not in his village and that he did not know what had 
happened. Then he said, that he had heard that some people from Europe related to the hall 
had written something disparaging of the oppressed castes in Puttur on the internet, and so 
oppressed caste youth from Puttur had attacked the place. Similar to his reluctance to speak 
about anti-caste struggles, Mr. Tharmaratnam dismissed this as an isolated incident of 
violence. 
 
Rethinking Caste in a Time of Crisis 
 In May 2014, as I was wrapping up my field research, I interviewed Mr. Chandrabose 
again. By then, he had become familiar and comfortable with me. My research assistant and I 
had also co-authored a long piece in a Tamil magazine on toddy tapping and palm 
development co-operatives, which I had shared with him, so he knew our political 
perspective.183 I wanted to ask him about caste oppression in particular. But our interview 
                                                          
183 Francisglaim, A. and Kadirgamar, A. (2013) ‘Seeval Tholil, Kooturavu Sangankalin Vettrihalum 
Savalhalum: Vadamahana Sabhaiyin Kavanathirkku’ [The Development and Challenges of Toddy Tapping and 
Co-operatives: For the Attention of the Northern Provincial Council]. Samakalam, October 1-15, 2013. 
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touched on many matters including toddy tapping and the role of the Palm Development Co-
operative; some of those comments I will return to in Chapter 5. I discuss Mr. Chandrabose’s 
interview at length, as he was so central to my research in Pathemany, and has greatly 
influenced my thinking on caste politics. I began by asking him about his upbringing and his 
entry into political work: 
I was born here [in Pathemany] and have lived here. My father was a farmer. 
After finishing my education up to HSC184, I was employed in the Palm Development 
Co-operative from 1972 to 2008. From my school days we interacted with the 
communist party and were active in their work. … I contested elections for the first 
time in 1971, as an Independent candidate against the Federal Party candidate, and I 
lost by a few votes.  
I was active in the anti-caste struggles through the initiatives of the 
Communist Party. Those were days of big struggles. We went and fasted and 
protested in front of the Mavattapuram Kandaswamy Kovil (temple famous for 
keeping oppressed castes out) and they used water pumps to flood water on us and 
chase us. There was a Communist leader called Nagaratnam from Chunnakam and it 
was through his connection that we went for the struggle. And then there was also 
violence and one of my friends was injured. 
In our village here, we could not go to the Pillaiyar Kovil. And when we told 
them we wanted to visit the temple, they fenced it with barbed wire to keep us out. It 
became a big problem, we tried to break in and they called the police. 
Mr. Chandrabose’s personal life history is very much linked to caste struggles. His links to 
the Communist Party in his youth, his participation in the anti-caste struggles and then 
                                                          
184 Mr. Chandrabose belongs to one of the early generations who benefitted from free education policies and the 
rural economic boom, which led to some level of education and social mobility into the lower middle classes 
among the oppressed. It is his generation that also produced a number of oppressed caste writers.  
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working for the Palm Development Co-operative organising the toddy tappers, which was 
itself a creation of those struggles and the Left Parties in power in the 1970s, all related in 
different ways to struggles against caste oppression.  
Mr. Chandrabose was active in one of the most renowned anti-caste struggles in 
Jaffna, the Mavattapuram temple entry movement which drew youth from many parts of the 
peninsula, but he was also part of temple entry struggles in his village including the large 
Pillaiyar temple mentioned above. Chandrabose’s anecdotal comments bring to life the 
largeness of caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Then I asked him about land and landed relations and their relationship to caste 
relations in Pathemany: 
The other house of our family which is towards the front part of the village, used to 
belong to them (Vellalar), and then my father managed to buy that land. You see, we 
were like their slaves, so we could only live in the back or where they wanted us to 
live. Some of these landlords owned the land, where our people had to live on the 
landlord’s land and work for him, so they never had their own land. Slowly, the 
oppressed community on that land started to study or went abroad, and are now 
slowly buying land. The caste and land issue is much worse in Puttur [neighboring 
village]. When I was young we could not even go close to their schools. When we 
were thirsty, we could not draw water from their wells. We could only get water if 
they gave it to us. 
Mr. Chandrabose is describing the productive and spatial relations of caste. The oppressed 
castes were denied agricultural land and were forced to depend on the Vellalar for their 
employment. They were denied water, with the Vellalar claiming that if the oppressed castes 
draw water from the wells, they will pollute the wells. Furthermore, they were pushed to the 
back of the village and were not given the visibility of living near the main road or the centre 
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of the village. His reference to Puttur, reflects the continuing strength of the Vellalar even in 
contemporary times in this village known for its severity of caste oppression. Because of a 
much larger Vellalar population in Puttur, the Vellalar were much stronger and more 
oppressive. 
Take the Ratneswari School, we could not go there. Now it is our children who are 
only studying there. In the 1970s after the caste struggles, our children could finally 
go there. The Puttur Somaskanda School, opened up to our people [his community, 
the oppressed caste community] much later. Our people can’t go there as teachers.   
Once there is economic progress, caste oppression will slowly disappear. Now our 
people go as wage labor to his house. They should go for work, but they should keep 
it a clear transaction. They should receive his wage and go home, and not interact 
further. 
Throughout the interview, even though I asked him about Pathemany, he referred to the 
neighboring villages not only for comparisons but also to articulate the relations they had 
with other villages. It was a reminder that villages are not enclosed, that there was 
considerable influence, movement and solidarity between villages and other regions of 
Jaffna. 
His reference to education above is about the hard fought victory for the oppressed 
caste children to enter the Ratneswari School in Pathemany. However, now that the upper 
castes have abandoned the school, education has become segregated once again, and the 
quality of the educational process for lower caste children had significantly declined. The 
school in Puttur, while it provided entry to oppressed caste children much later, and is a better 
performing school as the upper castes have not abandoned it, nevertheless excludes teachers 
from the oppressed caste community.  
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Mr. Chandrabose believes caste oppression is entangled with landed relations, and it 
is work on land that leads to oppressive forms of social relations with the upper castes. His 
solution is to strictly keep it as a wage labor transaction and nothing more than that. He links 
wage labor to economic progress, and what he believes will lead to the decline of caste 
oppression. As the discussion shifted to the possibilities of caste emancipation, he made a 
strong connection between caste and dowry:  
No one can end caste and dowry in our society. The Tigers also thought about ending 
it but they couldn’t. Even the Tigers were caste conscious. They would say there is no 
caste but they gave importance to their caste people. Caste and dowry domination will 
not end. Male domination is decreasing but dowry domination won’t. Now look at her 
[points to my research assistant]: she has studied, so now the man is going to ask for 
an even higher dowry. If a woman has not studied, he will ask for 10 lakhs [Rs. 1 
million, US$ 7,690], but for a woman who has studied, he will ask 30 lakhs [Rs. 3 
million, US$ 23,000]. Because a woman who has studied would also need a man who 
is better off. (laughs) The girl who has studied will ask for an appropriate husband and 
he will ask 50 lakhs [Rs. 5 million, US$ 38,500] in dowry. Now people like her won’t 
have time to earn her dowry, by the time she finished studying it will be time to get 
married. A woman studying is a big problem… (laughs)… I am speaking from 
experience. My friend had educated four of his daughters and now he is worried. 
What is he going to do? If you come to our house, all these worried fathers will be 
here late in the evenings talking to me. 
Mr. Chandrabose’s wife interjects: “Now there is importance for money and caste, nothing 
else.”  
For Mr. Chandrabose and his wife, as for so many of their relatives those are perhaps 
the two most troubling issues on a daily basis. Their caste identity is a constant reminder of 
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their position in society, and it has not changed even after the war. And the difficulties of 
finding marriages for their daughters and relatives continues because of the lack of dowry in 
the form of property, particularly land. 
Caste relations are also tied to land, particularly the possibilities of ownership of land. 
Mr. Chandrabose continued: 
It is with the caste struggle that land ownership also slowly started to change. 
In Puttur, because the upper castes are strong, there was no change, people can’t even 
talk about land. In our area, caste was not as strong, because there was some balance 
in our population. In the past [before the war], they were 60% and we were 40%, but 
in Puttur, they are 90% and our people only 10%. Here, because of the struggles, 
social consciousness also increased. In the Atchuvely area [which includes Pathemany 
village], our community was stronger and the domination was not as strong. In places 
like Changanai and Kodikammam, caste domination was much stronger.  
Now their [Vellala] population has greatly decreased, they only have 
economic strength [in Pathemany]. So, they [Vellalar] can’t face too many caste 
problems now [challenges by oppressed caste people]. That is why I say, it is when 
we go to their house that we become weak. We can’t demand to go and eat in their 
house; we can only demand equality in public places. Now their population has 
decreased, as many of them have gone abroad. And many in their community here [in 
Pathemany], are displaced people from Palaly. 
This is a perceptive analysis recognising the weakness of the Vellalar in relation to the 
demographic and spatial changes, and he understands how caste relations are strongly linked 
to a history of oppressed caste people working on the land of the Vellalar. He realises that the 
Vellalar continue to have wealth but that does not translate into productive relations locally, 
which is how caste relations are strengthened. Furthermore, he recognises that many of the 
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Vellalar in Pathemany in recent years are from Palaly, and they are not of local origin, so that 
also weakens Vellalar power in Pathemany. Finally, Mr. Chandrabose draws on his 
experience of anti-caste struggle in the 1960s and states anti-caste struggles can only take 
place with respect to public spaces. That is if they enter a Vellalar house or a farm to work, 
then at that point itself the demand for equality is lost. 
Then Mr. Candrabose went on to talk about the history of labor relations and 
exploitation: 
In those days, out of our people, half of them were tapping and the other half went for 
kuli work. Now only 5% or less of our people may be involved in tapping. … In those 
days if a mudalali [overseer], took kuli workers for mason work, and if the worker is 
to be paid Rs. 500, he would take Rs. 100 from that. So if he took five workers, and 
he is to be paid Rs. 1,000, he takes home Rs. 1,500 and the workers only take Rs. 400 
each. That kind of exploitation used to exist. Now, that kind of exploitation is 
decreasing. In those days, in each village there were only two or three mudalali 
[overseer] like that. Now, there are many more and people cannot be cheated. Now if 
five people go together for agricultural work and to cut water channels and they get 
Rs. 3,000, they have to divide it equally among them. Now people are much more 
conscious; before, people will take what they are given. 
Those going to kuli work, even if they get paid Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) that is 
not enough to support his family of five. He would have drunk for Rs. 400, so he 
gives his wife Rs. 600 which is not enough. And kuli work is irregular: once the rainy 
season comes for the three months, you just stay at home. Those who are dependent 
on kuli work and agriculture cannot depend on that work. They may get 10 or 15 days 
of work. If it rains for two weeks, then there is no work. So, tapping or industrial jobs 
are much more regular. For those involved in industrial jobs they have continuous 30 
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days of work. The Atchuvely Industrial Zone: if it starts to work properly, we will get 
work. People from our region will get the jobs. In the 1970s, it was working well and 
before it became much bigger the war disrupted it. At that time, we did not have any 
political connections so our people were not working there as much. 
Mr. Chandrabose in the above passage is discussing the changing consciousness among the 
oppressed caste community about wage labor and access to jobs. With the rural economy 
becoming more and more monetised, the wage laborers are also much more conscious of the 
wages paid to them and what might be skimmed by the overseers or those who employ them. 
In Jaffna, the demand for higher day wages is often translated as the arrogance and 
laziness of wage labor by the middle classes and the professionals including the bureaucrats. 
In fact, the higher wages demanded by wage labor is considered to be a problem of labor 
shortages rather than the increasing consciousness of wage workers about the wages due to 
them. This consciousness of labor factors in the irregularity of wage labor that is only 
available when those who employ them want it, and it is not needed during the rainy season.  
The Atchuvely Industrial Zone, lies a few kilometres from Pathemany, and Mr. 
Chandrabose believed that he could use his political connections to get such jobs for his 
community. Mr. Chandrabose claims the way out of caste oppression is to avoid dependence 
on incomes from working on the land of the Vellalar. Furthermore, he also believes that 
toddy tapping and industrial jobs are desirable as they not only create jobs independent of the 
Vellalar, they ensure regular incomes and makes the oppressed castes self-reliant.185 
 Mr. Chandrabose also discussed the way out for the oppressed castes, including the 
kind of social consciousness that was necessary to challenge the power of the Vellalar. 
                                                          
185 Contratry to this perspective, there has been considerable work done in India, particularly in the context of 
the modes of production debate on how capitalism and industrial exploitation can work in tandem with caste 
relations, rather than get rid of caste oppression. See for example the early work of Dipesh Chakrabarty on the 
working class in West Bengal. (Chakrabarty 2000) 
228 
 
Now if caste is to change, there needs to be a mind-set change. What do we do? Do 
we start a movement for this now? Look what happened in Mullivaikal [Where tens of 
thousands died in the last phase of the war]? Do we get destroyed through another 
struggle? People’s minds have to change. It’s much less in schools, it’s not in temples, 
but it’s in their minds. 
In Jaffna, and the post-war North and East, any reference to struggle is overshadowed by the 
history of the armed conflict and its disastrous consequences. Therefore, it also shuts down 
the possibility of discussing struggles as a way of resolving the social problems. This might 
also be related to the visible and massive military presence and the widespread surveillance, 
which confronts the idea of any notion of independent organising. 
 Mr. Chandrabose then touched on the politically sensitive issues militarization and the 
presence of a mostly Sinhala police force after the war: 
If a man from our community runs off with their [Vellalar] woman, they can’t do 
anything. Because the Sinhala police is here. … If it was the Tamil police, they would 
ask the man and woman to separate. We don’t need Tamils rights, first we need the 
rights for our community and we need to end caste oppression. 
Mr. Chandrabose’s comments about the police speak to the devolution debate in Sri Lanka 
and the demand for police powers to the Provincial Council. Since the 1980s a constitutional 
political solution to the ethnic conflict demanded considerable autonomy to the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces. The Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution 
instituted the Provincial Councils with various powers. However, police powers were not 
devolved to the Provinces during the war. And in the post-war context, one of the Tamil 
nationalist demands is to devolve police powers to the Provinces, so that a Provincial Police 
Force consisting mainly of Tamil police officers could be responsible for security. In this 
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context, Mr. Chandrabose is questioning the possible caste mind-set of such a Tamil police 
force and making a connection between caste and devolved state power. 
Mr. Chandrabose mentioned historical parallels of how it is in the interests of the 
oppressed castes to make alliances with outside actors given the Vellalar moves to deprive as 
well as socially and economically exclude the oppressed caste communities. He said 
American missionaries were more inclusive than Vellalar officials, and he justified the 
conversion to Christianity in the past to get jobs from the missionaries. This repudiation of 
Hinduism as a way of caste oppression is not new. The Indian anti-caste leader Ambedkar 
called for conversion to Buddhism. 
  The solution that Mr. Chandrabose proposes is that of the social consciousness and 
economic autonomy for the oppressed castes.  
If there is economic advancement caste issues will decrease. If the upper castes 
dominate politics, caste problem will not decrease. … We have to realize that he 
depends on our labor for his production. If our people don’t go to labor, will he be 
able to plant his crops? No, he can’t. But our people have to become conscious of 
that, but our people think he is giving us work. Until our community gains 
consciousness he will remain the mudalali [overseer], and our people won’t become 
mudalalis [overseers].  
These political views of Mr. Chandrabose come out of decades of experience first as an anti-
caste activist and then as a local political leader of a party. His language is one that speaks to 
his community. As with his comments about his people become mudalalis [overseers] or 
getting jobs, they are not necessarily about emancipation, but rather in some minimal way 
meeting the economic power of the Vellalar. The EPDP, his party also does not aspire 
towards social transformation, rather it is merely attempting to build a social base through 
patronage. Those are also the limitations of anti-caste politics in contemporary times.   
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In day to day interactions, Mr. Chandrabose is always matter of fact, he does not talk 
too much, as he is always running around with one errand or another assisting people. His 
speech is also not very clear as he mumbles. But as the interview progressed on that day, and 
he began talking more and more about caste, his articulation was powerful. His interview that 
day also reflected the moment. By 2014, the post-war economic crisis was all too clear and 
his community was in a dire situation. There is a sense of desperation in his words about the 
economic future and the political possibilities.  
 
Women, Land and Caste 
I now turn to Suganthy (pseudonym), whom my research assistant had met with and 
was impressed by her courage.186 Most single women refused requests for interviews when 
my research assistant approached them. My research assistant, herself not much younger than 
most of these women, explained to me that they did not want their stories to come out into the 
public, and feared the interview will bring further social stigma and shame. We wanted to 
talk to such women, because of the high number of single mothers with dependents and the 
economic difficulties such women faced.  
Suganthy is a thirty year old mother of two children, though with her thin frame, she 
could have passed for an eighteen year old. She was separated from her husband and lived in 
a small temporary house, a shack made of a combination of mud walls and tin sheets, on the 
land of her husband’s aunt who was sympathetic to her plight. She lives deep into the 
oppressed caste ward in Pathemany. 
Suganthy, a daughter of a mason, grew up in another village. In her late teens she 
eloped with a relative, a man slightly older than her and came to live in Pathemany. Eloping 
with her husband meant her relationship with her own family had severed and she could not 
                                                          
186 Interviewed on 14 May 2014. 
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expect any support from them. A few years into her marriage, she started going for kuli work 
to strengthen their household finances and also because her husband had a few unmarried 
sisters and he had to get them married. It is the duty of the male sibling to find the dowry to 
make sure his sisters are married off. She said, how initially going to kuli work was difficult, 
but then she got used to such work. She described her working day: 
I wake up at 5:00 or 5:30 am and finish all the housework by 7:30 or 8 am. I give my 
children their breakfast and also get their lunch ready and then I go to work. It is 
mostly work of weeding and harvesting, depending on crops like beet roots, onions 
and chilies. Morning wages are Rs. 300 (US$ 2.30) and afternoon another Rs. 300 
(US$ 2.30), to total Rs. 600 (US$ 4.60). It used to be a total of Rs. 300 (US$ 2.30) 
and then Rs 500 (US$ 3.85), [but] as prices increased wages were increased. People 
come in search of kuli workers, and they tell us, how many people they need, and we 
go as a group. Then when I come home, I cook dinner. We get breakfast at work and 
if we stay there for onion digging work, we get lunch. We also get tea in the late 
morning and again in the afternoon. … It is mostly women who are married and older 
than me that go for kuli work. They won’t send young unmarried daughters for such 
work. 
While she lived with her husband, he did not like her to go for kuli work in the Vellala ward, 
but after they separated and as kuli work reduced in the oppressed caste ward among the few 
landowning farmers, she now mainly goes for work in the Vellala ward. The gardens of 
people she works on are some who have their own land, and others are those who have rented 
lands for farming. Suganthy’s expenses are less than most families, because she has only 
small children: 
I have small children, so the food cost is less, so it costs about Rs. 350 (US$ 2.70) to 
Rs. 400 (US$ 3.00) a day. My husband has to pay alimony of Rs. 7,500 (US$ 58) [per 
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month]. He mostly pays it. Last month I would have only worked ten days. I get the 
support of my aunt to look after my children, when I work, which is a big help. 
Like many people in the oppressed caste ward of Pathemany, housing land is important for 
her. She mentioned her earnings and efforts to buy land: 
I have two lachams of land in Changanai. But I don’t go there as wages for kuli work 
are low there. I have taken a self-employment loan for 1 lakh (Rs 100,000, US$ 769) 
and I have put it aside to buy a piece of land here. But that will cost about Rs. 3 or 3.5 
lakhs (Rs. 300,000 or 350,000, US$ 2,300 or 2,700). I am trying to save some more to 
buy that land. I also have to keep paying the interest from the loan. 
Suganthy’s family having severed relations after she eloped, have re-established relations and 
given her some land. However, the two lachams of land from her family is not suitably placed 
to access even a meagre livelihood. She wants to stabilise her life by gaining housing land in 
her vicinity.  
Suganthy like most rural women in Jaffna has taken loans and also participates in a 
community savings scheme called seetu. In Jaffna, seetu is a system of pooled savings where 
each month a small amount is added by all members of the group, and when an individual 
needs a lump sum they can take it but continue paying the monthly payment.  
She talked about the other women who work with her and her interaction at the courts 
when she first got her alimony: 
The other women who come to work with me are married. They have young 
daughters who are unmarried, so they need money. … When my husband first left me, 
it took time before the court case and he had to start paying alimony. At the courts, 
there are so many women like me. When I first went, I went there crying, and then 
saw so many women like me. They are also going for work, some for kuli work, 
others work in shops. We all talk about our difficulties and then leave. 
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Around the time I was interviewing her, many people in Pathemany were starting to talk 
about the Atchuvely Industrial Zone, and I asked her if she is also thinking of such work 
given the decreasing amount of kuli work. She was indifferent. She said if the work they 
provide is flexible and allows her to take care of her children by getting home on time, then 
she could take such work. Industrial work, will provide regular incomes without having to 
work on Vellalar land. However, for single mothers like Suganthy even such work will have 
its challenges given her dependants. 
 Almost two years after I had interviewed Suganthy in early 2016, I heard from my 
contacts in Pathemany that Suganthy had purchased a small plot of land. However, that plot 
of land was in the Vellala quarter, bordering the oppressed caste quarter. In recent years, the 
Vellalar do sell their land to oppressed caste individuals, particularly in the context of the 
mass migration by the Vellalar. In the past, there would have been far more pressure on any 
Vellalar person who considered selling the land to an oppressed caste person, including the 
threat of ostracism. 
In any event, such caste prejudice continues, and in the case of Suganthy, her 
neighbors have written a petition to the Electricity Board claiming her plot of land should not 
qualify for an electricity connection because it is not on the land register connecting with an 
official address for the lane. She has to get the bureaucracy to sort her papers and depending 
on the local officer, who is likely to be a Vellala person, this process may take months if not 
years. In the past, the Vellala community may have used violence to chase away those 
oppressed caste individuals who move into their caste quarter, but in contemporary times 






Caste Oppression, Resistance and Violence  
In Jaffna, older oppressed caste men involved in anti-caste struggles in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, either avoid speaking about those struggles or spoke of them as belonging to a 
distant past with little relevance now.187 Perhaps after the armed struggle, the many 
massacres and the heavy presence of the military and police in the region, they can’t imagine 
the space for any struggle. Furthermore, their caste struggles are now considered irrelevant 
and insignificant in the public sphere, given the tremendous destruction the Tamil society had 
experienced with the war.  
In Jaffna, I have heard of a few incidents of spontaneous acts of violence by 
oppressed caste individuals against upper caste individuals, and they have not led to the same 
repercussions against the oppressed caste community as it would have happened before the 
war. Indeed, before the war, an act of violence and even an insult by an oppressed caste 
individual against a Vellala individual would have led to major retribution against the 
concerned oppressed caste village by Vellala backed thugs. 
In this context, a recent caste problem in northern Jaffna, in October 2016 gains 
significance. It was triggered by the Vellalar community in Punallaikatuvan village trying to 
re-establish a cemetery right in the middle of a neighboring oppressed caste villaged called 
Thidatpulam. The developments with this caste conflict may reflect the changing dynamics of 
caste relations after regime change in January 2015, and the attendant changes to social 
mobilisations.  
                                                          
187 In September 2016, with the support of the New Democratic Marxist Leninist Party, the offshoot of the 
Communist Party in the 1970s, I visited the villages of Nitchamam, Kanpolai and Puttur. The field visits were in 
preparation for a presentation on contemporary caste issues for a conference organised by the Mass Movement 
for Social Justice in Jaffna. These three villages were the sites of major caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the oppressed caste community had made major gains through those struggles including access to land 
(Senthivel 2009). Even those aligned with this party could not find people to talk about those caste struggles, 




I first heard about caste in Punallaikatuwan when I interviewed Ragavan188, one of the 
founding members of the LTTE, who left the organisation after ten years and became a strong 
critic of its politics. In that lengthy interview, at the height of the last phase of the war in 
2009, Ragavan began with one of his earliest memories of his village Punallaikatuvan. 
There was a man called Thuraisingam, an upper caste man and a Chandiyan (a local 
village thug), my mother told me that he murdered a man long ago. He also owned 
land and the Dalits (oppressed caste people) were the service caste and they would 
work for him. At that time, I was about six or seven years old, in the early 1960s, and 
one day, there was some problem with the Dalits, possibly because they didn’t want to 
work as he hadn’t paid them properly. The outcome was that the entire Dalit 
community was chased away from my village. … And it took them a long time before 
they could come back and resettle.189 
A few years after the incident mentioned by Ragavan, the Central Government in 1969 
created a housing settlement of 40 landless oppressed caste families from a neighboring 
village called Evinay onto state land adjacent to the cementry used by the Vellalar in 
Punnalaikattuwan. The oppressed caste people of this new village, Thidatpulam, continued to 
work as waged labor and share crop on the large lands owned by the Vellalar from 
Punnalaikattuwan. In 1982, there was another caste problem, culminating in thugs from 
Punnalaikattuwan murdering two youth from Thidatpulam, leaving a deep scar and fear 
among its residents to this day.  
 The cemetery was not used during the war, and with the population of Thidatpulam 
having increased to 180 families, about nine families had encroached and built houses on the 
                                                          
188 His movement name in the LTTE. 
189 Ragavan (2009) ‘Interview with Ragavan on Tamil Militancy (Early Years)’. Kafila, 16 February 2006. 
[Downloaded 27 November 2016: https://kafila.online/2009/02/16/interview-with-ragavan-on-tamil-militancy-
part-i/] Ragavan who is also active with some progressive Tamil diaspora forums uses the term “Dalit” that has 
been borrowed by some progressive diaspora writers who follow developments in India. 
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cemetery land. After the war, the Vellalar have resumed the use of the cemetery, creating 
tensions as the cemetery and the burning pyres pollutes the neighborhood. A confrontation 
ensued, and the Vellalar brought about 30 thugs, who camped out in the cemetery and built a 
high wall around the cemetery blocking the main entrance to a few of the houses. One night, 
the Sana Samuha Nilayam (Community Center) of Thidatpulam was also defiled by smearing 
engine oil presumably by those Vellalar-backed thugs. While the residents of Thidatpulam 
found it difficult to unite their village against the Vellalar as many of them either work as 
wage labor or sharecrop on the lands owned by the Vellalar, the attack on their Sana Samuha 
Nilayam created a sense of urgency and united them. The residents of Thidatpulam have 
appealed to various state officials and the police, but action is not forthcoming.  
In discussions with the Mass Movement for Social Justice, the oppressed caste 
villagers said they believe the police have been bribed and the state officials are partial 
considering they mostly belong to the Vellala caste. While there is palpable fear relating to 
the 1982 killings as consequences in the past for confronting the Vellalar, the villagers are 
defiant and believe they have the support of neighboring oppressed caste villages. They said, 
they told the Vellala thugs, if you kill one of us, we will kill one of you. 
The caste conflict in Thidatpulam is reflective of the changing dynamics of caste 
relations in post-war Jaffna, with possibly the the reemergence of overt and violent caste 
conflicts. However, this is the first major caste confrontation of this nature that I have heard 
of in recent years and it is too early to say, whether regime change, the loosening of military 
repression and the increasing space for protests, signals a shift in caste confrontations.  
In general, the space for organised violence and resistance has been muted in the post-
war years. Resistance with force, which is what my interlocutors consider to be “struggle”, is 
much more difficult after the war, with the large military camps, extensive surveillance and 
widespread police presence. However, the state structures at the district and local levels are 
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represented by Tamil officials, who are mainly of Vellala caste. They perpetuate caste 
discrimination through their administrative interventions, but not through overt violence. For 
example, oppressed caste quarters are rarely provided rural roads, access to water and street 
lighting.190 Therefore, even if the oppressed caste communities may now have the courage to 
challenge physical threats from the Vellalar landowners, they lack the wherewithal to 
confront the Vellalar officials dominating state structures. 
 
Towards an Analysis of the Contemporary Dynamics of Caste Relations 
Analysing caste relations in contemporary Jaffna is difficult due to the public silence 
on caste during the war and continuing into the post-war era. The current silence is a 
consequence of the near absence of an oppressed caste movement. Furthermore, there is 
suppression of anti-caste discourse with Tamil nationalist discourse dominating the public 
sphere. Indeed, Tamil nationalists argue that the priority is to achieve self-determination for 
the Tamil nation first and then address the internal contradictions such as caste. Many upper 
caste academics in Jaffna deny the existence of caste oppression in contemporary Jaffna, and 
claim that discussing caste in public, including its history would bring back caste and divide 
Tamil society.191 In this context, the oppressed castes are also responding to caste exclusion 
through a strategy of non-confrontation and educational progress.  
Historically, landed relations were central to caste structure in Jaffna, and the return to 
land after the war, and changes to land as a productive asset are shaping contemporary caste 
                                                          
190 I have noticed this in many villages. But I have a clear understanding of the workings of the state machinery 
from the problems faced by Maruthapuram village, in Karainagar in Jaffna, where I was part of a fisheries 
research project. It was only after the war that they were able to even get road connectivity to their village, and 
water service and street lighting are still denied to them among a host of grievances relating to state services. 
The villagers of Maruthapuram have also protested in front of the Divisional Secretariat, the bureaucratic center 
in their region, but progress on issues such as state services in water, housing and street lighting move at an 
extremely slow pace compared to other villages. 
191 Both during initial meetings with academics at Jaffna University in the sociology and geography 
departments, and in public forums involving retired academics, they discouraged me from pursuing research on 
caste and dismissed the importance of caste relations in contemporary Jaffna society. 
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relations. The spatial politics of caste relate to the location of houses, of temples and of 
schools and their proximity to caste wards in the village. Furthermore, caste is reproduced 
through social exclusion in schools, job opportunities and the caste demographics of 
migration and the related remittance economy.  
 
Caste in Social Institutions 
I argue that even if landed productive relations are not strengthened, the caste 
structure is not weakening. Rather, the very political economic processes that have been 
weakening landed relations are resulting in new forms of social exclusion leading to the 
consolidation of caste relations. Such strengthening of caste is tied to the workings of the 
social institutions. 
Temples continue to be important institutions for the persistence of caste. And their 
spatial location in each caste ward and the membership that sustains them is significant for 
caste relations. Much of the social investment in the post-war context has been in temples, 
and considerable amount of that capital comes from the Diaspora, creating a link between 
migration, remittances and the consolidation of caste in Jaffna. Migrant remittances are tied 
to forms of pride in the family and caste, and investment in temples has become the 
expression of social power. Indeed, belonging to a caste group and a temple, draw on the 
spatial differences that characterised social power in the pre-war decades. Furthermore, while 
there were major battles for temple entry in the 1960s confronting such social power, there 
are few such confrontations in contemporary times; oppressed caste people are now less and 
less interested in making their presence felt in upper caste temples. The social dynamic now 
is of each caste group investing in its own temple and each caste community worshiping in 
239 
 
their temples192 and reproducing caste differences projected as community differences in each 
locality, rather than confronting such differences as forms of caste oppression.  
In addition to temples, other social institutions such as schools and Sana Samuha 
Nilyam (community centers) are institutions that affect people’s everyday social life. Given 
that oppressed caste communities have the right to attend schools or teach in schools, there 
are subtle forms of exclusion where the Vellala caste avoids schools with oppressed caste 
children, by enrolling their children in urban schools. Furthermore, the Sana Samuha 
Nilayam by their proximity and linkage to the temples are inherently caste institutions, which 
through the pre-schools they run begin social exclusion by caste when children first enter 
public spaces.  
Such social exclusion is further reinforced in marriage. Inter-caste marriage can lead 
to the concerned individuals, particularly of the upper caste being disowned, and not 
receiving the property normally passed down to the next generation. Marriage and dowry are 
important for property relations, and impinge on household assets, which provide 
disincentives for inter-caste marriage. In any event, the imposition of arranged marriage is 
very strong. Even in the cases where youth find their own partners, such partners are also 
chosen to avoid the repercussions of inter-caste marriage. The continuing importance of 
dowry property in the marriage institution ensures segregation through caste based marriage. 
 
Caste in Spatial Relations of Employment and Social Access  
Land ownership gains a spatial significance with the location of houses within the 
caste geography of villages. Where do you live, in which part of the village? Which temple or 
                                                          
192 One argument that is put forward is that the war-time trauma is leading people to invest in and become 
involved in temples. Furthermore, that is the reason for the oppressed caste communities getting involved in 
their temples. The analysis of psycho-social concerns while they may contribute to this dynamic, is beyond the 
scope of my research. 
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Sana Samuha Nilayam do you go to? These are crucial questions for the recognition of caste 
position. And through such recognition, caste plays its role in access to education and jobs. 
The web of community activities, the recognition of peoples’ caste locations and 
kinship ties extend beyond the village, and the caste structure then reproduces itself in 
employment and education. There have been a number of controversial rejections of 
oppressed caste principal and teacher appointments in upper caste dominated schools; 
protests and petitions against such appointments of principals and teachers are mobilised by 
upper caste village bodies and old student associations. Therefore, in educational 
appointments in particular, there are increasing cases of caste exclusion.  
Industrial work is considered to be one possibility of exiting the caste relations tied to 
land. There was much expectation of jobs for example with the Atchuvely Industrial Zone, 
which can provide regular incomes and better wages. However, such industrial jobs may not 
be able to completely escape caste relations as they are still embedded within Tamil society, 
where owners, managers and engineers are likely to be Vellalar. Moreover, there is a 
gendered dimension to the accessibility of such industrial work. Indeed, social reproduction is 
contingent on a number of factors including spatial and temporal issues. The location of 
work, the hours of work and the priority of taking care of dependents will be an economic 
calculation for women who choose wage labor and domestic work in Vellala farms and 
homes. The larger economic pressures on war affected women as they attempt to survive the 
various challenges of caring for dependents while eking out a livelihood may draw them 
deeper into caste relations. 
State institutions which not only provide jobs but also a range of state services are 
disproportionately populated by the Vellalar. And caste prejudice reflects neglect in the 
delivery of state services to oppressed caste wards. The Muslim community which is outside 
caste relations also complains of such discrimination by Tamil bureaucrats in Jaffna 
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following their return after the war; that is two decades after their eviction by the LTTE in 
1990.193 
 
Dispossession, Social Exclusion and the State 
The entire population of Jaffna is affected by the post war onslaught of the market and 
financialisation resulting in widespread indebtedness and dispossession. However, the 
dynamics of dispossession are such that the more socially vulnerable, the oppressed caste 
communities in the case of Jaffna, are the heaviest hit as they lack significant remittances 
from the Tamil diaspora in the Western countries. Here, oppressed caste women, and 
particularly if they are single women with dependents, carry a major social burden, and the 
process of dispossession can be devastating. 
The subtle character of caste oppression in contemporary Jaffna is one reason why the 
process of consolidation of caste relations is not as evident. Caste relations in Jaffna are not 
characterised by atrocities as is the case in many parts of India (Teltumde 2010). Rather, 
caste exclusion in Jaffna is perpetuated by stealth. Furthermore, repression by the security 
apparatus including the army and police also have a caste character, to the extent that an 
upper caste individual is more likely to access officials and lawyers, and is less likely in the 
post-war context to be physically attacked by local gangs believed to be controlled by 
military intelligence. Caste struggles, if they emerge again in the future, will have to 
challenge the workings of state power in support of caste structure, particularly thorugh the 
workings of the Vellalar dominated bureaucracy in the Tamil regions. If the powers of the 
Government in Colombo are curtailed through further devolution, the devolved powers are 
likely to strengthen the Vellalar dominated administration in the Northern Province. 
                                                          
193 I have been involved in organizing a number of meetings on Tamil-Muslim relations in Jaffna town, and 
Muslims have mentioned such discrimination as the cause of lack of access to the housing schemes and 
infrastructural neglect of the Muslim quarters in Jaffna town. 
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The role of the state and its policies with respect to caste exclusion in the future are 
likely to be significant. Indeed, from the Social Disabilities Act of 1957 condemning caste to 
the support given to the co-operatives in the 1970s were enabling developments to confront 
caste exclusion. Next, the forms of politics that emerge in response to the processes of 
dispossession and social exclusion will be significant. Would a new political actor emerge 
with an emancipatory vision for the oppressed castes much like the role played by the 
Communist Party in the 1960s? Or would it be the continuation of patronage oriented parties 
like the EPDP which have managed to capture the social base of oppressed castes? How will 
any new political formation challenge the politics of the TNA dominating Tamil politics? The 
TNA is not only narrowly nationalist, but also caste conscious, but the question is whether 
the oppressed caste communities can mobilise their large voter base to change the nationalist 
political trajectory.  
The demographic changes with migration to form the large Tamil diaspora have 
possibly brought the numerical strength of the oppressed castes on par with the Vellalar in 
many regions, and political mobilisation and the revival of an anti-caste movement can 
drastically shape politics in Jaffna. However, that would also require the Tamil population 
and the oppressed caste communities coming to terms with the disastrous armed conflict and 
the legacy of the Tamil Tigers. It is through an ideological critique of the Tamil nationalism 
that has dominated the political imagination in Jaffna and the North that the space can be 






Cooperatives and Alternative Visions of Reconstruction 
 
In the growth of co-operation in Ceylon, Jaffna can justly be proud of blazing many a 
trail. The first Co-operative Central Bank was set up in Jaffna: so was the first Co-
operative Hospital at Moolai – perhaps the first of its kind in the world. The first 
successful Co-operative Marketing Society in Ceylon was the Jaffna – Malayalam 
Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. The first Co-operative Union for Agricultural 
producers was the one in the Northern Division. The first Harbour Services Union and 
the first District Fisheries Union were also later set up in Jaffna. Amongst these 
numerous ‘firsts’ an outstanding success was the creation of the Northern Division 
Co-operative Federation (the first regional Union) which was registered in 1937. It 
covered the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Kurukulasuriya, 1971, 78-79). 
 
Hence the Ten Hour Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a 
principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the 
middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class. But there was 
in store a still greater victory for the political economy of labor over the political 
economy of property. We speak of the cooperative movement, especially the 
cooperative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold ‘hands’. The value 
of these great social experiments cannot be overrated. – Karl Marx, Inaugural 






 If the war-torn northern economy is in crisis, what can be recovered from its past to 
reconstruct a future for its people? In this Chapter, I address the rise and decline of the co-
operatives. The history of the co-operative movement in Jaffna and Sri Lanka more broadly 
reaches back to the early twentieth century. The British colonial government initiated and 
then nurtured co-operatives as part of its agricultural policy and then for distribution of 
essential items during the Second World War. By Independence in 1948, co-operatives had 
become widespread and gained an important place in the economy. In the late 1950s and into 
the 1970s, left-leaning governments committed to import substitution strengthened co-
operatives to boost rural development.  
 The history of co-operatives in Jaffna finds its place in my research for a number 
reasons. First, co-operative development was tied to the advances in both formal and informal 
education in Jaffna. The second connection is between co-operatives and credit, with the co-
operative movement itself initiated through credit co-operatives by the British. The third 
connection is with caste, with the leadership coming from Vellala upper caste communities. 
However, with the emergence of producer co-operatives, particularly those formed for caste-
related occupations such as fisheries and toddy tapping, co-operatives also became 
institutions for advancing the interests of certain middle and oppressed castes.  
In analysing the co-operative movement, I address their deterioration with the war, the 
pressures they are now facing with market oriented reconstruction policies and the continuing 
obstacles placed by Tamil nationalist politics indifferent to their rejuvenation. While I realize 
that co-operatives cannot solve the economic crisis in the war-torn North, I articulate the 
importance of co-operatives in constructing an alternative development vision and plan. I 
further analyse the tension between state support for the revitalisation of co-operatives in a 
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post-war society and the historically problematic relationship between the state and co-
operatives.  
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the history of national level policies on the 
development of co-operatives in Sri Lanka and then move to a discussion of the emergence of 
a powerful co-operative movement in Jaffna and more broadly the north. I then discuss the 
contemporary workings of the fisher and palm development co-operatives, two of the most 
vibrant producer co-operatives in Jaffna to this day. Following a discussion of the broader 
contemporary challenges for co-operatives in Jaffna, I address the contradictions of state 
support for co-operatives through a discussion of Marx’s interventions on co-operatives. My 
discussion of co-operatives will argue that the legacy, institutional memory and wide 
presensence of co-operatives to this day in Jaffna provide ideas and possibilities for an 
alternative vision of reconstruction. 
 
The Growth of Co-operatives in Sri Lanka, 1911 - 1977 
By the late nineteenth century, indebtedness and defaults on taxes by farmers in Sri 
Lanka had led to calls on the colonial government to address the agricultural crisis. These 
pressures and subsequent interventions by the Governor, Sir Henry Blake, led to the 
formation of the Ceylon Agricultural Society in October 1904, with the Governor as 
President and a Board nominated by the Governor (Paramothayan 1990, 50). While this 
institution was created with a view to enhance paddy cultivation and increase productivity as 
well as to address indebtedness, further agitations called for the implementation of co-
operative credit banks along the model instituted in India in 1904.  
The new Governor, Sir Henry MacCallum appointed a Committee of Investigation 
called the Agricultural Banks Committee in 1909. On the basis of its recommendations, The 
Ceylon Co-operative Credit Societies Ordinance No. 7 was passed in the Legislative Council 
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in 1911 (Paramothayan 1990, 50-52). These credit societies became critical to address rural 
indebtedness and to strengthen farmers; while borrowings were necessary for farmers the 
interest rates were much lower than charged by the rural traders ensuring the farmers could 
repay their loans and not fall into permanent indebtedness.  
The rapid increase in the scale of co-operatives in the entire island, however, only 
came with the major push by the colonial government in 1942. The British centralised 
distribution of essential items and rationed goods in Ceylon, due to the Second World War 
shortages, particularly as the war with Japan escalated in South East Asia. This war-time 
colonial policy led to the tremendous increase in the formation of consumer co-operative 
societies and their membership in the country. 
 
Co-operatives at Independence 
 Soon after Independence, the Reserve Bank of India sent one of its Chief Officers in 
October 1948 to gain insights by studying the co-operative movement in Sri Lanka (Reserve 
Bank of India 1948). That study, titled, ‘Co-operation in Ceylon’ is an important historical 
record of the state of co-operatives in Sri Lanka at Independence. 
 The co-operative movement which had a membership of just 7 percent of the 
population in 1942 had reached two-thirds of the population by 1947. In 1946-1947, there 
were 6,521 co-operative societies with 1.1 million members and a working capital of Rs 33.2 
million (Reserve Bank of India 1948, 11). The population of Sri Lanka at that time was 6.8 
million and in 1946-1947 the government current expenditure and capital expenditure were 
Rs 448.3 million and Rs 57.3 million respectively (World Bank 1953, 193-196). Thus the 
working capital of the co-operative movement was equivalent to 7% and to 58% of the 
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colonial government’s current and capital expenditure respectively during the final years 
under British colonialism.194  
 Reviewing the tremendous increase in co-operatives in the 1940s, the Reserve Bank 
of India claimed every village in Ceylon had a co-operative and that it was now a “live 
issue”, though co-operation in the country was mainly with consumer co-operatives (Reserve 
Bank of India 1948, 11). This positive assessment was due to the creation of a system of 
rationing and distribution of essential items, particularly with the expansion of consumer co-
operatives. The question inevitably arises whether the colonial expansion of co-operatives for 
war-time distributional purposes could be sustained after the war in post-colonial Sri Lanka. 
 The World Bank Mission in the early 1950s also evaluated the state of co-operatives. 
It emphasized the expansion of agriculture and stressed the importance of co-operatives for 
that task: 
Ceylon is fortunate in possessing a well-developed and vigorous cooperative 
movement. It furnishes leadership and guidance in the solution of many agrarian 
problems, such as effective utilization of existing resources and the introduction of 
improved methods of cultivation. Cooperatives provide a large share of agricultural 
credit on reasonable terms. They also perform an important educative role, both in 
training of local leaders and in quickening the awareness of the peasant... (World 
Bank 1953, 58) 
The World Bank considered the co-operatives to be organising institutions for agricultural 
expansion, which it recommended for the dry zone with irrigation and colonization schemes. 
The World Bank also discussed the issue of exploitation of rural producers such as 
small cultivators and fishermen by village traders and money lenders. It went on to 
                                                          
194 The co-operatives running costs are compared with government expenditure as GDP figure are not readily 
available; even in the early 1950s the GDP figures are not reliable (World Bank 1953). 
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recommend the doubling of the number of credit, marketing and producer co-operatives to 
address such exploitation. It also discussed the possibilities of co-operatives providing long-
term loans of up to 30 years to relieve those farmers who are tremendously indebted to 
money lenders.  
 The co-operative credit societies had doubled in membership in the 11 years before 
the World Bank mission. The World Bank recorded that the co-operatives advanced loans to 
members on reasonable terms between 6% and 9% per annum, with limits to individual 
members of around Rs. 200-300. Furthermore, most loans were “productive” and used for 
cultivation with only less than 4% of “unproductive” loans used for ceremonies and 
repayment of old debts (World Bank 1953, 199). In this way, the co-operatives were 
considered indispensable institutions for the rural economy soon after Independence. 
 
Postcolonial Expansion of Co-operatives 
The left leaning regime of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike came to power in 1956 supported 
by a strong rural power base, and it initiated another phase of co-operative expansion. The 
Minister of Agriculture and Food, Philip Gunawardena, promoted a stronger role for the state 
utilising co-operatives in the rural economy. Gunawardena believed co-operatives had both a 
faulty ideology and a faulty structure, of serving the interests of selected groups of people 
with a multiplicity of single-purpose societies in a village (Royal Commission 1969). His 
concerns according to a policy directive to the Co-operative Department in the late 1950s was 
that in less developed countries co-operatives are active partners of the state in national 
development, however, in the process parochial interests of various groups are advanced 
(Royal Commission 1969). Therefore in the late 1950s, Gunawardena put forward a program 
of rural development through Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS) to assist the 
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state’s economic development agenda. In particular, he envisaged a rural development plan 
with an ambitious programme of developing entire villages.  
The MPCS was conceived as a society which carried on consumer services as well as 
agricultural credit, supply of marketing and, wherever possible labor contracts for the 
execution of village works.  By the end of 1960 there were 4,741 multipurpose co-
operative societies. … The Minister who introduced the multipurpose co-operative 
societies gave the multipurpose unions a monopoly in the wholesale distribution of 
rice, flour and sugar. … It was intended that the unions would be able to make a 
substantial profit on the monopoly trade and thereby augment their capital. This 
actually happened for a while but the margins allowed on the monopoly commodities 
were gradually reduced by the Government (Royal Commission 1969, 34 - 36). 
In this way, Gunawardena’s vision had a lasting impact of centralising the co-operatives and 
creating further dependence on the state. This role for the state in co-operation were further 
consolidated during the tenure of the left-leaning governments between 1960 – 1965 and then 
again 1970 – 1977.  
The consolidation of co-operative banking had a major impact on the co-operative 
movement as a whole. Gunawardena’s proposal in the late 1950s for a centralised co-
operative development bank with state support was realised with the formation of the 
People’s Bank in 1961. The People’s Bank amalgamated the capital in various rural co-
operative banks. While the People’s Bank was to benefit co-operatives through co-operative 
representation on the board, in reality, it took on the characteristics of a state-owned 
commercial bank. The older Bank of Ceylon was also nationalised around the same time, and 
the People’s Bank was seen by its General Manager in the 1960s as a rival to the Bank of 
Ceylon in commercial banking (de Livera 2000).  
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In retrospect, state led centralisation of co-operative banking undermined the co-
operative movement. The centralised operations of the People’s Bank did provide financial 
support for the co-operatives through its rural branch offices, its vast network of agents and 
its New Agricultural Credit Scheme for rural development. However, when the left was 
defeated in 1977, one of the first attacks on egalitarian social institutions was against co-
operative banking. The mandate of the People’s Bank was changed, removing the 
relationship to the co-operatives, and it became pure and simple a state owned commercial 
bank.    
 Next, consumer co-operatives became increasingly dependent on the state, 
particularly with the distribution of rations and subsidies to the public through MPCS and 
other co-operative stores. While co-operatives are enhanced through state subsidies and 
banking support, the left-leaning governments went much further in centralising and 
strengthening the hold of the state over the co-operatives. The left governments at that time 
assumed they were on the path to socialism and created a long-term plan of rural 
development.  
In India, it was rent-seeking within the co-operative movement that led to its 
decline.195 Whereas in in Sri Lanka, when a pro-business right wing Government came to 
power in the late 1970s, it was the earlier centralisation and state control that enabled the 
usurping of co-operative resources as with the capital of the co-operative banks and the 
undermining of consumer co-operatives through the sudden withdrawal of state support. The 
Sri Lankan case raises important questions about the trade-offs between the advantages of 
                                                          
195 According to Singh: “In India, traditional cooperatives were mostly registered under the respective State 
Cooperative Societies Acts. But due to political interference, corruption, elite capture, and similar issues, the 
cooperatives soon lost their vibrancy and became known for their poor efficiency and loss-making ways. Now, 
government support to these cooperatives is declining, though gradually and selectively. At the same time, they 
face higher competition due to privatisation and liberalisation policies. The new environment, however, 
provides new opportunities for cooperatives due to state withdrawal and deregulation.” (Singh 2008) 
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economies of scale that come with state led federation of co-operatives and the disadvantages 
of the membership losing control of the co-operatives.  
 
Historical Vitality of Co-operatives in Jaffna 
It is the business of the International Working Men’s Association to combine and 
generalize the spontaneous movements of the working classes, but not dictate or 
impose any doctrinary system whatever. The Congress should, therefore, proclaim no 
special system of cooperation, but limit itself to the enunciation of a few general 
principles. … 
We recommend to all cooperative societies to convert one part of their joint income 
into a fund for propagating their principles by example as well as by precept, in other 
words, by promoting the establishment of new cooperative fabrics, as well as by 
teaching and preaching. – Karl Marx, Instructions for the Delegates of the Geneva 
Congress in 1867 (Marx 2000, 90) 
While the co-operative movement in Sri Lanka was considered extensive and strong, 
the reach, breadth and strength of co-operatives in Jaffna was of another order. It is in Jaffna 
that producer co-operatives with their deeper organisational structure and symbiotic 
relationship with credit, marketing and consumer co-operatives thrived. In this section, I 
explore the rich history of co-operation created by a particular set of factors, both the social 
history of Jaffna and its social and economic links with other parts of the world. 
In 1926, when a separate Co-operative Department was formed taking away co-
operatives from the Agricultural Department, the Registrar of Co-operatives in Jaffna took up 
a strategy of recruiting local leaders for federated co-operative structures and encouraging 
these wealthier individuals, some of them former state officials to put their own capital into 
the co-operatives credit societies (Paramothayan 1990, 61-63). In the 1930s, a range of 
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marketing and producer co-operatives emerged with the proliferation of the co-operative 
concept with the new co-operative leadership encouraging different workers to form co-
operatives. It was this experimentation with and the emergence of innovative producer co-
operatives that instilled a deeper co-operative culture. 
The vibrancy of educational institutions in Jaffna and the highly literate culture 
contributed to co-operation. In particular, the presence of teachers and principals as well as 
retired public servants including those who had returned from working in Malaysia provided 
a pool of willing co-operative leaders in Jaffna.196 The particular characteristics of the Jaffna 
economy discussed in Chapter 2 also contributed to co-operation; high population density 
with small holding agriculture and high levels of literacy was conducive for co-operative 
organising. 
One of the most interesting co-operative initiatives was the marketing of tobacco in 
the subcontinent. The Jaffna Malayalam Tobacco Co-operative Sales Society was initiated in 
1934. It functioned by notifying its members of the current market prices for the different 
grades of tobacco, classifying the tobacco and paying the cultivators an average of 60 percent 
of the market price as an advance. On completion of all export and sales transactions the 
members were paid the balance due to them. This society was not only the first of its kind in 
Sri Lanka exporting to another country, it illustrated the vast potential for co-operation in the 
Northern Province, especially in the area of member-education and participation. The growth 
of its membership and capital over the first fifteen years of operation was a major boost to not 
only the tobacco growers but also the co-operative movement as a whole (Paramothayan 
1990, 140). 
                                                          
196According to Paramothayan, this tradition of co-operation beginning in the 1920s continued into the 1970s: 
“An examination of two large and well respected Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies in Jaffna (Alaveddy 
MPCS and Chavakacheri MPCS) showed that between 1971 and 1978 teachers constituted 39 percent and 41 
percent respectively of all members of the Executive Committee. … On the whole the majority of committee 
members of cooperative societies or unions were teachers, the rest being composed largely of lawyers, 
government officials, Malayan pensioners and a good many farmers.” (Paramothayan 1990, 100) 
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Such an initiative in tobacco was paralleled in many other sectors. Along with the 
Jaffna-Malayalam Tobacco Co-operative Sales Society, the most successful were Moolai Co-
operative Hospital Society (1936), the Northern Province Fishermen’s Cooperative Union 
(1959) and the Jaffna District Cooperative Harbour Services Union (1963) (Paramothayan 
1990, 163). By 1970, the Co-operative structure in the North consisted of a total of 1,301 
cooperative societies of which 1,259 primary societies and 42 secondary societies, under the 
aegis of Northern Division Co-operative Federation (Paramothayan 1990, 143). 
 The Moolai Co-operative Hospital Society, despite great setbacks during the war, 
including displacement and massive damage to its physical infrastructure, continues on a 
smaller scale in the post-war years. It has about thirty five staff, mainly nurses with one 
medical officer each on rotation during the three shifts. It serves the somewhat isolated 
population in the north-west region of the Jaffna peninsula. Its main income earner now is an 
elders’ home it runs, and it is struggling to rebuild after the losses and disruption during the 
war.197  
 The important role of fisher co-operatives in leading the fishing community in the 
post-war years will be discussed at length in the next section. Here it suffices to contextualize 
the fisher co-operatives with the history of co-operatives in Jaffna. The Northern Province 
Fishermen’s Cooperative Societies Union, the first of its kind in Sri Lanka was registered in 
1959 for the purpose of facilitating the supply of fishing gear to its member societies. In 
addition, it helped member societies by making advance payments on the produce sent to it 
and facilitated sea food exports (Paramothayan 1990, 164).  
 The success of such co-operation also had a caste dimension. In the case of 
agricultural co-operatives, it is the Vellala castes that gained from savings resulting from co-
                                                          
197 I visited the Moolai Co-operative Hospital in June 2015, and it is a moving site of vast infrastructure much of 
it in ruins with effects of war including shelling clearly visible. The visitors’ book preserved by its 
administrative staff despite years of displacement reflects the appreciation it had during the decades of its 
success. Visitors from places such as the Soviet Union and Japan had visited is back in the 1950 and 1960s. 
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operative marketing. Given the numerical majority of the dominant Vellala caste in Jaffna 
combined with small holding agriculture, a broad section of the population benefitted, and 
not just a small elite. However, with caste exclusion in the countryside, a section of society 
was completely left out of the gains from such agricultural co-operation. During my field 
research in Pathemany, I found that that there was no functioning agricultural co-operative 
after the war. This is also for the most part true of agricultural co-operatives more broadly in 
Jaffna and that is why I am unable to write on the current state of agricultural co-operatives. 
 In this context, the emergence of the Palm Development Co-operatives provided a 
major advance to the oppressed castes involved in toddy tapping. And the story of the toddy 
tappers co-operatives emerging in the early 1970s is important not only as a unique 
experiment in co-operation, but also to understand the consolidation of changes to caste 
structure in Jaffna following the anti-caste struggles of the 1960s. Hence, the contemporary 
concerns of the Palm Development Co-operative is discussed at length in a section below. 
 This rich history of co-operatives in Jaffna and their different path from co-operation 
in the rest of the country requires some discussion. At the national level, particularly in the 
early post-colonial decades it was state intervention and aid that promoted federated co-
operatives such as the MPCS. However, in Jaffna, institutions of co-operative expansion 
including of federations, marketing and banking had evolved in the early 1930s into the 
1950s, and had gained a level of autonomy from the state. Such co-operatives in Jaffna 
precedes the evolution of the now famous Mondragon Co-operative Corporation in Spain, 
which was initiated in the mid-1950s and grew tremendously in the following decades 
(Errasti et al 2003). Mondragon prioritised the four co-operatives functions of production, 
distribution/marketing/retail, banking, and training along with research. By the 1940s, the 
federation of co-operatives in Jaffna had all of these functions except the emphasis on 
research and technology. Given that Mondragon has survived and even expanded despite 
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neoliberal globalisation, the question arises whether the co-operative movement in Jaffna 
could also have innovated and thrived, even amidst the open economy reforms starting in the 
late 1970s, if not for the devastating civil war.  
 
Fisher Co-operatives 
 Close to 20 percent of the entire Northern Province population depend on fishing for 
their livelihood; this includes communities from all three religions, Hindus who form the bulk 
of the northern populations, Christians concentrated in the coastal regions and Muslims, 
particularly in the Mannar District. Historically, the development of fisher co-operatives 
came with the food production drive during the Second World War. By 1945 there were 
thirty fisher co-operative societies in the country (Kurukulasuriya 1975, 117). This interest in 
developing fisheries and co-operatives continued in the 1950s, particularly with the support 
of the Canadian government.  
There were different models of fisher co-operatives that were attempted. One was fish 
production co-operatives where the boats were owned by the co-operatives. The other was 
credit and marketing co-operative societies, where the societies supplied credit and assisted 
with sales and marketing. The latter, seems to have been a more successful model by the 
1960s (Royal Commission 1970). In the North today, the main function of the co-operatives 
continues to be that of facilitating credit and support for sales and marketing. 
 The efforts at promoting co-operative societies and the policies of promoting fisheries 
through mechanisation and exports enhanced fisheries organisations in the North. In 
September 1959, the Northern Province Fishermen’s Co-operative Societies Union was 
registered, which by 1969 had 56 member societies (Kurukulasuriya 1975, 207). By the early 
1960s, the Jaffna Fishermen’s Co-operative Societies Union is reported to have had a 
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profitable export business mainly of bêche-de-mer (sea cucumber), conch-shells and shark 
fins, contributing to the foreign exchange earnings of the country (Paramothayan 1990, 164). 
 Mechanisation of fisheries, including the introduction of trawling, and export of 
fisheries led to considerable accumulation by the fishing community. Such accumulation also 
contributed to the strengthening of the co-operatives in the 1970s into the 1980s (Bavinck 
1984). By 1985, with the escalation of the armed conflict, the seas also became a site of 
conflict between the various Tamil armed groups and the Sri Lankan Navy. The fishing 
community caught in the crossfire suffered major losses, both loss of lives and assets. 
Furthermore, the coastal communities suffered from multiple bouts of displacement. Even 
when there wasn’t heavy fighting, due to the fear of infiltration, the Navy put heavy 
restrictions on the hours and locations of fishing. Thus from 1985 until 2010, going to sea 
itself was a dangerous and arduous task for the fishing community.  
 
Contemporary Challenges and Fisher Co-operative Structure 
After the war, the fishing community in the North is facing the major challenge of 
Indian trawlers198 poaching in their waters. The trawlers from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu 
are much more powerful and practice environmentally damaging bottom trawling. For the 
small scale fishermen on the Northern coast, the trawlers did considerable damage by also 
cutting their nets which were one of their significant assets totalling as much as a year’s 
worth of income (Scholtens et al 2012). 
 The northern fisher-folk have mobilised their communities in powerful ways to 
address these war-time and post-war challenges. Such mobilization was possible mainly due 
to the co-operative infrastructure built over the decades prior to the war. The fishing 
                                                          
198 On the three days of the week, Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays, that over one thousand Indian trawlers 
cross into the northern Sri Lankan waters the northern fishermen do not venture out to sea worrying that the 
trawlers may destroy their nets which can be over a year’s worth of income of an average fisherman. 
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community in the north is one of the few communities that has been able to dialogue with the 
fishing community in the south to raise their concerns with the state. The fisheries co-
operative leaders have also participated in talks and negotiations with the Indian trawler 
fishermen, not to mention the organized capture of dozens of Indian trawlers poaching in 
their waters in two major incidents in 2011 (Scholtens et al 2012). 
The northern fishing community, though it has received little support from the Tamil 
political leadership, is arguably the most organized community. Every fishing village has a 
co-operative society called a sangam. Then a group of villages in a region form a small 
cluster of co-operatives societies called a samasam. Finally, the clusters at the Jaffna District, 
form a co-operatives federation called the samellanam. In this way, the entire fishing 
community is democratically organised.  
 The strength of the co-operative is the society (sangam) at the village level, which 
depends on the co-operative’s organizational capacity and leadership as well as the total fish 
catch in that village. For example, in most co-operatives, about 5% of the total sales 
auctioned by the co-operative market goes to the co-operative society to pay for its 
employees and services. Therefore, if the overall catch or the prices are low, then the co-
operative will also find it hard-going. 
 There are 207 fisheries co-operative societies in the Northern Province, and they are 
all federated at the district level. Out of the Northern Province population of 1.1 million 
people an estimated 200,000 people depend on fisheries for their livelihood, with close to 
50,000 active fishermen, most of whom are members of fisheries co-operative societies. 
 
Political Challenges facing Fisher Co-operatives 
 The fishing community, mainly due to its organisational capacity through its co-
operatives, was able to change the politics of the Palk Bay fishing conflict. The political 
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difficulties they faced were complicated; Colombo did not want to antagonize New Delhi on 
an issue that was seen to only affect the northern mainly Tamil fisher-folk; and the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA), the dominant Tamil party, did not want to antagonize Tamil Nadu 
and New Delhi whose pressure on Colombo towards a political settlement was their primary 
concern. Therefore, in the case of the fisher co-operatives, their work has been as much about 
shaping politics as about addressing the day to day economic concerns.  
The fisher co-operatives have also had to face the challenges of politicization and 
patronage politics by the various ministers in successive governments. Given that the fishing 
community is seen as an electoral base, some Ministers and politicians attempt to capture that 
base by politicizing the co-operatives. However, to date, the fishing community for the most 
part has maintained its independence; changing the co-operative leadership, particularly when 
they are perceived to be aligning with political interests rather than addressing the concerns 
of the community. 
 
Sustainability of Fishing and Fisheries Co-operatives 
The more worrying concern is the continuing fall in fisheries incomes particularly 
between 2012 and 2015 due to poaching by Indian trawlers. Co-operative revenues, which 
are a share of fisheries incomes, have also been falling, whereby making it difficult to employ 
co-operative employees such as accountants, clerks and managers necessary to run the co-
operative structure. Unless there is a resolution to the devastating Palk Bay fishing conflict 
with Indian trawlers, both fisheries in Jaffna and its co-operatives may continue to 
deteriorate.  
The Fisheries Ministry is now exploring the possibility of a robust fisheries 
development plan for the North including the building of a harbour for deep sea multiday 
fishing vessels similar to those in southern Sri Lanka. If the fisher co-operatives can survive 
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their current economic woes, some of them may grow considerably if they are given the 
opportunities for deep sea fishing; considerable employment in fish processing may also 
emerge. The prospects of the fishing community and their co-operatives in the North seem 
contingent on a number of external factors at the moment; including the future of the Indian 
trawling conflict and the proposed fisheries development plans of the government. 
 
Palm Development Co-operatives 
In many villages in the North, a common sight in the early mornings or the late 
afternoons is a bare bodied toddy tapper with his sarong tied up to his thighs riding his 
bicycle to different parts of the village. He usually carries his equipment including a big 
knife, a basket and large plastic containers filled with toddy199, and is either climbing the tall 
palm trees or transporting the toddy to the taverns. Until my field research I did not know that 
these simple looking men were part of an elaborate co-operative structure making collective 
decisions about the price of toddy and the number of bottles of toddy to be tapped and sold in 
the district, and that they controlled three distilleries for the production of arrack. It is when I 
started interviewing them, both the tappers at the village level and their leaders and co-
operative employees at their co-operative unions and federation that I realized that their 
dignity and confidence had greatly benefited from the existence of the Palm Development 
Co-operatives.   
The toddy tapping community belonging to the oppressed castes and exploited and 
excluded for centuries, made some major gains in the 1970s through the formation of their 
                                                          
199 Toddy is tapped from both Palmyrah and Coconut tree shoots, and is drunk on the same day without 
processing; due to fermentation it cannot be drunk after about eight hours at which point it needs to be distilled 
into arrack. Toddy has an alcohol content of 4.5% to 6% and is mainly drunk by the farming communities in the 
villages after the work in the fields in the morning and then again in the evening. Palmyrah trees are unique to 
northern Sri Lanka, and they grow abundantly with little care. Therefore, Palmyrah toddy is the more common 
form of toddy which is tapped from January to June. The taverns provide coconut toddy as well as bottled 
Palmyrah toddy in the off season from July to December.   
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co-operative. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is only in the 1960s that anti-caste struggles 
around temple entry had created both a level of social mobilization and consciousness around 
the concerns of the oppressed castes. The left played a significant role in those anti-caste 
struggles in the North, and it is no coincidence that the left coalition government coming to 
power in 1970 contributed to the formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives. While 
co-operatives were in general promoted by the left-leaning governments from the late 1950s 
as discussed above, the formation of the Palm Development Co-operative in 1972 was a 
unique intervention by the leftist Finance Minister at that time N.M. Perera. 
The parliamentary act which created the Palm Development Co-operative provided 
for a monopoly on toddy production and sales. Mr. Chandrabose, one of the village leaders 
and himself a former Palm Development Co-operative employee, saw the changes to the sale 
of toddy to be crucial: “With the Palm Development Co-operative, the social practice of the 
tappers having to beg the upper castes to buy their toddy changed to one where everyone had 
to come to the tavern and drink orderly was a major change.”200 
The toddy tappers in rural Jaffna are organised around a tavern. In each village with a 
tavern, there are usually around ten to twenty tappers who supply toddy to the tavern. Each 
tavern is assigned a co-operative employee, who is also from the same caste community, and 
whose duties are to run the tavern. A cluster of taverns are managed by a Palm Development 
Co-operative Union, which has an office run by a General Manager, an accountant and other 
office staff, who are co-operative employees responsible for that region.201  
A typical tapper depending on his capacity, leases a number of trees often on Vellala 
land, and pays about Rs. 500 (US$ 3.85) per tree for the six month period. Toddy tapping 
requires climbing the tall Coconut or Palmyrah trees and is physically exhausting and 
                                                          
200 Inteview with Kathirgaman Chandrabose, 14 May 2014. 




dangerous work; falling from a tree can be fatal or cripple one for life. While many tappers 
continue tapping into their 50s and even 60s, they begin to slow down after the age of 40, 
either reducing the number of trees or only climbing shorter trees. On a typical day, a tapper 
begins early in the morning around 6am and climbs the trees and empties the the pot tied to 
the shoots oozing sap. Before 11am, he has to deliver the toddy thus collected to the tavern. 
The tavern is usually open from 11am to 2pm, as many of the local farmers come to drink 
toddy before their lunch. Then again the tapper has to tap the trees starting again around 3pm 
and deliver the toddy by 6pm, so that the tavern is again open from 6pm to 8pm.202 
The toddy tavern near Pathemany village for example has ten tappers attached to it. 
The average sales in the tavern in an evening is about 150 bottles, each bottle costing Rs. 75 
(US$ 0.58). There would be anywhere from 50 to 75 men who come to drink at the tavern. 
The taverns that had been mere shacks in the past are being modernized in recent years, as the 
co-operative is trying to keep its clientele from increased competition by modern bars serving 
beer and liquor. The modern taverns now consist of a cement structures with tables, chairs 
and ceiling fans. And on any day around noon or at sun down, farming men come on their 
bicycles to drink for a couple hours and socialize before they stagger back to their homes.203    
Toddy has light alcohol content of about 4.5 to 6 percent, and needs to be drunk on 
the same day before it ferments further. If the toddy is not drunk at the tavern, then the left 
over toddy from the taverns are collected and sent to the distillery run by a cluster of Palm 
Development Co-operative Unions. There are three such distilleries in Jaffna, and that is 
where arrack, much higher in alcohol content of about 32 percent, is distilled and bottled. 
Excess toddy that is not expected to be sold is also bottled and stored for the off seasons 
when toddy is not produced. 
                                                          
202 Interview with Selvarasa, General Manager, Atchuvely Palm Development Co-operative Union, 17 June 
2013. 




The Palm Development Co-operatives have a Federation at the Jaffna District level. 
The members of the Federation meet every month to decide on the price of toddy and other 
issues relating to operation of co-operatives. In addition to the production of toddy and 
arrack, the co-operatives are also involved in the production of other Palmyrah products such 
as Palmyrah jaggery (a sugar), Pathaneer (a non-alcoholic nutritious drink) and other sweets 
through small industries. The Palm Development Co-operatives have also created a 
compulsory saving and pension scheme for the tappers. They also provide accident insurance, 
other loan services and even pre-schools to the community.  
Mr. Chandrabose who eventually became a political leader in Pathemany village, 
started working for the Palm Development Co-operatives soon after they were established in 
1972. He claims the toddy tappers earned much better than the co-operative employees, 
particularly after the distilleries were built to transform toddy into arrack: 
There are people during that period, who earned well as tappers, built houses and 
educated their children and moved up because of the good incomes. When I worked 
in the Palaly branch there was a man who did not know how to sign his name, and I 
used to sign his name for him. He did so well that his two sons studied and became 
doctors.  
Despite toddy tapping being affected by displacement with the war, many of the tappers 
continued to work in their new locations and managed their livelihood. During war-time the 
Palm Development Co-operatives functioned quite well with high incomes as there was no 
import of liquor.  
Mr. Chandrabose pointed out a generational change, which is resulting in the 
reduction of the number of toddy tappers: 
The younger generation does not like tapping because of the social stigma. I know a 
man here who earned well and sent his sons abroad. Now his sons call him and tell 
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him not to tap. May be only a fifth of the number of people who used to tap are now 
tapping in our area. There are young people, children of tappers, who are not doing 
anything, they have no work and are refusing to tap. Or they go for kuli (day wage) 
work which is very irregular. 
If toddy tapping will be abandoned as Mr. Chandrabose fears, it is going to impact the social 
and economic life of the community as a whole. In reality, given the lack of other 
opportunities in Jaffna for this community and the low incomes and irregular work available 
in agriculture, the continuation of tapping may depend to a large extent on the incomes that 
can be accrued.  
The post-war change in attitudes towards tapping is not only social but also affected 
by economic factors. With road connectivity to Jaffna after the war, and integration with the 
market, the toddy tappers are facing falling demand for their produce. The expansion of the 
market for beer and arrack from the South of the country is drastically reducing the demand 
for local toddy and arrack. Not only is marketing of beer attracting the youth in particular, the 
opening of bars and liquor shops in many part of Jaffna, and the easy availability of beer and 
liquor from the South have created a tremendous challenge to the sale of local toddy and 
arrack. The arrack produced in Jaffna is also of a lower quality due to the lack of investment 
in new distilleries over the decades.204 Indeed, with diminished production and little capital 
accumulation, a range of small industries in the North including distilleries are outdated and 
find it hard to compete with products from the South and the global market. 
In Jaffna District in 2015, about 9 million bottles of toddy were produced of which 
about 6 million bottles were consumed in toddy taverns. The rest of the toddy is either bottled 
or distilled into arrack. However, not all such bottled alcohol finds a market. The tax structure 
                                                          
204 I noticed that the equipment at the Varani Distillary in southern Jaffna is very outdated, with the boiler still 
using a wood stove. Visit to Varani Distillary and discussion with engineer, Senthan on 9 September 2013. 
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of the Government increasingly depends on excise tax on alcohol. The varying levels of tax 
on toddy, arrack and beer may determine the consumption of local toddy and arrack.205  
Despite these changes and limitations, Mr. Chandrabose believes there is an 
unrealised political potential with the co-operatives: 
Politically, also such organizing by the co-operatives has potential. For example, here 
in the Kopay Division we [oppressed caste community] are a majority, if there was 
social unity we can put forward and win with a parliamentary candidate. The 
consciousness in our community is not there. At least we [his party the EPDP] do 
some work. Look, at what the Provincial Council has done, nothing, but no one will 
ask them any questions. They will come and say we are Tamils, we are going to fight 
for our Tamil rights. Then they will say you are Tamils and you should vote for the 
Tamil Arasu Katchy (Federal Party), and people will vote for them. (He laughs). 
This relationship between mainstream politics and co-operatives, particularly as a space to 
organize on class and caste lines is a complicated and difficult endeavour. The lack of 
consciousness in the community that Mr. Chandrabose discusses also relates to the power of 
Tamil nationalist ideology and discourse that he is critiquing.  
The Palm Development Co-operatives have contributed greatly to the community’s 
dignity and economic empowerment, but their political emancipation is a more complicated 
question. It was the political struggles of the oppressed caste communities in the 1960s that 
led to the formation of their co-operative. However, the ensuing decades of war, the rise of 
Tamil nationalist ideology silencing debates on caste oppression and the weakening of social 
movements with militarization, have politically weakened the interests of this community and 
their struggles for emancipation from caste oppression.  
 
                                                          
205 Discussion with General Manager of Palm Development Co-operative Federation on 21 March 2016. 
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The Life of a Toddy Tapper 
I was fortunate to meet one of the oldest practicing toddy tappers in Pathemany. Mr. 
Tharma Balasingham, 67 years. He was continuing to tap when I met him, and he was willing 
to explain the process of tapping and allow me to follow him while he worked. Mr. 
Balasingham had lived through the various changes that had shaped the toddy tappers over 
the past five decades and he narrated to me this history through his own experience.206   
I started toddy tapping when I was 18 years old with a cousin of mine. Then I got 
married and started moving from place to place. I stopped tapping when I was 24 
years old. Because I got into farming, which had increased and I found that it was 
hard to do both. When we took land for share cropping, we also had to irrigate the 
lands of the land owners, so that [the additional work for the land owners] took a lot 
of time [making it difficult to continue with toddy tapping]. 
He went on to explain the system that existed before the Palm Development Co-operatives. 
That system was called “maraweri”, which involved getting official licence to tap, but 
tapping remained under the control of the Vellala land owners who owned the trees, and 
could demand that the tappers sell them the toddy at a cheaper price. In other words, 
“maraweri” amounted to a form of share cropping but with toddy tapping. As discussed 
above, it was only with the Palm Development Co-operatives that the tapping community 
was given a monopoly on the sale of toddy through their co-operative unions and in the 
process took away the possibility of exploitation by the land owning Vellala castes. 
According to Mr. Balasingham the “maraweri” system was corrupt and exploitative. 
When I was 18 years old the co-operatives didn’t exist and so we had to sell it 
ourselves. This was “maraweri”, about five of us would get together and go inform 
                                                          
206 I interviewed him at length on 31 August 2013 and 1 September 2013 and followed him from morning to 
evening, as he went about his work and he took the time to explain the process of tapping and slowly opened up 
about his past as well. 
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the local official that we are going to tap so many trees, and so we get the licence and 
we pay the commission for the permit. In those days, we would pay the big official 
there a bribe of Rs. 100. Do you think all this works normally? (He laughs.) Even 
though we have the permit, a couple fellows [state officials who issue licences] will 
come, they will ask for two or four bottles of toddy. We give it to them, you can’t 
challenge them. Those were days when we sold toddy for first 10 cents, then 15 cents 
and then 25 cents. Those were such days. If I tap for a mudalali (a boss) in those days, 
I was paid 10 cents per bottle. I did that, I would tap 90 bottles a day.  
Mr. Balasingham like many others in Jaffna was displaced during the war for years, but was 
fortunate to find a community that accepted him and was able to tap for them during his years 
of displacement. 
In 1991 all of us including the land owners were displaced due to the war. And I lived 
in the Vanni, in Mannar, until 2001. We lived in a village deep inside the Vanni in the 
jungles, where we had to walk twelve miles from the road, in a village with sixty 
families. Those families were so united, if one person gets a headache, all sixty 
families will feel the headache. I can never forget that community, how they helped 
me. They are people who had come from plantations in the Up-Country, they told me 
they had come in the 1950s. So, I did toddy tapping for them there in the Vanni, when 
I was displaced.  
In this way, Mr. Balasingham had worked as a toddy tapper under different contexts, first 
under a system that was more or less share cropping toddy for the upper caste landowners, 
then for the palm co-operatives, then through the informal exchange of labor during his years 
of displacement during the war under conditions of a subsistence rural economy and then 
finally again after the war for the co-operatives.  
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What is remarkable about toddy tapping are the varying forms of the relations of 
production that it could be adopted to, particularly in the context of war and displacement. 
While this may also be true for other forms of rural production such as agricultural crop 
cultivation and fisheries, it is significantly different from manufacturing and industrial 
production that were for the most part disrupted during the war. Amidst the precarious 
conditions of war-time and post-war rural production, including with the possibilities of 
exploitative productive relations, the co-operatives are important for reintegrating labor into 
more egalitarian forms of production.  
 Mr. Balasingham’s work in the post-war years consisted of toddy tapping 
supplemented by agriculture. It is work that required considerable discipline. 
These days, I also do a little bit of agriculture, just about 1500 plants (quarter 
of an acre). And I tap ten trees. I wake up at 4am every morning, and because my wife 
is sickly, I sweep the house, boil the water and then wake up my wife. I then go and 
tap the trees, which I will get done by 9:30 am. It will take until, 10:30 am if I have to 
also hit the shoots, which has to be done at a certain pace. You can’t do it too hard or 
quickly, as it will ruin the shoots. Hitting the shoots is to make sure the sap will keep 
coming. In the evenings, I will go and tap at 4:30 pm and I would have handed over 
the toddy at the tavern by 6:30pm, because we don’t do other work on the trees. After 
that I will look at the farm, bring the cow in and tie it and then come home.  
In the mornings, from the ten trees I tap, I get about 15 bottles of toddy, and in 
the evenings, only about 10 bottles of toddy. People look down on us, and they say 
tapping is easy work. But they don’t realise how dangerous it is. We have to climb the 
trees, and then sometimes when we get up there, we realise that the pot which collects 
the toddy has a hole because the crows have pecked on it, and then we get nothing. 
We have to think about all these challenges.  
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Since I am old now, I only climb short [4 to 7 meter high] coconut trees. I 
climb them after having tied coconut husks on the tree so it is not as dangerous. 
Before, I also used to climb the tall trees, and then you would have seen that my arms 
and calves were bruised from hugging the trees when I climb. The marks and the 
bruises on my body used to be so visible. People could look at my arms and legs and 
right away know that I am a tree climber. 
I then asked about his current economic situation including questions about indebtedness, and 
he responded that incomes were low and the cost of living was high. But he also spoke of the 
services provided to them by the co-operatives: 
This year is economically difficult. The onion plants failed me because of crop 
disease. And I only started tapping more intensively the last few months. So, my 
incomes are just enough to meet the expenses. I don’t take loans. We don’t need that 
headache. We are eating and living. They [the leasing companies that sell all kinds of 
goods from television sets, furniture to motorcycles on monthly instalment payments] 
will show us desires and get us caught in loans. Look at it, every house is in debt, 
every house has a motorcycle. 
While indebtedness is widespread in the Jaffna, the toddy tapping community in Bharathy 
Veethy was the least indebted. The structure and the services provided by the Palm 
Development Co-operatives is the reason for the reduced levels of indebtedness of the toddy 
tapping community. 
With the co-operatives, when we end our tapping life, we write to the Federation and 
they have records of our savings. For a person who has tapped through his life, he 
probably has savings of Rs. 10 lakhs or Rs. 15 lakhs (Rs. 1 million or Rs. 1.5 million, 
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US$ 7,700 or US$ 11,500) to his name.207 There are so many advantages with the co-
operatives. They will subtract money for accident insurance, for compulsory savings, 
and another savings scheme. The compulsory saving is for retirement. The other 
savings are returned to us every three months [which can be used for family and 
festive expenses]. And we also get a pension. 
Therefore, the reason for the low levels of indebtedness of the toddy tappers has to do with 
the savings and credit schemes run by the co-operative. Unlike the banks, the co-operative 
restricts, monitors and links the loans of the toddy tappers to their savings so they do not 
reach levels of debt that are unsustainable. 
 Despite Mr. Balasingham’s loyalty to the co-operatives and his pride in his work, he 
nevertheless was sceptical about the next generation continuing toddy tapping.  
After my generation, the next generation won’t be toddy tapping. Even I don’t 
encourage youth to tap. They should get educated and find better jobs. The times have 
changed. 
This generational view may be linked to his sense of the fast changing world around him and 
the increasing emphasis placed on educational mobility of the toddy tapping community even 
by the co-operatives, which often have programs to celebrate the educational success of their 
youth.  
During the interview, my research assistant and I pressed him on the anti-caste 
struggles of the past and his involvement in them. He eventually spoke with reluctance about 
those times: 
                                                          
207 This level of retirement funds would be enough for a person to build a small house or to buy half an acre of 
land in rural Jaffna. Alternatively a fixed deposit in a bank will allow them to barely pay for their daily expenses 
through the monthly interest. For example, through the senior citizens savings scheme the Government provides 
a subsidized 15% interest on deposits up to Rs. 1 million, which amounts to Rs. 12,500 a month interest on a Rs.  
1 million deposit.  
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We were involved in all the anti-caste fights. About twelve of us youth would 
go and stand at the junction and stop the van [with Vellala passengers], and get the 
driver and cleaner out and beat them up and tie them up and send the passengers on 
another bus. We had many fights like that and only after [fights] that they started to 
respect us. We went and broke the Mukkuperni (cup given to oppressed caste people 
at tea shops) at the Atchuveli tea shops. We did everything, I won’t hide it, and we did 
show gangsterism. We threw shit at shops. We broke windows. We would fight all 
night. Now the police will try to come immediately, but then the police had to come 
from Kangesanthurai. [So they could not suppress the violent struggle.] 
The Pillaiyar temple, they locked it up, because they didn’t want our people to 
go inside, and we broke the door open. It was Atchuvely North [one of the 
neighboring villages] people who started the struggle, but it is our youth who gave 
them support. At that time there were Russia Communists and Chinese Communists 
here, so we were influenced by all of them and we were militant. There were two 
factions within us, Ponnuthurai was Russia Communist, Kathirkaman was Chinese 
Communist and I was with the Chinese Communists. 
Mr. Balasingham is explaining the role of the various leftist parties in the anti-caste struggles. 
The Communist Party had been split between the Moscow and Peking wings in the 1960s. 
The split came right down to the village level. As with others of his generation, many of them 
were mobilised and politically educated by the Communist cadres.  
In those days there were educated people. Today’s youth have studied but 
have nothing in their heads. We used to work hard. In just one night, we built our 
reading room. We cut the wood, weaved the coconut leaves and built it. Think how 
much the boys worked in just one night. We would work so hard, we would climb the 
trees like birds and cut the coconut leaves. Now we can only dream of doing things 
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like that. We used to go to the volleyball tournaments and it is both our groups that 
would win. Look now, what our youth are worth? Even the dogs won’t look at them. 
Now they just wear shirts and look at girls; that is all there is to them. I feel like 
killing them. I don’t go where the youth stand around. I can’t stand them.” 
Not only is there a major generational gap between the life of Mr. Balasingham and the youth 
today. The political memory of that generation of toddy tappers is also fading.  
Mr. Balasingham’s generation were at the centre of the struggle for their community’s 
dignity by fighting exclusion in public spaces such as temples and tea shops. Those struggles 
for dignity and the social consciousness and organizing that it created eventually contributed 
to the formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives. Yet the legacy of their struggles 
have been overshadowed by the far more brutal and devastating war which consumed almost 
the entire population with displacement, death and destruction. Recovering the struggles and 
politics of those times some four or five decades ago has become even hard for the very 
generation that ensured the social empowerment of their community.  
 
Challenges Facing Co-operatives in Jaffna Today 
Historically, in the Jaffna District, there was a range of co-operatives involved in 
various trades and different economic functions such as credit, production and marketing. 
However, the war and displacement have led to the decline of co-operatives and in many 
cases their dissolution. Co-operatives from boat transport to a vibrant network of carpentry 
unions no longer exist. As far as institutional memory and membership, however, the co-
operatives continue to have a widespread presence. There are close to 1000 and 2000 
registered co-operative societies, with total membership of 260,000 and 409,000 members, in 
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the Jaffna District and Northern Province respectively.208 The challenge is to mobilise and 
activate the members; and even if a fraction of those members become active out of the total 
population of 630,000 and 1,100,000 in the Jaffna District and Northern Province 
respectively, they will have a major impact.  
At the monthly meetings at the Co-operative Council of Jaffna District,209 the 
umbrella body of all the co-operatives, the representatives of the following co-operatives are 
usually present: 
1. Palm Development Co-operative 
2. Fisher Co-operative 
3. Multipurpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS) (mandated to co-operate various forms 
of producer and consumer societies) 
4. Livestock Co-operative 
5. Lorry Co-operative (private transport truck societies) 
6. Textile Co-operative (handloom weaving) 
7. Rural Bank Co-operative 
8. Thrift and Credit Co-operative 
The Co-operative Council is housed in the massive Veerasingham Hall, named after V. 
Veerasingham, a former principal of a school, the first president of the co-operative 
federation in Jaffna, and considered the father of co-operatives in Jaffna. Veerasingham’s 
popularity culminated in his election to parliament in 1956, where he continued his advocacy 
for co-operatives. The Veerasingham Hall, the largest auditorium in the Northern Province 
where major public events take place, is a testament to the vibrancy of co-operatives in a 
bygone era, as it was built entirely with co-operative funds. The Co-operative Council used to 
                                                          
208 Data provided by the Jaffna Co-operative Council May 2014. 
209 I have attended two of the Co-operative Council Meetings in February 2015 and January 2016. I also 
attended the annual Co-operatives Day celebration in December 2014 and I witnessed over the a thousand 
people attending the event.  
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run a co-operative school and training centre in Jaffna before the war, but both were 
destroyed during the war. At present, the Co-operative Council mainly meets its expenses 
through income from renting out the Veerasingham Hall and running a printing press. 
 The most extensive structure of co-operatives in Jaffna to this day consists of the 
MPCS, with 19 of them in each of the divisions of the Jaffna District. The MPCS as local 
federated structures manage the consumer co-operative stores and depending on the region 
organize agricultural co-operatives, rice mills, bakeries and other small industries including 
food and fruit processing plants. While some of the producer co-operatives under the MPCS 
are profitable and producing for the local market using local resources and labor, the 
consumer co-operatives, particularly co-operative stores are struggling to survive due to 
competition from the retail market. 
 
Problems facing contemporary co-operatives in Jaffna 
One of the central challenges facing co-operatives in the post-war years is the lack of 
capital: both capital investment and working capital to increase production. Many of the 
producer co-operatives that have potential to grow also face cash flow problems, having 
depleted their savings and lost assets during the war. Furthermore, banks are unwilling or 
charge high interest rates on loans making it difficult for producer co-operatives to increase 
their production and take new orders from clients. 
Such problems are compounded by the role of the state and the bureaucracy. The co-
operatives are over-regulated by the Provincial Government. The co-operative laws drafted in 
the 1970s continue and even the bylaws have not changed. Thus co-operatives are weighed 
down by the Provincial Co-operative Minister and the Commissioner, who often deny the co-
operatives the autonomy to take up new initiatives or insist on programs that do not benefit 
the co-operatives. The co-operatives are sometimes demanded to carry out awareness 
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programs by the Minister using the co-operatives own funds, eventhough such programs are 
unlikely to produce results.210 Given that the co-operatives lack political strength and 
militancy after the war, the co-operatives are easily intimidated by the bureaucracy who 
threaten them with blocking approvals for routine functions. Furthermore, the market-
oriented policy vision of the Central Government also constrains much needed material 
support and resources from the state towards rebuilding the co-operatives. There have been 
no major projects to revitalise the co-operatives through allocations in the government 
budgets. Without policies towards capital investment to upgrade co-operative production 
facilities, they cannot compete with more capital intensive production from the rest of the 
country and the global market. 
The co-operatives constantly face the danger of attack by capital on their assets and 
resources. While the Co-opertives need capital and credit, they can also be dispossessed by 
finance capital. There are pressures on co-operatives to sell or rent their assets in the form of 
prime real estate to private companies. Next, excessive liscences and concessions to large 
fishing companies for lucrative export oriented fisheries can quickly undermine the future of 
fisher co-operatives and the livelihoods of their membership.  
The post-war challenges facing the Palm Development Co-operatives are reflective of 
the new political and economic environment that cripples co-operatives more generally. 
While it was the monopoly provided by the state in the production, distribution and 
distillation of toddy that accounted for the co-operatives’ take off few decades ago, the 
situation has changed now with competition in the market from new products such as beer 
and arrack distilled in the South. The Palm Development Co-operatives are also weighed 
down by new taxes on bottling plants and distilleries, where they are forced to pay a higher 
                                                          
210 Communication with co-operative employee in January 2016. I am aware of a few initiatives including a 




tax due to relatively smaller economies of scale compared to private plants in the south of the 
country.  
Next, the co-operatives have lost much of their vibrant middle class leadership, as the 
middle classes have overwhelmingly migrated with the war to join the diaspora in Western 
countries. The political culture of violence and overt intimidation during the war has resulted 
in potential leaders avoiding public roles. In this way, strong links between educationists and 
the co-operative leadership have been severed. With the class character of the co-operative 
leadership changing, the social and informal linkages with the bureaucracy have weakened. 
Therefore, in addition to the material setbacks including the destruction and drain of 
accumulated capital, social networks that sustained co-operatives in an earlier era hardly exist 
now. The larger question is whether the vibrant contribution of co-operatives to the northern 
economy in the past can be recovered in post-war era. 
 
Argentinian co-operatives after the crisis, investment and research 
The worker co-operatives in Argentina after the severe economic crisis in 2000 is of 
relevance to the situation of co-operatives in Jaffna. In Argentina, with the tremendous 
disruption of the economy, worker co-operatives have taken over factories with the support of 
the municipal governments (Dobrusin 2013). A similar program of local government support 
to co-operatives in Jaffna and the North could go a long way in revitalising the local 
economy. In Argentina, one of the significant challenges of workers taking over bankrupt 
factories was the need for technological upgrade of backward machinery and equipment 
(Dobrusin 2013). One of the central needs of producer co-operatives in Jaffna are also such 
capital investment including in technologies that can enhance production. 
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Research to develop new products with the local resources remains a challenge for 
rural co-operative production in Jaffna. The Palmyrah Research Institute (PRI)211 in Jaffna 
developed with a grant from the Government of India in 2012 is the only technological 
research institute in the North. Palmyrah palms being one of the most important natural 
resources in the North, research and extension from PRI is contributing to upgrading the 
products of the Palm Development Co-operatives. However, there is both the need for greater 
investment in PRI and research capacity for various other forms of rural production. One of 
the reasons for Mondragon’s success in Spain is their strong research capacity to adapt to the 
changes in the market (Errasti 2003). Similarly, the once successful and extensive structure of 
co-operatives in Jaffna requires adaptation to the global consumer market, which has 
drastically changed over the last few decades when production and innovation in Jaffna was 
paralysed by the war. Such capital investment, technological advancement of local 
production and research development in Jaffna will require support from the state. 
 
Marx and the Political Economy of Co-operatives  
The co-operatives in post-war Jaffna are in a conundrum. On the one hand, they 
require a different path of social and economic revitalisation from the neoliberal trajectory of 
promoting private businesses, markets and financialization. On the other hand, the co-
opertives require support from the donor agencies and the state that are taking forward such a 
neoliberal transformation. In this section, I analyse this contemporary problem of state 
support in the neoliberal age by revisiting Marx’s engagement with co-operatives. 
                                                          
211 I have visited PRI on a number of occasions starting in August 2015, and looked at their laboratories and 
have had discussions with their manager, extension officer and researchers. Contrary to the perception in Jaffna 
that the PRI had not produced meaningful research, I am of the view that it has been doing important work in 
identifying the nutritional content and refining methods of palmyrah products. Revamping PRI could greatly 
contribute towards innovative methods and expansion of rural production in Jaffna and the Northern Province.  
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Marx found the historical emergence of producer co-operatives as a major advance for 
working class politics, particularly after the many political setbacks following the defeats of 
the uprisings in 1848. Furthermore, producer co-operatives were also theoretically important 
signifying the emancipatory possibilities of transcending capitalist productive relations. Marx 
considered the trade union movement’s advances in gaining legal recognition of the ten hour 
working day and the emergence of producer co-operatives as great victories for the working 
class movement by the early 1860s.  
Marx in his Inaugural Address of the First International in 1864 as evident from the 
epigraph greatly commended the initiation of producer co-operatives. Subsequently in 1867, 
Marx’s Instructions for the Delegates of the Geneva Congress engaged co-operatives in a 
programmatic manner. Marx rejected any formulaic creation of co-operatives and believed 
their strength was the spontaneous efforts of workers to co-operate and change productive 
relations. Marx articulated the significance of the co-operative as one based on class struggle:   
We acknowledge the cooperative movement as one of the transforming forces of the 
present society based upon class antagonism. Its great merit is to practically show, 
that the present pauperizing and despotic system of the subordination of labor to 
capital can be superseded by the republican and beneficent system of the association 
of free and equal producers (Marx 2000, 90). 
However, such co-operation had to emphasize producers and production as central to 
capitalism and hence the transformation of capitalism itself. 
 We recommend to the working men to embark in cooperative production rather than 
in cooperative stores. The latter touch but the surface of the present economical 
system, the former attacks its groundwork (Marx 2000, 90). 
As evident from my own research, it is again the producer co-operatives that engage in 
resistance to many forms of oppression. Significantly, it is also the producer co-operatives 
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that have survived the war and the attendant destruction. The consumer co-operatives, on the 
other hand, have declined with the withdrawal of support from the state and the expansion of 
the market. The producer co-operatives in the context of Jaffna also gain significance for 
their ability to empower oppressed caste communities such as the toddy tappers. Thus 
producer co-operatives challenge productive relations not only as class relations but also as 
caste relations. 
My engagement with the post-war challenges facing co-operatives and their 
relationship to working class politics should be contextualised in relation to the political 
economy of Jaffna. Trade unions in Jaffna were historically weak due to the small industrial 
production base and the independent organizing of workers has centred on co-operatives. The 
centrality of fisheries and agriculture to the Jaffna economy have also added to this emphasis 
on co-operatives over that of trade unions. The trade unions’ disintegration in Jaffna was 
linked to the destruction of the small industrial production base during the war. Furthermore, 
nationalist militarisation and repression of the left by armed actors including the LTTE, 
undermined what trade union base that existed including for example the teachers unions.  
It is in the context of such repression of independent organizing during the war years 
and the immediate post-war years that the survival of the co-operatives and their continuing 
extensive structures are of importance. However, the political limitations of co-operatives – 
including the lack of militancy and protests – and their calls for state support despite over 
regulation by the state, raises questions about their political possibilities. On the other hand, 
the weakening of co-operatives was due to tremendous loss of assets and the crippling of 
their leadership due to the war and migration, and as with most social institutions in post-war 
Jaffna, co-operatives find reconstruction difficult without external support.  
Next, productive relations in Jaffna are not only shaped by class relations but also 
caste structure further complicating the political economic questions about the workings and 
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progressive potential of co-operatives in Jaffna. From the discussion above, it should be clear 
that the contradiction between oppressed castes involved in toddy production and the upper 
castes land owners who oppress them was over-determined by a left leaning government, 
which gave the toddy tappers the monopoly on the production and sale of toddy. Such state 
aid, in this case by the state centred in Colombo and acting as an external actor, was able to 
strengthen the oppressed caste workers by working as a countervailing force against the 
Tamil elite in Jaffna. 
The history of co-operatives in Sri Lanka discussed above, including the efforts of left 
leaning governments to promote them at the national level and the eventual attack on the co-
operatives including by the usurpation of their finances held in co-operative banks towards 
commercial ends raises serious questions about the state and its relationship to co-operatives. 
While Marx commends the efforts towards co-operation, he was wary of the attack that 
eventually ensues: 
To save the industrious masses, cooperative labor ought to be developed to national 
dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means. Yet the lords of land 
and the lords of capital will always use political privileges for the defence and 
perpetuation of their economical monopolies (Marx 2000, 80). 
In Sri Lanka, liberalization starting in 1977 led to such attacks by economic monopolies on 
the co-operatives.  
 This is where Marx’s warning about the limitations of the co-operative movement in 
relation to capitalist society and state power is important.  
Restricted, however, to the dwarfish forms into which individual wage slaves can 
elaborate it by their private efforts, the cooperative system will never transform 
capitalistic society. To convert social production into one large and harmonious 
system of free and cooperative labor, general social changes are wanted, changes of 
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the general conditions of society, never to be realized save by the transfer of the 
organized forces of society, viz., the state power, from capitalists and landlords to the 
producers themselves (Marx 2000, 90). 
Thus for Marx and his revolutionary politics, the co-operatives can never transform the 
capitalist system, because it does not lead to the transfer of state power. 
 A number of years later, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme drafted in 1875, 
Marx went further in critiquing state aid for co-operatives. 
That the workers desire to establish the conditions for co-operative production on a 
social scale, and first of all on a national scale in their own country, only means that 
they are working to revolutionise the present conditions of production, and it has 
nothing in common with the foundation of co-operative societies with state aid. But as 
far as the present co-operative societies are concerned, they are value only in so far as 
they are the independent creations of the workers and not protégés either of the 
government or of the bourgeois (Marx 1875, 536). 
This strong critique of co-operatives by Marx and a shift from the more generous account of 
the co-operatives in the Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association, 
according to Karl Korsch, relates to particular politics of that historical moment. 212 By 1875, 
Marx was struggling against the reformist tendencies in the international communist 
movement.  
The problem with the war-torn society such as in Jaffna is that production itself had 
been disrupted with the war, and strategies for organising production requires the aid of the 
state. In the case of the Sri Lanka as a whole, it is the change in economic policies of the state 
from import substitution to “open economy” in 1977 that led to the decline of the co-
                                                          
212 See: Karl Korsch, Introduction to the Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1922.  
Downloaded from: https://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1922/gotha.htm  
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operatives, in the case of Jaffna, it was also other exogenous political factors including the 
tremendous disruption that came with the war that devastated the co-operatives. The fisher 
co-operatives and the northern fishing community continue to be undermined by the external 
attack by Indian trawlers poaching in the northern Sri Lankan waters. 
Given the political devastation with the war and the tremendous setbacks to working 
class politics including the elimination of the left and trade union base, co-operative forms of 
organising become important for rejuvenating radical democratic politics. Indeed, revival of a 
vibrant co-operative movement will not only have implications for working class politics as 
spaces of organising but also strengthen anti-caste politics through the strengthening of co-
operation in caste-based occupations and communities. 
Marx’s challenge remains, and co-operatives decades down the line may fall apart if 
sustained with state aid. However, the urgencies of addressing the continuing post-war 
economic crisis may require drawing on the strong co-operative tradition in Jaffna and 
coupling it with support from the state towards reconstruction of this war-torn society. In the 
post-war years, such revitalisation of co-operatives will be a platform to reverse the failed 
reconstruction policies that atomise workers and put them at the mercy of the market, private 
businesses, self-employment schemes and financialized indebtedness. Just as Marx in 1864, 
after the long defeat of the working class with the failed revolutions of 1848, was inspired by 
the efforts of co-operation, Jaffna in its post-war context may also draw from the potential of 
co-operatives, but it may require the support of the state in the form of investment, 
regulations and protections from the continuing deterioration of the rural economy and the 






Conclusion: The Co-operative Alternative 
In this concluding section, I articulate the possibilities and advantages of co-operation 
to rejuvenate the war-torn economy and consider an alternative vision of reconstruction. First, 
reconstruction requires leadership and vision, including confidence of rebuilding a war-torn 
society. The legacy and institutional memory of the vibrant history of co-operation in Jaffna 
is a powerful social asset to organise and reintegrate a war torn society. Toddy tappers, 
fishermen and farmers require social and institutional supports to strengthen their productive 
activities after a war. The co-operatives are effective institutions for providing such support 
including meaningful credit where necessary, without pushing workers into the debt trap as 
with banks and financial institutions.  
Next, co-operatives are capable of pooling labor resources and facilitating the 
participation of fractured communities towards production. One of the central challenges of 
reconstruction in the war-torn North is to rejuvenate production and employment, and create 
a virtuous cycle with the re-investment of accumulation from such production in the local and 
still rural economy. Here, the advantage of co-operative production and accumulation is that 
any profits accruing to the co-operatives will be either shared by the broad membership or re-
invested in the local economy. This is not the case with the Colombo-based companies and 
multi-national corporations, whose profits are siphoned out to Colombo and other capitals.  
In the current context, co-operatives in Jaffna can draw from ideas about new 
generation co-operatives and producer companies that are attempting to address the 
challenges of markets in India (Singh 2008). Given the constraints facing co-operatives in 
Jaffna of raising capital and marketing arrangements for their produce on the one hand and 
over regulation and interference by local officials on the other hand, new generation of co-
operatives such as the producer companies in India that are set up with producers in control 
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of the companies and one member one vote for major decisions, are new ideas that co-
operatives in Jaffna should explore. 
 While the reconstruction of the war-torn economy can draw from the revitalisation of 
co-operatives, the realization of such a vision is dependent on political conditions including 
state policies and the Tamil political leadership. Tamil politics has focused on trying to 
achieve devolved powers through a constitutional political solution. Ironically, the co-
operatives are a devolved subject, which means the powers of regulating and developing the 
co-operatives reside with the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) led by the Tamil nationalist 
leadership. However, the TNA has done little during its three years leading the NPC, starting 
in September 2013 to address the concerns of the co-operatives. The economic policy 
trajectory of the Central Government focused on promoting private business and disregarding 
co-operatives and the rural sectors is also a major obstacle. The prospects of both the 
Northern Provincial Council awakening from its indifference to economic issues and the 
Central Government making a drastic change in policies of reconstruction are rather bleak. 
 In this context, co-operatives in post-war Jaffna can draw on the politics of co-
operatives in post-conflict and neoliberal Nicaragua after the Sandinistas lost power in 
1990.213 The co-operatives in Nicaragua adopted multiple strategies of economic and political 
proportions, both organizing horizontally for broader militant struggles to guard the land of 
agricultural co-operatives as well as second and third tier structures to provide services 
including credit and sustain primary co-operative societies. Given the strong neoliberal 
                                                          
213The survival of co-operatives in Nicaragua after an initial phase of tremendous state support followed by the 
attack of a neoliberal regime is something to consider: “The analysis of post-conflict reconciliation and 
development in Nicaragua shows that ‘peace’ in the context of neoliberalization came at the cost of a deep 
socioeconomic crisis, manifested in large-scale unemployment, dispossession, and the renewal and dispersion of 
armed conflict. … As regards cooperatives, they were subject to numerous pressures and constraints which 
provoked a contradictory response. On the one hand, many were disabled and disbanded; on the other, both 
producers and workers engaged in various forms of collective action and social innovation, involving 
associative and enterprise practices, not only as a coping strategy but as a route to economic and political 
empowerment. The upshot of these developments was that the cooperative sector acted as a partial brake on 
neoliberal restructuring” (Utting et al. 2014). 
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policies in Sri Lanka and the lack of concern on the part of Tamil nationalist politics, co-
operatives in Jaffna and the Northern Province more broadly may also have to adopt such 
strategies. They will have to activate their broad base into militant struggles against the new 
forms of market-led and financialized dispossession and indebtedness, by using the newly 
opened democratic space after regime change. They should also insist on and seek to create a 
market for locally produced goods for their survival. The survival of the co-operatives and 
addressing the failure of reconstruction seven years after the war is increasingly now a 










 The changes in Sri Lanka, between 2008 and 2016 have been extraordinary. In mid-
2008, it was hardly imaginable that the long and protracted war in Sri Lanka would come to 
an end in the near future. By late 2008, the LTTE, once considered one of the most ruthless 
and invincible armed movements in the world, was on the retreat, holding the civilian 
population as human shields even as the Sri Lankan Security Forces mercilessly bombed and 
shelled the rebel territory with tremendous fire power. The catastrophic end to the civil war 
came in May 2009, with tens of thousands of civilians killed and the leadership of the LTTE 
decimated.  
The end of the war raised the humanitarian predicament of the devastated population 
as well as longer-tem concerns of resettlement of the displaced people and reconstruction of 
the war-torn regions. It was also a major shift in politics for a country and its people 
priortising security and survival amidst decades of protracted war. In this context, the 
euphoric regime in power focused on its own political consolidation with a major economic 
development push and continued militarization.  
From May 2009, I visited the war-torn regions frequently, and then moved back in 
May 2012 to Jaffna for my field work. These were years when the authoritarian Rajapaksa 
regime seemed invincible and people in the North in particular were under constant 
surveillance, where public meetings could not be held without permission from the military 
and people even feared to speak in small groups. In September 2013, under considerable 
international pressure, elections for the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) were held after a 
twenty-five year hiatus. The NPC led by the Tamil nationalists lacks a vision for 
reconstruction and has done little to strengthen Tamil society.   
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Soon after the completion of my field work, in a major political shift in January 2015, 
the Rajapaksa regime was thrown out of power by a coalition of forces including the Tamil 
and Muslim constituencies. Regime change offered hopes of a constitutional solution to the 
grievances of minorities, new initiatives towards post-war reconciliation and a fresh approach 
to reconstruction and development. A year and a half after regime change, while the 
democratic space opened up for discussions and protests, there is little change in the approach 
to and conditions of the economic crisis facing the war-torn people. 
I provide this brief sketch of major developments to point to the tremendous political 
upheavals in Sri Lanka, and particularly the North, with the end of the war and the post-war 
years. I am conscious of this period as a time compressed with various social, economic and 
political imperatives that inevitably shape my scholarly study. Many countries after 
protracted armed conflicts, situations on the scale of uprisings and revolutions or return to 
civilian rule after decades of military dictatorships, go through such periods of turmoil 
creating unique challenges for political economic analysis. 
 While analysing political economic developments during such a period is inevitably a 
difficult endeavour, in the course of these years, I have also found that working under such 
conditions provides new insights. In other words, the workings of some social and economic 
processes are revealed during such periods of flux, which may be hidden or not as apparent 
during analysis of the long durée. Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte is 
characteristic of such analysis; where Marx is able to capture a variety of social dynamics 
including those of regime consolidation, the various factions within classes and how 
economic structures built over time interact with political and economic processes in a time 
of change (Cowling and Martin 2002). 
While the social devastation that is prevalent during the time of war is readily 
understood, the times of change following the protracted war, can also cause tremendous 
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suffering during a short period of time. However, exploitation and dispossession with 
problematic policies of resettlement and market integration are hidden when such a period is 
conceptualised as a time of “transition”. While the discourse of transition is prescriptive in 
pushing for a market oriented economy, it is promoted as descriptive concept.214 In this 
conclusion I want to raise some questions about the power of a concept such as transition, its 
relationship to concepts such as accumulation, dispossession and social exclusion in analysis 
of “post-conflict” societies.  
The other set of challenges of analysis relate to the spatial changes during the decades 
of war and the post-war years. The tremendous bouts of displacement, the formation of a 
diaspora, the resettlement after the war, the temporary migration of labor to the Middle East 
and the flows of funds such as remittances have created new dynamics in society. During the 
decades of war, Jaffna and the war-torn regions were isolated from the “open economy” 
policies and integration with the global economy transforming the rest of Sri Lanka. The 
rapid re-integration with the market in the post-war years and increasing flows of people, 
goods and capital in and out of the war-torn North have also contributed to the above 
mentioned new forms of accumulation, dispossession and social exclusion.  
In this context, a silence prevails about the failure of reconstruction. This silence in 
scholarly work, in policy discourse and in the mainstream media about the economic crisis 
and widespread indebtedness in the war-torn regions is in stark contrast to the international 
attention on the challenges of a constitutional solution, transitional justice and war-time 
accountability in Sri Lanka. Indeed, contemporary international discourses relating to post-
conflict societies ignore concerns relating for example to rural dispossession. The clamour of 
Tamil nationalist demands for international intervention, including to address war crimes, 
                                                          
214 Nicolas Guilhot’s genealogy of the concept of transition is instructive. He claims that in various intellectual 
traditions and research programmes, transition has emerged as either a social ontology or a social technology. 
He further claims the “former is usually associated with macro-sociological paradigms, while the latter tends to 
codify and rationalize political practices.” (Guilhot 2002) 
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suppresses discussion of the travails of the war-torn people. The vision and policies on 
reconstruction, first under the authoritarian Rajapaksa regime and then under a liberal 
democratic regime, as challenges of building infrastructure and expanding credit effectively 
silences the concerns of the rural population even as they are increasingly trapped into cycles 
of debt and dispossession.  
The caste structure is the principal historical source of social exclusion in Jaffna 
society. War-time dispossession and its aftermath have created new and more subtle forms of 
caste exclusion. The subtle segregation in schools and the large invesments in caste-based 
temples provide an institutional base for strengthening caste relations. The organisational 
weakness of oppressed caste community centers and the absence of an anti-caste movement 
have muted the social and political voice necessary for resistance against caste oppression in 
the countryside. Tamil nationalist discourse continues to silence discussion of caste even as 
the Tamil bureaucracy through its day to day workings contributes to caste exclusion. 
Finally, such temporal and spatial changes and the overwhelming silence on the 
economic crisis and persistence of caste relations, create major intellectual challenges for 
thinking about alternatives. I critique the failure of reconstruction in post-war Jaffna by 
contrasting those policies with the historical workings of the co-operatives and the alternative 
vision they embody. What are the possibilities of such alternatives and how do they relate to 
neoliberal globalisation with deepening financialisation? How do different paths of 
reconstruction interact with caste relations and its subtle changes, and what are the impacts of 
migration, remittances and economic changes removed from landed productive relations on 
caste oppression? How do institutions such as co-operatives, which attempt to reduce the 
dispossession inherent to the expansion of the market, function after decades of disruption 
and under the now prevalent market-oriented policies? In this context, the historical moment 
is one that could be characterised as a crisis for neoliberal globalisation, particularly with the 
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Great Recession of 2008,215 and this may be an opportune moment to begin thinking about 
alternatives from the periphery including from the perspective of war-torn societies. 
 
Transitions and Temporal Dynamics 
The concept of transition is often deployed in the discourse on “post-conflict” 
societies (Del Castillo 2001, Collier 2009). Indeed, many argue either explicitly or implicitly 
that what is going on in the North is a transition to a market economy and that this process is 
set on the path of economic development.216 However, I argue that reconstruction policies in 
Jaffna are leading to new forms dispossession and social exclusion.  
In earlier scholarship on Sri Lanka, Newton Gunasinghe critiqued the singular 
narrative of agrarian change, as a transition towards capitalist development, by analysing the 
variations within agrarian systems and the contingent factors that lead to specific trajectories 
(Gunasinghe 1985). More recently in the context of India, Kalyan Sanyal has made the 
important point that neither the emergence of capitalism with primitive accumulation nor 
capitalist growth necessarily leads to a process of transition to an economy centred on capital. 
Rather a process of exclusion from capital is also possible, particularly in postcolonial 
societies. In such cases, an informal sector and economies for subsistence removed from 
capital can emerge (Sanyal 2009). Both these critiques are relevant for analysis of 
contemporary Jaffna. There is no single transitional trajectory for the post-war rural 
economy. Furthermore, the current context in Jaffna could be one of exclusion for sections of 
society from both capital and the state; particularly with the absence of local employment 
from capitalist production and the abandoning of marginalised communities by the state and 
its services.   
                                                          
215 In June 2016, three researchers from the IMF itself have questioned some aspects of the earlier neoliberal 
policy package of increasing capital market integration (Ostray 2016). 
216 Despite the sustained critique of the concept of development (Edelman and Haugerud 2007, Sanyal 2007), in 
most countries including Sri Lanka, the concept has tremendous power. 
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One starting point for a critique of post-conflict transition is the importance of 
historical specificity. The colonial legacy, the disruptive civil war, vulnerability of Sri 
Lanka’s economy to global economic forces and neoliberal processes such as financialization 
shape the path of post-war reconstruction in Jaffna and the war-torn regions. Furthermore, the 
post-war period is not a complete break from war-time or the pre-war period. Rather there are 
continuities in the social structure including productive and social relations, which even if 
disrupted for long periods of time may be recovered or consolidated after the war-time 
disruption. In this context, post-conflict reconstruction policies by the state with the support 
of international donor agencies often impose a model that disregards the local social 
structures and dynamics, as if it is a blank sheet after war-time destruction to be reconstructed 
with an economic blue print. In Sri Lanka, such reconstruction policies are an intensified 
extension of the policies of financialization and infrastructure buildout being carried out in 
the rest of the country.  
The discourse of transition also disregards historical conjunctures and the contingent 
factors that shape societies even after the sudden end of protracted armed conflicts. The post-
war years starting in May 2009, I argue were characterised by a second wave of neoliberalism 
in Sri Lanka, particularly with post-war stability including the emergence of an authoritarian 
regime and the influx of global capital into the emerging markets with the Great Recession of 
2008. The sudden integration of war-torn Jaffna into such accelerating financialization had a 
tremendous impact on society, particularly through increased indebtedness as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Contrary to the claim that this is merely a transition period that will 
eventually lead to economic development to the benefit of much of the war-torn society, 
economic processes unleashed by global economic changes and related policies at the 
national level have resulted in dynamics of dispossession and social exclusion, which are 
going to be hard to reverse and in any event have already had a tremendous impact on the 
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war-torn communities. Therefore, the discourse on transition often ignores the broader global 
economic changes and forces which overwhelm efforts to revive war-torn societies at the 
local level. 
I critique the long durée assumptions of the discourse of transitions by 
conceptualising the dynamics during a period of flux. I argue that social and economic 
developmnts in post-war Jaffna reveals hidden processes of debt creation that may not be 
evident over the long durée. Furthermore, an analysis of the dynamic relationship between 
financial flows, indebtedness and the changes to labor reveals new circuits of accumulation. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, rural debt during periods of rapid financialization can be 
hidden. Household debts are cascaded, where bank debts are leveraged for leased hire 
purchasing of vehicles or housing debt, which in turn can lead to the pawning of gold 
jewellery for monthly payments on previous loans. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, gold 
jewellery the primary liquid asset of the rural population which survived the war, has been 
considerably depleted in the post-war years with the expansion of credit and a market for 
pawning with the tremendous rise in global gold prices between 2009 and 2011. In this way, 
such cascaded debts don’t immediately reveal the draining of household assets and the level 
of debt, which require an analysis of the changes to stocks rather than flows of assets and 
debts. Data for such analysis of the changes to the stock of wealth and debt is difficult to 
come by. Given the hidden character of such cascaded debts, it is difficult to raise concerns 
about the need for policies to counter such processes of indebtedness, until well after the 
onset of a crisis, which may have done considerable damage, and hard to reverse.  
The new circuit of accumulation that became apparent in my study, as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and 3, is linked to this period of flux in the post-war years. Sri Lanka’s greater 
integration after the war with the global capital markets led to deepening financialization. The 
state encouraged banks to float euro and dollar bonds and capitalised on the increased flows 
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of global finance capital in the form of sovereign bonds to expand credit in the entire country 
and disproportionately higher levels in the war-torn regions. This expansion of credit, 
augmented by pawning, lease hire purchasing and micro-finance loans, led to indebtedness in 
the war-torn regions resulting in increased out migration of labor to the Middle East. The 
remittances from such migrant workers in part is used to pay back the debt to banks and 
finance companies, which in turn had to pay back their liabilities to global finance capital. 
Financialization driving such a new circuit of accumulation is not just the expansion of 
finance and the proliferation of loan instruments. It is also a structural shift in the workings of 
finance in rural society, with rural households becoming deeply enmeshed in the formal 
financial sector of banks and finance companies and increasingly connected to the global 
financial system. Thus this form of financialization that accelerates after a society has been 
economically uprooted by war requires a systemic analysis as opposed to analysis of a single 
financial instrument and its working in a rural economy, for example like the proliferation of 
microfinance schemes in rural societies. This new circuit of accumulation may not be 
sustained for long periods of time, but it has considerable impact on local society by 
displacing labor, particularly as migrant labor to work in the Middle East. 
My critique of the concept of transition has two analytical implications relating to the 
political economy of post-war societies. First, in assuming a progressive directionality after 
the war, the concept of transition disregards new forms disruption and dislocation in the rural 
economy after a war. That is the concept of transition legitimizes the falling incomes and lack 
of employment and livelihoods to be some form of post-war adjustment to a market 
economy, rather than as structural changes with dispossession leading to exclusion. Second, 
in critiquing transition with its long durée assumptions, I find that dispossessing dynamics of 
processes such as indebtedness due to recent post-war reconstruction policies may be 
wrongly attributed to the long-term impact of war. In other words, the increased levels of 
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indebtedness are blamed on the war and its devastation, but in fact they are due to the post-
war reconstruction polices including deepening financialzsation. In this context, economic 
anthropological inquiry through deeper analysis of the periods of flux, provides a critique of 
the concept of “transition” as well as new insights and possibilities of addressing the 
challenges facing post-war societies.  
 
Spatial Relations and Caste Exclusion 
 The war in addition to the loss and maiming of lives, the destruction of assets and the 
disruption of production, also involved tremendous displacement. Such displacement 
involved both permanent emigration to form a Tamil diaspora in the West and internal 
displacement with return to their villages after years and sometimes decades of living in other 
regions. Such spatial movement of people had a considerable impact on social structure, 
particularly caste relations. People belonging to various castes were uprooted from village 
life embedded in caste quarters and proximity to caste-linked social institutions such as 
temples, community centres and schools. Furthermore, there were major changes to the 
demographic composition of caste communities, with a considerable section of the dominant 
Vellala caste migrating out of the country to form the diaspora. In this context, the return to 
land, both the dwellings in the caste quarters and for agriculture with the renewal of landed 
caste relations, necessarily raised questions about the persistence and strengthening of caste 
relations that were disrupted by the war. I argue that caste relations and its related oppression 
do not end with displacement, rather, it requires a political movement towards the 
annihilation of caste relations and emancipation of oppressed caste communities. This has 
been both the experience in Jaffna in the 1960s and the experience of the Dalit movement 
over the last many decades in India. 
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The reliance on land is weakening due to the falling incomes in agriculture relative to 
household expenditure and more generally the rural economic crisis in Jaffna. The changes to 
landed productive relations are reducing the direct power of the Vellala caste over the 
oppressed castes, as they employ less of oppressed caste labor on their land. On the other 
hand, the oppressed caste community are being pushed further into pauperization, thus further 
weakening their ability to organise themselves as they had done for example during the years 
of the cash crop boom in the 1960s and the 1970s.  
The failure of reconstruction with falling incomes and rising indebtedness have led to 
further economic and social exclusion of the oppressed caste communities. Amartya Sen 
makes a distinction between active and passive forms of social exclusion (Sen 2000), which 
are relevant for my research. Active exclusion relates to the ways in which oppressed caste 
communities have been historically denied access to temples and schools discussed in 
Chapter 4. On the other hand, passive forms of exclusion can be understood as the 
consequence of the failure of reconstruction whereby the economic consequences of lack of 
employment and poverty lead to further exclusion, without it being identified as such. I 
would argue that the subtle forms of caste exclusion prevalent in Jaffna are characteristic of 
the passive forms, and are different from the more overt and coercive exclusion in India 
characteristic of the active forms.  
Next such social exclusion is also different from exploitation; a system could be 
inclusive but exploitative (Sen 2000). For example with class exploitation, the worker is part 
of a system where his labor is exploited by the capitalist. While caste relations are also 
exploitative as with oppressed caste labor in agriculture and services provided by the 
oppressed caste community in rural social life, it also has the other social dynamic of 
exclusion from social life itself including the economic system. Even as agricultural work 
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declines, people by virtue of their caste designation are also excluded from the other forms of 
employment that survive in the countryside, namely government and private sector jobs.  
One of the few options available for the oppressed caste community in contemporary 
Jaffna suffering from such social exclusion, is outmigration for work in the Middle East. The 
remittances of oppressed caste migrant labor do not necessarily strengthen the oppressed 
caste community, as remittances typically go toward meeting day to day expenses and 
payment of debts, rather than savings that could be invested including in the rural economy. 
Furthermore, such migrant labor is inherently temporary and add to the exclusion of such 
migrant workers from the local economy, because they lose their footing in the local labor 
market. 
While caste relations were disturbed by war-time displacement, in the post-war 
context, there is a resurgence, albeit subtle forms of social exclusion as evident from the 
increasing segregation in social institutions such as temples, schools and work places. The 
absorption of wealth in the expansion and refurbishing of temples reflects strengthening of 
caste relations through the assertion of a form of social power and pride reflected in caste 
communities belonging to specific temples. The politics of such social power draws on the 
remittances from the West, which is also constituted disproportionately, with much of the 
remittances towards rebuilding of temples and to a lesser extent special facilities for schools 
coming from the Vellala caste dominant in the demography of the Tamil diaspora. Next, caste 
relations are also strengthening in schools where there is a subtle segregation of oppressed 
caste children in rural schools as discussed in Chapter 4.  
There have been incidents of discrimination in employment and promotions in the 
state sector in Jaffna. While there is perhaps even more prevalent exclusion in the private 
sector, it has not come to light, due to the absence of mechanisms of redress or a system to 
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challenge such discriminatory hiring practices in the private sector. The silence on caste 
relations in the public domain is an important reason for such unchecked discrimination.  
Such social exclusion along caste lines is not challenged due to the absence of a 
movement to confront caste oppression. War-time nationalist mobilisation and politics as 
well as post-war militarised repression has stymied anti-caste agitation. In the post-war 
context, the heavy military and intelligence presence suspects and discourages any form of 
organising and even discussion of any possible movement; such is the singular security 
objective of repressing any kind of independent organizing, instituted by the Rajapaksa 
regime in the war-torn regions. The Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centers), once the 
organizing core at the village level of anti-caste struggles are now weaker due to both the 
deterioration of rural social life and the lack of a political movement to galvanise such social 
institutions. Solidarities among oppressed caste communities in different villages 
considerably weakened with the decline of the Communist Party, which once had a strong 
oppressed caste base in Jaffna. 
Tamil nationalist politics continues to press an exclusively ethnic agenda, and with 
military repression in check following regime change in January 2015, there are more overt 
mobilisations with a separatist agenda. Furthermore, the loud and powerful Tamil nationalist 
forces effectively silence any discussion about caste oppression, particularly by shaping the 
discourse in the Tamil media, other popular forums and even the local academic scene. The 
representations towards a new Constitution in early 2016,217 led to a few groups raising caste 
issues in Jaffna. However, the middle class opinion makers including journalists have 
succeeded thus far in silencing caste in popular discourse. 
                                                          
217 The Prime Minister appointed a Public Representations Committee to support efforts to draft a new 
Constitution towards addressing the grievances of the minorities. The sittings of the Committee in every District 
led to interesting and varied submissions. In Jaffna, the representations included a few submissions on caste 
relations (Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform 2016). 
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 As discussed in Chapter 4, caste relations in Jaffna were historically unique in South 
Asia due to the fact that a single upper caste, the Vellala caste, constitute a numerical 
majority. The overwhelming power of the Vellala caste provided little room for resistance. In 
this context, the anti-caste struggles of the late 1960s were characteristic of an exceptional 
historical moment. Those anti-caste struggles emerged out of the conjuncture of a rural 
economic boom strengthening the oppressed caste landless labor, an effervescence of 
oppressed caste consciousness including increasing literacy and oppressed caste writers, and 
decades of build-up of diverse anti-caste trends gaining militancy under the leadership of the 
Communist Party. The momentum gained in the late 1960s and the 1970s including the social 
base of the Communist Party and local social institutions such as the Sana Samuha Nilyam, 
were marginalised with the ascendancy of Tamil nationalist mobilisations, repression of 
social struggles and dissent and eventually the civil war and mass displacement.  
Next, as discussed in Chapter 3, neoliberal policies – where individuals are expected 
to fend for their livelihoods and address their debts in a monetised and financialized rural 
economy – are seeking to atomise individuals and weakening the possibilities of collective 
forms of organizing and work. Therefore, earlier solidarities constituted by the vibrancy of 
village institutions such as community centres and co-operatives have eroded with state and 
NGO programs that engage directly with individuals rather than community organizations.   
The politics of caste has taken a very different trajectory in war-time and post-war 
Jaffna compared to developments in India. Caste politics in India is characterized by caste-
based political parties and vibrant debates on caste relations and tremendous struggles that 
have shaped political alliances in India. Furthermore, official state policies are addressing 
caste discrimination including through affirmative action policies called reservation (Omvedt 
1991).  In India, a caste-based census was carried out in 2011, whereas in Jaffna even talking 
about caste is taboo. In an important article by Sonalde Desai and Amaresh Dubey based on a 
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survey of over 40,000 households in India in 2005, have come to some very important 
conclusions that are relevant for understanding the differences and persistence of caste in 
contemporary Jaffna (Desai 2012). In India caste is significant in political and civic 
participation, however, as discussed above, this is not the case in Jaffna. However, as in 
India, caste differences in Jaffna have a significant impact on capacities such as educational 
levels and out comes such as earned incomes. The new forms of caste exclusion in Jaffna, 
which as in India are less about untouchability, but nevertheless different in its contemporary 
dynamics, may contribute to analysis of caste relations in South Asia. 
The unique dynamics of caste relations in contemporary Jaffna are its subtle 
character. Caste atrocities, which are common in India, have for the most part been subdued 
in Jaffna, perhaps in part due to the widespread military presence that deters any kind of 
violence. The discourse of caste relations in Jaffna, as put forward by upper caste academics 
can best be characterised as a “culturalization” discourse, borrowing from Balmurli 
Natrajan’s work in India (Natrajan 2011). This discourse claims caste is merely a difference 
in identity and has been defanged of its oppressive and exclusionary character. Indeed, the 
culturalization discourse of caste in Jaffna removes it from its material and political questions 
and limits it to the realm of cultural differences that will fade with time. Therefore, even as 
caste relations strengthen, there is a call from the Vellalar opinion makers to silence 
discussions on caste. They claim caste oppression is in fact weakening and any incidents of 
caste discrimination are merely abberations.    
It is difficult to conclusively say if anti-caste consciousness and a movement may 
come forth in the near future. For now, I would argue the subtle character of caste oppression 
in Jaffna, the lack of caste atrocities and the silence of any discussion of caste, are unique 
characteristics of the persistence of caste in Jaffna. It will be even more difficult to find such 
a unique caste-ridden society that has also gone through a protracted armed conflict for 
299 
 
comparative analysis. However, the broader impact of armed conflict, the complex 
interaction of ethnic and caste relations, the silencing of social contradictions versus the 
resurgence of mobilisations and armed conflicts may gain insights from comparative studies 
of armed conflicts in South Asia and particularly places like Nepal.218  
 
Critiquing the Present through the History of Co-operatives 
 An alternative path of reconstruction for Jaffna could have been considered. However, 
neither the Rajapaksa regime, nor the international donors, nor even the Tamil political 
leadership considered such possibilities. Reconstruction policies focused on the building of 
infrastructure, expansion of credit and promotion of the market to bring in private business 
have failed to improve the standard of living of the rural people in Jaffna. Rather, there 
should have been greater efforts to rebuild local institutions and investment in the rural 
economy, particularly in agriculture and fisheries. I have drawn on the history of co-
operatives to critique the political economy of Jaffna after the civil war. The progressive 
vision of cooperation did not weaken merely because of the protracted war, but due to a 
conscious global project of promoting markets that determines policies and analysis of 
economic development in post-war Sri Lanka.  
 One argument commonly made against most efforts towards a planned or for that 
matter a co-operative vision of economic revitalisation is that the Sri Lankan economy with 
its earlier emphasis on import substitution has now changed with globalization, and that such 
efforts at planning will not work in contemporary Sri Lanka (World Bank 2015). With the 
                                                          
218 The developments in Nepal in the late 2000s following the end of the protracted Maoist insurgency, with the 
uprisings in the Terai by the Madeshi community, who due to ethnic grievances complicated the politics in 
Nepal are a case in point. While any comparison is beyond the purview of this dissertation, a future comparative 
study of post-conflict Nepal with Sri Lanka may provide some insights about the challenges of reconstruction 
and avenues of addressing ethnic and caste grievances. In Nepal, such ethnic differences led to overt 
mobilisations after the protracted armed conflict, where as in Sri Lanka, it has led to the silencing of differences 
within the Tamil community (Miklian 2009). 
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exception of the Japanese Government sponsored report on reconstruction for Jaffna (JICA 
2011), there is for the most part silence on the role of the co-operatives by the donors and the 
local policy makers. In fact, USAID provides subsidies for private businesses starting up in 
Jaffna and the North, but has not provided any assistance to co-operatives. The World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank have also completely failed to support the rejuvenation of co-
operatives, and continue to insist on Public Private Partnerships with the emphasis on the 
promotion of private businesses (World Bank 2016). The economic model of the donors and 
think tanks calls for the further opening of the Sri Lankan economy to trade and increase 
business confidence to invite Foreign Direct Investments towards export-led growth. The 
proponents of this private sector-led model have little interest in the co-operative forms of 
rural production and distribution that is mainly for domestic consumption.  
For my dissertation research, I was working within the limits of a regional economy, 
particularly war-torn Jaffna and to some extent the Northern Province, and therefore the 
larger economic policy challenges for Sri Lanka as a whole are beyond the scope of this 
discussion. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the problems and challenges with the 
reconstruction of the war-torn districts are related to the larger economic development vision 
in the country. The co-operative alternative requires state support which is not forthcoming, 
but could make a major difference in the dignity of workers and equality in this post-war 
caste-ridden society.219 However, I fully realise that the co-operative alternative is only one 
important element of reconstruction, and that alone is limited without a major shift in Sri 
Lanka’s neoliberal development trajectory. 
The co-operative movement in Jaffna not only drew ideas about co-operation from 
around the world but also took advantage of international factors in their development during 
                                                          
219 In many parts of the world co-operatives are more egalitarian institutions with greater control of management 
by the workers and much less pay differences between workers and managers (Blim 2004). 
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the late colonial period. Thus the co-operative movement was not parochial and was always 
open to global changes. The co-operative movement drew on international experience that 
included study missions from Jaffna to England and Japan to learn about the workings of co-
operatives. Furthermore, co-operatives in Jaffna drew on the social capital of Tamil 
pensioners who had returned after employment in South East Asia under British colonial rule. 
Such pensioners had a regular income and educational background allowing them to devote 
time and energy to develop co-operatives. The Jaffna Malayalam Tobacco Cooperative Sales 
Society created the infrastructure for exporting to India and the fisheries co-operatives at a 
later date resorted to exporting sea food to an international market. Finally, it is confidence 
gained from the co-operative movement and an openness towards experimentation that 
pioneered the Moolai Co-operative Hospital in Jaffna in the 1930s, one of the first of its kind 
in Asia. In this way, the co-operative movement in Jaffna from its inception drew on 
international ideas and experience. Therefore, the question then is about the kind of global 
integration and the forms of economic institutions that it creates.  
The other argument put forward is that there is no way out of financialization, as 
credit is important for any form of reconstruction. I argue that financialization in its 
contemporary manifestation as discussed in Chapter 2 is characteristic of neoliberal 
globalization with exploitative expansion of finance resulting in social harm in the form 
indebtedness. Furthermore, credit comes in different forms and should be differentiated from 
financialization (Fine 2013). Indeed, even at the inception of co-operatives a century ago, the 
question of credit and indebtedness of the farmers was central to the colonial government’s 
policies of initiating co-operatives. Significantly, the first co-operatives in Jaffna and Sri 
Lanka more broadly, were formed mainly to address the problem of credit and to resist the 
exploitation of the rural communities by money lenders. The efforts at co-operative banking 
eventually led to a bottom up process culminating in the federation of rural banks in the 
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North, which were able to ensure the availability of credit and also in the process ensure 
growth of production and employment through the expansion of co-operatives. 
In the post-war years starting in 2009, the formal financial institutions, including 
finance companies involved in lease hire purchasing and micro credit institutions, have 
become predatory lenders. In Chapter 3, I discussed the high interest rates and the 
unsustainable levels of debt. Furthermore, I argued that the financial institutions while 
recognising the rural economic crisis are merely competing with each other to make a quick 
profit. A century ago, the state supported the formation of producer co-operatives and 
cooperative banks to free people in the countryside from exploitation by money lenders and 
small traders charging high interest on purchases. I argue, that a reversal of exploitative 
financialization in the rural economy today can draw from the extensive network of rural 
banks run by co-operatives.220 In Chapter 3, the low levels of indebtedness among the toddy 
tapping community was analysed as a consequence of their loans mainly coming from co-
operative rural banks linked to the palm development co-operatives, as opposed to those who 
relied on private banks and financial institutions. There is considerable difference in both the 
level of debt and the interest rates paid to co-operative rural banks compared to the private 
financial sector. Co-operative banks with state assistance can provide credit and lessen the 
financialized dispossession currently at work in Jaffna, provided there are clear policies of 
reversing financialization including ending problematic financial mechanisms such as lease 
hire purchasing and micro-finance schemes. In fact, in June 2016 the Jaffna District 
                                                          
220 In conflict-ridden Asam in India, in the decade following liberalization, informal loans increased while co-
operative loans decreased (Purkaystha 2001). This could also be the case in places like Jaffna that after the surge 
of formal sector loans and their default, rural debt could again be captured in the future by money lenders. Thus 




Federation of Women’s Societies took a decision to campaign for a ban on lease hire 
purchasing and microfinance schemes in the Jaffna District.221 
The co-operative vision drew on the strong foundation of education coupled with the 
collective and democratic participation for economic empowerment. Co-operatives like 
educational institutions and Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centers) were social 
institutions that strengthened social resilience, and which I argue provided considerable 
support for the survival of northern society during the war. I would further argue that the 
cooperatives have considerable potential in the post-war era. Co-operative production and 
distribution coupled with state support attenuates the fluctuations and ravages of the market, 
even if they cannot completely control the crisis prone character of the market in a capitalist 
economy or remedy all of the woes that have emerged since the war. The co-operatives can 
contribute to empowering exploited communities and valorise their dignity, particularly 
important for oppressed caste communities such as toddy tappers and landless laborers who 
face the double attack of market forces and oppression of local caste structure. 222 
The Sri Lankan state in the past not only supported co-operatives, it also supported 
important social welfare programs. The state apparatus is wide and deep; it continued to 
function in the conflict areas during the war, and has a wide presence in the war-torn regions 
after the war. Every village, often correlating with a Grama Niladhari Division has a Grama 
Sevaka (Village) Officer, a Samurdhi (Welfare) Officer and an Economic Development 
Officer, and at the Divisional Secretary Level (a division of a District) there are a range 
development officers including for women’s development. In this way, the state has the 
robust capacity to address many of the challenges in the rural economy, but its institutional 
workings have many problems, and do not address the concerns of the rural and minority 
                                                          
221 This was communicated to me by the Women’s Development Officer for Jaffna District. 
222 Bina Aggarwal has shown the possibilities for collectivities and co-operatives when they organize farmers 
and particularly women farmers, in contemporary times. Schemes that have been taken forward with land for the 
landless in parallel with bottom up collectivities she claims have been successful (Agarwal 2010).  
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communities. Therefore, these state institutions have to be directed through social 
mobilisation, including by social institutions such as co-operatives and other community 
organisations, for meaningful reconstruction in war-torn places like Jaffna.  
In post-war Jaffna, the alternatives towards rejuvenating the war-torn society, though 
constrained by the limitations of neoliberal policies by the Central Government in Colombo, 
can draw on the following ideas for reconstruction: 
1. Reversal of financialization, particularly curtailing the new financial instruments 
such as lease hire purchasing and micro finance, and mobilizing more productive 
forms of capital which leads to employment generating investment. Addressing 
the high levels of indebtedness through some form of debt forgiveness or debt 
deferral is a precondition for any new process of meaningful reconstruction. In 
short, an exception has to be made for the war-torn districts to alleviate the 
problem of widespread indebtedness. 
2. Strengthening local social institutions and creation of co-operative led and other 
small industries towards livelihood and job creation. In addition to increasing rural 
incomes, the need is for regular monthly incomes as with jobs from small 
industries and the service sector. Reviving rural incomes may depend on the 
diversification of household incomes with at least one income earner getting a 
regular monthly income with the rest of the household engaging in the rural 
economy including agriculture and fisheries. Currently that option of diversifying 
incomes is temporarily sought through migrant work in the Middle East; but with 
considerable social cost including isolation from family life, lack of workers’ 
rights and difficult working conditions. 
3. The state has an important role in post-war reconstruction including through 
channelling or directly investing in the rural economy, so that a virtuous cycle of 
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value-addition and accumulation begins within the war-torn regions. The 
extensive presence of the state structure needs to be mobilised towards 
reconstruction and strengthening local social institutions such as co-operatives. 
4. Many households in the North are completely landless including lacking land to 
qualify for state and donor housing grants. Therefore, some form of land grants 
for the landless is critical. Furthermore, even small plots of land on the order of 
quarter of an acre can ensure rural provisioning including the possibility of finding 
firewood for cooking and produce from home gardens increasing food security. 
Therefore, addressing landlessness in even a limited way contributes to 
strengthening the war affected communities. 
 
Resistance and Political Possibilities 
The solutions for war-torn Jaffna are the path of moderation, given that any 
revolutionary politics is on hold after decades of devastation, the utter exhaustion of the 
people and the loss of an entire younger generation to the war. However, struggles in some 
form are necessary to redress class and caste injustices. Furthermore, the struggles for 
alternatives in Jaffna and the North more broadly, necessarily relate to progressive politics in 
the country as a whole. Indeed, any radical shift from the now entrenched neoliberal 
economic trajectory is dependent on major struggles outside the war-torn Northern and 
Eastern Provinces. It is in the rest of the country that there are active social and political 
formations, and it is there that as much as ninety percent of the population resides.  
Tamil nationalist politics, with its ethnic exclusivism which isolates the Tamil 
community in the war-torn regions from the rest of the country, and its indifference towards 
the economic issues facing the dispossessed Tamil community, undermines reconstruction. 
Similarly, the Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian politics at the national level and the militarised 
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environment in the North and East, continue to undermine solidarities between the war-torn 
communities and the rest of the country. In other words, the failure of reconstruction is 
deeply political, and it is conservative politics of the Colombo and Tamil elites that isolates 
the war-torn communities and keeps them mired in the social and economic crisis. 
 In Chapter 2, I critiqued reconstruction through the different forms of capital and an 
understanding of capital as a social relation. The Central Government merely considers 
capital necessary for infrastructure development, and that access to global finance is the way 
to secure it. On the other hand, the Tamil nationalist leadership including the provincial 
government have failed to even articulate the need for capital, and solely focus on legal and 
constitutional demands relating to devolved powers of autonomy. Between these two 
dominant perspectives, the assault by financialization and the market in the war-torn regions 
are resulting in dispossession and increasing indebtedness.  
 The crisis in the global economy since 2008 have impacted Sri Lanka during the 
following eight years. The ebbs and flows of global capital characterized by speculative 
flows, including the cost of capital necessary for continued policies of financialization, are 
creating difficulties for Sri Lanka’s external finances. The IMF Standby Agreement in 2009 
discussed in Chapter 2, which I argued was central to the emergence of a second wave of 
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka, has now been succeeded by an IMF Extended Fund Facility in 
June 2016, as Sri Lanka slipped again into balance of payment problems. While the new 
Government continues on the neoliberal path of financialized urbanisation223, the financial 
                                                          
223 In Chapter 2, I discussed how urbanization in the form of beautification of Colombo was central to the 
second wave of neoliberalism after the war. The new Government after regime change in January 2015 
continues with that urbanization push with a massive Megapolis project, aiming to expand Colombo city 
through urban sprawl to reach much of the Western Province, with expected investment of some US$ 30 billion 
by 2030. In parallel the World Bank is funding what it is calling its Strategic Cities Project developing the cities 
of Kandy and Galle, and in May 2016 added the city of Jaffna with an addition US$ 55 million. This World 
Bank project for the development of Jaffna city for a total of US$ 65 million including funds of US$ 10 million 
from the Government is one of the largest development projects for Jaffna District. While I argue about the 
continuing crisis in the rural economy in Jaffna and the North, the World Bank prioritises the urban 
development of Jaffna. 
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crisis in other parts of the world such as in Southern Europe are pointing to the difficulties of 
sustaining capital flows necessary to continue with financialization in Sri Lanka. If the crisis 
in the global economy spreads and deepens in the Middle East, the consequences for those 
now depending on migrant labor in the Middle East and the attendant remittances will be 
severe. The circuit of global capital accumulation discussed above with the expansion of 
credit by global capital and debt payments facilitated by remittances may also fall apart. 
Therefore, the contemporary moment continues to be one of flux, but for that reason it may 
also engender new forms of political mobilizations and alternatives. 
 Few analysts considered the possibility of overthrowing the authoritarian Rajapaksa 
regime through the electoral democratic process. However, regime change while it has 
curtailed militarization and opened up democratic space, has brought in a government that is 
unequivocally committed to neoliberal policies. For a country’s politics held hostage by a 
civil war for three decades, there are tremendous political possibilities as economic issues 
gain increasing importance. It took six years after the war for the population to throw out the 
Rajapaksa regime and there may be many more political changes in the ensuing years in 
national politics. The next phase of political mobilizations and movements may focus on the 
rising inequalities and uneven development and thus challenge the political economic 
trajectory of the country. 
 In the North and the East with the Tamil constituencies, the democratic possibilities 
were further constrained as electoral politics was disrupted with the LTTE in totalitarian 
control of the population and squashing any form of independent organizing or dissent. It is 
only in the last three years that the once vibrant electoral political tradition in the North and 
the East are slowly beginning to re-emerge. Central to revitalization of Tamil politics is the 
need for a self-critical move questioning Tamil nationalist politics and the legacy of the 
LTTE. How long it may take for the Tamil community to emerge out of Tamil nationalist 
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politics, which has been ideologically dominant over the last six decades, is hard to predict. 
However, such a challenge to Tamil nationalism, the emergence of a new political leadership 
taking hold of the Northern Provincial Council and a democratic politics grounded in 
economic concerns of the people are all central to the political foundation of rebuilding the 
war-torn society. In this context, the mounting dispossession and crisis of indebtedness in the 
countryside may put forward a challenge to Tamil electoral politics, which has long ignored 
the economic problems of its constituencies.  
 It is radical changes to Tamil politics that may also finally address the persistence of 
caste oppression in Tamil society. Such a shift in Tamil politics can also be stimulated by the 
emergence of an anti-caste movement. To begin with the initiation of public discussions and 
mobilisations on caste issues, including by identifying and addressing forms of caste 
exclusion in education, employment and state services is a priority. The first step in this 
process is to break the silence on caste in the public domain. In the medium term, much will 
depend on the oppressed caste community forming an anti-caste movement, creating alliances 
with progressive actors and taking forward struggles for dignity and equality.  
A major weakness of Tamil nationalist politics was its exclusive character, where it 
failed to seriously engage other communities like the Muslims and work with progressive 
forces in the Sinhala community and address the national issues including the economic 
issues, while demanding devolution of power to the regions. Any future anti-caste movement 
should not make the same mistake of restricting itself to the caste issue alone. Rather, there is 
a need for an anti-caste movement that can make links with other movements and trade 
unions. Futhermore, such an anti-caste movement should consider a progressive position on 
the “national question,” while demanding devolution of power to the regions, it should also 
challenge the Tamil community to devolve some of those powers to the oppressed caste 
villages and empower the oppressed caste communities. Caste was central to Tamil politics 
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and any major shift in Tamil politics including to address the failure of reconstruction may 
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